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EGALITE ET LIBERTE

Mihailo Marković / Gleichheit und Freiheit 135
Zagorka Golubović / Self-fulfilment, Equality and Freedom . . 153
Žarko Puhovski / Demokratie und Demagogie 161
Ljubomir Tadić / Differenciation de la notion de démocratie . . 173
Jean-Michel Palmier / La critique de la vie quotidiene et les nouvelles formes de lutte 179
Ivan Kuvačić / »Post-industrial Society« and Freedom . . . 187
Horst Gizycki / Vorüberlegungen zu einer Theorie der Fraternität 191
Džemal Sokolović / Propriété et nonliberté 195
Srđan Vrcan / Some Comments on Social Inequality . 217

PORTRAITS ET SITUATIONS

Milan Kangrga / Vom Begriff des Mangels bei Hegel 243
Nadežda Čačinović-Puhovski / Die Dialektik der Aufklärung und die aufgeklärte Dialektik 253

PENSEE ET REALITE

Danko Grlić/L'Organisation sociale et le théâtre . 271

DISCUSSION

Gunnar Skirbekk / Ecology and Marxism . . 283
Dimitar Dimitrov / Marxismus und Literatur . 291

DOCUMENTS

Georg Lukács / Die Budapester Schule 299

IN MEMORIAM

Serge Mallet . 303

PRAYICREVUEPHILOSOPHIQUE

Il\/\AI^EDITIONINTERNATIONALE

ZAGREB, 2® ET 3e TRIMESTRE 1973

96 with ANNEE, No. 2— 3

EQUALITY AND FREEDOM

Mihailo Marković / Gleichheit und Freih e it.....

135

Zagorka Golubović and Self-fulfilment, Equality and Freedom.

153

Zarko Puhovski / Democracy and Demagogy

.

.

.

.

161

Ljubomir Tadić / Differentiation de la notion de democratic .

173

Jean-Michel Palmier / The critique of everyday life and new forms of struggle ....

179

Ivan Kuvačić / »Post-industrial Society« and Freedom 187

Horst Gizycki / Preliminary Considerations for a Theory of Fraternity

.....

191

Džemal Sokolović / Propriete et nonliberte.

.

.

.

195

Srđan Vrcan / Some Comments on Social Inequality .

217

PORTRAITS AND SITUATIONS

Milan Kangrga / On the concept of deficiency in Hegel.

.

.

.

243

Nadežda Čačinović-Puhovski / Die Dialektik der Aufklarung und

the enlightened dialectic ....
253

THOUGHT AND REALITY

Danko Grlić/Social organization and theatre.

271

DISCUSSION

Gunnar Skirbekk / Ecology and Marxism .

283

Dimitar Dimitrov / Marxism and Literature.

291

DOCUMENTS

Georg Lukžcs/The Budapest School

299

IN MEMORIAL

Serge Mallet

303

GLEICHHEIT UND FREIHEIT*

Mihailo Marković

Beograd

Alle wirklichen gesellschaftlichen Revolutionen der letzten Jahrhunderte, von der amerikanischen und der französischen bis zur russischen, chinesischen, der jugoslawischen, der kubanischen und der chileanischen trugen auf ihren Fahnen die Parole der Gleichheit und Freiheit.

Gleichheit und Freiheit sind die grundlegenden Voraussetzungen oder die langfristigen Ziele der beiden größten und einflußreichsten Ideologien der zeitgenössischen Welt: des Liberalismus und des Marxismus.

* Die neunte Tagung der Korčula Sommerschule mit dem Thema GLEICHHEIT UND FREIHEIT wurde unter besonderen Umständen abgehalten. Zu Beginn der Jahres 1972. berichtete die Presse, daß der Korčula Sommerschule seitens der Ortsbehörden in Korčula die Gastfreundschaft gekündigt wurde, und daß der Rat für wissenschaftliche Arbeit die finanzielle Hilfe gestrichen habe. In dieser Situation hat der Verwaltungsrat der Schule alle Vorbereitungen für die IX. Tagung unterbrochen. Erst unmittelbar vor Sommerbeginn, als erklärt wurde, daß es keinerlei Hindernisse für die Abhaltung der Sommerschule im gewohnten Zeitraum gebe, beschloß der Ausschuß, die IX. Tagung dennoch stattfinden zu lassen, wenn notwendig, auch auf der Basis der vollständigen Eigenfinanzierung in verkürzter Form und Dauer. Von diesem Beschluß wurde der Rat für wissenschaftliche Arbeit der Sozialitischen Republik Kroatien benachrichtigt, der dann der Schule eine bescheidene Hilfe zukommen ließ. So fand die Tagung der Schule vom 27. bis 31. VIII. 1972 doch statt. Die Tagung wurde am 27. VIII. am Nachmittag mit einer Begrüßungsrede des Vorsitzenden der Schule Rudi Supek und dem Einführungsvortrag »Gleichheit und Freiheit« von Mihailo Marković eröffnet. Die Arbeit der Schule wurde in Diskussionen am Runden Tisch in folgenden Themen mit folgenden Mitarbeitern und Teilnehmern fortgesetzt: DAS PROBLEM DER DEMOKRATIE IN DER ZEITGENÖSSISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT (28. VIII.) Vorsitzender: Veljko Korać. Teilnehmer: Besim Ibrahimpašić, Wolfgang Leonhard, Žarko Puhovski, Mario Spinella, Ljubomir Tadić — DIE TECHNOLOGISCHE ENTWICKLUNG UND GLEICHHEIT (29. VIII.) Vorstizender: Predrag Vranicki. Teilnehmer: Božidar Jakšić, Ivan Kuvačić, Gunnar Skirbekk, Svetozar Stojanović, Rudi Supek. — SELBSTVERWIRKLICHUNG DES MENSCHEN, GLEICHHEIT UND FREIHEIT (30. VIII.) Vorsitzender: Gajo Petrović. Teilnehmer: Horst Gizicky, Zagorka Go-

EG ALIVE AND FREE

EQUALITY AND FREEDOM*

Mihailo Marković

B eograd

All real social revolutions of the last centuries, from the American and the French to the Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav, Cuban and Chilean, carried the slogan of equality and freedom on their flags.

Equality and liberty are the basic premises, or long-term goals, of the two greatest and most influential ideologies of the contemporary world: liberalism and Marxism.

* The ninth conference of the K orčula summer school with the theme SAME

HEART AND FREEDOM was held under special circumstances. At the beginning of 1972, the press reported that the Korčula Summer School had been denounced of hospitality by the local authorities in Korčula, and that the Council for Scientific Work the fin a cial help deleted. In this situation, the Board of Directors of the School made all the preparations for the IX. conference interrupted. Only immediately before summer

At the beginning of the year, when it was declared that there were no obstacles to holding the summer school in the usual period, the committee decided to hold the IX. to allow the conference to take place, if necessary, also on the basis of complete self-financing in a shorter form and duration.

The Council for Scientific Work of the Social-Litic Republic of Croatia was informed of this decision, which then gave the school a modest amount of help. So the school conference did take place from August 27th to 31st, 1972. The conference was opened on the afternoon of August 27th with a welcome speech by the head of the school, Rudi Supek, and the introductory lecture »Equality and Freedom« by M ihailo M arković. The school's work continued in round-table discussions on the following topics with the following staff and participants: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (28 VIII) President: V eljko Korać . Participants: B esim Ibrahim pašić, W olfgang Leonhard, Zarko Puhovski, Mario Spinella, L jubomir Tadić — TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EQUALITY

(29. VIII.) Chairman: Predrag Vranicki. Participants: B ožidar Jakšić, Ivan Kuvačić, Gunnar Skirbekk, Svetozar S tojanović, Rudi Supek. — HUMAN SELF-EMPOWERMENT, EQUALITY AND FREEDOM (30.

VIII.) V orsitzender: Gajo Petrović. Teilnehm er: Horst Gizicky, Zagorka G o-135

Diesen großen humanistischen Ideen geht eine mindestens zwei Jahrtausende alte Tradition voran. Zunächst treten sie in sehr abstrakter Form ohne Implikation für die gesellschaftliche Organisation auf. So bringt zum Beispiel der Hinduismus gleichzeitig mit der ideellen Begründung und der Behauptung des Kastensystems auch die Idee der Gleichheit aller Individuen mit Rücksicht auf die Möglichkeit der Selbst-Entdeckung, Selbst-Behauptung und des Erlebens der höchsten religiösen Erfahrungen. Parallel damit geht die Anerkennung der Religionsfreiheit und eine ungewöhnliche Toleranz anderen Religionen gegenüber und gegen andere Wege der geistigen Vervolkommung. Vom Standpunkt der jüdischen Religion aus sind alle Menschen insofern gleich, als sie in sich das Bild ihres göttlichen Schöpfers tragen — *Tselem Elohim*, was als Seele oder Vernunft begriffen werden kann. Daraus folgt die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz. »Ihr werdet ein und dasselbe Gesetz für den Bürger und für den Fremden haben« sagt die Bibel. Interessant ist auch die Idee, daß das gelobte Land alle fünfzig Jahre neu geteilt werden muß (denn die Vertreibung ist die Folge der Ausbeutung der Armen durch die Reichen). Diese Ideen konnten in den bestehenden gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen nicht verwirklicht werden, lebten aber fort und meldeten sich Jahrhunderte später in anderen Formen: im frühen Christentum, in den Bauernaufständen und der Reformation. Der ehrliche Glaube an die naturgegebene Gleichheit aller Menschen und die Fehlbarkeit der Gottheit führte zur Bildung der humanistischen Gemeinschaften: die ersten Christen verkauften ihr Gut und gaben das Geld den Aposteln, um das Elend der in Armut lebenden zu lindern. Die aufständischen Bauern Flanderns, Frankreichs und Englands und des Heiligen Römischen Reichs verlangten im vierzehnten Jahrhundert eine Änderung der Gesellschaftsordnung im Namen der ursprünglichen naturgegebenen Gleichheit.

Der radikale Flügel der Reformation, besonders Thomas Münzer entwickelt klar sozialistische Ideen in religiöser Form. Gott hat die Bauernarmee gewählt, um die Avantgarde eines Jahrtausends zu sein. Der Geist Gottes ist in die Geschichte getreten, und er wird stärker solange bis die teuflischen Kräfte des Bösen, der Ausbeutung und Unterdrückung besiegt sind. Die geistige Einheit und die Gleichheit aller Menschen müssen in der weltlichen Organisation, nicht nur im Rahmen der Kirche verwirklicht werden. Dies

lubović, Danko Grlić, Mihajlo Marković, J. M. Palmier. — An den Nachmittagen fanden folgende Vorträge mit anschließender Diskussion statt: Rudi Supek: Machtstruktur in der Selbstverwaltungsgesellschaft und in der etatistischen Gesellschaft (28. VIII.), Gunnar Skirbekk: Ökologie und Marxismus (28. VIII.), Gajo Petrović: Marxistische Philosophie in Jugoslawien (29. VIII.). Unter dem Titel »Fragen und Antworten« sprachen mit den ausländischen Teilnehmern Žarko Puhovski, Svetozar Stojanović und Predrag Vranicki (30. VIII.). Die abschließende Generaldebatte, mit der die IX. Tagung ihre Arbeit abschloß, fand am Morgen des 31. VIII. statt. — In dieser Nummer bringen wir den einführenden Vortrag von Mihajlo Marković und eine Auswahl der Round-Table-Diskussionen, wie auch den Vortrag von Gunnar Skirbekk über Ökologie und Marxismus.

These great humanistic ideas are preceded by a tradition that is at

least two thousand years old. At first they appear in very abstract form with no implication for social organization. For example, Hinduism, along with the ideal establishment and assertion of the caste system, also brings the idea of the equality of all individuals with regard to the possibility of self-discovery, self-assertion and experiencing the highest religious experiences. Parallel to this is the recognition of religious freedom and an unusual tolerance of other religions and other avenues of spiritual perfection. From the point of view of the Jewish religion, all human beings are equal in that they bear within themselves the image of their divine Creator — Tselem Elohim, which can be conceived as soul or reason. From this follows equality before the law. "Ye shall have one and the same law for the citizen and for the stranger," says the Bible.

Also interesting is the idea that the Promised Land must be redivided every fifty years (because the expulsion is the result of the exploitation of the poor by the rich). These ideas could not be realized in the existing social conditions, but they lived on and made their appearance in other forms centuries later: in early Christianity, in the peasant uprisings and the Reformation. The sincere belief in the natural equality of all human beings and the fallibility of God led to the formation of humanistic communities: the first Christians sold their goods and gave the money to the apostles to alleviate the misery of those living in poverty. The rebellious peasants of Flanders, France and England and the Holy Roman Empire in the fourteenth century demanded a change in the social order in the name of original natural equality.

The radical wing of the Reformation, especially Thomas Miinzer, developed clearly socialist ideas in religious form. God chose the peasant poor ee to be the vanguard of a millennium. The Spirit of God has entered history and will grow stronger until the devilish forces of evil, exploitation and oppression are defeated. The spiritual unity and equality of all people must be realized in the secular organization, not only in the framework of the church. Dies lubović, D anko Grlić, M ihajlo Marković, J. M. Palm ier. — The following lectures with subsequent discussions took place in the afternoons: Rudi Supek: Power structure in self-governing society and in eta ti-stic society (28.8.), Gunnar Skirbekk: O cology and M arxism (28 VIII), Gajo Petrović: M arxist P h ilosophic in Yu goslav ia (29 VIII).

Zarko Puhovski, S vetozar S tojanović and Predrag Vranicki spoke with the foreign participants under the title »Questions and Answers« (30.

VIII.). The final general debate, with which the IX. conference completed its work, took place on the morning of August 31st. — In this issue we feature M ihajlo M arković's introductory lecture and a selection of the round-table discussions, as well as Gunnar Skirbekk's lecture on ecology and M arxism us.

ist der weiteste Punkt, an dem das egalitaristische Denken in seiner religiösen Form angelangt ist. Es ist nicht schwer zu bemerken, daß gewisse Elemente der Mystifizierung bis heute nicht verschwunden sind (zum Beispiel; die Idee der auserwählten Avantgarde, die eschatologische Geschichtsauffassung).

In der weltlichen rationalen Form zeigen sich Andeutungen der Ideen der Gleichheit schon bei den Sophisten, zum Beispiel, in der These Antiphons, die natürliche Begabtheit aller Menschen sei gleich, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob jemand Grieche oder Barbar sei, und so sei es barbarisch, jemanden mehr zu achten, weil er in einem größeren Haus geboren sei. Erst die Philosophie von Stoa entwickelt im Verlauf der zweiten Zeitperiode sowohl in Griechenland als auch in Rom klar und folgerichtig die Doktrin von der natürlichen Gleichheit aller Menschen. Die Wurzel dieser Gleichheit liegt in der Tatsache, daß alle Menschen eine Vernunft besitzen und dazu fähig sind, Gutes zu erfahren und zu tun. »Schlechte Gewohnheiten und falsche Überzeugungen können die Menschen verunstalten«; wenn dies aber nicht so wäre, »würde niemand mehr sich selbst ähneln, als er viel mehr allen andern ähneln würde«.

In der Zeit riesiger gesellschaftlicher Ungleichheit erschien der Gedanke der universalen menschlichen Gleichheit äußerst unreal. Aber seine Autoren, besonders die aus dem späten Stoa, strebten nicht danach, die Wirklichkeit zu beschreiben und die Ideologie ihrer Zeit zu bauen: sie betonten den utopischen Charakter ihres Zugangs, indem sie die natürliche Gleichheit in die Vergangenheit projizierten, in die ursprüngliche unschuldige Zeit vor der Einführung des Privateigentums, der Sklaverei, vor der Entstehung des Staates. Dieser Dualismus der jetzigen Ungleichheit und der vergangenen Gleichheit, der sozialen Organisation und des natürlichen Zustands, der aktuellen, verzerrten Wirklichkeit und des möglichen humaneren Seins wird für das humanistische Denken der gesamten Epoche der Klassengesellschaft charakteristisch sein. Eigentlich sehen wir die Idee des natürlichen Rechts schon bei Justinian: »Nach dem natürlichen Recht sind alle Menschen frei geboren« und »Nach dem natürlichen Recht sind alle Menschen gleich«.

Das mittelalterliche Rechtsdenken überträgt die Idee der natürlichen Gleichheit und Freiheit aus dem römischen Recht — wir finden sie in den Kommentaren von Bulgarus Placentinus, Bomanoaro und anderen. Hier hat sie allerdings keinerlei Implikationen, sie dient nur als Beschreibung des natürlichen Zustands vor dem Fall. Erst Nikola Kuzanski, also ein Denker der Renaissance zieht aus der ursprünglichen Gleichheit und Freiheit bestimmte politische Schlüsse: »Da naturgegeben alle Menschen gleich sind, muß jegliche Macht ausschließlich aus dem Beschluß und der Zustimmung der Bürger kommen. Denn, wenn alle Menschen naturgegeben gleich sind nach der Macht und gleich frei, kann die Autorität jemandes, der gleich ist, nur durch Wahl und Zustimmung der anderen errichtet werden. Auch das Recht wird durch Zu-

is the furthest reached by egalitarian thought in its religious form. It is not difficult to notice that certain elements of mystification have not disappeared to this day (for example; the idea of the chosen vanguard, the eschatological view of history).

In the worldly rational form hints of the ideas of equality are already evident among the Sophists, for example, in the thesis of Antiphon, the natural endowments of all human beings are equal, regardless of whether someone is Greek or barbarian, and so it is barbaric, to respect someone more because he was born in a bigger house. Only in the course of the second period of time, Stoic philosophy, both in Greece and in Rome, clearly and logically developed the doctrine of the natural equality of all human beings. The root of this equality lies in the fact that all human beings possess reason and are capable of experiencing and doing good.

"Bad habits and false beliefs can deform people"; but if this were not so, "no one would resemble himself more than he would resemble all others much more."

In a time of huge social inequality, the idea of universal human equality seemed extremely unreal.

But its authors, especially those of the late Stoic period, did not aspire to describe the reality and construct the ideology of their time: they emphasized the utopian character of their approach, projecting natural equality into the past, into the original innocent Time before the introduction of private property, before slavery, before the emergence of the state. This dualism of present inequality and past equality, social organization and the natural state, present distorted reality and possible human being will be characteristic of humanistic thought throughout the epoch of class society.

Actually, we already see the idea of natural law in Justinian: "According to natural law all human beings are born free" and "According to natural law all human beings are equal".

Medieval legal thought carried over the idea of natural equality and liberty from Roman law - we find it in the commentaries of Bulgarus Placentinus, Bo-manoaro and others. Here, however, it has no implications whatsoever, it serves only as a description of the natural state before the fall. Nikola Kuzanski, a Renaissance thinker, was the first to draw certain political conclusions from the original equality and freedom: »Since all people are naturally equal, all power must come exclusively from the decision and consent of the citizens. For if all men are inherently equal in power and equally free, the authority of one who is equal can only be established by the choice and consent of others. Also the right is given by Zu-137

stimmung konstituiert. »Ohne Rücksicht darauf, daß Kuzanski versuchte, seinen Standpunkt mit der bestehenden Ordnung in Einklang zu bringen, wie auch mit dem Prinzip der Hierarchie, (indem er eine Harmonie der göttlich inspirierten Elitenherrschaft, die sich durch Vernunft auszeichnet und der Herrschaft auf Grund der Zustimmung der Untertanen forderte) ist die Tatsache historisch bedeutend, daß hier zum ersten Mal aus der Idee der ursprünglichen Gleichheit und Freiheit ein universales demokratisches Konzept, entsteht das Wahlen verlangt, die Zustimmung der Bürger und Teilnahme an der Rechtskonstituierung.

Von hier ist der Weg zum klassischen Liberalismus des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts, zur Aufklärung und zu den demokratischen Ideen der großen bürgerlichen Revolutionen in Amerika und Frankreich weit. Aber viele wesentliche Elemente der Kritik am autoritären und hierarchischen Gesellschaftswesen waren historisch schon da: die Idee von der universalen Gleichheit und Freiheit im natürlichen Zustand, die These vom gemeinsamen Verstand für alle Menschen, die Idee vom Fall, die Idee der Verwaltung auf Grund der Zustimmung der Bürger usw. Mit der Zeit gewannen diese Ideen weltlichen konkreten Charakter, zum Beispiel: anstelle des Falls in Folge der Erbsünde kommt es zur Einführung des Privateigentums, zum Gesellschaftsvertrag und zur Schaffung des Staates; die Idee der Glechheit vor dem göttlichen Gesetz wurde durch die Gleichheit vor dem menschlichen Gesetz ersetzt; die umfassend abstrakte Forderung nach der Zustimmung der Bürger wurde durch eine entwickelte Theorie der repräsentativen Demokratie überwunden.

Die bei Rousseau explizit vorhandene Idee — im *Essai über den Ursprung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen* heißt es, daß die bürgerliche Welt mit ihren Ungleichheiten und Unfreiheiten das Resultat der Einführung des Privateigentums ist — hat die sozialistische Theorie systematischer bearbeitet und entwickelt, besonders in der Form, die Marx gegeben hat.

Zum Unterschied von den streng egalitär-sozialistischen Theorien hat Marx die abstrakten Forderungen nach Gleichheit und Freiheit nicht wiederholt, er verneinte nicht die natürlichen Unterschiede unter den Menschen und begriff den Kommunismus nicht als Gesellschaft, in der alle buchstäblich gleich belohnt würden und uniform leben sollten. Sein Konzept der Gleichheit ist völlig konkret, historisch und kritisch: das ist die Forderung nach der Aufhebung der Klassen, also nach der Aufhebung des Kapitals und der Lohnarbeit, des Marktes und der Warenproduktion. So sieht auch sein Konzept der Freiheit aus. Es ist die Forderung nach Aufhebung des Staates, nach Überwindung der bürgerlichen formalen Freiheiten und der Verwirklichung der selbstverwaltenden menschlichen Gemeinschaft ohne ökonomisch und politisch entfremdete Machtzentren. Diese konkreten Ideen haben ihre philosophisch anthropologische Dimension: in ihrem Kern ist die Idee der universalen menschlichen Emanzipation und Selbstverwirklichung. Echte Gleichheit und wahre positive Freiheit werden im

mood constituted. "Regardless of the fact that Kuzanski was attempting to reconcile his point of view with the existing order, as well as with the principle of hierarchy, (by promoting a harmony of divinely inspired elitist rule, distinguished by reason and ruled by

Because of the consent of the subjects demanded) is the historically significant fact that here for the first time from the idea of original equality and freedom a universal democratic concept arises, which requires elections, the consent of the citizens and participation in the constitution of the law.

From here it is a long way to the classic liberalism of the seventeenth century, to the Enlightenment and to the democratic ideas of the great bourgeois revolutions in America and France. But many essential elements of the critique of authoritarian and hierarchical society were already there historically: the idea of universal equality and freedom in the natural state, the thesis of a common mind for all people, the idea of the case, the idea of administration based on consent the citizen, etc. Over time, these ideas acquired a secular concrete character, for example: instead of the fall as a result of original sin, private property was introduced, the social contract and the creation of the state; the idea of equality before divine law was replaced by equality before human law; the broadly abstract requirement for citizen consent was overcome by a developed theory of representative democracy.

The idea explicitly present in Rousseau - in the essay on the origin of inequality among men it says that the bourgeois world with its inequalities and lack of freedom is the result of the introduction of private property - has been worked on and developed more systematically by socialist theory, especially in the form given by Marx.

In contrast to the strictly egalitarian socialist theories, Marx did not repeat the abstract demands for equality and freedom, he did not deny the natural differences among people and did not understand communism as a society in which everyone would be rewarded literally equally and live uniformly should. His concept of equality is entirely concrete, historical and critical: this is the demand for the abolition of classes, that is, for the abolition of capital and wage labour, the market and commodity production. This is also his concept of freedom. It is the demand for the abolition of the state, for the overcoming of civil formal freedoms and the realization of the self-governing human community without economically and politically alienated centers of power. These concrete ideas have their philosophical-anthropological dimension: at their core is the idea of universal human emancipation and self-realization. True equality and true positive freedom are in the 138th

gesellschaftlichen Leben dann verwirklicht, wenn adäquate Bedingungen geschaffen werden, daß sich jedes Individuum nach ihren spezifischen Fähigkeiten und Notwendigkeiten autonom als Wesen der *Praxis* verwirklicht. Marx war sich im klaren darüber wie weit die bürgerliche Gesellschaft seiner Zeit von diesem Projekt entfernt war: sowohl wegen der Natur ihrer Instituitionen und der allgemeinen Technik als auch der ökonomischen und kulturellen Unterentwicketheit. Zum Unterschied zu seinen zahlreichen Vorgängern hat er die Gesellschaft der maximalen menschlichen Gleichheit und Freiheit weder in die Vergangenheit noch in eine unbestimmte entfernte Zukunft projiziert. Er sah die realen gesetzmäßigen gesellschaftlichen Tendenzen, die zu dieser Gesellschaft führen, und er begriff sie als einen notwendigen Ausgang des historischen Prozesses. Gleichzeitig erkannte er, daß dies nicht auf einmal durch einen entscheidenden revolutionären Sprung zu erreichen ist, daß eine ganze Epoche als Übergang dazu notwendig ist. Ein Großteil seines Denkens war das Nachdenken über diesen Übergang — von der verdinglichten hierarchischen, autoritären Gesellschaft zur klassenlosen freien Gesellschaft.

Heute wissen wir, daß alles noch viel komplizierter ist, als es diesem genialen Denker erschien. Die gesellschaftlichen Kräfte, die die gesellschaftliche Aufgabe der Vermittlung übernehmen sollen, müssen nicht anwesend sein oder subjektiv für die entsprechende Tätigkeit bereit sein — obwohl schon alle objektive Widersprüchlichkeiten, die eine Lösung verlangen, gegeben sind. Wenn es auch anwesend ist, kann sich das Subjekt der revolutionären Veränderung im Laufe und Prozeß der Ausführung seiner Arbeit auf verschiedenste Weise verändern und deformieren. Im Prozeß der Vermittlung erstehen neue Formen der Ungleichheit und Unfreiheit, die von der ursprünglichen Analyse nicht beachtet worden waren, und die von der sozialistischen revolutionären Bewegung manchmal unterstützt und verstärkt, anstatt aufgehoben war. Es wird immer klarer, daß das Endziel nicht klar ist, daß eigentlich keine historische Notwendigkeit besteht, die seine Realisierung garantierte, sondern es drückt nur eine der Möglichkeiten des historischen Prozesses aus.

Die Marxisten, die heute versuchen, die bestehenden Formen der sozialistischen Gesellschaft zu schaffen oder weiter zu entwickeln, treffen auf folgende Probleme:

1. Was ist der konkrete Sinn des Prinzips der Gleichheit und Freiheit auf dem heutigen Niveau der kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie und Praxis?

2. Welchen Beitrag zur Verwirklichung der Gleichheit und Freiheit haben die bisherigen sozialistischen Revolutionen geleistet? Im Besonderen, welche historische Erfahrung gab uns die jugoslawische Revolution?

3. In welchem Verhältnis stehen Gleichheit und Freiheit. Ist die Gleichheit eine notwendige Bedingung der Freiheit? Und umgekehrt, welche Art Gleichheit verlangt die allgemeine menschliche Emanzipation im Sinne von Marx?

social life is realized when adequate conditions are created. that each individual realizes itself autonomously as a being of practice according to its specific abilities and needs. Marx was aware of how far the bourgeois society of his time was from this project: both

because of the nature of its institutions and general technology, and because of its economic and cultural underdevelopment. Unlike his numerous predecessors, he projected the society of maximum human equality and freedom neither into the past nor into an indefinite distant future. He saw the real lawful social tendencies leading to this society and he understood them as a necessary outcome of the historical process. At the same time he recognized that this cannot be achieved all at once by a decisive revolutionary leap, that an entire epoch is necessary as the transition to it. A large part of his thinking was reflecting on this transition - from the reified, hierarchical, authoritarian society to the classless free society.

Today we know that everything is much more complicated than it appeared to this brilliant thinker. The social forces that are supposed to take on the social task of mediation do not have to be present or subjectively ready for the corresponding activity - although all objective contradictions that require a solution are already given.

Even if it is present, the subject of revolutionary change can change and deform in the most varied ways in the course and process of carrying out his work. In the process of mediation new forms of inequality and unfreedom arise which were ignored by the original analysis and which the socialist revolutionary movement at times supported and reinforced rather than abolished. It is becoming increasingly clear that the end goal is not clear, that

actually there is no historical necessity guaranteeing its realization, but it only expresses one of the possibilities of the historical process.

The Marxists who try to create or further develop the existing forms of socialist society today encounter the following problems:

1. What is the concrete meaning of the principle of equality and freedom at today's level of critical social theory and practice?

2. What contribution to the realization of equality and freedom have the previous socialist revolutions made? In particular, what historical experience did the Yugoslav revolution give us?

3. What is the relationship between equality and freedom. Is equality a necessary condition of freedom? And conversely, what kind of equality does general human emancipation demand in Marx's sense?

I.

Es gibt nichts Trivialeres auf der Welt, als es die theoretische Anfechtung der Idee der Gleichheit und Freiheit in ihrem absoluten Gesichtspunkt ist. So wird man zum Beispiel entgegen der These des *radikalen Egalitarismus* beweisen, daß sich die Menschen durch physische Qualitäten, die Intelligenz, den Charakter, Fähigkeiten, Bedürfnisse, Funktionen in der gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung, die Bedeutung des Beitrags für die menschliche Gemeinschaft usw. unterscheiden. Entgegen der These von der absoluten Freiheit wird unsere Bedingtheit durch verschiedene biologische, soziale und psychische Determinanten angeführt.

Der konkrete Sinn der Idee der Gleichheit und Befreiung wird erst im negativen kritischen Zugang klar, in der Forderung, manche der bestehenden Formen der Ungleichheit und Determinierung aufzuheben.

Natürlich bestehen wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen den Ungleichheiten unter einzelnen Individuen in bezug auf Begabung und Interesse und Ungleichheit im Hinblick auf die Art der gesellschaftlichen Rolle die sie haben. Weiter, soll man unterscheiden zwischen den Ungleichheiten im Sinne der Differenzierung in der Art die nicht auch eine Rangverleihung bedeuten muß, und den Ungleichheiten am Sinne der Schichtung, die eine Zugehörigkeit zur niedrigeren oder höheren Schicht das Innehaben eines höheren oder niedrigeren Status nach sich zieht. Wenn wir beide Dimensionen kreuzen, erhalten wir vier Arten von Ungleichheit:

(a) Unterscheidung auf Grund natürlicher Fähigkeiten.
(b) Schichtung auf Grund natürlicher Fähigkeiten.
(c) Unterscheidung auf Grund der gesellschaftlichen Rolle.
(d) Schichtung auf Grund der gesellschaftlicher Rolle.

(a) In jeder Gesellschaft werden sich die Individuen durch ihre physischen und psychischen Charakteristiken, Fähigkeiten, Dispositionen, ihren Charakter unterscheiden. Die egalitaristischen Tendenzen, die sich der natürlichen Vielartigkeit der menschlichen Existenzen und Lebensarten widersetzen, haben keinen humanistischen Charakter. Durch den Zwang der allgemeinen Uniformiertheit machen sie die menschliche Selbstrealisierung unmöglich, da das potentielle Wesen jedes Individuums einzigartig und eigen ist, und so ist auch der Prozeß ihrer Selbstverwirklichung spezifisch. Die Gesellschaft kann nur in einem anderen Sinn erfolgreich intervenieren. Viele der sogenannten natürlichen Charakteristiken des entwickelten menschlichen Individuums: Intelligenz, Talent und Neigung zu einer bestimmten Tätigkeit sind nicht einfach ererbt, sondern das Resultat von Interaktion der genetischen Disposition und gesellschaftlicher Faktoren. Durch die Schaffung von günstigen Bedingungen zur Entwicklung eines jeden Kindes können große, scheinbar natürliche Unterschiede überwunden werden;

I.

There is nothing more trivial in the world than theoretically challenging the idea of equality and liberty in its absolute point of view. For example, contrary to the thesis of radical egalitarianism, one will prove that human beings differ in physical qualities, intelligence, character, abilities, needs, functions in the social division of labor, importance of contribution to the human community, and so on. Contrary to the thesis of absolute freedom, our conditionality is led by various biological, social and psychological determinants.

The concrete meaning of the idea of equality and liberation only becomes clear in the negative critical approach, in the demand to abolish some of the existing forms of inequality and determination.

Of course, there are important differences between inequalities among individuals in terms of ability and interest, and inequalities in terms of the type of social role they play. Furthermore, one should distinguish between the inequalities in the sense of differentiation in the way that does not also have to mean a ranking, and the inequalities in the sense of stratification, which entails belonging to a lower or higher stratum, holding a higher or lower status . If we cross both dimensions, we get four kinds of inequality: (a) Discrimination on the basis of natural ability.

(b) Stratification due to natural abilities.

(c) Distinction based on social role.

id) Stratification by social role.

(a)

In any society, individuals will differ in their physical and psychological characteristics, abilities, dispositions, character. The egalitarian tendencies that oppose the natural diversity of human existence and ways of life have no humanistic character. By enforcing general uniformity, they make human self-realization impossible, since the potential nature of each individual is unique and specific, and so is the process of their self-realization.

Society can only intervene successfully in another sense. Many of the so-called natural characteristics of the developed human individual: intelligence, talent, and propensity for a particular activity are not

simply inherited, but the result of the interaction of genetic disposition and societal factors. By creating conditions favorable to the development of each child, great differences that seem natural can be overcome; 140

potentielle Fähigkeiten können aktualisiert werden, die sonst verkümmern würden; Fähigkeiten und Talente, die sonst im Verlauf der ungeordneten Entwicklung durchschnittlich blieben, könnten in einer höheren Stufe entwickelt werden.

(b) Bestimmte Formen der Schichtung (nicht nur der Unterscheidung) auf Grund natürlicher Fähigkeiten werden sich vielleicht nie umgehen lassen. Es gibt natürliche Fähigkeiten, die nicht nur einen Artunterschied, sondern auch einen Unterschied im Sinne der Hierarchie der menschlichen Werte, wie sie auch seien, nach sich ziehen. Es gibt eine einfache Unterscheidung zwischen einen introvertierten und einem extrovertierten Charakter. Aber Vernunft und Charakterkraft, künstlerische Imagination, Weisheit, überdurchschnittliches Wissen, organisatorische Fähigkeiten, klare Perzeption der Wirklichkeit, die Fähigkeit des Sich-Einlebens in den psychischen Zustand anderer, und ein entwickeltes Gefühl für wahre (wenn auch unklar artikulierte) Notwendigkeiten einer Gemeinschaft — sind menschliche Qualitäten, die in jeder Gesellschaft besonders geschätzt werden, deretwegen manche in die Räte gewählt werden, die sich mit gesellschaftlicher Koordination und Richtunggebung befassen; andere werden als große Künstler und Schaffende geschätzt; manche wieder werden vom anderen Geschlecht außerordentlich geliebt, und andere Bewunderung als Erzieher der jüngeren Generationen ernten. Ungleichheiten solcherart können nicht beseitigt werden. Sie werden sich vielmehr erst dann voll entwickeln und zur dominierenden Form der gesellschaftlichen Ungleichheiten werden wenn die Ungleichheiten verschwinden die auf dem Bestehen des Monopols der ökonomischen und politischen Macht begründet sind. Wesentlich aber ist, daß eine solche Schichtung nicht Klassencharakter trägt (sie beruht auf dem Statusunterschied, schließt aber weder ökonomische Ausbeutung noch politische Domination ein). Die entsprechende gesellschaftliche Organisation und die Schaffung eines entsprechenden gesellschaftlichen Bewußtseins die soll der Überwindung der Statusunterschiede und der Unterschiede in wirtschaftlicher und politischer Macht führen.

(c) Eine Unterscheidung nach der Art der gesellschaftlichen Rolle wird ebenfalls in jeder Gesellschaft bestehen. Die profesionelle Fixierung einer bestimmten Rolle wird schwinden, die Automatisierung wird viele Routinerollen eliminieren, die übrigen einander angleichen, und was besonders wesentlich ist, die Sphäre der Arbeit wird immer mehr an Bedeutung der Sphäre der freien kreativen Tätigkeit, der *Praxis* gegenüber verlieren. So sehr auch auf ein Minimum reduziert, bleibt doch die Arbeit die dauernde Bedingung für das Bestehen jeder Gesellschaft. Hohe Produktivität verlangt Rollenverteilung. Auch wenn sie nicht mehr profesionell ist, werden sich die Rollen unterscheiden und dies gerade in ihren kreativen, schöpferischen Aspekten — durch das, was die Maschine im Prinzip nicht leisten kann. Wenn das aber schon so ist, dann folgt daraus keineswegs, daß die Differenzierung in den Rollen zu irgend einer gesellschaftlichen Hierarchie führen muß

potential skills can be actualized that would otherwise wither away; Abilities and talents that otherwise remained average in the course of disorderly development could be developed at a higher level.

(b) Certain forms of stratification (not just discrimination) based on natural ability may never be avoided. There are natural abilities which entail not only a species difference, but also a difference in the sense of the hierarchy of human values, whatever they may be. There is a simple distinction between an introvert and an extrovert character. But common sense and character, artistic imagination, wisdom, above-average knowledge, organizational skills, clear perception of reality, ability to attune oneself to the psychological state of others, and a developed sense of the true (albeit vaguely articulated) needs of a Community — are human qualities particularly valued in any society, for which some are elected to the councils concerned with social coordination and direction; others are valued as great artists and creators; some are greatly loved by the opposite sex, and others earn admiration as educators of the younger generations. Inequalities of this kind cannot be eliminated. Rather, they will only fully develop and become the dominant form of social inequalities when those inequalities based on the existence of the monopoly of economic and political power disappear. But it is essential that

such stratification is not class (it is based on status difference but does not include economic exploitation or political domination). The corresponding social organization and the creation of a corresponding social consciousness should lead to the overcoming of status differences and differences in economic and political power.

(c) A distinction according to the nature of the social role will also exist in any society. The professional fixation on a specific role will dwindle, automation will eliminate many routine roles that balance the rest, and most importantly, the sphere of work will become more and more important to the sphere of the free creative activity, losing to practice. However reduced to a minimum, work remains the permanent condition of the existence of any society. High productivity requires role allocation. Even if it is no longer professional, the roles will differ, and this precisely in their creative aspects - because of what the machine cannot do in principle. But if that is the case, then it does not follow at all that the differentiation in roles must lead to any social hierarchy

— das können einfach Unterschiede sein, die nicht zur Schaffung ökonomischer und politischer Eliten führen.

(d) Das Wesen des Prinzips der Gleichheit in den zeitgenössischen historischen Bedingungen ist die Aufhebung der *Schichtung* auf Grund unterschiedlicher gesellschaftlicher Rollen. In allen bisherigen Gesellschaften hat die Rolle des manuellen Arbeiters, wenn noch damit verbunden war, daß er Frau, Angehöriger einer nationalen oder religiösen Minderheit war, gerade auf den Grund der Gesellschaftshierarchie geführt. Die Rolle des militärischen Führers, der Lenker, der Eigentümer der Produktionsmittel, der Funktionäre im Staats- oder Parteiapparat verlieh ökonomische Privilegien, politische Macht, den höchsten gesellschaftlichen Status. Die bisherige geschichtliche Entwicklung hat schon einige dieser Rollen entwertet. Die moderne Wirtschaft ist auch ohne private Investitionen möglich, die Möglichkeit der Entprofessionalisierung der militärischen und politischen Funktionen im Sozialismus ist klar, während andere noch unumgängliche Verwaltungsfunktionen wie auch alle anderen qualifizierten Arbeitsrollen angesehen werden können.

Nun, was theoretisch klar ist, ist in der Praxis noch lange nicht klar im öffentlichen Leben der sozialistischen Staaten. Die Quelle aller Konfusion liegt darin, daß die klassischen Klassenunterschiede in diesen Staaten tatsächlich aufgehoben wurden, und dennoch sind das noch stratifizierte, hierarschische Gesellschaften mit Eliten, die in ihren Händen eine riesige vereinte Macht halten: die militärische, die politische, die ökonomische, die Polizeimacht und die Kontrolle über Informationsmittel, über die Wissenschaft und die Kultur. Es fehlt aber ein Begriffsapparat, der der Beschreibung und Analyse dieser Stratifikation angemessen wäre.

Die moderne postmarxistische Soziologie, besonders die Webers, hat zur Schaffung eines solchen Begriffsapparats beigetragen, indem sie Distinktionen zwischen Klasse, Macht und Status einführte. Die Elite der politischen Macht ist nicht dasselbe wie die herrschende Klasse. Die politische Macht ist nicht immer und ist nicht die einfache Emanation der ökonomischen Macht. Sonst wäre das Phänomen des Faschismus nicht erklärbar, oder das *New Deal* in den U.S.A., die Bürokratie im Sozialismus. Die Macht der Bürokratie liegt nicht darin, daß sie im Produktionsprozeß einen bestimmten Platz einnimmt, sondern darin, daß sie eine privilegierte Rolle im Prozeß des gesellchaftlichen Beschließens hat.

Theoretisch ist es klar, wie man die Klassenunterschiede aufheben kann, beziehungsweise, wie verhindert werden kann, daß die Stratifizierung auf Grund ungleichen Rangierens unterschiedlicher gesellschaftlicher Rollen zu einer neuen Klasseneinteilung führt. Das grundlegende ist: die Aneignung des Mehrwerts muß verhindert werden, der Landzins, das Profit und die bürokratischen Privilegien müssen aufgehoben werden. Die konsequente Durchführung des Prinzips der Belohnung nach der Arbeit ist ein wirkungsvolles ökonomisches Instrument gegen die klassenmäßige

— these can simply be differences that do not lead to the creation of economic and political elites.

(d)

The essence of the principle of equality in contemporary historical conditions is the abolition of stratification based on different social roles. In all previous societies, the role of the manual worker, if it was linked to the fact that he was a woman or a member of a national or religious minority, led to the very bottom of the social hierarchy. The role of the military leader, the manager, the owner of the means of production, the functionary in the state or party apparatus bestowed economic privileges, political power, and the highest social status. Historical development to date has already devalued some of these roles. Modern economy is possible even without private investments, the possibility of deprofessionalization of military and political functions in socialism is clear, while other administrative functions that are still indispensable can be considered as well as all other qualified labor roles.

Well, what is clear in theory is far from clear in practice in the public life of the socialist states. The source of all confusion is that the classic class distinctions have in fact been abolished in these states, and yet these are still stratified, hierarchical societies with elites holding in their hands a vast combined power: the military, the political, the economic, the Police power and control over information media, over science and culture. However, there is no conceptual apparatus that would be appropriate for the description and analysis of this stratification.

Modern post-Marxist sociology, particularly Weber's, has contributed to the creation of such a conceptual apparatus by introducing distinctions between class, power and status. The elite of political power is not the same as the ruling class. Political power is not always and is not the simple emanation of economic power. Otherwise the phenomenon of fascism could not be explained, or the New Deal in the USA, the bureaucracy in socialism. The power of bureaucracy lies not in its having a specific place in the production process, but in its having a privileged role in the process of social decision-making.

Theoretically, it is clear how to eliminate class distinctions, or how to prevent them from happening

the stratification based on the unequal ranking of different social roles leads to a new class division. The basic thing is: the appropriation of surplus value must

be prevented, the land interest, the profit and the bureaucratic privileges must be abolished. The consistent implementation of the principle of reward after work is a powerful economic instrument

Differenz, obwohl es selbs zu bestimmten Unterschieden führen kann.

Theoretisch ist es klar, wie man auch die Machthierarchie aufheben kann. Das grundlegende ist eine völlige Emanzipation des gesellschaftlichen Beschließungsprozesses, sowohl vom Kapital, als auch von den professionellen Managern und den Spitzen der politischen Organisationen. Die konsequente Durchführung der Wahl der Versetzungen und der echten vertikalen Rotation in allen Funktionen des Beschließens zusammen mit dem klaren Bewußtsein daß die Lenkung der Gesellschaft nicht die Sphäre der professionellen Arbeitsteilung sein kann, müßten genügen, um bürokratische und technokratische Tendenzen zu ersticken.

Es ist aber keineswegs klar, wie verhindert werden kann, daß bestimmte gesellschaftliche Rollen in der Gesellschaft mehr Prestige genießen und einen höheren gesellschaftlichen Status nach sich ziehen als andere. Weber war der Ansicht, daß der Status mehr durch den Verbrauchsstil gegeben ist als durch die Einnahmequelle und ihren Umfang. Wenn das so wäre, müßten uns die Ungleichheiten im Status keine Sorgen bereiten. Was besorgniserregend ist, ist die Tatsache, daß die Gruppen, die einen hohen Status innehaben, auch starken Einfluß haben können, der mit der Zeit in politische Macht übergehen kann. Michel Jung hat zum Beispiel auf die Gefahr der »Meritokratie« verwiesen, also auf die Herrschaft der Eliten mit Diplomen und hohen akademischen Titeln und Stufen. Gegen solche Gefahren kann sich die Gesellschaft nur durch die Entwicklung eines kritischen Bewußtseins für diese Gefahr und durch das eifersüchtige Behüten ihrer demokratischen Normen schützen. In dem Fall wäre die einzige Elite der Gesellschaft die Elite des Geistes, der moralischen Autorität, des Geschmacks und der Weisheit. Diese Form der Ungleichheit aber an sich gefährdet die menschilchen Beziehungen nicht, sie degradiert die Persönlichkeiten nicht, und die Gesellschaft hat keinen Grund, davor Angst zu haben.

Die kritische Analyse der bestehenden Formen der Unfreiheit leitet zu zwei grundlegenden Distinktionen, die dem marxistischen Denken nicht verborgen bleiben dürfen. Man muß zunächst die Unfreiheit unterscheiden, die Resultat der beschränkenden äußeren, gesellschaftlichen Faktoren ist, und die Unfreiheit, die Resultat innerer, persönlicher Barrieren und einer Beschränkung psychischen Charakters ist. Außerdem besteht ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen Unfreiheit im Sinne der Determinierung, die das Gebiet verengt, im Rahmen dessen man wählen und wirken kann, und der Unfreiheit im Sinne des Vakuums der möglichen Ziele, die der Auswahl und des Engagements wert sind.

Das Prinzip der Befreiung als das Prinzip der konkreten historischen Praxis bedeutet die Aufhebung der gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und Strukturen, die die menschliche Selbstverwirklichung verhindern. Es steht also die Freiheit in Frage, die der Mensch als gesellschaftliches Wesen hat. Damit ist selbsverständlich Raum für die Selbstverwirklichung jedes Individums gegeben. Doch be-

Difference, although it can itself lead to certain differences.

Theoretically, it is clear how the hierarchy of power can also be abolished. The basic one is a complete emancipation of the social decision-making process, both from capital and from professional managers and the heads of political organizations. The consistent implementation of the choice of transfers and true vertical rotation in all decision-making functions, together with the clear awareness that the management of society cannot be the sphere of professional division of labor, should be enough to stifle bureaucratic and technocratic tendencies.

However, it is by no means clear how this can be prevented

Certain social roles in society enjoy more prestige and entail higher social status than others. Weber believed that status was determined more by consumption style than by revenue source and volume. If that were so, we need not worry about inequalities in status. What is worrisome is that the groups that hold high status can also have powerful influence, which over time can translate into political power. Michel Jung, for example, referred to the danger of »meritocracy«, i.e. the rule of elites with diplomas and high academic titles and levels. Society can protect itself against such dangers only by developing a critical awareness of this danger and by jealously guarding its democratic norms. In that case the only elite of society would be the elite of spirit, moral authority, taste and wisdom. But this form of inequality in itself does not endanger human relationships, it does not degrade personalities, and society has no reason to be afraid of it.

The critical analysis of the existing forms of bondage leads to two fundamental distinctions that must not remain hidden from Marxist thought. One must first distinguish between the lack of freedom that is the result of limiting external, social factors and the lack of freedom that is the result of inner, personal barriers and a limitation of a psychological character. There is also an essential difference between bondage, in the sense of determination, which narrows the field within which one can choose and operate, and bondage, in the sense of the vacuum of possible goals worth choosing and engaging in.

The principle of liberation as the principle of concrete historical practice means the abolition of social institutions and structures that prevent human self-realization. The freedom that man has as a social being is therefore in question. This of course leaves room for the self-realization of each individual. But be-143

deutet keine gesellschaftliche Reform oder Revolution, keine Klassenemanzipation oder Emanzipation von Nation oder Rasse einfach auch die Emanzipation jeder Person. Um wirklich und wahrhaft frei zu sein, nicht nur als gesellschaftliches Subjekt, sondern auch als bestimmte Persönlichkeit muß der einzelne Mensch die Angst vor der Verantwortung überwinden, muß kritisch die Wertskala, die ihm andere gegeben haben und die das Kriterium der Bewertung und Wahl darstellt (die von uns automatisch und entfremdet angewendet wird), überprüfen und überwinden; er muß eine Anstrengung unternehmen, die Situation, in der er sich befindet zu erkennen. sich selbst zu erkennen seine potentiellen Möglichkeiten, Neigungen, wahren Bedürfnisse und Interessen. Um dann wirklich und wahrhaft frei zu sein, muß er seine Identität ausbauen und feststellen, was da in ihm liegt, das er aufnehmen und ausbauen will.

Es ist klar, daß auch in den besten gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen dem Individuum das Bewußtsein der eigenen Identität, die Bereitschaft zum Risiko und der Wille zur Selbstverwirklichung fehlen können. Diese Seite der Problematik der Freiheit bleibt dauernd in der Sphäre des menschlichen Intimbereichs und der individuellen Psychologie. Wohin das Prinzip der Freiheit als Forderung der historischen Praxis reicht, ist die Sicherung günstiger gesellschaftlicher Bedingungen für eine *mögliche* Selbsttrealisierung. In Frage steht also die *positive* Freiheit, die in sich nicht nur die Aufhebung der repressiven Institutionen, die den Menschen verkrüppeln, trägt, deformieren und verdinglichen, sondern auch die Schaffung solcher neuer Formen der menschlichen Gemeinschaft, die die Entwicklug fördern, die Teilnahme am Beschließen ermöglichen und die Phantasie und Schaffenskraft favorisieren.

II.

Welchen Beitrag haben zur Verwirklichung der Gleichheit und Freiheit die besherigen revolutionären Bewegungen, besonders die sozialistische Revolution in Jugoslawien, geleistet?

Keine bisherige revolutionäre Bewegung konnte in vollem Ausmaß die Ideen der Gleichheit und Freiheit verwirklichen. Aber jede blieb für die Geschichte gerade in dem Ausmaß revolutionär, als eine der partiellen Formen realisiert wurde, und auf diese Weise wurde das Problem auf eine höhere Ebene verschoben. Der Sklavenaufstand, der durch die stoisch-christliche Ideologie inspiriert war, affirmierte die Prinzipe der naturgegebenen Gleichheit und spirituellen Freiheit. In dieser geschichtlichen Epoche wurde der erste ontologische Grundstein für jede spätere egalitaristische Befreiungsbewegung gelegt: alle Menschen sind nach ihrer Natur gleich und frei. Tatsächlich, wenn es nichts im menschilchen Wesen gäbe, nach dem die Menschen alle als gleich und frei beachtet werden müßten, hätte auch keine Revolution ihren philosophischen Grund.

does not signify any social reform or revolution, no class emancipation or emancipation from nation or race simply also the emancipation of each person. In order to be really and truly free, not only as a social subject but also as a definite personality, the individual must

overcome the fear of responsibility, must critically examine the scale of values that others have given him and which are the criterion of evaluation and represents choice (applied automatically and alienated by us), examine and overcome; he must

make an effort to recognize the situation in which he finds himself. to recognize oneself's potential possibilities, inclinations, true needs and interests. Then, in order to be really and truly free, he must build his identity and find what lies within him that he wants to absorb and build upon.

It is clear that even in the best of social conditions the individual may lack a sense of identity, a willingness to take risks, and a desire for self-actualization. This aspect of the problem of freedom always remains in the sphere of the human intimate sphere and individual psychology. Where the principle of freedom reaches as a requirement of historical practice is the securing of favorable social conditions for possible self-realization. What is in question, then, is positive freedom, which involves not only the abolition of repressive institutions that cripple, deform, deform and reify people, but also the creation of such new forms of human community that promote development that Enable participation in decision-making and encourage imagination and creativity.

II.

What contribution have previous revolutionary movements, especially the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia, made to the realization of equality and freedom?

No previous revolutionary movement has been able to fully realize the ideas of equality and freedom. But each remained revolutionary to history to the extent that one of the partial forms was realized, and in this way the problem was shifted to a higher level. The slave rebellion, inspired by Stoic Christian ideology, affirmed the principles of natural equality and spiritual freedom. In this historical epoch the first ontological foundation for every later egalitarian liberation movement was laid: all human beings are equal and free by nature. In fact, if there was nothing in the human condition that made all men to be considered equal and free, then no revolution had its philosophical basis.

Der unglückliche Bauernaufstand des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts überwand eine wesentliche Beschränkung der stoisch-christlichen Ideologie: ihren abstrakt spirituellen Charakter. Aus der Forderung nacht Gleichheit und Freiheit wurden konkrete ökonomische und politische Implikationen abgeleitet. Sie werden in jeder späteren sozialistischen und Volksbewegung bestehen bleiben.

Die bürgerliche Revolution hatte ein sehr ehrgeiziges Programm, konnte aber nur einen Teil davon realisieren. Sie affirmierte zwei Formen der Gleichheit: die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und die Gleichheit der Gelegenheit.

Damit im Zusammenhang hat sie eine Reihe von Freiheiten verwirklicht, die dem einzelnen Menschen Gedankenfreiheit, Ausdrucksfreiheit, ungestörte wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit und Wahl der Vertreter in den politischen Institutionen garantierten. Wie epochal dieser Durchbruch in der Geschichte der menschlichen Emanzipation war, sieht man heute in den sozialistischen Staaten am besten, die diese Epoche übersprungen haben. Es scheint, als ließe sich das sozialistische Programm nicht ohne wenigstens, wenn auch verspätete Aufklärung durchführen.

Natürlich bildete die wesentliche innere Grenze des bürgerlichen ideologischen Programms auch die Bindung an ein ökonomisches System, das spontan kolossale ökonomische Ungleichheiten hervorbrachte. Diese Ungleichheiten der wirklichen Lebensbedingungen konnten nicht ermöglichen, daß die Denschen wirklich gleich vor dem Gesetz waren, konnten ihnen keine wirklich gleichen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten bieten und auch nicht die Möglichkeit für alle, wirklich, ihre Ausdrucksfreiheit, Pressefreiheit, die Gründung politischer Parteien geben.

Die ausgesprochen wettbewerbsmäßig, konsumorientierte Gesellschaft bietet die verschiedensten Möglichkeiten zur Persönlichkeitsexpansion, aber diese Entfaltung ist meist sehr weit von wahrer Selbstverwirklichung entfernt. Nur manche menschliche Fähigkeiten werden geschätzt und gefördert- die, die zu größerem Effekt, besserer Organisation, und höherem Profit beitragen.

Der große historische Schritt, den bisher jede sozialistische Revolution getan hat, war die Aufhebung des Kapitals und der Klasse, die es besaß. Damit wurde einer der grundlegenden Faktoren der gesellschaftlichen Diskriminierung entfernt. Der Boden war frei für ein wesentlich gerechteres System, besonders in der Distribution des Reichturns und potentiell im Hinblick auf die Verteilung der Macht.

Aber jeder bisherigen Revolution, auch der jugoslawischen fehlte das Bewußtsein über die Probleme und die Gefahren die im Zusammenhang mit der Statusungleichheit erstehen.

Die Kampfbedingungen verlangten eine Organisationsform, die der Erringung der politischen Macht angepaßt war, die aber zur Verwirklichung der grundlegenden revolutionären Ziele der Gleichheit und Freiheit keineswegs günstig war. Dem leninistischen Parteitypus hat gerade sein hierarchischer Charakter, der zentra-

The ill-fated peasant revolt of the fourteenth century overcame a major limitation of Stoic Christian ideology: its abstract spiritual character. Concrete economic and political implications were derived from the demand for equality and freedom. They will persist in every

later socialist and people's movement.

The bourgeois revolution had a very ambitious program, but could only realize part of it. It affirmed two forms of equality: equality before the law and equality of opportunity.

In connection with this, it implemented a number of freedoms, which guaranteed the individual freedom of thought, freedom of expression, undisturbed economic activity and election of representatives in political institutions. How epochal this breakthrough was in the history of human emancipation can best be seen today in the socialist states that have skipped this epoch. It seems as if the socialist program could not be carried out without at least some, albeit belated, enlightenment.

Of course, the essential inner limit of the bourgeois ideological program was also the attachment to an economic system that spontaneously produced colossal economic inequalities. These inequalities in real living conditions could not enable people to be truly equal before the law, could not offer them truly equal opportunities for development, nor give the opportunity for all, really, their freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the formation of political parties.

The decidedly competitive, consumption-oriented society offers the most diverse possibilities for personality expansion, but this development is usually very far removed from true self-realization. Only some human skills are valued and encouraged - those that contribute to greater effect, better organization, and higher profits.

The great historic step taken by every socialist revolution up to now was the abolition of capital and the class that owned it. This removed one of the fundamental factors of societal discrimination. The ground was clear for a much more equitable system, particularly in the distribution of wealth and potentially in the distribution of power.

But every previous revolution, including the Yugoslav one, lacked awareness of the problems and dangers that arise in connection with status inequality.

The conditions of struggle demanded a form of organization adapted to the attainment of political power, but which was by no means conducive to the attainment of the fundamental revolutionary goals of equality and liberty. The Leninist type of party has precisely its hierarchical character, the zentra-145

listische Beschluß, die maximale Geheimhaltung im Funktionieren, die völlige Disziplin in der Befehlsausführung, die Pflege des Kults charismatischer Führer und der höchsten Forume mehr Wirkung garantiert als es bis dahin irgend eine illegale Oppositionsorganisation hatte. Andererseits aber, aus der Distanz von mehreren Jahrzehnten gesehen, mußte es einem solchen Organizationstypus schwerfallen, seine langfristigen revolutionären Ziele zu verwirklichen.

Die erste Schwierigkeit mußte der riesige Statusunterschied zhischen den Führenden, den gewöhnlichen Mitgliedern, den Kandidaten und Sypathisierenden sein-von Anfang an.

Die zweite Schwierigkeit liegt darin, daß diese Ungleichkeit nicht als Problem bemerkt wurde, daß zu ihr ganz am Beginn kein kritisches Verhältnis bestand. In dieser Hinsicht konnte auch die Theorie von Marx nicht viel weiter helfen.

Die dritte Schwierigkeit bestand darin, daß die Statusunterschiede nicht nur von der natürlichen Begabung abhingen, von der Tapferkeit und Ergebenheit der Sache der Revolution gegenüber, sondern auch von der Fähigkeit des maximalen Selbstvergessens und Sich-Unterordnens den Normen und Direktiven der Bewegung. Dieser Charakter liegt in vielem dem Charakter des neuen Menschen, der nach der gelungenen Revolution ausgebaut werden sollte zuwider.

Die vierte Schwierigkeit zuletzt liegt darin, daß sich die Revolution in einer Gesellschaft ereignete, die die Epoche der Aufklärund und des klassischen Liberalismus nicht durchlaufen hatte, die sich noch nicht von den typisch feudalen Gewohnheiten befreit hatte, sich den Personen mit hohem Status gegenüber völlig unkritisch und im Prinzip untertänig loyal zu verhalten.

Schon im Verlauf der Revolution erstanden aus den Statusungleichheiten auch Ungleichheiten in der Machtverteilung. Diese Unterschiede waren teilweise durch den Charakter des Kampfes und die Forderungen der Wirkung bedingt. Der größte Teil der Aktivisten konnte an den Beschlüssen nicht teilnehmen oder auch nur nach der Zustimmung gefragt werden. Aber in der Machtkonzentration ging man weiter als dies unumgänglich notwendig war: gewöhnlich traten Einzelne Führer im Namen des Forums hervor. Keinem fiel ein, dieses angeeignete Recht anzufechten.

Die politischen Strukturen, die auf solche Weise gebildet wurden, waren auch 1948 noch revolutionär genug, um, wenn auch mit einiger Verspätung den Weg der Demokratisierung und der Selbstverwaltung zu gehen. Aber sie waren bereits so fixiert, daß sie bestimmte Grenzen nicht zu überspringen vermochten. In den Fünfziger- und den frühen Sechzigerjahren wurden Schritte unternommen, zwar Anfängerschritte, dennoch aber von unvergänglicher historischer Bedeutung:

— im Übergang von der repräsentativen zur partizipativen Demokratie;

cunning decision that guarantees maximum secrecy in operation, complete discipline in carrying out orders, cultivation of the cult of charismatic leaders and the highest forums, more effective than any illegal opposition organization had hitherto. On the other hand,

however, seen from the distance of several decades, it must have been difficult for such an organization type to realize its long-term revolutionary goals.

The first difficulty had to be the huge difference in status between leaders, ordinary members, candidates and sympathizers from the start.

The second difficulty lies in the fact that this inequality was not noticed as a problem, that there was no critical relationship to it at the very beginning. In this regard, Marx's theory could not help much.

The third difficulty was that the difference in status depended not only on natural talent, on bravery and devotion to the cause of the revolution, but also on the capacity for maximum self-forgetfulness and submission to the norms and directives of the movement. In many respects this character is contrary to the character of the new man who was to be developed after the successful revolution.

Finally, the fourth difficulty is that the revolution occurred in a society that had not passed through the epoch of the Enlightenment and classical liberalism, which had not yet freed itself from the typically feudal habits of dealing with persons of high status to behave completely un-critically and in principle subserviently loyal.

Already in the course of the revolution, inequalities in the distribution of power arose from the inequalities in status. These differences were due in part to the nature of the combat and the demands of the effect. Most of the activists could not take part in the resolutions or even be asked for their approval. But the concentration of power went further than was absolutely necessary: usually individual leaders emerged on behalf of the forum.

No one thought of contesting this acquired right.

The political structures that were formed in this way were still revolutionary enough in 1948 to go the way of democratization and self-government, albeit with some delay. But they were already so fixed that

they were unable to cross certain borders. Steps were taken in the 1950s and early 1960s, initial steps but nonetheless of immortal historical importance:

— in the transition from representative to participatory democracy;

— in der Aufhebung des Lohncharakters der Arbeit und der Realisierung des Prinzips der Belohnung nach der Arbeit;

— in der Bildung eines neuen Selbstverwaltungstyps der Gemeinschaft, nicht nur in der Produktion, auch in der Bildung, in der Kultur, Wissenschaft und in allen anderen Formen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens.

Aber in der Sphäre der höchsten Politik konnten die hierarchischen Beziehungen, die schon bis 1948 gebildet waren, nicht wesentlich überwunden werden, trotz aller Veränderung des politischen Systems.

Aus den Statusungleichheiten in unseren spezifischen Bedingungen erwuchsen rasch auch Ungleichheiten in der Machtdistribution. Die unausweichliche Folge war zunächst die Aufhaltung der Prozesses der Aufhebung der Klassenunterschiede, um in den letzten Jahren auch zum Prozeß der Restaurierung einiger schon überwundenen Klassenunterschiede zu kommen. Dem Staatskapital, das zunächst von der Bürokratie verwaltet wurde, schloß sich das unfangreiche Kapital der Banken der Handels- und Industrieunternehmen an, das durch die ungeordnete Entwicklung der Marktwirtschaft entstand und manchmal auch durch Methoden der ursprünglichen Akkumulation. Heute verwaltet dieses Kapital anstelle der klassischen Bourgeoisie eine immer mächtigere Managerschicht- die Technostruktur, ohne die Selbstverwaltungsorgane zu beachten. Da das Kapital in seinem Wesen ein *gesellschaftliches Verhältnis* ist, und da sein Bestehen allein das Bestehen von Ausbeutung bedeutet, war es unausweichlich, daß es zu einem plötzlichen Anwachsen der ökonomischen und sozialen Ungleichheit, und auch zu nationalen Konflikten kam. Die Klassennatur dieser neuen Usurpatoren der ökonomischen Macht in unserer Gesellschaft ist noch nicht klar, da sie sich ziemlich erfolgreich hinter der Fassade der Selbstverwaltung verbergen, und da ihnen die bestehenden Gesetze nicht gestatten, das Kapital tatsächlich zu entfremden und als Erbe zu hinterlassen. Deshalb schaffen sie es ins Ausland, wo es unvollständigen Angaben zufolge schon mehr als 600 auf einzelne Jugoslawen registrierte Unternehmen gibt, die ein Kapital umfassen, das im Moment noch nicht bekannt ist. Vor uns haben wir also die Klasse »der sozialistischen Großkapitalisten« *in statu nascendi* und niemand soll sagen, daß ein »sozialistischer Markt« und ein »sozialistische Kapital«, bestehen können, nicht aber »socialistisches Kapitalisten«. Dieser Prozeß könnte wahrscheinlich immer noch aufgehalten werden, und die entfremdeten Mehrwerte der jugoslawischen Arbeiterklasse könnten immer noch vergesellschaftlicht werden. Aber auf der politischen Bühne gibt es im Moment nicht genügend starke Kräfte, die in dieser Richtung kämpfen würden.

Das andere, ähnliche Problem ist, wie das neuentstandene Kleinbürgertum aufhalten, das in den letzten Jahren durch Grundspekulation, durch Raub und beispiellose Korruption reich wurde. Sein angehäuftes Geld wartet sehnsüchtig darauf, in Umlauf zu kommen und Profit zu tragen.

— in the abolition of the wage character of work and the realization of the principle of reward after work;

— in the formation of a new type of community self-government, not only in production, but also in education, culture, science and all other forms of social life.

But in the sphere of the highest politics, despite all the changes in the political system, the hierarchical relationships formed by 1948 could not be significantly overcome.

Inequalities in the distribution of power quickly grew out of the status inequalities in our specific conditions. The inevitable consequence was initially the halting of the process of abolishing class differences, so that in the last few years the process of restoring some class differences that had already been overcome could also begin. State capital, which was initially administered by the bureaucracy, was joined by the large capital of the banks of commercial and industrial enterprises, created by the disorderly development of the market economy and sometimes by methods of primitive accumulation. Today, instead of the classic bourgeoisie, this capital is managed by an increasingly powerful managerial stratum - the technostructure, without heeding the self-governing bodies. Since capital is in its essence a social relation, and since its very existence means the existence of exploitation, it was inevitable that there would be a sudden increase in economic and social inequality, and also national conflicts. The class nature of these new usurpers of economic power in our society is not yet clear, since they hide quite successfully behind the facade of self-government, and since existing laws do not allow them to actually alienate capital -

to leave the and as an inheritance. That's why they make it abroad, where, according to incomplete information, there are already more than 600

There are companies registered to individual Yugoslavs, comprising capital that is not known at the moment. So before us we have the class of "socialist big capitalists"

in statu nascendi and nobody should say that a "socialist market" and a "socialist capital" can exist, but not "socialist capitalist". This process could probably still be stopped, and the alienated surplus values of the Yugoslav working class could still be socialized. But at the moment there are not enough strong forces on the political stage that would fight in this direction.

The other, similar problem is how to stop the newly emerged petty bourgeoisie that has grown rich in recent years through land

speculation, robbery and unprecedented corruption.

His accumulated money is eagerly waiting to circulate and make a profit.

147

Das kann immer noch verhindert werden. Der jugoslawische Sozialismus hat seine große historische Chance immer noch nicht verspielt. Aber er steckt in einer tiefen Krise. Die deutlichsten Zeichen dieser Krise sind gerade die Stärkungstendenzen der sozialen Ungleichheiten, und damit im Zusammenhang die Tendenzen der Erstarkung des politischen Drucks.

Die grundlegende Erfahrung, die aus der bisherigen Geschichte der jugoslawischen sozialistischen Revolution abgeleitet werden kann ist: die Eskalation von der Statusungleichheit bis zur ungleichen Distribution der politischen Macht und weiter zur Restaurierung der ökonomischen und klassenmäßigen Ungleichheiten muß in der Wurzel erstickt werden. Dies bedeutet vor allem daß man die Bildung und Fixierung hierarchischer Verhältnisse schon in der Anfangsphase der Schaffung der revolutionären Organisaton verhindern muß. Die sozialistische Bewegung soll von Anfang an demokratisch sein. Sonst wird sie nie zum Sozialismus führen. Die selbstverwaltung muß vom ersten Tag des Sieges an entwickelt werden, sonst wird sie kaum weiter als zu einigen Anfangsform gelangen. Sie darf nicht in der Entwicklung steckenbleiben, die zu immer integrierteren Formen führt, von Mikrozellen zur Ganzheit der Gesellschaft. Ein Stehenbleiben bedeutet ein Sich-Aussetzen den Erosionen der übriggebliebenen Machtstrukturen, im schlimmsten Fall bedeutet es eine Umwandlung zur leeren Form, in eine ideologische Fassade, in ein Denkmal.

III.

In welchem Verhältnis stehen Gleichheit und Freiheit? So sehr uns auch die intuitive Voraussetzung anzieht, daß sie einander notwendig bedingen, so könnten doch nicht gegenteilige Argumente und Beispiele gefunden werden. Aristoteles konnte fühlen, daß die Freiheit der Bürger Athens auf der Arbeit der Sklaven, Frauen und Barbaren beruht. In der Anstregung, diesen Zustand zu rationalisieren entstand auch seine Theorie von der natürlichen Ungleichheit. Der freie Mensch ist naturgegeben dem Sklaven überlegen, der Mann der Frau, der Grieche dem Barbaren. Also ist die Herrschaft des freien Griechen, des Mannes gerecht. Viel später stellt Kant fest, daß die Ungleichheit unter den Menschen »eine reiche Quelle für alles, was schlecht ist, aber auch für alles, was gut ist. »Damit ist augenscheinlich impliziert, daß die Freiheit ihren Ursprung in der Ungleichheit hat. Sartres »*Teufel und der gute Herrgott*« zeigt uns, was das bedeuten kann. Gotz von Berliehingen schließt sich den Bauern im Kampf um die universale Freiheit an. Er will nur gleich wie sie sein, aber ihre beschränkten Fähigkeiten zwingen ihn dazu, der Ziel der Freiheit die Gleichheit zu opfern und die Rolle des autoritativen Führers zu übernehmen. Das hat sich natürlich in allen bisherigen Revolutionen ereignet.

Umgekehrt ist es nicht schwer, zu erkennen welche Grenzen der Freiheit in einer nicht wahrhaft individuellen Selbstverwirklichung in einer radikal egalitären Gesellschaft gesetzt wären. Die

That can still be prevented. Yugoslav socialism has still not squandered its great historic opportunity. But he is in a deep crisis. The clearest signs of this crisis are precisely the tendencies towards increasing social inequalities and, in connection with this, tendencies

towards increasing political pressure.

The basic experience that can be derived from the previous history of the Yugoslav socialist revolution is: the escalation from status inequality to the unequal distribution of political power and on to the restoration of economic and class inequalities must be nipped at the root. This means above all that

one must prevent the formation and fixation of hierarchical relationships already in the initial phase of the creation of the revolutionary organization. The socialist movement should be democratic from the start. Otherwise it will never lead to socialism.

Self-government must be developed from the first day of victory, otherwise it will get little further than some initial form. It must not get stuck in the evolution that leads to ever more integrated forms, from microcells to the whole of society. Standing still means exposing oneself to the erosion of the remaining power structures, in the worst case it means a transformation into empty form, into an ideological facade, into a monument.

III.

What is the relationship between equality and freedom? Much as we are attracted by the intuitive assumption that they necessarily condition one another, arguments and examples to the contrary could not be found. Aristotle could feel that the liberty of the citizens of Athens rested on the labor of slaves, women and barbarians. In the effort to rationalize this state of affairs, his theory of natural inequality also arose. The free man is naturally superior to the slave, the man to the woman, the Greek to the barbarian. So the rule of the free Greek, of the man, is just. Much later, Kant states that inequality among people

"a rich source of all that is bad, but also of all that is good. “This apparently implies that freedom has its origin in inequality. Sartre's "The Devil and the Good Lord" shows us what that can mean. Gotz von Berliehingen joins the peasants in the struggle for universal freedom. He just wants to be like them, but their limited abilities force him to sacrifice equality for the goal of freedom and assume the role of authoritative leader.

This has of course happened in all previous revolutions.

Conversely, it is not difficult to recognize the limits of freedom in a not truly individual self-realization in a radically egalitarian society.

Verwirklichung sehr *unterschiedlicher* individueller potentieller. Fähigkeiten und Dispositionen ist mit *gleichen* Lebensbedingungen für alle nicht zu vereinen. Deshalb war Marx der Ansicht, daß das Prinzip der kommunistischen Verteilung nicht die *gleiche* Belohung ist, nicht einmal die Belohnung nach der Arbeit, sondern die Belohnung *nach* den Bedürfnissen.

Das echte Prinzip ist weder die Uniformiertheit, nocht die Vielfalt, sondern der individuelle und gruppenmäßige Unterschied im generisch Gleichen. Es gibt nämlich bestimmte Strukturen der grundlegenden menschlichen Fähigkeiten und Bedürfnisse, die jedes Individuum als *menschliches Wesen charakterisieren.* Diese Fähigkeiten sind: die unbegrenzte Entwicklung der Sinne, das begrifflich logische Denken, Kommunikation, Problemlösung, kreatives Verbindung und Innovation in der eigenen Tätigkeit, des Harmonisierens im Rahmen der Gruppe und der breiteren Gemeinschaft usw. Ebenso bestehen bestimmte primäre Bedürfnisse, biologische, soziale und psychische, die dem ganzen Menschengeschlecht eigen sind-vom Bedarf nach Nahrung, nach Flüssigkeit und der Person des anderen Geschlechts bis zum Bedürfnis nach Selbstbehauptung und Selbstidentifizierung. Es besteht also eine grundlegende Gleichheit der menschlichen Wesen im Grund aller individuellen, nationalen, Klassen-, Generations-, Epochen- und anderer Unterschiede. Auf dieser Grundlage der antologischen Gleichheit beruhen alle anderen rechtlichen, politischen und ökonomischen Gleichheiten, wie jene zum Beispiel die in den folgenden Prinzipien ausgedrückt waren: »Ein Mensch- eine Stimme«, oder »das Gesetzt gilt gleich für alle« oder »Alle Menschen gehören in eine Klasse- die der Produzenten«.

Solche Normen sichern nur die *negative,* nicht auch die *positive* Freiheit. Die menschliche individuelle Selbstverwirklichung setzt eine sehr differenzierte Erziehung voraus nach dem Prinzip das gleich für alle ist die für spezifische potentielle Wesen jedes Individuums adäquat sein muß. Das würde bedeuten, daß im gesamten Erziehungssystem eine wahre Revolution nötig ist. Zum Beispiel: das heutige Kasernen-Erziehen, das allem uniforme Programme aufdrängt, dasselbe Lerntempo, dasselbe Regime mit all seinem scheinbaren Egalitarismus, fixiert und vertieft die infolge ungleicher Entwicklungsbedingugen bestehenden Unterschiede noch mehr. Ein Kind aus dem Kosovo oder aus *Gornja Jablanica* (unterentwickelte Gegenden) hat bestimmt nicht dieselben Entwicklungschanchen wie ein Kind aus Belgrad oder Zagreb, Selbstverständlich ist es noch ärger, wenn sich die Schulen unterscheiden oder klassenmäßig systematisch die Vorzüge verschärft werden, die die Kinder aus den höheren Gesellschaftsschichten haben. Die einzige Lösung ist ein System, das sich jedem Individuum differenziert nähert, ihm alle Möglichkeiten zur Entdeckung der Welt und seiner selbst bietet, ihm die Möglichkeit zu Experimenten gibt, ihn mit dem Reichtum der Kultur bekannt macht es aber auch darauf verweist, daß es verschiedene Tätigkeiten gibt, es lehrt, seine verschiedenen Dispositionen kennezulernen und unter ihnen eine

Realization of very different individual potential.

Abilities and dispositions cannot be combined with the same living conditions for everyone. Therefore Marx was of the opinion that

the principle of communist distribution is not equal reward, not even reward after work, but reward according to needs.

The true principle is neither uniformity nor variety, but individual and group differences in the generic same. Namely, there are certain structures of basic human abilities and needs that characterize each individual as a human being. These skills are: unlimited development of the senses, conceptual reasoning, communication, problem solving, creative connection and innovation in one's own work, harmonization within the group and wider community, etc. There are also certain primary needs, biological , social and psychological, which are inherent in the whole human race - from the need for food, for liquid and for the person of the opposite sex, to the need for self-assertion and self-identification. There is thus a fundamental equality of human beings at the root of all individual, national, class, generational, epochal and other differences. On this basis of antological equality rest all other legal, political, and economic equality, such as those expressed in the following principles: "One man - one vote," or "The law is equal for all," or "All men belong into a class - that of the producers«.

Such norms only secure negative freedom, not positive freedom as well. Human individual self-realization presupposes a very differentiated education according to the principle that is the same for all, which must be adequate for specific potential beings of each individual. That would mean that a true revolution is needed throughout the educational system. For example: today's barracks education, which imposes uniform programs on everything, the same pace of learning, the same regime with all its apparent egalitarianism, further fixes and deepens the differences that exist as a result of unequal development conditions. A child from Kosovo or from Gornja Jablanica (underdeveloped areas) certainly does not have the same developmental opportunities as a child from Belgrade or Zagreb. Of course it is even worse when the schools differ or the advantages are systematically strengthened by class who have children from the higher social classes. The only solution is a system that approaches each individual in a differentiated way, offers him every opportunity to discover the world and himself, gives him the opportunity to experiment, acquaints him with the richness of culture, but also points out that it is different activities, it teaches to know its different dispositions and among them a 149

Auswahl zu treffen. Diese Auswahl soll nicht nach dem Kriterium der erfolgreichen Karriere getroffen werden, sondern jenen der Selbstrealisierung zuletzt um schießlich die der Umwandlung der erwählten Dispositionen zu aktuellen Fähigkeiten.

Natürlich verlangt ein solches System bedeutend bessere Schulen, mehr und bessere Erzieher; es wird teuer sein und intesives gesellschaftliches Engagement verlangen, also auch ein hohes Niveau der materiellen und allgemeinen Entwicklung der Gesellschaft. Aber die entwickelten Industrieländer (von denen einige schon mehr als 4000 Dollar Nationaleinkommen pro Kopf haben) könnten es schon heute haben unter der Bedingung, daß die katastrophale Diskrepanz, die zwischen den Ausgaben für Militär und den gesamten Schulungskosten herrscht, überwunden wird, und unter der Bedingung, daß das bisherige Wirtschaftswachstum bedeutend reduziert wird, da es nach Berichten von Experten[2] in zwei oder drei Dezenien zur Erschöpfung vieler grundlegender Reserven auf der Erde führen würde. Ganz Asien, Afrika und Süd-Amerika gaben für die Bildung in 1967 nur 15,7 Milliarden Dollar aus, während nur die U.S.A. 75,5 Milliarden Dollar für das Militär ausgaben (Us Arms. Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military expeditures*, 1969). Die Reduzierung der Wachstumsrate auf ein Minimum (manche schlagen sogar 0% for) würde die materielle Basis für eine Bildungsrevolution schaffen. Es muß auch berücksichtigt werden, daß die technologische Entwicklung und die Automatisierung unweigerlich die Bedeutung der produktiven Arbeit verringern, dessen, was Marx die Sphäre der Notwendigkeit nannte. Die praktische Verkürzung der Arbeitszeit ist heute, einschießlich bei uns, in vielen Ländern möglich (es würde für Millionen von Arbeitslosen, die wir jetzt haben, Arbeitsplätze schaffen). Die Sphäre der Freiheit, die Sphäre der Praxis, des Wirkens der Selbstverwirklichung wird immer mehr an Bedeutung gewinnen. Die Praxis ist in ihrer Natur etwas, das sich der institutionellen gesellschaftlichen Intervention dem Zwang widersetzt. Was die organisierte Gesellschaft, also die Selbstverwaltugsorgane auf allen Niveaus einführen und sichern müssen, ist: (1.) die notwendigen materiellen Bedingungen, und (2.) die notwendige Erziehung der Menschen für die Praxis. Also, in dem Ausmaß, in dem die Sorge der Gesellschaft für die Produktion nachläßt (Sphäre der Notwendigkeit) soll sich die Erziehung vergrößern (Vorbereitung für die Sphäre der Freiheit).

Natürlich bleibt die Ordnung die dauernde Bedingung der menschlichen gesellschaftlichen Existenz. In dieser Sphäre kann man Ungleichheiten und Belohnung von Rollen nicht umgehen. Die Lösung liegt nicht in der einfachen unmittelbaren mechanischen Rotation aller Rollen, wie Galtung dies vorschlägt: Chirurg und Putzfrau, Pilot und Stewardess, Direktor und Laufbursche

[2] 1967 haben die entwickelten Länder für das Militär 160 Milliarden Dollar ausgegeben, für das Bildungswesen 114 Milliarden. Die Ausgaben der unterentwickelten Länder für das Militär betrugen 20 Milliarden und für das Schulwesen 13.

to make selection. This selection should not be made according to the criterion of a successful career, but that of self-realization, ultimately the conversion of the chosen dispositions into current skills.

Of course, such a system requires far better schools, more and better educators; it will be expensive and will require intensive social commitment, including a high level of material and general development of society. But the developed industrialized countries (some of which already have more than $4,000 per capita in national income) could have it today provided the catastrophic disparity that exists between military expenditure and total training costs is overcome. and on condition that previous economic growth be significantly reduced, since according to expert reports2 it would lead to the depletion of many basic reserves on earth in two or three decades. All of Asia, Africa and South

-America spent only $15.7 billion on education in 1967, while only the U.S. spent $75.5 billion on the military (Us Arms, Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expeditures, 1969). Reducing the growth rate to a minimum (some even suggest 0%) would provide the material basis for an educational revolution. It must also be borne in mind that technological development and automation inevitably diminish the importance of productive labour, what Marx called the sphere of necessity. The practical reduction in working hours is now possible in many countries, including ours (it would create jobs for the millions of unemployed we have now).

The sphere of freedom, the sphere of practice, the work of self-realization will gain more and more importance.

The praxis is in its nature something that defies institutional social intervention of coercion. What organized society, i.e. self-governing bodies, must introduce and secure at all levels is: (1) the necessary material conditions, and (2) the necessary education of people for practice. So, to the extent that society's concern for production slackens (sphere of necessity), education should increase (preparation for the sphere of freedom).

Of course, order remains the permanent condition of human social existence. In this sphere one cannot avoid role inequalities and rewards.

The solution does not lie in the simple, immediate, mechanical rotation of all roles, as Galtung suggests: surgeon and cleaner, pilot and stewardess, director and errand boy education 114 billion. The underdeveloped countries spent 20 billion on the military and 13 on education.

können ihre Arbeit nicht einfach austauschen- dies innerhalb von kurzen Zeiträumen- ganz einfach, weil für jede dieser Arbeiten eine bestimmte Vorbereitung notwendig ist. Die Lösung liegt in der freien Auswahl alle Leute intellektuelle, schaffende Rollen wäkostenlosen Umqualifizierung. Die, die glauben, daß in dem Fall der freien Auswahl alle leute intellektuelle, schaffende Rollen wählen würden, verlieren aus dem Blickfeld, in welchem Kontext die Frage gestellt wurde (Das ist schon die Situation, in der die Arbeit zeitlich sehr beschränkt und weniger bedeutend ist während die Möglichkeiten der Praxis vergrößert werden). Die schaffende Rolle im Arbeitsprozeß bedeutet eine langwierige disziplinierte und anstrengende Vorbereitung gesellschaftliche Kontrolle, Beschränkung der Zeit für die übrigen schöpferischen Tätigkeiten. Einfacher, die Routinerollen im Arbeitsprozeß ermöglichen sofort viel größere Freiheit für die Praxis neben der dauernden Möglichkeit der Erfüllung durch kostenlose Schulung und Umqualifizierung für eine andere, ehrgeizigere, schöpferischere Rolle im Arbeitsprozeß. Damit ist, wie es scheint, das Gleichgewicht hergestellt.

Die wesentliche Bedingung der Befreiung ist natürlich die Aufhebung der jetzigen Ungleichheiten in der Sphäre der Politik. Die einfachste Lösung wäre natürlich die Aufhebung jedes Professionalismus' in der Politik. Die Sphäre des Beschließens dürfte nicht die Sphäre sein, in der eine professionelle Arbeitsteilung möglich ist. Eine gemäßigtere Lösung für die Situation, in der sich die moderne Gesellschaft heute befindet, würde auf einer bedeutenden Unterscheidung zwischen wesentlichen und technischen Beschlüssen beruhen. Die erste würde sich mit grundlegenden Zielen, langfristigen Programmen, Festlegung von Kriterien der Bewertung und Tätigkeitsnormen, der Bewertung der Realisierung der beschlossenen Entwicklungspolitik befassen. Die zweite würde sich mit der Auswahl der angemessenen Mittel, der Ausarbeitung der Implikationen verschiedenen Alternativelösungen, der alltäglichenoperativen Verwaltung, mit einem Wort mit den technischen Problemen befassen.

Die Grundbeschlüsse müssen in der Hand der Selbstverwaltungsorgane liegen, die aus freigewählten und versetzbaren Mitgliedern des Kollektivs oder der breiteren Gemeinschaft bestehen. Hier muß das Prinzip der vertikalen Rotation rigoros angewendet werden. Ihre Tätigkeit darf keinerlei dauernde Macht oder materielle Privilegien bringen. In ihrem Charakter ist das die *Praxis*, di freie Tätigkeit, deren Ziel gleichzeitig die Selbstverwirklichung und Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse anderer ist. Die technischen Beschlüsse können in der Hand Professioneller, von Direktoren und Experten liegen. Die Erfahrung zeigt, daß die Manipulation der Selbstverwaltungsorgane seitens der Administration und der Technostruktur nicht auchzuweichen ist, wenn zwei Bedingungen nicht erfüllt werden: (1) Die Selbstverwaltungsorgane von der Fabrik bis zur Föderation müssen einen eigenen Einblick in die Lage haben, einen eigenen analytischen Dienst, nicht aber von der Analyse und den Informationen der Technostruktur abhängi sein. (2)

cannot simply exchange their work within short periods of time, simply because a certain preparation is necessary for each of these works. The solution lies in the free choice of all people's intellectual, creative roles wa-free requalification. Those who believe that in the

case of free choice all people would choose intellectual, creative roles lose sight of the context in which the question was asked (this is already the situation in which the work is very time-limited and less significant is while increasing the possibilities of practice). The creative role in the work process means long, disciplined and strenuous preparation, social control, limitation of time for other creative activities. More simply, the routine roles in the work process immediately allow for much greater freedom of practice alongside the continued possibility of fulfillment through free training and requalification for another, more ambitious, more creative role in the work process. It seems that the balance has been established.

The essential condition of liberation is, of course, the abolition of the present inequalities in the sphere of politics. The simplest solution would, of course, be the abolition of every profession a lis m ˆ ' in politics. The sphere of decision-making should not be the sphere in which a professional division of labor is possible. A more moderate solution to the situation in which modern society finds itself today would be based on an important distinction between essential and technical decisions. The first would deal with basic goals, long-term programs, definition of evaluation criteria and norms of activity, evaluation of implementation of the agreed development policy. The second would deal with the selection of the appropriate means, the elaboration of the implications of various alternative solutions, the day-to-day operational management, in a word with the technical problems.

The basic decisions must be in the hands of the self-governing bodies, composed of freely elected and transferable members of the collective or the wider community.

Here the principle of vertical rotation must be applied rigorously. Their activity must not bring any lasting power or material privileges. In its character it is practice, ie free activity, the aim of which is at the same time self-realization and satisfaction of the needs of others. The technical decisions can be in the hands of professionals, directors and experts. Experience shows that the manipulation of the self-governing organs by the administration and the technostructure cannot be avoided even if two conditions are not met: (1) The self-governing organs from the factory to the federation must have their own insight into the situation, their own analytical service, but not dependent on the analysis and information provided by the technostructure. (2) 151

Die Selbstverwaltungsorgane müssen sich absichern, um von der Technostruktur Alternativlösungen geboten zu bekommen, um diese kritisch zu erörtern und die optimalsten zu erwählen, vom Standpunkt der allgemeinen Bedürfnissen, nicht vom pragmatischen Standpunkt der Technostruktur aus. Im gegenteiligen Fall werden sie zur Institution, die für schon Beschlossenes oder bereits Durchgeführtes nur grünes Licht gibt. Das Recht auf Zustimmung oder Ablehnung mag im Zeitalter Nikola Kuzanskis vielleicht eine Errungenschaft gewesen sein, in unserer Zeit ist die Mindestbedingung der Freiheit wenigstens das Bestehen eines Rahmens, innerhalb im Sinne von Marx noch viel mehr. Es steht die Art der Ziele, die Qualität der Zukunftsvision in Frage. Die Freiheit einer immer rascheren und immer sinnloseren Produktion und einer übersättigten, vor Komfort und Überfluß stumpfen Welt ist eine versklavende Freiheit.

Neben allen Anstrengungen zur Überwindung des materiellen Elends und zur Schaffung der angemessenen demokratischen Mechanismen ist eine weitgreifende humanistische Revolution, eine Revolution in der Revolution, notwendig. Sie muß die feudalen und bürgerlichen Strukturen im Bewußtsein der Menschen überwinden. Sie muß in einem Schlag die Arbeit von zwei historischen Epochen bewältigen: der bürgerlichen Aufklärung und der sozialistischen Aufklärung. Jeder wahren bürgerlichen Revolution ging die Schaffung des Bewußtseins vom freien Bürger voraus, der seine Rechte gut kennt, der also das untertänige entwürdigende patriarchale Verhältnis der Macht gegenüber überwunden hat. Für jede wahre sozialistische Revolution ist die Bedingung die Schaffung des Bewußtseins der sozialisierten Persönlichkeit, die sich jeder Privatisierung und Verdinglichung wie auch jeder Entfremdung der Macht, spontan widersetzt.

Eine solche, schon verspätete humanistische Revolution fordert titanische Anstrengungen von vielen Generationen. Ohne sie aber ist ein weiterer Fortschritt, ein sozialistischer Fortschritt nicht möglich.

The self-governing bodies must secure themselves in order to be offered alternative solutions by the technostructure, to discuss them critically and to choose the most optimal ones, from the point of view of general needs, not from the pragmatic point of view of the

technostructure. On the contrary, they become an institution that only gives the green light to what has already been decided or implemented. The right to consent or rejection may have been an achievement in the age of Nikola Kuzanski, but in our time the minimum condition of freedom is at least the existence of one frame, within in the sense of Marx much more. The nature of the goals and the quality of the vision for the future are in question. The freedom of ever faster and ever more meaningless production and a world oversatiated, dulled by comfort and excess, is an enslaving freedom.

In addition to all efforts to overcome material misery and to create the appropriate democratic mechanisms, a far-reaching humanistic revolution, a revolution within the revolution, is necessary. It must overcome the feudal and bourgeois structures in people's consciousness. It must do the work of two historical epochs in one fell swoop: the bourgeois enlightenment and the socialist enlightenment. Every true bourgeois revolution was preceded by the creation of the consciousness of the free citizen who knows his rights well, who has thus overcome the subservient, degrading patriarchate relationship to power. For any true socialist revolution, the condition is the creation of the consciousness of the socialized personality, which spontaneously opposes any privatization and reification, as well as any alienation of power.

Such a belated humanistic revolution requires titanic efforts from many generations. Without them, however, further progress, socialist progress, is not possible.

SELF-FULFILMENT, EQUALITY AND FREEDOM

Zagorka Golubović

Beograd

The first and fundamental condition for the realization of freedom — freedom for all and not for certain members of society only — is the realization of social equality among men, or to use opposite terms, the abolition of social inequality, which is manifested in a number of objective obstacles and hindrances for all members of the society who belong to underprivileged classes, not only when they try to develop and manifest their human potentialities, but even when they try to secure the minimum of conditions for existence. Speaking, therefore, about freedom in the societies in which the principle of social inequality obtains, means accepting as normal the division of people into those who are »free« and who are »not free«, since in such societies even freedom is a privilege of certain classes and individuals.

The essential difference between bourgeois and socialist societies is in the fact that in socialism the two principles — *equality and freedom* — must go hand in hand, and this changes qualitatively the very sense of freedom. Freedom then has not a narrow legal and political meaning (freedom as the right to speak freely, write, associate and be an individual protected by law as the citizen)[1] — but assumes a much wider and deeper meaning, and translates into a possibility and demand for *man's self-fulfilment*.

The bourgeois society may accept and proclaim only the narrow meaning of freedom — the political one — because it does not imply social equality at all costs for all citizens, but is satisfied with equal rights for elite strata, i. e. for those who have

[1] This is not intended to underestimate that aspect of freedom, the more so, because not even that degree of freedom has been achieved in socialist systems; it is only an indication of the limitations of the meaning of freedom interpreted in that way, which remains within the limits of certain political rights of man as citizen.

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access to culture of Bourgeois society (newspapers, periodicals, science, works of art etc.) It is incapable even of proclaiming another meaning of freedom — t h e h u m a n o n e — because it would contradict certain fundamental principles on which it lies: the principle of free acquisition and protection of private property; and closely linked with it, the conception that »by nature« people are unequal, on which fact depends the position in hierarchy that individual members of the society may take.

The p r i n c i p l e o f m a n ' s s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t presupposes social equality and such social conditions as may materialize this demand not only for s o m e but for a l l members of society. Socialism, which formulates this principle, is essentially opposed to societies that tolerate the existence of privileged and underprivileged strata. Therefore the question of social equality is the touchstone of a socialist society and, one may say, its main trial.

There are, however, two versions interpreting social equality, or rather the claims for the abolition of social inequality. Both represent a modification of the radical demand for implementation of social equality.[2]

One of the two versions modifies the principle of equality by »proving« that there is a »natural inequality« among people; the other justifies inequality which arises from the results of work. The former refers to »biological proofs«, the latter to »social interests«, while in fact, in both cases those »proofs« are taken for granted, without examination of their validity and weight.

What is then the position of those »proofs« which ought to convince us that a radical demand for social equality is a utopia.

Let us begin with »natural inequality«. It is a well known fact that people differ from one another not only by their outward appearances but also by their capacities, temperaments, interests. In this sense people are not equal i. e. they are n o t u n i f o r m. But to claim that is a different matter than »to prove« that people are unequal by nature, i. e. some are born capable, others uncapable, which implies further: that some are predetermined to be leaders — the elite, others to be led — the masses, etc. (One might go further in elaborating on what follows from it, but this is a familiar subject in social theories and relations).

Indeed some people are born with a higher IQ than others, and have more expressed capacities for action and creativity; some bring with them dispositions which will under conditions favouring it — make them passive, uninterested in active participation in social and cultural processes; others come into this world with considerably diminished potential to understand what goes on around them, and under conditions favourable for it — their intelect is blunted and their capacities crippled. All that can be proved

[2] The radicality of the demand is usually treated in a pejorative way nowadays — as »equality in poverty« or as »levelling«, which is in essence opposed to the principle of self-fulfilment of individual potentialities since the principle of self-fulfilment of individuals is replaced by the principle of exclusive interest of the community.

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with certainty by an empirical analysis. But an essential analysis must inquire into the c a u s e s of »natural inequality« of individuals, go behind the description and question the innteness of such fundamental differences.

Modern psychology, which is very much engaged in matters of early socialization and explains the personality structure of individuals on this basis, can offer evidence against the thesis that a person's unequal fundamental capacities are the result of man's »unequal biological nature« as his innate unchangeable features. The questions of biological and the so-called »social heredity« are closely linked, and it becomes evident that many of the so-called natural inequalities among people arise as the result of the transfer of certain socially determined dispositions, depending on the social and cultural conditions into which a child is born, and in which, most probably, his parents also lived (and often even his forefathers). The conditions of the child in the family depend in the first place on the social class to which the family belongs and the social and cultural opportunities the family has at its disposal. In this complex of factors parents appear to channel the socially »inherited« properties and abilities (or disabilities): since they reflect the social circumstances which have influenced their own formation on the one hand, and on the other, they transfer onto their children the shaped characteristics, habits and propensities as a given potential of their own personalities; in this way they lend them a primary frame in which the child's dispositions will be stimulated or quenched.

If such a process were observed over several generations it would be possible to determine that the essential differences — such as for instance, a pronounced creative potential in some people and a total lack of creativity in others, or a high degree of independence and keenness to act upon one's own principles as opposed to a total absence of independence and wish to shape one's own »self« — have developed through history as a result of diverging social and cultural conditions in which individuals were formed by being compelled to live under given circumstances. For, how else could we explain that a far greater number of capable, intelligent creative individuals have always come from the elite classes of society, while such people have been exceptions among the lower strata. Unless we accepted the view that elitism is something inborn; but in this case we would be in danger of biologizing society and social divisions — an approach rejected by modern science long ago.

In other words, inherited differences in fundamental human properties can be explained by differences developed in historical circumstances which separated men by various conditions of living, having been accumulated over generations and as such have appeared as »innate« properties of the progeny. Affiliations to various classes imply that the positive potentials have been stimulated in one group, while an other group's potentials have been permanently frustrated, which in historical perspective has resul-

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ted in: an accumulation of a greater number of capacities among the privileged classes, and vice versa, an accumulation of more limited abilities among the underprivileged. There is no need to prove that a child, whose parents have over generations belonged to higher cultural strata, brings at birth a higher human potential than the child whose ancestors have in a long line been exclusively manual workers deprived of even elementary culture.[3] Thus, what has been called »natural inequalities« and cannot be denied empirically, is in ultima linea the result of a long influence of social inequality and can be solved only by removing the source from which it springs. (This does not mean that all differences among men will be abolished, not even in the sense of better or less developed capacities; it only supposes that the abolition of social inequality will abolish the division into the *capable* and the *uncapable*, because favourable socio-cultural conditions for all members of the society may prompt the development of certain capacities to a certain degree in e v e r y man. The world in which individuals will be able to develop different capacities will certainly differ greatly from the present world where some are born capable and others must accept their position of the »less capable« as a »natural« law).

What are the social implications of such interpretation of »natural inequality« among people? This concept assumes that with social conditions changed essentially, the »natural inequality« will be transformed into natural differences in characteristics and propensities, with people having different capabilities, whereby no single individual could be classified in advance into an inferior group (with the exception of mentally retarded and disturbed persons, and even they should be treated as medical cases and not as less valuable in a social sense). The changed conditions would mean that all social and cultural values have been made accessible to all members of the society — without any privileges and rights to a greater share in the distribution of social and cultural goods originating from inherited titles or higher social statuses.

It is therefore a radical demand for the abolition of social inequality that can solve the problem of »natural inequality«, and make self-fulfilment of man operative as the principle of socialism. And vice versa, it is the error of petitio principii sophism, when the »proof« of »natural inequality«, has been used in argument against a radical demand for the abolition of social inequality, because the starting assumption has not been checked nor have the causes of the phenomenon been sought.

The justification of social inequality based on the results of work is also linked with avoidance of the question of how and

[3] It is here that the answer should be sought about the reproduction of those classes and of intelligentsia, since children of the lower strata are handicapped at the start in the race with children of the upper classes; they are deprived of that positive »social heredity« which would enable them to achieve better results with less effort in the process of schooling. But here too lies the touchstone of socialism as a more humane society which must provide help to overcome this injustice.

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w h y the various results of work have appeared, which is the base of important aspects of social inequality: unequal distribution of material goods, unequal opportunities of sharing in the culture (first of all in education) and unequal conditions for the achievement of certain social positions (even in the bourgeois sense, in the sense of social mobility). One of the reasons for various labour contributions by individuals is what has been discussed before, i. e. the reproduction of social inequality through »natural inequalities« already accumulated, whereby individuals born into favourable social conditions have considerably better opportunities to prepare successfully for their activities and occupations and achieve better results in work. The other cause, however, is of an entirely different nature and springs from the voluntaristic evaluation of labour, not as actual results of individual work but as socially evaluated kinds of work which are classified according to hierarchically ranked positions — not by their s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e (although productive workers have always been more important for the survival of any society than politicians, the latter have always been more estimated than the former). (According to this principle then, the higher up the ladder the social position connected with a given activity, the higher will be the a priori evaluation of the »result of work« — which is evaluated abstractly and independently of the realistic and concrete results achieved).[4]

And finally, self-reproduction of social strata decrees in advance that in a mass of peasants' and workers' children the majority will remain confined to those strata and will be trained only for certain vocations, usually those lower on the social ladder. The reproduction perpetuates social inequality and limits the room in which individuals from those layers will be able to develop their talents, expand their education and prepare successfully for promotion on the social ladder of professions and social positions.

If therefore, we try to reach the roots of the meaning of social differences which are due to the »results of work«, we must face these implications. And since in socialism too those differences hit mainly individuals from peasant and worker strata, the »natural inequalities« developed through history are cemented further, and the circle closes.

Obviously, as long as there is social inequality among people and strata of society, freedom remains a privilege — be it of a given class, group or the energetic individuals who have managed to fight it out for themselves. It has not yet become a common and fundamental condition for a humane living.

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[4] For, how to explain the fact that a manager gets awarded in spite of the losses of the enterprise, while workers receive diminished wages; the same analogy may be drawn from political life, where the bills for failures are not paid by those in command but by those who have had no influence in the »political mistakes« made.

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Freedom as understood in a wider humane (and not narrowly political) sense is linked to the principle of self-fulfilment of the personality and the realization of humane conditions of life. It follows just from such a determination of freedom that we are not concerned here with freedom for only some, exceptional individuals,[5] but with freedom as a way of life of each individual. One can say that the notion of freedom is here understood as »freedom for« and not in the limited sense of »freedom of« (as this distinction is made by Erich Fromm).

Such a view of freedom as a principle of social community points to the qualitative difference between the bourgeois and the socialist society, and between the bourgeois democracy and the social self-management.

In the bourgeois society freedom is understood, first of all, as the right to guarantee lawfulness and freedom of coercion, of repression, in order to protect civil rights in the sense of citizens' autonomy. In other words, bourgeois society cannot go beyond guaranteeing the rights to single individuals that they will not be prosecuted for their opinion expressed in writing or spoken, beyond protecting them from the state's arbitrariness to the extent that they a s c i t i z e n s must be free in order to be able to take part in the life (first of all as a free labour force) of bourgeois society.[6] But the bourgeois society stops here, bacause the bourgeois revolution proclaims f r e e d o m f o r t h e c i t i z e n and not a complete human liberation of the individual. It has not made the basic assumption for a total emancipation, because it is based on an economic (and thus a more widely social) inequality of individuals and classes and upon the exploitation and antagonism of class interests. Therefore the bourgeois society cannot stimulate freedom in a deeper humane sense — freedom for people to create the conditions of their own lives and take decisions when the important social problems are in question.[7]

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[5] Intellectuals often support first of all their own freedom, claiming freedom for creativity in culture; in my opinion, however, every true intellectual's first must be for the realization of freedom to live in a humane way with respect for every person's human dignity, which is much broader and more fundamental than freedom for creativity in culture, because the former concerns all members of the society and not only those who already enjoy the privilege of being makers of culture. If that claim is not posed, it may be possible to parade freedom of creativity to avoid seeing the true human reality for all those who are not makers of culture.

[6] This, of course, is the great achievement of the bourgeois society and should not be underestimated, which certainly is not the intent of the present treatise.

[7] Therefore the claim for self-management as a community of free people has been converted into the claim for »participation in management«, which does not exceed the borders of freedom in bourgeois sense, because it does not touch upon the basic achievements of the bourgeois society, but fits, as some followers of the »Left« point out, the programme of integration into the existing system.

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Freedom, understood as man's opportunity to develop without hindrance as a human being and release all his human potential in such social and cultural conditions as would prompt rather than hinder his development, means a qualitatively new determination of freedom which appears as the goal of the socialist society. In the name of such freedom revolutions have taken place, and in its name people have persisted on socialist ideas and movements in spite of the different experience of practical results in the countries with socialist systems.

Socialist society which accepts self-management as its principle cannot refrain from two essential prerequisites for the realization of a self-managing society: social equality and freedom understood in the sense given above (of course, the realization of freedom in the sense of guaranteeing fundamental civil rights is the first step towards achieving a wider scope of freedom).

Among the paradoxes which socialist systems — those which did not have bourgeois institutions already constituted nor the tradition of bourgeois democracy — had to face was the paradox of civil rights not realized together with socialist claims for the realization of those human rights which go far beyond bourgeois society. That is why it happened that the fundamental principle of communist society: »freedom of the individual is the prerequisite for freedom for all« was turned to »freedom for the impersonal collective« and »the sacrifice of individual interests in favour of the social interests«. In this context all civil rights have been proclaimed to be bourgeois prejudice, and instead of building the bridge for a fuller emancipation of men by realizing those rights, emancipation is rejected and with it the right of individuals to fight for their freedom. Therefore the question of civil liberties is still topical in socialist societies today, and when this question is posed it is not because it ends the struggle for human emancipation, but because this struggle c a n n o t e v e n b e g i n without it.

Unwillingness to acknowledge elementary civil rights, without which there is no freedom even in its most limited sense, is replaced by the thesis about unwillingness to stop at the achievements of the bourgeois society. (When it is said: bourgeois democracy cannot be the goal of socialism — which is true — people forget that without elementary achievements of bourgeois democracy as the basic instrument no foundations for self-management can be built, firstly because bourgeois democracy guarantees basic security to people enabling them thus to take part in it, and secondly it builds institutions in which at least the basic principles of democracy must be accepted, which in turn is a good »elementary school« for people to learn how to use freedom). And vice versa, supporting the guaranteeing of elementary civil rights, which is a basic condition for free participation in a self-managing society has been labelled as taking sides with the bourgeois society. (This turn was probably necessary to justify the reprisals, since it is impossible to explain in principle that perseverance on the

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At the same time, j u s t i c e as the social expression of humane right to equality and freedom is with incresing frequency being replaced by l a w f u l n e s s, so that what is socially allowed and what is not, is estimated according to the criterion of the law (whereby the fact, that law is an essential category of the state and the state an indispensable institution of class society, is forgotten instead of treating the law only as an instrument in bringing social justice to the society.

Since the law — as the legal expression of the ruling class-power and of the state as its institution — is essentially opposed to freedom as a human attribute (law can protect only certain rights which constitute the notion of »freedom prescribed« by the state), insisting on lawfulness implies inevitability of clashes with some of the basic principles of socialism, such as those mentioned before: equality and freedom (let us take only the terms in usage: legal and illegal affluence, limitation of the rights of people as citizens »for the sake of state security« etc.).

This does not mean that freedom tolerates anarchy in its popular sense. One forgets that between anarchy and law as the implement of the state there is a wide scale of more suitable social behaviour and control, such as for instance, free and responsible decision making by organized associations etc., which means that there is much more room left for individual and group initiative, than if the evaluation of the »possible« is carried out from one or more centres. Thus »organized freedom« in corresponding associations could appear as an alternative to traditional forms of coercion before which freedom vanishes as an attribute of the life of every member of the society, to survive only in its narrowest and most limited aspects — always as the privilege of only a few.

In contemplations of freedom it is necessary to point out those different meanings in order to understand what it means when certain societies claim that they respect freedom as the manner of behaviour of its members, which by itself need not be a false statement, but may mean rather different things. Therefore, until we have made it clear f o r w h o m a society guarantees freedom and w h a t kind of freedom it allows, we cannot judge on the degree of humanity achieved in that society.

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DEMOKRATIE UND DEMAGOGIE

Žarko Puhovski

Zagreb

Die *Gemeinschaft*, als die Weise ohne Identitätsverlust zusammen zu sein, braucht, schon immer Menschen, ihre Mitglieder, und die aus den Bedürfnissen der Menschen hergeleitete Idee, ihr Ziel. Die geschichtliche Wenden zeigen jedoch die ununterbrochene und unabwendbare Anwesenheit einer eigenartigen Wermittlung; das Organisieren der Bestrebungen zur Erreichung des vereinigenden Zieles trifft und vernichtet zugleich und unausweichlich die Anfangsvoraussetzung — die Menschlichkeit des Menschen. Die Frage nach der Verantwortung des Ideals der Gemeinschaft selbst für das spätere Geschehen; die Frage nach dem, nämlich, ob es möglich ist eine solche politische Transformation des ursprünglichen Bedürfnisses nach dem Zusammensein zu erreichen, die ihren Ursprung nicht »vergessen« würde, aber auch keine Vielfältigkeit des versteckten »Interpretierens« erlauben würde, ist wesentlich für die geschichtliche Ortsetzung verschiedener epochaler Erscheinungsformen der Gemeinschaft. Die Verzerrung des Ideals der Gemeinschaft durch die Vernachlässigung des initial--Bedürfnisses, oder dadurch daß man ein Lauf der Dinge ermöglicht, der nicht im Einklang ist mit dem, was der »Titel der Gemeinschaft« besagte, ist jedoch nicht nur ein Geschehen das durch die Sprache der Theorie, die der besagten Frage gewidmet ist, laut wird, sondern, von einem bestimmten Standpunkt auch der Inhalt der ganzen sogenannten politischen Historie.

Es gibt, natürlich, scheinbar eine Art, die einleitende Verwirrung schell und »wurzelhaft« zu lösen — es ist genug logisch daraus hinzuweisen, es sei lächerlich die Verlust des Menschen in der Gemeinschaftlichkeit zu bedauern, da sie ja selbst durch die Reduktion von Menschlichem entsteht, durch das Hipostasieren eines Budürfnisses (oder einiger) von den vielen Bedürfnissen die das menschliche Dasein voraussetzt. Wäre es also wirklich so, würde man mit einer unwidersprüchlichen Gerechtigkeit am En-

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The community, as the way to be together without loss of identity, has always needed people, its members, and the idea derived from people's needs, its goal. The historical turns, however, show the uninterrupted and inevitable presence of a peculiar mediation; the organizing of efforts to attain the unifying goal hits upon and at the same time and inevitably destroys the initial premise — the humanity of man. The question of the responsibility of the ideal of community itself for later events; the question of whether it is possible to achieve such a political transformation of the original need for togetherness that would not "forget" its origin, but also would not allow a variety of hidden "interpretations" is essential for the historical one Location of various epochal manifestations of the community. The distortion of the ideal of community by neglecting the initial

-Need, or by enabling a course of things that is not in accordance with what the "title of the community" meant, is not only an event through the language of the theory dedicated to the said question is, but, from a certain point of view, also the content of the whole so-called political history.

There is, of course, apparently a way of quickly and "rootlessly" resolving the initial confusion - it is logical enough to point out that it is ridiculous to regret the loss of the human in the community, since it itself arises through the reduction of the human , by hipostasizing a need (or some) of the many needs that human existence presupposes. So if it were really so, one would with an irrefutable justice at En-161

de notwendig das zurück bekommen womit man den Weg angefangen hat, würde sich die Sache restlos vereinfachen. Das ist jedoch nicht möglich — schon wegen der Sache selbst. Es ist zwar wahr daß jede Gemeinschaft in Beziehung zu einem *bestimmten* Bedürfnis des Menschen entsteht, aber alles was wir überhaupt über den Menschen und seine Besonderheit wissen, wissen wir über den Menschen in der Gemeinschaft, weil es einen anderen und veschiedenen einfach nicht gibt.

Es bleibt also noch weiter die Frage noch der Vermittlung die bezüglich der ursprünglichen Bedürfnisses und des Ziels der Gemeinschaft, bezüglich des Ziels der Gemeinschaft und ihrer Verwirklichhung, geschieht. Ohne solche Vermittlung gibt es, natürlich keine Gemeinschaft; *das Zusammenleben unter dem Zwang unvermittelter Bedürfnisse heißt, nämlich, Gesellschaft, für die Gemeinschaft ist die politische Vermittlung der Bedürfnisse in das bewußte Interesse aller notwendig* (die Tatsache daß man zusammen lebt weil der Ausgang (die Grenze) geschlossen ist, kann nicht als Gemeinschaft betrachtet werden, aber eine Gesellschaft formiert sich auch in dieser Situation). Und wenn auf der Ebene der Gesellschaft die Möglichkeit der Beständigkeit von so etwas wie einer »legalisierten« menschlichen Persönlichkeit überhaupt nicht fraglich ist (was, im Gegensatz, zum Beispiel, zur Meinung mancher marxistischen Ästhetiker, die Ursache des Mangels von großen Gestalten aus der produzierenden Klasse in den bekannten Werken der Literaturgeschichte ist, oder, im Gegensatz zu den Zeitgenössischen Sozialismustheoretikern, die Ursache des Mangels von Produzenten in den Entscheidungszentren) zeigt sich der Mensch also nur auf der Ebene des sogenannten Überbaus (was eigentlich eine Tautologie ist, weil der Überbau, oder die Kultur, nichts anderes ist als die isolierte Reserviertkeit der Menschlichkeit in den Bedingungen die eine solche Menschlichkeit tatsächlich und nicht nur für verfeinerte Elitisten unmöglich machen) so wird auf eine gewisse Weise die Frage nach der Vermittlung zur Frage des Hervorbringens des Unterschiedes im Artikulieren der Bedürfnisse, zur Frage über die Teilung der menschlichen Tätigkeit (über die Arbeitstrennung) die wenigstens das fiktive Äußern des sogenannten geistigen, scheinbar unengagierten schwebenden Überbaus bedingt.

Damit sich, zum Beispiel, das Bedürfnis nach einer Abwehr dem Feind gegenüber als ein Interesse artikulieren würde das aus dieser (prinzipiell negativen) Bestimmung heraus die Gemeinschaft fördern würde, muß ein *Bewußtsein* bestehen nicht nur darüber daß man sich zusammen mit anderen leichter wehrt, sondern auch, was eben wesentlich, ist, darüber daß es einen Grund geben muß daß sich eben diese Leute zusammen wehren müssen, der selbe Grund weshalb sie auch zusammen angegriffen werden. *Das Bewußtsein von einer gemeinsamen Qualität schafft aus einer Gruppe Menschen eine Gemeinschaft.* Nur auf dieser Ebene der Betrachtung läßt sich der Widerspruch zwischen zweien für die politische Philosophie wichtigen Bestimmungen des Bewußtseins

de necessarily get back what you started the way with, things would be completely simplified. This is not possible, however, because of the very nature of the matter. While it is true that every community arises in relation to a specific human need, all that we know at all about

man and his specificity, we know about the man in the community , because there is simply no other and different.

So there still remains the question of the mediation that takes place regarding the original need and the goal of the community, regarding the goal of the community and its realization. Without such mediation there is, of course, no communion; living together under the compulsion of unmediated needs means, namely, society, for the community the political mediation of needs in the conscious interest of all is necessary (the fact that one lives together because the exit (the border) is closed cannot considered as a community, but a society forms in this situation as well). And if at the level of society the possibility of the permanence of something like a "legalized" human personality is not at all in question (which, contrary, for example, to the opinion of some Marxist aesthetes, is the cause of the lack of great figures from the producing class in the well-known works of literary history, or, in contrast to the contemporary theorists of socialism, the cause of the lack of producers in the decision-making centers), man only shows himself on the level of the so-called superstructure (which is actually a tautology, because the superstructure, or the culture, is nothing other than the isolated reserve of humanity in the conditions which actually make such humanity impossible, not only for refined elitists) so in a certain way the question of mediation becomes the question of bringing about the difference in articulating needs, to the question about the division of human activity (about the separation of labor) which determines at least the fictitious appearance of the so-called intellectual, seemingly uncommitted floating superstructure.

So that, for example, the need to defend oneself against the enemy would articulate itself as an interest that would promote the community from this (principally negative) determination, there must be an awareness not only that one defends oneself more easily together with others, but Also, what is essential is that there must be a reason why these same people have to defend themselves together, the same reason why they are also attacked together.

The awareness of a common quality creates a community out of a group of people. It is only on this level of consideration that the contradiction between two determinations of consciousness that are important for political philosophy can be understood

versöhnen — zwischen *Fichtes* nach welcher »alles *Sein*, des Ich sowohl, als des Nicht-Ich, ist eine bestimmte Modifikation des Bewußtseins; und ohne ein Bewußtsein gibt es kein Sein«[1] und der Bestimmung von *Marx* daß »das Bewußtsein nie etwas Anders sein (kann) als das bewußte Sein« wobei »das Bewußtsein also von vornherein schon ein gesellschaftliches Produkt«[2] ist. Das Bewußtsein schafft nämlich tatsächlich die Gemeinschaft, ist jedoch auch selbst real (mit anderen Worten gesellschaftlich) bedingt und das Sein des Menschen in den verschiedenen konkreten Formen in denen er sich selbst gegenwärtig ist — ist der Mensch-Gemeinschaft, nämlich »der wirkliche Lebensprozeß der Menschen.«

Das wesentliche der Gemeinschaft ist nämlich das Bewußtsein über das Bedürfnis der Gemeinschaftlichkeit, alles was gedenkt eine Gemeinschaft weiterhin zu konstruiren muß dem gerecht werden. Die geschichtliche Vermittlung ist jedoch durch die Gestaltung der Gemeinschaft als Staat bezeichnet, »der Staat aber ist eine Gemeinschaft von Ebenbürtigen, (gebildet) zum Zwecke des bestmöglichen Daseins«,[3] so wird zum Grundwiderspruch des gemeinsammen Lebens der Menschen *die Frage nach dem Leben wegen der Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse — die Frage nach der Gesellschaft und die Frage nach dem Leben wegen der Realisierung des partiellen Interesses — die Frage nach dem Staat.* Aber, während die historischen Unterschiede der Arten die Gesellschaftlichkeit zu erreichen (in erster Reihe mit epochalen Unterschieden in der Gestaltung der Beziehungen deren Summe die Gesellschaft ausmacht verbunden) nicht wesentlich darauf wirkten was die Gesellschaft ist, haben die Veränderungen in der Weise den Staat zu organisieren, seit den Griechen als die Gemeinschaft überhaupt gilt, die Grundvoraussetzungen der Gemeinschaft wirklich in Frage gestellt. Weil nämlich obwohl der Staat die bewußt gemachten Bedürfnisse als Interessen ausdrückt ist für seine Erhaltung nicht mehr das Bewußtsein aller notwendig, sondern nur einiger weniger (mag das auch, wenigstens theoretisch, die Mehrheit sein); die anderen sind nicht mehr zusammen (kroatisch = für-das-Eine). Im Zustand in welchem sie sich befinden werden sie entweder durch den Zwang des Staates festgehalten (im diesen Sinne haben die Analysen der Macht, »die der menschlichen Fähigkeit, nicht nur zu handeln oder etwas zu tun (entspricht), sondern sich mit anderen zusammenschliessen und im Einvernehmen mit ihnen zu handeln«,[4] als historisch erste zur *Entblößung der allgemeinen Gemeinschaftlichkeit als, mutatis mutandis, herrschaftlichen Scheins gebracht),* oder durch das eigene Bestreben in dem gegebenen Rahmen *sein* eigenes Bedürfnis als gemeinsames Interesse aufzuzwingen (was, also, die Notwendigkeit des Bewußtseins über das

[1] J. G. Fichte, »Grundlage des Naturechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre«, Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1960, S. 2

[2] K. Marx — F. Engels, »Die deutsche Ideologie«, MEW, Dietz-Verlag, Berlin 1953, Bd. 3, S. 22, 27

[3] Aristoteles, »Aufzeichnungen zur Staatstheorie (Politik)«, Jakob Hegner, Köln 1967, S. 354, 28a 38

[4] H. Arendt, »Macht und Gewalt«, Piper Verlag, München, 1970, S. 45

reconciled - between Fichtes according to which 'all being, of the ego as well as of the non-ego, is a specific modification of consciousness; and without consciousness there is no being"1 and Marx's determination that "consciousness can never (can) be anything other

than conscious being” whereby “consciousness is therefore a social product from the outset”2. Namely, consciousness actually creates the community, but it is also itself really (in other words socially) conditioned, and the being of man in the various concrete forms in which he is present to himself — is the human community, namely “the real process of life People."

The essence of the community is namely the awareness of the need for community; everything that a community intends to continue to construct must do justice to it. However, historical mediation is characterized by the formation of the community as a state, "but the state is a community of equals, (formed) for the purpose of the best possible existence,"3 so the fundamental contradiction in the common life of people becomes the question of what Life because of the satisfaction of needs—the question of society, and the question of life because of the realization of partial interests—the question of the state. But, while historical differences in the ways of attaining sociability (primarily associated with epochal differences in the formation of relationships, the sum of which constitutes society) have not materially affected what society is, changes in ways have Organizing the state since the Greeks considered community at all really called into question the basic requirements of community. Because although the state expresses the needs made conscious as interests, the consciousness of all is no longer necessary for its maintenance, but only of a few (this may also be, at least theoretically, the majority); the others are no longer together (Croatian = for-the-one). In the state in which they find themselves, they are either held in place by the coercion of the state (in this sense, the analyzes of power "which (corresponds to) the human ability not only to act or to do something), but to associate with others and to act in agreement with them«4 as historically the first to expose general communality as, mutatis mutandis, a semblance of domination), or through one’s own endeavors within the given framework to impose one’s own need as a common interest (which, i.e , the necessity of consciousness about the 1 J. G. Fichte, "Fundamental of the natural right according to principles of science teaching", Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1960, p. 2

2 K. M arx — F. Engels, »Die deutsche Ideologic«, MEW, Dietz-Verlag, B erlin 1953, vol. 3, pp. 22, 27

3 Aristoteles, »Notes on State Theory (Politics)«, Jakob He egner, Koln 1967, p. 354, 28a 38

4 H. Arendt, »Macht und G ewalt«, Piper Verlag, Munich, 1970, p. 45

eigene Interesse für das Unternehmen von politischen Aktionen voraussetzt, und das Ungenügende des Wirkens auf Grunde unreflektierter Bedürfnisse).

So erscheint also erst im Bezug auf die scheinbare Gleichbedeutung von Staat und Gemeinschaft überhaupt, auf dem Horizont der Analyse die Nation, die Masse, oder das Volk. Während, nämlich, die verallgemeinerte und bestehende Gemeinschaft Individuen und ihr Bewußtsein voraussetzt, operiert der Staat notwendig, weil er territorial oder national, traditionell oder provisorisch gegeben wird und nur mit einem Teil der Leute verfügt deren Interesse mit dem seinem im Einklang ist, mit einer geteilter Bevölkerung. Noch vor dieser, oft trügerischen Teilung für und wider, teilt die Tatsache der Institutionalisierung der Technologie der Erhaltung der Gemeinschaft in einen eigenartigen Apparat die Menschen in der Gemeinschaft auf solche die Subjekte und solche die Objekte der Herrschaft sind. Es erscheint die Antinomie des Einzelnen und der Gattung, wobei das Bewußtsein der Gattung (= Wissenschaft für Feuerbach [5]) die Gemeinschaft konstruiert, das Bewußtsein des Einzelnen vorausetzend; oder es erscheint die Antinomie des Bürgers und der Nation, wobei der Bürger, de facto, der soziale Ausdruck des Bewußtseins über das Verfügen über ein gewisses »außer-politisches« Recht des Primats ist, ein politisches Subjekt das, sein Bewußtsein politisch ausdehnend, aber sein Substrat erhaltend, die Nation konstruiert.

Wie also erst sub specie des Staates Begriffe wie Bürger oder Volk, Einzelner oder Gattung ins Spiel kommen, so erscheint auch erst im Bezug auf den Staat, bzw. seine Herrschaft, das Phänomen der Unvollkommenheit des Menschen. Dem Menschen der zwischen den teilweise und zum hohen Preise in der Gesellschaft befriedigten Bedürfnissen und den mangelhaft konstruierten Interessen im politischen Leben, im Staat, zerrissen wird, diesem Menschen wird ein ursprüngliches, durch die Enttäuschung vermitteltes, Streben nach der Gemeinschaft zurück gegeben, nach einer Gemeinschaft die alles vereinigen würde und mit ihrer Ganzheit auch die Ganzheit des Menschen garantieren würde. Da sich jedoch in der (in jeder) epochal gegenwärtige Situation den Bestrebungen nach eigener Ganzheit die Bestrebungen nach einer eventuellen Ganzheit oder wenigstens das Recht daraus bei anderen entgegenstellt; da weder die Arbeitsteilung, noch die Teilung auf Arbeit und sogenannte kulturell-geistige Allgemeinheit die daraus folgt, die Neigung nach der Ganzheit logisch nicht erreicht, bleibt sie durch die Literatur vermittelt (die selbst schon auf einer hohen Ebene dieser Teilung begründet ist) durch die Tradition oder durch die Phantasie. *Die Bestrebung nach der Ganzheit ist jedoch politisch artikuliert nichts anderes als die Forderung nach Freiheit*, weil, ohne Rücksicht auf die Vielfalt der Bestimmungen, die Freiheit immer nur ein Name für den Zustand in dem sich der Mensch wahrhaftig verwirklichen kann ist.

[5] L. Feuerbach, »Das Wesen des Christentums«, Philipp Reclam Verlag, Stuttgart 1971, S. 37

own interest in undertaking political actions, and the insufficiency of action due to unreflected needs).

The nation, the masses, or the people only appear on the horizon of the analysis in relation to the apparent equality of state and community in general. While, namely, the generalized and established community presupposes individuals and their consciousness, the state operates necessarily because it is given territorially or nationally, traditionally or provisionally, and only disposes of a fraction of the people whose interests are aligned with its own , with a divided population. Even before this often deceptive division for and against, the fact of the institutionalization of the technology of maintaining the community into a peculiar apparatus divides the people in the community into those who are subjects and those who are objects of domination. The antinomy of the individual and the species appears, whereby the consciousness of the species (= science for Feuerbach ach 5) constructs the community, presupposing the consciousness of the individual; or there appears the antinomy of the citizen and the nation, the citizen being, de facto, the social expression of the consciousness of disposing of a certain "extra-political" right of primacy, a political subject who, politically expanding his consciousness, but preserving its substratum, the nation constructs.

Just as concepts such as citizen or people, individual or species only come into play sub specie of the state, the phenomenon of human imperfection only appears in relation to the state or its rule. The person who is torn between the needs that are partially and at a high price satisfied in society and the poorly constructed interests in political life, in the state, becomes an original striving for the community, mediated by disappointment given back, according to a community that would unite everything and with its wholeness would also guarantee the wholeness of man. Since, however, in the (in every) epochally present situation, the striving for one's own wholeness is opposed by the striving for a possible wholeness or at least the right from it in others; Since neither the division of labor, nor the division of labor and so-called cultural-spiritual universality that follows from it, logically does not reach the tendency towards wholeness, mediated by literature (which itself is already based on a high level of this division), it persists the tradition or by the imagination. Politically articulated, however, the striving for wholeness is nothing other than the demand for freedom, because, regardless of the variety of determinations, freedom is always just a name for the state in which man can truly realize himself.

5 L. Feuerbach, »The essence of Christianity«, Philipp Reclam Verlag, Stuttgart 1971, p. 37

Da die Freiheit als ein Wunsch, eine Neigung, ein Interesse, nur dann erscheint wenn die theoretische Gemeinschaft durch eine Art von praktischen Staat ersetzt wird der gleichzeitig auch von der Gesellschaft-der Produktion getrennt ist, sind die Voraussetzungen ihres immer konkreten Inhalts die Gestaltungen des Staates beziehungsweise der Gesellschaft in welcher sich die Forderung nach Freiheit stellt. Die Aussage daß die Gesellschaft für sich selbst genommen keine Freiheit kennt ist trivial, weil sich »das Ganze nur vermöge der Einheit der von seinen Mitgliedern erfüllten Funktionen (erhält). Generell muß jeder Einzelne, um sein Leben zu fristen, eine Funktion auf sich nehmen und wird gelehrt, zu danken, solange er eine hat.«[6] Die Funktionalität die die Gesellschaft perpetuiert ist nicht, um Mißverständnisse vorzubeugen, die *Verantwortung* (da »eine Person, die für ihre Tat Verantwortung tragen soll ... in ihren Entscheidungen und ihren Taten *frei* sein (muß)«,[7] noch ist es die gemeinsame Arbeit (weil dabei auch ein gemeinsames Bewußtsein über das Ziel der Arbeit besteht), die Funktionalität ist also das Eingeschaltetsein — das in selbe Leisten Geschlagensein — um (unmittelbar) das eigene Dasein und (mittelbar) das fremde Dasein zu sichern, sie bedeutet, einfacher gesagt, kein Annehmen, sondern ein Aufzwingen eines Teils der Arbeit deren Ganzes subjektiv, oder gar objektiv nicht bekannt ist.

Wenn sich in der, klassisch-theoretischen, Trennung der Gesellschaft vom Staat die Freiheit in der Gesellschaft nicht einmal als Forderung aufstellen läßt, der Staat aber auch der Forderung nach Freiheit und ihrer wenigstens teilweiser Begrenzung beruht, beruht die wesentliche Voraussetzung der Verschiedenheit der Forderung nach Freiheit (= der Verschiedenheit der Gestaltungen des Staates und der Gesellschaft) notwendig in einer »Sphäre« in der sich die Forderung nach Freiheit nict einmal aufstellen läßt. Jene Begrenzung die nicht einmal ein Gespräch oder das Schreiben über die Freiheit in ihren Voraussetzungen zuläßt, muß nämlich auch die Wurzel des ganzen Baumes sein, der historisch die so viel umweinte menschliche Ganzheit unmöglich macht (den verschiedenen Thesen über das Schreiben-Lesen-als-revolutionäres-Handeln müßte gesagt werden daß dies nur dann möglich wäre wenn man *innerhalb* (und nicht ausserhalb) der Bedingungen die Unfreiheit und damit auch die Begrenztheit auf das Zeichen ermöglichen, schreiben-lesen könnte). Von dieser Wurzel her kann eine mögliche Erforschung nach der Ganzheit-Freiheit ausgehen. Jede Erforschung jedoch die im sogenannten politischen Raum anfängt kommt nicht weit da man hier ein gewisses reduziertes Bild der Freiheit immer schon voraussetzt und jede andere Frage die weiter geht bleibt an »reservierte Termine«, gefesselt, oder wesentlicher, an Interessen die in dieser »Sphäre« anerkannt sind, die

[6] Th. W. Adorno, »Aufsätze zur Gesellschaftstheorie und Methodologie«, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1970, S. 138

[7] R. Ingarden, »Über die Verantwortung«, Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 1970, S. 67.

Since freedom appears as a desire, an inclination, an interest only when the theoretical community is replaced by some kind of practical state which is at the same time also separated from the community of production, the premises of its ever-concrete content are the

formations of the state or society in which the demand for freedom arises. The statement that society for itself knows no freedom is trivial, because

“(maintains) the whole only by virtue of the unity of the functions fulfilled by its members. In general, every individual must assume a function in order to make a living and is taught to give thanks as long as he has one.«c The functionality that society perpetuates is not, to prevent misunderstandings, responsibility (since » One person who is responsible for their act. Functionality is therefore being involved — being slammed into the same ledge — in order to (directly) secure one's own existence and (indirectly) that of others. To put it more simply, it does not mean accepting, but rather imposing a part of the work on its whole subjectively, or not at all objectively ˆ

is known.

If, in the classical-theoretical separation of society from the state, freedom in society cannot even be put forward as a demand, but the state is also based on the demand for freedom and its at least partial limitation, the essential presupposition is based on the difference in the demand Freedom (= the difference in the configuration of the state and society) is necessary in a "sphere" in which the demand for freedom cannot even be raised.

That limitation, which does not even permit a conversation or writing about freedom in its prerequisites, must also be the root of the whole tree, which historically makes the human wholeness so much mourned about impossible (the various theses about writing-reading-as-revolutionary action it had to be said that this would only be possible if one could enable the lack of freedom and thus also the limitation to the sign within (and not outside of) the conditions, writing-reading). A possible search for wholeness-freedom can proceed from this root.

However, any exploration that starts in the so-called political space does not get very far, since a certain reduced image of freedom is always already presupposed here, and any other question that goes further remains tied to "reserved dates", or, more importantly, to interests that are in this »Sphere« are recognized, the 8 Th. W. Adorno, »Essays on Social Theory and Methodology«, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1970, p. 138

7 R. Ingarden, »About Responsibility«, Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 1970, p. 67.

jedoch keine Ganzheit auf der Tagesordnung haben, da diese Ganzheit der bloßen Existenz dieser Interesse geopfert wurde, das heißt der »Sphäre« in der sie sich äußern.

Wenn die Freiheit nichts der realen Welt äußerliches ist, kein *actus purissimus,* ist sie also gesellschaftlich bedingt, obwohl gegen-gesellschaftlich gerichtet (oder, genauer, gegen die theoretische Teilung des Menschen auf gesellschaftliche und staatliche Teile), wenn sie für verschiedene Gruppen, Klassen, oder Stufen der Betrachtung verschieden ist, handelt es sich hier in erster Reihe um etwas das die eigene Möglichkeit des Subjekts ausdrückt »denn frei ist, was nur den Gesetzen seines eigenen Wesens gemäß handelt und von nichts anderem weder in noch außer ihm bestimmt ist«.[8] Die Gesetze des eigenen Wesens sind, nämlich, ihrem Ursprung nach nicht ganz persönlich, sie sind immer und überall im Geschehen begründet in dem das Eigentliche erst geschaffen wird — in der realen Produktion des Lebens.

Auch ohne eine systematischere Ausführung der historischen Folge der Umwandlungen in den Produktionsweisen überhaupt und in der Produktion des Lebens, läßt sich jedoch immerhin zeigen daß sich die Dichotomie Gesellschaft-Staat in der Gespaltenheit der Individuen jeder bisherigen Epoche widerspiegelt, aber auch im ständigen Prozeß ihrer politischen Formierung in eine Mehrheit, Masse, Volk (weil sie eben durch sich selbst nicht ganz sind) und diesen, wenn sie auch künstlich geschaffen werden, läßt sich sogar die Macht übertragen. Wenn man nämlich in diesem Zusammenhang über Demokratie redet, ist die Grundfrage wer das Volk ist, wie es geschaffen wird, wenn man die Beziehung zwischen dem Individuum und dem Gesetzen seines Wesens, das seiner Ganzheit oder Freiheit entspricht, erforschen möchte. »Ein größerer Grad bürgerlicher Freiheit scheint der Freiheit des *Geistes* des Volks vorteilhaft, und setzt ihr doch unübersteigliche Schranken«,[9] aber das Volk in diesem Sinne besteht auch erst unter der Voraussetzung des Bürgers, der Bürger wiederum erst unter der Voraussetzung eines bestimmten Systems der Produktion das entwickelt genug ist um eine theoretische Gleichsetzung aller zu erlauben und zu fordern, die man, übrigens zu Recht, bürgerliche Freiheit nennt.

Auf einer bestimmten Stufe der geschichtlichen Umwandlungen geschieht es also daß die Unterscheidung zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft ihre Gestalt bis zum Ende radikalisiert so daß der Staat den Ort der vollkommenen Gleichsetzung bezeichnet, die Gesellschaft jedoch den Ort der Differenziertheit, wobei der Staat gleichzeitig die Vereinigung zum Volk bezeichnet und die Gesellschaft die Trennung auf gegenseitig entgegengesetzte Einzelne. Der Stufe entspricht das politische System das man üblicherweise bürgerliche Demokratie nennt — das System in welchem die Freiheit im Rahmen der vorausgesetzten Unfreiheit der Produktion das

[8] F. W. J. Schelling, »Uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit«, Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart 1968, S. 101

[9] I. Kant, Werke, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1969, Bd. XI, S. 61

however, have no wholeness on the agenda, since that wholeness has been sacrificed to the mere existence of these interests, that is, to the

"sphere" in which they are expressed.

If freedom is nothing external to the real world, no actus purissimus, then it is socially conditioned, although directed against-socially (or, more precisely, against the theoretical division of man into social and state parts), if it is intended for different groups, classes , or stages of observation, it is primarily about something that expresses the subject's own possibility

"For what is free is what only acts according to the laws of its own being and is not determined by anything else either in or outside it."8 The laws of one's own being are, namely, in their origin not entirely personal, they are always and everywhere in the Happening is grounded in that what is essential is first created—in the actual production of life.

Even without a more systematic elaboration of the historical sequence of the transformations in the modes of production in general and in production. of life, it can nevertheless be shown that the society-state dichotomy is reflected in the split nature of the individuals of every previous epoch, but also in the constant process of their political formation into a majority, mass, people (because they are not are whole) and these, even if they are created artificially, can even be given power. Namely, when speaking of democracy in this context, the fundamental question is who the people are, how they are created, if one wishes to explore the relationship between the individual and the laws of his being, which corresponds to his wholeness or freedom. "A greater degree of civic freedom seems advantageous to the freedom of the people's spirit, and yet sets insurmountable limits on it,"9 but the people in this sense also only exists under the presupposition of the citizen, and the citizen in turn only under the presupposition of a specific system of production that is developed enough to allow and demand a theoretical equalization of all, which one rightly calls civil liberty.

At a certain stage of historical transformations, then, it happens that the distinction between state and society radicalizes its form to the end, so that the state designates the locus of complete equality, while society the locus of differentiation, with the state at the same time denoting union with the people denotes and society the separation upon mutually opposed individuals. The level corresponds to the political system that is usually called bourgeois democracy — the system in which freedom, within the framework of the presupposed lack of freedom in production, is 101

9 I. Kant, Werke, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 19C9, Bd. X I, S. 61

höchste Ideal ist. Die theoretische Freiheit ist jedoch auch die höchste Stufe der Forderung nach der Ganzheit des Individuums, wenn man sie nur als solche fordert; die Sache der praktischen Verwirklichung ist ganz verschieden — sie beginnt aus der Wurzel der historischen Unfreiheit selbst — der Produktion.

Für die Freiheit die nicht nur theoretisch wäre, nämlich für die Ganzheit des Menschen die seine Geteilheit nicht voraussetzen würde, ist die mit dem Anderen notwendig als »die reine Unendlichkeit des Rechts, seine Untrennbarkeit, reflektiert an dem Ding, dem Besondern selbst«.[10] Die Unendlichkeit des Rechts jedoch an dem Ding selbst reflektiert ist nichts anderes als die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Arbeit gehoben auf die Ebene der Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt — des Rechts. Weil nämlich jedes andere Recht schon durch sich selbst eine Rechtstheorie voraussetzt, diese jedoch einen besonderen Menschen im Bezug auf die Gesetzmäßigkeit eines bestimmten Staates und seinen Abgetrenntheit von der Gesellschaft. Von der anderen Seite kann die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Arbeit nur eine theoretisch gedachte allgemeine Gemeinschaft aushalten die sich darin konkretisiert. Ist die bürgerliche Demokratie die ausgesprochenste und höchste Stufe der Trennung von Staat und Gesellschaft, kann sich ihre Einheit, zu der jede Idee der Gemeinschaft strebt, nur in Folge des Aufhebens von allem was sie trennte entwickeln, durch eine verschiedene Beziehung zu dem ursprünglichen Bedürfnis des Menschen. Da die Arbeit gleichzeitig ein Bedürfnis des Menschen und das Mittel der Befriedigung anderer Bedürfnisse ist, da die Arbeit auch ein Interesse des Menschen ist, da sie durch die Befriedigung anderer Bedürfnisse auch das Bewußtsein über sie verlangt, da sie aber auch das Wesen des Menschen ist — weil sie die Produktion des Menschen überhaupt bedeutet, läßt sich also nur im Bezug auf diese Kategorie eine Gemeinschaft konstruieren die die historische Vermittlung, die sich in der Teilung auf Staat und Gesellschaft ausdrückt, überwinden würde. Und eine solche Gemeinschaft die auch die Freiheit für ihre Voraussetzung bedeutet, besitzt, soziologisch betrachtet, eine technisch-technologisch absolvierte Funktionalität, so wie die griechische Polis, die Sklaven und ihre Arbeit nicht anerkennend, auf eine gewisse Weise diese Funktionalität ebenfalls absolviert hatte, auf einer anderen Ebene der Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse.

Spricht man in diesem Sinne über die bürgerliche Demokratie und ihr Überwinden durch die Gemeinschaft — durch den Kommunismus, ist das Zwischenglied die unmittelbare Demokratie, (die keine Demokratie in vollem Sinne des Wortes ist, weil alle Einzelne herrschen, und nicht das von ihnen abstrahierte Volk) die Demokratie deren Gesetzmäßigkeit die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Arbeit ist während die Trennung zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat (paralell zum besagten technisch-technologischen Geschehen) im Übergang und provisorisch durch eine Gleichsetzung in der Arbeit

[10] G. W. F. Hegel, »System der Sittlichkeit«, Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1967, S. 29

highest ideal is. Theoretical freedom is, however, also the highest level of the demand for the wholeness of the individual, if it is only demanded as such; the matter of practical realization is quite different - it begins at the root of historical bondage itself - production.

For the freedom that is not only theoretical, namely for the wholeness of man, which would not presuppose his dividedness, freedom with the other is necessary as "the pure infinity of law, its inseparability, reflected in the thing, in the particular itself." However, the infinity of law reflected in the thing itself is nothing other than the lawfulness of work raised to the level of lawfulness in general - of law. Namely, because every other right already by itself presupposes a legal theory, but this presupposes a special person in relation to the legality of a certain state and its separateness from society. On the other hand, the lawfulness of work can only withstand a theoretically conceived general community that is concreted in it. If bourgeois democracy is the most pronounced and highest stage of the separation of state and society, its unity, to which every idea of community tends, can only develop as a result of the abolition of everything that separated it, through a different relation to the original need of the People. Because work is both a human need and a means of satisfying other needs, because work is also a human interest, because by satisfying other needs it also requires awareness of them, but because it is also the essence of man - Because it means the production of man in general, a community can only be constructed in relation to this category, which would overcome the historical mediation, which is expressed in the division between state and society. And such a community, which also means freedom for its prerequisites, possesses, from a sociological point of view, a technically and technologically completed functionality, just as the Greek polis, not recognizing the slaves and their work, had also completed this functionality in a certain way another level of need satisfaction.

In this sense, when one speaks of bourgeois democracy and its overcoming by the community - by communism, the intermediate link is direct democracy (which is not democracy in the full sense of the word, because all individuals rule, and not that of them abstracted people) democracy whose legitimacy is the legitimacy of work while the separation between society and state (parallel to the said technical-technological events) in transition and provisionally through an equation in work , Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1967, p. 29

und in der Beziehung zu ihr ausgeschloßen wird — durch eine Aufhebung der Möglichkeit also daß das Resultat der Arbeit jemandem anderen zufällt als dem Arbeiter, was jedenfalls bedeutet daß es gemeinschaftlich wird, weil die »Gemeinschaft« hier nur aus den Herstellern verschiedener Werke zusammengesetzt wird die in verschiedene Beziehungen treten. Das Interesse der Arbeit fordert daher gegenseitige Mitarbeit und die Verwaltung nach den Bedürfnissen dieser Mitarbeit und der eigenen Arbeit. *Das Entscheiden nach den Erfordernissen der eigenen Arbeit ist jedoch, noch für lange, das Entscheiden nach den Gesetzen des eigenen Wesens,* ist die Freiheit deren Inhalt das »unentfremdete Humanum« ist.[11] Beginnend mit dem Menschen der, als vollkommener, nicht ohne die Gemeinschaft die es nicht gibt auskommen kann, kommt man, über alle historischen Gestaltungen hindurch zu der Situation in der es sich zeigt daß die Gemeinschaft nicht möglich ist, aber »an die Reihe kommen wird« durch eine Ausgleichung der Gesetzmäßigkeit des Staates mit den ursprünglichen, nach eigenen Zwecken organisierten, Gesetzmäßigkeit der Gesellschaft.[12] Manchen Parolen gegenüber ist *das,* vielleicht, die *sozialistische Demokratie.*

Aber, die sozialistische Demokratie ist nicht nur das endgültige geschichtliche Geschehen, die Krone verschiedener Veränderungen in den Weisen den Staat zu organisieren, beziehungsweise die Gemeinschaft zu ersetzen, wie das in verschieden intonierten ideologisch-revolutionären Konzeptionen erscheint. Weil, sowohl historisch, als auch im Bezug auf ihre epochale Gegenwärtigkeit stellen die bürgerliche und die sozialistische Demokratie (denkt man daran was diese Begriffe auf Grund der folgenden Ausführung bedeuten können, und nicht an den tagespolitischen Gebrauch) die vollkommensten, aber auch unserer Zeit nächsten Formen der Artikulierung der Gemeinschaft. In diesen Formen erscheinen also alle wesentliche Charakteristiken der Ersetzung der Gemeinschaft, aber auch die Hinweise für ihre tatsächliche Festsetzung in der Wirklichkeit.

Das zeitgenössische Antlitz der »bürgerlichen« und der »sozialistischen« Demokratie ist durch die Krisis der Bestimmung der Gemeinschaft bedingt und auch durch die Krisis der Klassenteilung die daraus folgt. Obwohl, nämlich, wie schon gesagt, die Gemeinschaft eigentlich immer imaginär war, wenn man eine Gesellschaft im Ganzen betrachtete, hat in jeder Epoche für eine bestimmte Klasse (oder Gruppe) eine reale Gemeinschaft bestanden,

[11] E. Bloch, »Naturrecht und menschliche Würde«, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1961, S. 186

[12] Für die gesellschaftliche Gesetzmäßigkeit und die Beziehung zu »höheren Zielen« ist jedoch wichtig auch das daß »wer sich der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit vollkommen weiht und jedes andere *Heilige* ablehnt, bei sonst gleichen Bedingungen einen größeren Teil der sozialen Vorteilen erlangen wird, als wenn er einen Teil seiner Kräfte anderen (historischen) Zielen vorbehält. Diese Regel spricht lediglich das Prinzip der modernen Gesellschaft aus, so wie es sich dem Individuum zeigt.« (E. Weil, »Philosophie der Politik«, Luchterhand, Neuwied und Berlin 1964, S. 109)

and is excluded in relation to it - by eliminating the possibility that the result of the work falls to someone other than the worker, which in any case means that

it becomes communal because the "community" here is composed only of the makers of different works who enter into different relationships. The interest of the work therefore demands mutual cooperation and administration according to the needs of this cooperation and one's own work. Deciding according to the requirements of one's own work is, however, for a long time to come, deciding according to the laws of one's own being, is freedom, the content of which is the "unalienated human num."11 Beginning with the human being who, as a more perfect, cannot get by without the community that does not exist, one arrives, across all historical configurations, at the situation in which it shows that the community is not possible, but "it will come about" through a balancing of the laws of the state m with the original legitimacy of society, organized according to its own purposes.12

In relation to some slogans this is, perhaps, socialist democracy.

But socialist democracy is not just the final historical event, the crown of various changes in the ways of organizing the state, or replacing the community, as appears in variously intoned ideological-revolutionary conceptions. Because, both historically and in terms of their epochal presence, bourgeois and socialist democracy (if you think about what these terms can mean on the basis of the following explanation, and not the day-to-day political usage) are the most perfect, but also closest to our time forms of community articulation. All the essential characteristics of the replacement of community appear in these forms, but also the indications for its actual establishment in reality.

The contemporary face of "bourgeois" and "socialist" democracy is conditioned by the crisis of community destiny and also by the crisis of class division that ensues. Although, as already mentioned, the community was actually always imaginary when one considers a society as a whole, a real community has existed for a specific class (or group) in every epoch, according to E. Bloch, »Naturrecht und m human dignity«, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1961, p. 186

12 For social lawfulness and the relationship to “higher goals”, however, it is also important that “whoever devotes himself completely to social work and rejects every other sacred thing, all other things being equal will obtain a greater share of the social benefits than if it reserves part of its powers for other (historical) purposes. This rule merely expresses the principle of modern society as it appears to the individual.« (E. Weil, »Philosophic der Politik«, L uchterhand, N euwied and B erlin 1964, p. 109) 168

die für die anderen die Form eines Herrschaftsapparats bekam. In einer Epoche in der, durch die gleichen Formen des Staates vorgestellt, gleichzeitig, im Beziehung zu verschiedenen Klassen betrachtet, die reale und die imaginäre Gemeinschaft bestanden, gab es auch einen klaren und alltäglich sichtbaren Unterschied zwischen den Mitgliedern der auch auf diese Weise entgegengesetzten Klassen. Das ganze Geheimnis dieser Bestimmungen der Gemeinschaft bestand ja auch darin daß sie nur im Bezug auf einen Teil der Interessen die in der gegebenen Umwelt bestanden konstruiert waren, im Bezug nämlich auf die Interessen von nur einer Gruppe oder Klasse. Als diese Klassenunterscheidung in ihrer ganzen alltäglichen Schärfe unmöglich wurde, als sich die Interessen nicht mehr deutlich genug durch die immer gleicherwerdende Parolen unterschieden ließen, (weil, nach 1789, alle politische Parteien in der Öffentlichkeit ausschließlich mit allgemeinen Programmen hervortreten, mit Entwürfen für das unmittelbare oder künftige bessere Leben aller) als der Grundsatz des ideologischen Kampfes als der Kampf um das Recht auf die Allgemeinheit des gesellschaftlichen Interesses bestimmt wurde, hat sich das beschriebene »Gleichgewicht« einfach verflüchtigt. Zum anerkannten politischen Faktor wurden an statt der Klassen — die Masse, das Volk, die Nation.

Zeigte es sich also daß es unmöglich ist die zeitgenössischen Staaten nur als Gemeinschaften zu behandeln, beziehungsweise nur als Herrschaftsapparate für bestimmte gesellschaftliche Gruppen, ist auch die Möglichkeit von schnellen und wesentlichen Veränderungen der Institutionalisierung dieser Organe von gewissen Interessen fraglich. In einer solchen Situation, bleibt auch die »formell-marxistische« Analyse auf der Ebene der Entdeckung von »Gründen« warum die Dinge nicht so stehen wie sie, dieser Analyse zu folge, stehen sollten, oder man bleibt bei einem eigenartigen Beschimpfen der Macht da man die Analyse der wirklichen Interessen auf die sich jeder Marxismus beruft nicht so einfach durchführen kann, nicht auf die Art die für frühere Situationen charakteristisch war. Immerhin bestehen auch in der Epoche in der die Krisis der Gemeinschaft, beziehungsweise ihre Abwesenheit bis zum Ende gebracht ist zwei wesentlich verschiedene Arten die Idee der Gemeinschaft als einen möglichen politischen (oder sogar verfassungsrechtlichen) Programm zu artikulieren — die sogenannte bürgerliche und die sozialistische Art.

Man kann hier ohne die Absicht mit einer soziologischen, oder gar politologischen Analyse alle Züge die diese Arten die Gemeinschaft zu artikulieren bezeichnen (weil ein solcher wissenschaftlicher Zugriff auch eine andere Formulierung des Problems erfordern würde) doch durch einen Vergleich der Auffassungen gewisser geschichtlich veränderbaren politischen Grundbegriffe doch einige Elemente des genannten Unterschiedes in den Arten der Artikulation finden. Weil ohne Rücksicht auf verschiedene Bezeichnungen' auf ideologische Etiketten, eine ernste Analyse eben die Unterschiede in gleichen Grundbegriffen der verschiedenen

which for the others took the form of an apparatus of domination.

In an epoch in which, represented by the same forms of the state, the real and the imaginary community existed simultaneously, considered

in relation to different classes, there was also a clear and everyday visible difference between the members of the also in this way opposite classes. The whole secret of these determinations of the community consisted in the fact that they were only constructed in relation to a part of the interests that existed in the given environment, namely in relation to the interests of just one group or class. When this class distinction in all its everyday sharpness became impossible, when interests could no longer be distinguished clearly enough by slogans that became ever more similar (because, after 1789, all political parties appeared in public exclusively with general programs, with drafts for the Immediate or future better lives of all) as the principle of ideological struggle as the struggle for the right to the general public interest, the described has become

"Balance" simply evaporates. Instead of classes, the recognized political factor became — the masses, the people, the nation.

So if it turned out that it is impossible to treat contemporary states only as communities, or only as dominance apparatuses for certain social groups, the possibility of rapid and significant changes in the institutionalization of these organs of certain interests is also questionable. In such a situation, the remains

"formal Marxist" analysis at the level of discovery of

"Justify" why things are not as they should be according to this analysis, or stick to a peculiar insult to power since the analysis of real interests to which all Marxism appeals is not so easy to carry out, either in the way that was characteristic of earlier situations. After all, even in the epoch in which the crisis of community, or rather its absence, has been brought to an end, there are two essentially different ways of articulating the idea of community as a possible political (or even constitutional) program — the so-called civic one and the socialist kind.

One can, without the intention of using a sociological or even politicalological analysis, describe all the features of these ways of articulating the community (because such a scientific approach would also require a different formulation of the problem) but by comparing the views of certain Historically changeable basic political concepts can still find some elements of the mentioned difference in the types of articulation. Because regardless of different designations' on ideological labels, a serious analysis just the differences in the same basic concepts of the different 169

Systemen zeigen sollten. Das Begreifen der Geschichtlichkeit dieser Begriffe (wie es in dieser Skizze zur Analyse zum Beispiel die Begriffe Freiheit und Gleichheit sind) ist ein möglicher Weg des geschichtlich relevanten Durchdenkens historischer Formationen, aber auch der Entblößung jenes Types des Gebrauchs dieser Begriffe der sie als ein-für-alle-Mal-gegeben nimmt, als Namen die immer und unveränderbar ihren strikten Inhalt behalten.

Da hier die Geschichtlichkeit, über die die Rede ist, nicht ausgeführt wird, sondern nur im Rahmen der Begriffsanalyse des Prozesses der Ersetzung der Gemeinschaft ilustriert wird, genügt es bei den Begriffen Freiheit und Gleichheit zu bleiben. In der Epoche in der sich die Demokratie auch tatsächlich als eine Lebensform bekundet, weil das Volk, die Masse, die Nation auf die Szene des politischen Interessespiels kommen, werden Freiheit und Gleichheit zu den Grundwerten jedes politischen Programmes und jeder Aktion. Das immanente Ausführen in Rahmen von dem was man allgemein die bürgerliche Demokratie nennt, beziehungsweise das Konstruieren von Elementen einer möglichen sozialistischen Demokratie führt zu Erscheinung von klaren Unterschieden auch im Begreifen von dem Menschen scheinbar »natürlich gegebenen« Neigungen, wie es Freiheit und Gleichheit sind.

Da die bürgerliche Demokratie, auch ganz abstrakt genommen, den politischen Ausdruck einer gewissen Produktionsweise darstellt — auf die Ebene des Kampfes der Interessen gebrachte eigenartige Organisation der Arbeit — erklären sich auch alle ihre politische Grundkategorien in diesem Zusammenhang. Die Arbeit von der die Rede ist erfüllt ihre gesellschaftliche Funktion zweifach. Von einer Seite durch ihre primäre Bezeihnung — durch die Vermittlung mit der Natur, und von den anderen Seite durch ihr Hergeleitetes — durch das Schaffen von Eigentumverhältnissen Durch das »Befreien« der Werte aus der Natur schafft die Arbeit so die *Freiheit von der Natur* als ein Kennzeichen jener die, ohne Rücksicht auf die Weise, die *Entstellung der Arbeit durch das Einfügen des Eigentums* erreicht haben — die Arbeit kann jetzt unmöglich zum Bedürfnis werden, da sie die Bedürfnisse befriedigt, sie ist zum Interesse geworden das das Eigentum fördert. Die Freiheit von der Natur ist deshalb auch die Grundlage jedes bürgerlichen Begriffs der Freiheit, ihre Grundlage ist der Prozeß der Arbeit in welchem sich jeder (Werktätiger) aktiv zur Natur verhält, aber nur wenige die aktive Freiheit der Natur gegenüber haben die durch das Eigentum gegeben ist. Die Rechtsordnung, die auf dem Recht des Eigentums basiert, kann die Gleichheit nur als die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz begreifen, wobei die privateigentümliche Grundlage dieses Rechtssystems immer klar ist. Der Einzelne der durch das Eigentum erst möglich ist (das kommt zu seinem äußersten Ausdruck in Schleiermachers Gleichsetzung der Begriffe Individualität und Eigentümlichkeit), bekommt seine tatsächliche Gleichsetzung (durch das sogenannte Demokratisieren des Eigentums in der zeitgenössischen »Überflußgesellschaft«) erst in der Masse, im Volk, in der Situation nämlich in der alle ent-

systems should show. Understanding the historicity of these concepts (as, for example, the concepts of freedom and equality are in this sketch for the analysis) is a possible way of thinking through historical formations in a historically relevant way, but also of uncovering that

type of use of these concepts that sees them as one-for -every-time-given, as names that always and unchangeably retain their strict content.

Since the historicity that is being discussed is not explained here, but is only illustrated within the framework of the conceptual analysis of the process of replacing community, it is sufficient to stay with the concepts of freedom and equality. In the epoch in which democracy is actually manifested as a way of life, because the people, the masses, the nation come onto the scene of political interest, freedom and equality become the basic values of every political program and every action. The immanent execution within the framework of what is generally called bourgeois democracy, or the construction of elements of a possible socialist democracy, leads to the appearance of clear differences also in the understanding of people's seemingly "natural" inclinations, such as freedom and equality.

Since bourgeois democracy, even taken quite abstractly, represents the political expression of a certain mode of production—a peculiar organization of labor brought to the level of the struggle of interests—all its basic political categories can be explained in this context. The work we are talking about fulfills its social function in two ways. From one side through its primary designation — through mediation with nature, and from the other side through its derivation — through the creation of property relationships. By "liberating" values from nature, work thus creates freedom by nature as a mark of those who, regardless of the way, have achieved the distortion of labor through the incorporation of property — labor cannot possibly become a need now that it satisfies needs, it has become an interest that the property demands. Freedom from nature is therefore also the basis of every bourgeois concept of freedom, its basis is the process of work in which everyone (workers) actively relates to nature, but only a few have active freedom from nature through the property is given. The legal order based on the right of property can only understand equality as equality before the law, whereby the private-property basis of this legal system is always clear. The individual, who is only possible through property (this finds its utmost expression in Schleiermacher’s equation of the concepts of individuality and peculiarity), only gets its actual equation (through the so-called democratization of property in the contemporary »superfluous society«) in the mass, in the people, in the situation namely in which all ent-170

scheiden aber nur einige die Entscheidungen produzieren die die anderen »bringen«.

Die Chance der sozialistischen Demokratie ist prinzipiell eben darin *keine Demokratie zu sein,* auf dem unmittelbaren, also individuellen Entscheiden zu gründen, darin die Fiktion des Volkes und der Gesetzmäßigkeit seines Verhaltens als massenideologischen, oder totalitären durch das Einführen des Einzelnen in das politische Spiel aufzulösen, des Einzelnen der über sich selbst und andere selbst entscheidet. In diesem Sinne ist die Freiheit, die ein solcher System proklamieren könnte, nur die *Freiheit der menschlichen Natur,* und die Gleichheit auf der es ruht ist die *Gleichheit in der Selbstgesetzlichkeit* (der Autonomie). Die Gesetzlichkeit von der die Rede ist ist die Gesetzlichkeit der Arbeit die als Prozeß ohne Einführung jedweden Eigentums durchgeführt ist, weil, wie Marx in einem Fragment aus den »Grundrißen« sagt, »das Eigentum an fremder Arbeit durch das Eigentum an eigener Arbeit vermittelt ist«. Da erst in der Situation »der Befreiung der Arbeit« von der Einmischung des Eigentums die Rolle der Arbeit im Befriedigen der Bedürfnisse ein Teil des Bewußtseins wird, also ein Interesse, wird in einer solcher Konstellation die Gesetzlichkeit der Arbeit auch eine politische Gesetzlichkeit und das Unterscheiden zwischen der Gesellschaft und dem Staat läßt sich durch ein tatsächliches Aktuellisieren der Gemeinschaft lösen.

Aber, die Analyse hat kein Bedürfnis nach Träumen. Der gegenwertige Zustand, der gewöhnlich mit den Termine bürgerliche und sozialistiche Demokratie bezeichnet wird, ist andererseits ein Zustand der Autonomie der Unternehmer (oder, teilweise anders, der Manager), beziehungsweise ein Zustand der Autonomie »profesioneller Vertreter« der Produzenten (was im Namen der Situation in der angeblich dennoch die Produzenten herrschen dazu gebracht hat daß die Legalität des Deklarierens (alles was deutlich genug verkündigt wird, veröffentlicht wird, wird durch dieses bloße Bestehen legal) zur herrschenden Legalität wird, das Prinzip der Dreiteilung der Herrschaft ist im Zuge »der Suche nach wesentlich neuen Lösungen« ganz aufgegeben). Die Demokratie bleibt deswegen also noch für lange Zeit wesentlich ein demagogischer Schein. Ihr Gegensatz jedoch — *die autonome Selbstentscheidung* — bleibt noch an den Anfängen des Weges der hier, nur teilweise, theoretisch beschrieben wurde.

but only a few separate who produce decisions that "bring" the others.

In principle, the chance of socialist democracy lies in not being a democracy, in being based on direct, i.e. individual decisions, in the

fiction of the people and the lawfulness of their behavior as mass ideological, or totalitarian through the introduction of the individual into the political game to dissolve, of the individual who decides about himself and others. In this sense, the freedom that such a system could proclaim is only the freedom of human nature, and the equality on which it rests is equality in self-regulation (autonomy). The legality in question is the legality of work, which is carried out as a process without the introduction of any property, because, as Marx says in a fragment of the Grundrisse, "ownership of others' labor through ownership of one's own labor mediated«. Since only in the situation of "liberation of work" from the interference of property does the role of work in satisfying needs become part of consciousness, i.e. an interest, in such a constellation the legality of work also becomes political legality and that Distinguishing between society and the state can be resolved by actually actualizing the community.

But, the analysis has no need for dreams. The current state, which is usually denoted by the terms bourgeois and socialist democracy, is, on the other hand, a state of autonomy for entrepreneurs (or, to some extent different, managers), or a state of autonomy for "professional representatives". of the producers (which, in the name of the situation in which the producers supposedly nevertheless rule, has led to the legality of declaring (everything that is declared clearly enough being published becoming legal by its mere existence) becoming the ruling legality, the principle of D The division of power has been completely given up in the course of "the search for essentially new slogans"). For this reason, democracy will remain essentially a demagogic semblance for a long time to come. Its opposite, however—autonomous self-decision

— still remains at the beginning of the path that has been theoretically described here, only partially.

DIFFÉRENCIATION DE LA NOTION DE DÉMOCRATIE

Ljubomir Tadić

Beograd

La notion de démocratie a eu des interprétations très différentes dans son histoire vraiment longue; elle a été soutenue par des groupes sociaux hétérogènes, et aux temps modernes, surtout depuis la Révolution française, elle est, pour ainsi dire, l'objet d'une propagande continuelle ainsi que l'objet des manipulations les plus insolentes. Même les pires usurpateurs n'hésitent pas aujourd'hui à se qualifier de démocrates: tout homme qui détient le pouvoir et tout homme qui aime le pouvoir voudrait se parer du nimbe de tribun du peuple et voudrait devenir l'incarnation de la volonté du peuple. En même temps, rares sont les écrivains politiques et les écrivains juridiques qui n'attribuent pas le prestige de la théorie démocratique à leur théorie, de même que rares sont les idéologues et les apologistes qui ne se présentent pas »du point de vue démocratique«.

En dépit de tout cela, depuis les temps les plus anciens, la signification *authentique* de la démocratie est conservée jusqu'à nos jours.

La substance primordiale qui a conçu la démocratie était *l'égalité* des citoyens. Le système politique dans lequel le peuple a la suprématie, a été appelé par les vieux Hellènes *l'isonomie* ou *l'égalité de loi.* A vrai dire, »l'isonomie« avait avant tout un caractère mythologique et divin qui exigeait l'ordre d'égalité. Son nom témoigne de la compréhension »nomiste« du système étatiste dans lequel les lois égalitaires gouvernent. A l'origine le »nomos« n'avait pas le caractère tyrannique et usurpateur de la loi qui permettait la prise de possession de la terre commune, mais il était une sorte de norme qui était valable pour chacun. L'état d'après le »nomos« s'appelait *l'eunomie,* à condition que chaque »nomos« ait son »kairos« ou sa *»juste mesure«.* Et inversement: l'état contraire à l'eunomie s'appelait *la disnomie* ou *l'anomie.* Dans l'eunomie, c'est le *bon* »nomos« qui gouverne et c'est en lui que le droit

DIFFERENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

Love and Tadic

B eograd

The notion of democracy has had very different interpretations in its very long history; it has been supported by heterogeneous social groups, and in modern times, especially since the French Revolution, it is, so to speak, the object of continual propaganda as well as the object of the most insolent manipulations. Even the worst usurpers today do not hesitate to call themselves democrats: any man who holds power and any man who loves power would like to adorn himself with the nimbus of a tribune of the people and would like to become the incarnation of the will of the people. . At the same time, rare are the political and legal writers who do not attribute the prestige of democratic theory to their theory, just as rare are the ideologues and apologists who do not present themselves "from the democratic point of view". .

Despite all this, from the earliest times, the authentic meaning of democracy has been preserved to the present day.

The primordial substance which shaped democracy was the equality of citizens. The political system in which the people have the supremacy was called by the ancient Hellenes Visonomy or Equality of Law. To tell the truth, »isonomy« had above all a mythological and divine character which demanded the order of equality. Its name testifies to the »nomist« understanding of the statist system in which egalitarian laws govern. Originally the »nomos« did not have the tyrannical and usurping character of the law which allowed the taking possession of the common land, but it was a kind of norm which was valid for everyone. The state according to the »nomos« was called eunomia, provided that each »nomos«

has its »kairos« or its »just measure«. And conversely: the state contrary to eunomy was called disnomy or vanomy. In eunomia, it is the good »nomos« that governs and it is in him that the law 173

(»dike«) agit d'une manière *égalisante* sur la réalisation du bien-être, de l'apaisement et de la satisfaction. On pourrait dire que sans l'eunomie il n'y a pas *d'eudémonisme*, de bonheur humain non plus. Au contraire, l'état disnomique ou anomique est l'état de misère, de pénurie, de tyrannie et d'injustice, en un mot l'état du malheur du citoyen. »Dike« et »l'eunomie« consolident le polis d'après sa juste mesure.[1]

Il est naturel que dans un état qui ne connaissait pas la notion de la société dans sa signification contemporaine *non-politique*, »l'isonomie« se rapportait à la disposition égale des droits politiques au polis. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que c'étaient *les pauvres* qui mettaient en relief ces droits, si bien que les grands *réformateurs* Solon et surtout Klisten, ont *reconnu* clairement que les malheurs qui naissaient de la violence des puissants et des riches, et les souffrances que les pauvres et les exploités vivaient, étaient une menace dangereuse à l'existence du polis. Pour sauvegarder la liberté du polis (»eleutheria«), non tant la liberté du *territoire* qu'on peuplait, mais plutôt la liberté de la *communauté* humaine, il fallait créer les suppositions réelles de l'eunomie. Donc, la condition nécessaire de la liberté antique se trouve dans la limitation des richesses et l'égalisation des citoyens dans l'ordre d'une communauté *agraire* et *guerrière*. Il était clair aux réformateurs d'Athènes, de même que plus tard à Aristote, que les citoyens libres représentaient *deux parties* du polis que étaient *contraires* l'une à l'autre. Aristote soulignait au sur plus que »ce sont toujours les plus faibles qui demandent l'égalité et la justice, tandis que les plus forts ne s'occupent nullement de cela«[2]. Les réformateurs du rang d'eupatrides privilégiés *devaient* consentir aux réformes; étant donné que »les réformes sociales ne peuvent jamais être réalisées par la faiblesse du fort, elles doivent être réalisées et elles le sont par la force du faible«[3]. Quand les faibles, c'est-à-dire les pauvres, dans la vieille ville d'Athènes, ont assuré leur suprématie et pris le contrôle public des affaires communes du polis, »l'isonomie« ainsi que »l'eunomie« étaient alors possibles. Donc, dès que *l'exigence du droit* est devenue une *réalité politique* à Athènes au V^e^ siècle av. J. C., l'eunomie comprise d'une manière mythique et divine, en tant qu'utopie de droit et sociale, s'est transformée en système *kratistique*, en »katalein ton demon« ou »le pouvoir du peuple«. La démocratie est devenue le force des faibles que les privilégiés *devaient respecter*[4].

Dans sa signification politique, l'égalité a été garantie par la participation efficace des pauvres à la politique et elle a été as-

[1] Comp. Erik Wolf, *Griechisches Rechtsdenken*, I, Frankfurt a/M. 1950, p. 66; Christian Meier, *Entstehung des Begriffs »Demokratie«*, Frankfurt a'M. 1970, p. 13—60; Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis*, 1945.

[2] Comp. Aristote, *Politika*, Beograd, 1960, p. 205.

[3] Comp. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke, Bd. 4, Berlin 1959, p. 298.

[4] Meier (p. 41—45) renvoie à la similitude et à la différence entre les verbes »archein« et» kratein«, c'est-à-dire entre les noms »archê« et »kratos« en grec. Ces notions convergent dans les significations »gouverner« et »le gouvernement«, mais elles proviennent le surces différentes. »Archein«

(»dike«) acts in an equalizing way on the realization of the well-being

-being, appeasement and satisfaction. One could say that without eunomy there is no eudemonism, nor human happiness. On the

contrary, the disnomic or anomic state is the state of misery, scarcity, tyranny and injustice, in a word, the state of the citizen's misfortune. »Dike« and »eunomy« consolidate the polis according to its proper measure.1

It is natural that in a state which did not know the notion of society in its contemporary non-political meaning,

»isonomy« referred to the equal disposition of political rights to the polis. But we must not forget that it was the poor who emphasized these rights, so that the great reformers Solon and especially Klisten clearly recognized that the misfortunes which were born of the violence of the powerful and the rich, and the sufferings that the poor and the exploited lived, were a dangerous threat to the existence of the polis. To safeguard the freedom of the polis (»eleutheria«), not so much the freedom of the territory that was populated, but rather the freedom of the human community, it was necessary to create the real assumptions of eunomy. Therefore, the necessary condition of ancient freedom is found in the limitation of wealth and the legalization of citizens in the order of an agrarian and warlike community. It was clear to the Athenian reformers, as it was later to Aristotle, that free citizens represented two parts of the polis that were opposed to each other. Aristotle emphasized even more that “it is always the weakest who demand equality and justice, while the strongest do not bother about that”2. The reformers of the rank of privileged eupatrids had to consent to the reforms; given that “social reforms can never be achieved by the weakness of the strong, they must be achieved and they are achieved by the strength of the weak”3. When the weak, i.e. the poor, in the old city of Athens secured their supremacy and took public control of the common affairs of the polis, »isonomy« as well as »eunomy« were then possible. Therefore, as soon as the demand for law became a political reality in Athens in the fifth century BC. J. C., eunomy understood in a mythical and divine way, as a legal and social utopia, was transformed into a kratistic system, into “katalein your demon” or “the power of the people”. Democracy has become the strength of the weak that the privileged had to respect 4.

In its political significance, equality has been guaranteed by the effective participation of the poor in politics and has been as-1 Comp. Erik W olf, G riechisch es R ech tsd en ken , I, Frankfurt a/M. 1950, p. 66; Christian Meier, E ntsteh un g des B egriffs »D e m o k ra tie«, Frankfurt

:i'M. 1970, p. 13—60; H einim ann, Nom os u nd P h ysis, 1945.

2 Comp. Aristotle, Politics, Beograd, 1960, p. 205.

3 Comp. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Work, Bd. 4, Berlin 1959, p. 298.

4 Meier (p. 41—45) refers to the similarity and difference between the verbs »arehein« and »kratein«, i.e. between the nouns »arehe« and »kratos« in Greek . These notions converge in the meanings »to govern« and

»the governm ent«, but they come from different surces. »Areeh«

surée par le rôle *compétent* de *l'assemblée populaire* en tant qu' organe des citoyens égaux au polis. La démocratie était l'ordre où tous les ans les citoyens se succédaient au pouvoir d'après le principe de l'égalité. Dans la communauté qui ne connaissait pas l'opposition moderne entre la société et l'Etat, mais qui connaissait seulement le partage en *une minorité riche* et en *une majorité pauvre* des citoyens libres, la démocratie signifiait, contrairement à l'oligarchie, *le gouvernement de la majorité pauvre et libre.* Cette caractéristique est restée pour toujours la seule détermination *authentique* de la démocratie. A son opposé, *l'oligarchie* signifiat dans l' Antiquité *le gouvernement de la minorité riche.*

La différenciation de la notion de démocratie ainsi que de la notion d'oligarchie commence seulement dans l'histoire plus nouvelle. Cette différenciation est liée à l'ascension historique mondiale de la classe bourgeoise et de sa idéologie dominante. Mais avant cette ascension ou parallèlement à elle, c'était la lutte des pauvres contre la minorité privilégiée dominante qui durait. Elle commence par le soulèvement de la »jacquerie« française au XIV^{e} siècle et par le conflit du »popolo minuto« avec le »popolo grosso« dans les villes italiennes médiévales, et elle se poursuit dans la guerre des paysans en Allemagne au XVI^{e} siècle, dont le reflet est la rébellion des paysans croates de Matija Gubec. Toutes ces luttes ont un caractère expressivement démocratique et elles se prolongent dans les révoltes des paysans du XIX^{e} siècle dans les pays où les rapports féodaux étaient restés prédominants. La Réforme religieuse de Luther suscitait chez les paysans insurgés l'espoir en la résurrection de la justice chrétienne et de l'égalité. Mais ces espoirs, comme Thomas Münzer l'a dit d'une manière théorique, ont été brutalement trahis par l'engagement résolu de Luther pour les intérêts des princes allemands et par son appel à la répression des paysans insurgés et à leur persécution comme représentants de l'esprit de Satan même. Le protestantisme luthérien a ainsi annoncé l'arrivée »de l'esprit du capitalisme«[5].

La vraie renaissance de la notion originelle de démocratie réapparaît avec les révolutions au XVII^{e} et au XVIII^{e} siècle, dont les représentants les plus conséquents sont les »diggers« de la révolution anglaise ainsi que le courant égalisateur-communiste des »sans-culottes« de la Révolution française. Leurs héritiers légaux sont les communards de Paris au XIX^{e} siècle et les prolétaires russes révolutionnaires au XX^{e} siècle. Aut temps modernes la notion authentique de démocratie était liée étroitement aux *révolutions* et non aux *réformes* qui, en règle générale, la dénaturaient

provient de »commencer«, »conduire«, et »kratein« de »vaincre«, »être plus fort«. Le nom »kratos« signifie »la suprématie« et »la victoire«. C'est pourquoi, d'après Meier, la position de »demos« pouvait être mieux indiquée avec »kratein« qu'avec »archein«. »Demos« ne gouverne pas sans condition, mais tout en provient et tout peut être déterminé par lui. Mais il n'est pas très clair pourquoi à côté des expressions: démocratie, aristocratie, ploutocratie, ohlocratie, on emploie l'expression »oligarchie« qui signifie également le gouvernement?

[5] Voir plus largement dans mon livre Tradicija i revolucija *(Tradition et révolution)*, Beograd 1972.

assured by the competent role of the People's Assembly as

organ of citizens equal to the polis. Democracy was the order in which citizens succeeded each other in power every year according to the

principle of equality. In the community which did not know the modern opposition between society and the State, but which only knew the division into a rich minority and a poor majority of free citizens, democracy meant, unlike oligarchy, the government of the poor and free majority.

This characteristic has always remained the only authentic determination of democracy. In contrast, oligarchy meant in antiquity the government of the wealthy minority.

The differentiation of the notion of democracy as well as the notion of oligarchy begins only in the newer history. This differentiation is linked to the global historical rise of the bourgeois class and its dominant ideology. But before this rise or parallel to it, it was the struggle of the poor against the dominant privileged minority that lasted. It begins with the uprising of the French »jacquerie« in the 14th century and with the conflict between »popolo minuto« and »popolo grosso«

in medieval Italian cities, and continues in the peasant war in Germany in the sixteenth century, reflected in the rebellion of the Croatian peasants of Matija Gubec. All these struggles have an expressively democratic character and they continue in the revolts of the peasants of the nineteenth century in countries where feudal relations had remained predominant. Luther's Religious Reformation raised hopes among peasant insurgents for the resurrection of Christian justice and equality.

But these hopes, as Thomas Miinzer put it in a theoretical way, were brutally betrayed by Luther's resolute commitment to the interests of the German princes and by his call for the suppression of the insurgent peasants and their persecution as representatives of the spirit of Satan himself. Lutheran Protestantism thus heralded the arrival of the "spirit of capitalism".

The true revival of the original notion of democracy reappeared with the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, whose most significant representatives were the "diggers" of the English revolution as well as the equalizing-communist current of the

»sans-culottes« of the French Revolution. Their legal heirs are the communards of Paris in the 19th century and the revolutionary Russian proletarians in the 20th century. In modern times the authentic notion of democracy was closely linked to revolutions and not to reforms which, as a general rule, distorted it. “. The name

»kratos« signifies »suprem aty« and »victory«. This is why, according to M eier, the position of »demos« could be better indicated with »kratein« than with »arehein«. »Demos« does not govern unconditionally, but everything stems from it and everything can be determined by it. But it is not very clear why alongside the expressions: democracy, aristocracy, plutocracy, ohlocracy, we use the expression “oligarchic” which also means government?

s See more widely in my book Tradicija i revolucija (T radition

and revolution), Belgrade 1972.

toujours. »Le peuple« en tant que substrat démocratique et révolutionnaire était toujours représenté par les *pauvres*, mais la notion de »pauvres« changeait avec les époques historiques, c'est-à-dire d'après le contenu de la discrimination d'état ou de classe.

Dans le cadre du droit naturel rationnel, la notion moderne de démocratie se développait dans la confrontation directe avec *l'arbitraire* du pouvoir absolutiste monarchique en tant que forme contemporaine de la *tyrannie*. Par ses conséquences *radicales*, le droit naturel rationnel est lié à la compréhension *révolutionnaire* de la démocratie comme »souveraineté du peuple« qui se protège à l'aide du droit du peuple à la révolution, lorsque le gouvernement trahit la confiance du peuple. Dans ses conséquences *modérées*, le droit naturel rationnel comprend la démocratie en tant qu'ordre de la *liberté* dans lequel le pouvoir étatiste est *limité*, et par ce fait son arbitraire est déjoué. Cette conception de la démocratie est exposée d'une manière représentative dans le »Tractatus theologico-politicus« de Spinoza. D'après lui tout pouvoir qui tâche de s'élargir également à la pensée, est violent. Spinoza considère que dans la démocratie ainsi que dans »l'Etat libre«, »chacun peut penser ce qu'il veut et peut dire ce qu'il pense«. Encore plus: personne ne peut renoncer à la liberté de sa propre pensée parce que tout homme a »le droit imprescriptible« d'être maître de ses pensées. Bien que le pouvoir puisse être »offensé par les mots«, il est impossible de priver les citoyens de la liberté de parler, parce qu' »il est impossible que tous les hommes aient la même opinion sur toutes les choses et que tous disent la même chose«. D'après Spinoza, la liberté de la pensée est une vertu qu'on ne peut étouffer, et elle est indispensable au progrès de la science et de l'art »qui ne sont soignés d'une manière réussie et heureuse que par les hommes qui jouissent de la liberté totale et non troublée du raisonnement«. Spinoza a clairement compris que la privation de la liberté de la pensée et de son expression est une supposition de la corruption de la nature et du caractère. Dans ce cas-là les hommes »penseront une chose et diront une autre« d'où le mensonge, la flatterie odieuse et l'hypocrisie naîtront. Si le pouvoir essaie d'empêcher la liberté de la pensée à l'aide des *lois*, alors ces lois ne peuvent pas être tournées contre les coupables, mais contre les hommes libres. Spinoza considère que ces »lois inutiles« seront violées »seulement par ceux qui aiment les chosse sublimes et les plus belles«. Dans les Etats où on étouffe par force la liberté de la pensée, on persécute les citoyens »parce qu'ils pensent différemment de la masse et parce qu'ils ne savent pas feindre«. D'après Spinoza, une seule leçon tirée de cette scène sera la suivante: ou il faut prendre exemple sur les martyrs nobles de la liberté de la pensée, ou il faut devenir les lâches flatteurs des tourmenteurs[6].

Par son enseignement et sa vie, Spinoza connut la fureur des tourmenteurs et des flatteurs, mais depuis ce temps-là *la pensée*

[6] Comp. Spinoza, *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, Beograd, 1957, p. 244—253.

always. "The people" as a democratic and revolutionary substrate was always represented by the poor, but the notion of "poor" changed with the historical eras, that is-

that is, according to the content of state or class discrimination.

Within the framework of rational natural law, the modern notion of democracy developed in direct confrontation with the arbitrariness of monarchical absolutist power as a contemporary form of tyranny. Through its radical consequences, rational natural law is linked to the revolutionary understanding of democracy as the "sovereignty of the people" which is protected by the people's right to revolution, when the government betrays the trust of the people. In its moderate consequences, rational natural law understands democracy as an order of freedom in which state power is limited, and thereby its arbitrariness is thwarted. This conception of democracy is presented in a representative way in Spinoza's »Tractatus theolo-gico-politicus«. According to him, any power which tries to extend itself also to thought is violent. Spinoza considers that in democracy as well as in the "free state", "everyone can think what he wants and can say what he thinks". Even more: no one can renounce the freedom of his own thought because every man has the "imprescriptible right" to be master of his thoughts. Although power may be "offended by words", it is impossible to deprive citizens of the freedom to speak, because

»it is impossible for all men to have the same opinion on all things and for all to say the same thing«. According to Spinoza, freedom of thought is a virtue that cannot be stifled, and it is indispensable to the progress of science and art "which are successfully and happily nurtured only by men. who enjoy complete and untroubled freedom of reasoning. Spinoza clearly understood that the deprivation of freedom of thought and its expression is a supposition of the corruption of nature and character. In this case the men

»will think one thing and say another« from which lie, odious flattery and hypocrisy will be born. If power tries to prevent freedom of thought by means of laws, then these laws cannot be turned against the guilty, but against free men. Spinoza considers that these »useless laws« will be violated »only by those who love the sublime and most beautiful things«. In states where freedom of thought is forcibly stifled, citizens are persecuted "because they think differently from the masses and because they do not know how to pretend".

According to Spinoza, a single lesson drawn from this scene will be the following: either we must take the example of the noble martyrs of freedom of thought, or we must become the cowardly flatterers of the tormentors.

Through his teaching and his life, Spinoza knew the fury of tormentors

and flatterers, but since that time the thought 6 Comp. Spinoza, T racta tu s theolog ico-politicus, Beograd, 1957, p. 244—

—253.

libre est devenue l'élément constitutif et essentiel de toute vraie démocratie.

Mais dans le cadre du droit naturel rationnel, c'est l'idéologie du libéralisme bourgeois qui s'est développée à l'opposé de la démocratie. Ce qui est caractéristique de cette idéologie, c'est la séparation de la liberté de l'égalité en tant qu'éléments contitutifs de la démocratie, ou plus exactement: la compréhension de la liberté en tant qu' *entreprise libre* et la soumission fonctionnelle de la notion de l'égalité à cette notion de la liberté. Déjà chez Voltaire se manifeste le rapport ambivalent envers l'égalité qui est pour lui en même temps la chose la plus naturelle et la plus chimérique. Diderot s'exprime de la même façon. L'égalité n'a aucune indépendance conceptuelle et sert également à l'idéologie libérale seulement en tant que catégorie pure et formelle[7]. Déjà chez Montesquieu l'égalité se réduit seulement à l'égalité devant la loi, c'est-à-dire au droit de faire tout ce que la loi (formelle) permet de pouvoir faire. Locke, par exemple, refusait explicitement de reconnaître toutes les sortes d'égalité. Les physiocrates en tant qu' idéologues du libéralisme économique affirmaient que toute égalité *réelle* serait non seulement chimérique, mais aussi contre-naturelle. Ils défendaient résolument la thèse que l'inégalité réelle est fondée sur »la loi naturelle« et sur »l'ordre naturel«. Pour Mercier de la Rivière, l'inegalité *naturelle* conditionne l'inégalité *social* les hommes »ne peuvent pas être réellement égaux, étant donné qu'ils sont par nature inégaux en talents, force et qualitées du corps et de l'esprit«[8].

La rigueur de l'opposition entre le libéralisme et la démocratie s'est manifestée surtout dans les luttes entre les Girondins et les Jacobins. Elle a duré en France jusqu'à l'année révolutionnaire de 1848, quand Lamartine demanda à la bourgeoisie française de ne pas refuser l'idée de la démocratie si elle ne voulait pas tout perdre devant le flot de la colère du peuple. Depuis lors, le libéralisme conservateur a une conception de la démocratie conservatrice dont »la formule politique« consiste en l'assurance de la suprématie constante de *la minorité riche* par l'intermédiaire de *la majorité électorale*. Avec une notion si dénaturée de la démocratie, il est possible de dissimuler le gouvernement réel de l'oligarchie dans la société moderne.

Nous rencontrons dans le bonapartisme une autre forme de la manipulation de la notion de démocratie. Sa formule du pouvoir est exprimée dans cette maxime de Napoléon: »La confiance d'en bas, le pouvoir d'en haut«. Avec cette formule, le gouvernement du plébiscite pseudodémocratique césarien se renouvelle dans l'histoire moderne. La pratique arcane des dictatures contemporaines depuis Napoléon I[er] jusqu'à Hitler et Stalin, s'en réfère également »au peuple« et à sa volonté pour justifier son existence. A l'aide d'un succédané de démocratie, les dictatures plébiscitaires

[7] Comp. Adré Vachet, *L'idéologie libérale*, Paris 1970, p. 212.

[8] Cité d'après: Vachet, p. 329.

freedom has become the constitutive and essential element of any true democracy.

But within the framework of rational natural law, it is the ideology of

bourgeois liberalism which has developed in opposition to democracy. What is characteristic of this ideology is the separation of freedom from equality as constituent elements of democracy, or more exactly: the understanding of freedom as a free enterprise and the functional submission of the notion of equality to this notion of freedom. Already in Voltaire the ambivalent relationship towards equality is manifested which is for him at the same time the most natural and the most chimerical thing.

Diderot expresses himself in the same way. Equality has no conceptual independence and also serves liberal ideology only as a pure and formal category. Already in Montesquieu equality is reduced only to equality before the law, that is-

i.e. the right to do whatever the (formal) law allows one to do. Locke, for example, explicitly refused to recognize all kinds of equality. The Physiocrats as

ideologues of economic liberalism asserted that any real equality would not only be chimerical, but also unnatural. They resolutely defended the thesis that real inequality is based on "natural law" and on "natural order". For Mer-cier de la Riviere, natural inequality conditions social inequality: men “cannot be really equal, given that they are by nature unequal in talents, strength and qualities of body and mind. “8.

The rigor of the opposition between liberalism and democracy was manifested above all in the struggles between the Girondins and the Jacobins. It lasted in France until the revolutionary year of 1848, when Lam artine asked the French bourgeoisie not to refuse the idea of democracy if they did not want to lose everything before the flood of the anger of the people. Since then, conservative liberalism has a conception of conservative democracy whose

- the political formula “consists of the assurance of the constant supremacy of the rich minority through the intermediary of the electorate majority. With such a distorted notion of democracy, it is possible to conceal the real government of the oligarchy in modern society.

We encounter in Bonapartism another form of manipulation of the notion of democracy. Its formula for power is expressed in this maxim of Napoleon: "Confidence from below, power from above". With this formula, the government of the Cesarean pseudo-democratic plebiscite is renewed in modern history. The arcane practice of contemporary

dictatorships from Napoleon I to Hitler and Stalin also refers to "the people" and their will to justify their existence.

With the help of a substitute for democracy, the plebiscitary dictatorships 7 Comp. Adre Vachet, L’ideo lo g ie lib erale, Paris 1970, p. 212.

8 Quoted from: Vachet, p. 329.

luttent très efficacement contre la démocratie même, en combinant la violence avec la confiance manipulée de la masse non-critique, qui est privée de toutes les libertés réelles de citoyen et à laquelle il est imposé de devoir opter pour les décisions arbitraires déjà prises par le pouvoir césarien, et de les accepter, en les *acclamant* et en les soutenant. C'est pourquoi dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, la tâche la plus importante de tous les démocrates convaincus est d'ôter le viole idéologique, tant de l'oligarchie dissimulée par le libéralisme que de la tyrannie démagogique dissimulé par le plébiscite. Cette tâche est avant tout le premier souci du communisme critique.

fight very effectively against democracy itself, by combining violence with the manipulated confidence of the non-critical mass, which is deprived of all the real freedoms of citizenship and on which it is imposed to have to opt for the decisions already arbitrated taken by

the Cesarean power, and to accept them, cheering and supporting them. This is why in the world today, the most important task of all convinced democrats is to remove the ideological violation, both from the oligarchy concealed by liberalism and from the demagogic tyranny simulates by the plebiscite. This task is above all the first concern of critical communism.

LA CRITIQUE DE LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE ET LES NOUVELLES FORMES DE LUTTE

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Je voudrais seulement proposer à la discussion quelques remarques sur l'importance de l'élaboration d'une critique politique de la vie quotidienne en rapport avec les nouvelles formes de lutte qui s'y déploient, en insistant sur la nécessité de définir dès à présent les différences qui devraient exister entre une société socialiste et capitaliste au niveau de la dialectique des besoins, cela, à partir des thèses d'Henri Lefebvre et d'Herbert Marcuse, mais aussi de nos discussions précédentes sur les nouvelles formes d'actions ouvrières, que Mario Spinella a analysé à propos de l'exemple italien.

I

LE MARXISME COMME CRITIQUE DE LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE

Il est évident que cette critique de la vie quotidienne est déjà présente sous la plupart de ses aspects théoriques dans les textes de Marx et d'Engels: il suffit de rappeller les premiers textes de Marx sur la ramassage du bois mort dans les forêts allemandes et les pages du *Capital* sur l'argent et le fétichisme de la marchandise où luers les pages de la *Situation des classes laborieuses en Angleterre* qui jettent les fondements de la problématique urbaine, en ahalysant l'évolution des grandes villes anglaises — Manchester, Liverpool — pour s'en convaincre. Cette critique de la vie quotidienne chez Marx se développe à travers une

- Critique de l'existence aliénée
- Critique du travail aliéné
- Critique des besoins aliénés

FORMS OF FIGHT

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P aris

I would simply like to offer for discussion a few remarks on the importance of the elaboration of a political critique of everyday life in relation to the new forms of struggle unfolding there, insisting on the need to define presents the differences that should exist between a socialist and a capitalist society at the level of the dialectic of needs, based on the theses of Henri Lefebvre and H erbert Marcuse, but also on our previous discussions on new forms of action workers, which Mario Spinella has analyzed in connection with the Italian example.

I

MARXISM AS A CRITICISM OF LIFE

DAILY

It is obvious that this critique of everyday life is already presented in most of its theoretical aspects in the texts of Marx and Engels: it suffices to recall Marx's first texts on the collection of dead wood in the forests. German cities and the pages of Capital on money and the fetishism of commodities or read the pages of The Situation of the working classes in England which lay the foundations of the urban problematic, by analyzing the revolution of the big English cities — Manchester, Liverpool — to be convinced. This criticism of

of everyday life in Marx develops through a

— Critique of alienated existence

— Critique of Alien Labor

— Critique of alien needs

— Critique des rapports bourgeois (ex: Critique des rapports familiaux dans le *Manifeste du Parti Communiste)*

— Critique de la liberté négative bourgeoise

Engels enfin, développe une critique de l'existence urbaine à partir de la Misére anglaise, dont Lefebvre nous a montré récemment toute la valeur, et insiste sur l'importance de la ville — comme marché du travail et de la production — jusqu'à l'importance de la ville-état, du mode de production asiatique. Il est intéressant de suivre toutefois les autres grandes étapes de cette critique politique de la vie quotidienne.

La première étape fut peut-être réalisée par la Révolution d' Octobre. Les premiéres réalisations du communisme en URSS ont été la concrétisation de cette critique marxiste du quotidien. L'ébranlement des institutions, l'élaboration, la recherche de nouvelles formes de vie traversent toutes les oeuvres de cette époque. Il suffit pour s'en convaincre de relire quelques poèmes de Majakowski, comme le célébre *DESEMBOURBEZ L'AVENIR:*

L'avenir
Ne viendra pas tout seul,
si nous
ne prenons pas des mesures.
Attrape-le par les oui'es Komsomol!
Attrape-le par la queue, pionnier!
La commune
n'est pas une princesse féérique
pour que d'elle
on rêve la nuit (. . .)
Le communisme
ne réside pas seulement
dans la terre
dans la sueur des usines
Mais aussi chez soi
à table
dans les rapports,
la famille
les moeurs . . .

C'est la question qui traverse tous ses poémes, lorsqu'il s'interroge à propos des Communistes, sur ce que seront leur vie, leurs sentiments, leurs désirs. Il faudra inclure dans cette étape, toute la nouvelle législation sur la famille, la réforme de la pédagogie et aussi toutes les oeuvres de Kolonataï Geschelina, Vera Schmidt, Makarenko, qui sont autant de symboles de cette critique.

La seconde grande étape me semble être réalisée en Allemagne, à la veille de la montée du nazisme, par l'action militante de Wilhem Reich, le premier psyhanalyste communiste, à tenter une double critique de l'aliénation économique et instinctuelle à partir de Marx et Freud. Tous les écrits de Reich sur le rôle néfaste de l'idéo logie bourgeoie, la faille patriarcale, la morale sexuelle hypocrite du capitalisme, ses analyses du rapport entre la misére et la pau-

— Critique of bourgeois relations (ex: Critique of family relations in the Manifesto of the Communist Party)

— Critique of bourgeois negative freedom

Finally, Engels develops a critique of urban existence based on English Misery, the value of which Lefebvre recently showed us, and insists on the importance of the city — as a market for labor and production — until has the importance of the city-state, of the Asian mode of production. It is interesting to follow, however, the other major stages of this political critique of everyday life.

The first stage was perhaps carried out by the Revolution of

October. The first achievements of communism in the USSR were the concretization of this Marxist critique of everyday life. The shaking of institutions, the elaboration, the search for new forms of life run through all the works of this period.

To be convinced of this, it suffices to reread a few poems by Majakowski, such as the famous DESEMBOURBEZ U AVEN IR: L'avenir

Won't come alone

if we

don't take action.

Grab him by the Komsomol gills!

Grab it by the tail, pioneer!

The municipality

is not a fairy princess

for that of her

we come back at night (...)

The communism

don't just reside

In the ground

in the sweat of the factories

But also at home

a table

in reports,

family

the mores . . .

This is the question that runs through all his poems, when he wonders about the Communists, about what their life, their feelings, their desires will be. It will be necessary to include in this stage, all the new legislation on the family, the reform of pedagogy and also all the works of Kolonatai Geschelina, Vera Schmidt, Makarenko, which are so many symbols of this criticism.

The second major step seems to me to have been taken in Germany, on the eve of the rise of Nazism, by the militant action of Wil-hem Reich, the first communist psychoanalyst, in attempting a double critique of economic and instinctual alienation from from Marx and Freud. All of Reich's writings on the harmful role of bourgeois ideology, the patriarchal flaw, the hypocritical sexual morality of capitalism, his analyzes of the relationship between misery and poverty.

vreté sont autant d'éléments qui montrent l'importance d'une critique politique, conduite à partir de Marx et Freud, de la misére oppressive du quotidien. A la veille de la montée du nazisme, Reich comprend qu'il est possible de mobiliser les ouvriers, surtout les jeunes, à partir d'une critique politique de la vie quotidienne, notamment une critique de la misère instinctuelle.

La troisiéme étape me semble incarnée par les travaux de l'Ecole de Francfort qui réunit en 1933 Marcuse, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin. La recherche par Marcuse d'une »philosophie concrète« à partir d'oeuvres contradictoires — Lukàcs, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Husserl — est l'annonce d'un nouveau tournant dans la recherche théorique. Les travaux d'Adorno et Horkheimer sur la personnalité autoritaire annoncent l'importance des recherches ultérieures telles que celles de Mitscherlich sur la *Société sans péres.*

L'oeuvre d'Henri Lefebvre est l'étape peut-êtr la plus décisive de cette élaboration de la critique de la vie quotidienne car sur le plan théorique, elle aboutit à l'élaboration d'une théorie de la quotidienneté, de la modernité qu'il n'a cessé d'enrichir par la suite. Alors qu'il est membre du Parti communiste, Lefebvre publie cette oeuvre magistrale qu'est la CRITIQUE DE LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE et d'autres études comme celle sur *Rabelais* qui sont la recherche d'un champ d'investigation particulier. La philosphie, sans cette dimension concrète du quotidien, est vide et par ailleurs, le quotidien, à l'état brut, est aveugle. Lefebvre tente d'élaborer une théorie de la quotidienneté qui échappe à ces différents écueils, Par la suite sa réflexion s'enrichit de nouveaux centres d'interêts intimement liés à ses préoccupations précédentes: Combats idéologiques qu'il mène à propos de l'Existentialisme, du structuralisme, étude de la sociologie rurale et de la métamorphose du monde paysan, étude de la sociologie urbaine, du langage social, de la civilisation urbaine, du mythe de la ville (à propos de la commune de Paris) et enfin ses derniers travaux, qui tentent d'élaborer une nouvelle problématique de l'espace urbain et, de son rapport avec la politique.

L'une des derniéres étapes me semble rèprésenter par les travaux publiés par Marcuse sur la société américaine. *Eros et Civilisation* est l'une des interrogations les plus fondamentales élaborées à partir du marxisme et de la psychanalyse, sur le sens de la civilisation moderne et de nos réalisations technologiques. *L'homme Unidimensionnel* est l'une des études les plus importantes — après *la Foule Solitaire* de Riesman — de l'évolution des sociétés capitalistes et de la totalitarisation des formes de vie. *Vers la libération* est une tentative pour comprendre à partir des différentes brèches qui s'ouvrent dans l'univers capitaliste, les nouveaux facteurs de dissolution, telle cette sensibilité esthético-érotique que Marcuse voit incarnée par la jeunesse américaine, qui laisse espérer une soubversion générale du système ou du moins un lent et efficace travail de sape.

Je rappelle ces différents élements pour souligner que nous avons déja tous les élements théoriques pour élaborer une critique

truth are all elements that show the importance of a political critique, based on Marx and Freud, of the oppressive misery of everyday life. On the eve of the rise of Nazism, Reich understood that it was possible to mobilize workers, especially young people, based on a political

critique of daily life, in particular a critique of instinctual misery.

The third stage seems to me embodied by the work of the Frankfurt School which brought together in 1933 Marcuse, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin. Marcuse's search for a »concrete philosophy«

from contradictory works - Lukacs, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Husserl - is the announcement of a new turning point in theoretical research. Adorno and Horkheimer's work on the authoritarian personality announces the importance of later research such as that of Mitscherlich on the Society without fathers.

The work of Henri Lefebvre is perhaps the most decisive stage in this elaboration of the critique of everyday life because on the theoretical level, it leads to the elaboration of a theory of the everyday, of the m odernity which he continued to enrich thereafter. While he was a member of the Communist Party, Lefebvre published this masterful work, the CRITIQUE DE LA VIE QUOTI

DIENNE and other studies like the one on Rabelais which are the search for a particular field of investigation. Philosophy, without this concrete dimension of everyday life, is empty and moreover, everyday life, in its raw state, is blind. Lefebvre attempts to develop a theory of everyday life which escapes these various pitfalls. Subsequently his reflection is enriched by new centers of interest intimately linked to his previous concerns: Existentialism, structuralism, study of rural sociology and the metamorphosis of the peasant world, study of urban sociology, social language, urban civilization, the myth of the city (about the commune of Paris) and finally his latest works, which attempt to develop a new problematic of urban space and its relationship with politics.

One of the last stages seems to me to be represented by the works published by Marcuse on American society. Eros and Civilization is one of the most fundamental questions elaborated from Marxism and psychoanalysis, on the meaning of modern civilization and our technological achievements. One-Dimensional Man is one of the most important studies —

after Riesman's Solitary Crowd — of the devolution of capitalist societies and the totalitarianization of forms of life. Toward Liberation is an attempt to understand, from the different breaches that are opening up in the capitalist universe, the new factors of dissolution, such as this aesthetico-erotic sensitivity that Marcuse sees embodied by American youth, which leaves hope rer a general subversion of the

system or at least a slow and effective work of undermining.

I recall these different elements to underline that we already have all the theoretical elements to develop a critique 181

politique de la vie quotidienne et qu'il reste à trouver les moyens de concrétiser cette théorie critique en nouvelles formes d'action et de propagande.

II

LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE COMME EXPRESSION DES NOUVELLES CONTRADICTIONS DU CAPITALISME

L'importance de toutes les recherches sur la critique de la vie quotidienne se trouve renforcée par une série de faits:

Le quotidien, à tous les niveaux de la vie sociale, est devenu obsédant. Par sa médiocrité croissante, sa tristesse, son ennui, la vie quotidienne s'est imposée au centre de toutes nos préoccupations: politiques, esthétiques, philosophiques. Il suffit de penser au cinéma européen et américain: L'*Année dernière à Marienbad, La Salamandre, Charles Mort ou vif, Easy Rider, Petits meurtres sans importance* sont autant d'illustrations de la saturation oppressive du quotidien, de sa médiocrisation croissante. Tous les films de J. L. Godart sont autant d'illustrations de cette préoccupation du quotidien: la vie quotidienne d'*A bout de souffle* à *Pierrot le Fou,* le rapport entre l'individu et la société moderne, la misére urbaine sont autant de thémes sans cesse rebattus. Si on prend la littérature, la poésie, on voit que le quotidien n'a cessé de s'imposer depuis le Surréalisme au centre de toutes les reflexions. Dans le réalisme classique — Balzac, Tolstoi, Nekrassov, Pouchkine — il est évident que la vie quotidienne tenait déja une trés grande place, mais ce qui est nouveau, dans les oeuvres modernes, c'est que le vide du quotidien devient presque l'unique théme. Des oeuvres telles que *Feu Follet* de *Drieu-la-Rochelle* qui exprimait le vide d'une vie bourgeoise, *La Nausée,* de Sartre, *l'Etranger* de Camus étaient déjà des symboles important. Le nouveau roman prend ce vide de la vie comme théme central et le renforce par ses descriptions minutieuses du vide, de l'inintéressant: le meurtre d'une petite fille n'a pas plus d'importance chez Robbe-Grillet que le vol d'une montre. Enfin *Ulysse* de James Joyce peut être considéré comme la première description d'une journée mondiale, universellement vide.

Au niveau politique, l'importance du quotidien n'a cessé d'être soulignée car c'est au niveau du quotidien que semblent éclater de nouvelles formes de lutte: les revendications ouvrières deviennent de plus en plus qualitatives et non plus quantitatives. Ce n'est plus seulement pour plus d'argent que l'on se met en gréve mais pour réclamer le temps de vivre. On demande une amélioration des conditions de travail, de vie, de logement, la diminution des cadences.

La lutte de classes ne se limite plus aux luttes de l'usine, elle se poursuit dans les rues, les HLM, elles s'empare de nouveaux objets — la division de la ville l'exigence d'une auto-gestion généralisée de la vie quotidienne — comme l'anillustré en Italie les

politics of daily life and that it remains to find the means to concretize this critical theory in new forms of action and propaganda.

II

DAILY LIFE AS AN EXPRESSION OF

NEW CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM

The importance of all research on the critique of everyday life is reinforced by a series of facts:

Everyday life, at all levels of social life, has become obsessive. By its growing mediocrity, its sadness, its boredom, daily life has imposed itself at the center of all our concerns: political, aesthetic, philosophical. Just think of European and American cinema: Last Year in Marienbad, The Salamander, Charles Dead or Alive, Easy Rider, Small Murders Without Importance are all illustrations of the oppressive saturation of everyday life, of its growing mediocrity. All of J. L. Godart's films are so many illustrations of this preoccupation with daily life: daily life from A bout de soujle to Pierrot le Fou, the relationship between the individual and modern society, urban misery are all themes without stop hackneyed. If we take literature, poetry, we see that everyday life has continued to impose itself since Surrealism at the center of all reflections. In classical realism—Balzac, Tolstoy, Nekrassov, Pushkin—it is obvious that everyday life already held a very large place, but what is new in modern works is that the emptiness of everyday life becomes almost single theme. Works such as Feu Follet by Drieu-la-Rochelle, which expressed the emptiness of a bourgeois life, La Nausee by Sartre, The Stranger by Camus were already important symbols. The new novel takes this emptiness of life as its central theme and reinforces it with its meticulous descriptions of the empty, the uninteresting: the murder of a little girl is no more important to Robbe-Grillet than the theft of a watch. Finally Jam es Joyce's Ulysses can be considered as the first description of a world day, universally empty.

At the political level, the importance of everyday life has never ceased to be underlined because it is at the level of everyday life that new forms of struggle seem to break out: workers' demands are becoming more and more qualitative and no longer quantitative. It is no longer just for more money that we go on strike but to demand the time to live. We are asking for an improvement in working conditions, living conditions, housing, a reduction in production rates.

The class struggle is no longer limited to the struggles of the factory, it continues in the streets, the HLM, it seizes new objects - the division of the city the demand for a generalized self-management of the daily life — like the anillustre in Italy the 182

récents mouvements revendicatifs, des travaux théoriques comme eux de Lotta Continua: »*Aujourd'hui nous prenons les maisons, demain nous prendons la ville*«.

C'est encore ce nouveau type de revendications qui éclatent dans les »grèves sauvages« d'Europe occidentale: »sauvages« car elles sont déclenchées souvent sans preavis, par la base et non par les syndicats et que les revendications qualitatives pour lesquelles elles éclatent ne trouvent pas toujours à s'exprimer dans les programmes des syndicats.

Enfin, il fait citer toutes les oppositions sauvages: celles des étudiants, des marginaux, d'une large fraction de la jeunesse des pays capitalistes qui, en dehors des partis, déclenche une offensive généralisée contre le système à partir des différents niveaux d'oppression du quotidien, transformant tous ces secteurs d'oppression en autant de secteurs de luttes.

Tous ces faits nous conduisent à nous demander s'il ne serait pas possible de décrire de nouvelles contradictions du capitalisme au niveau du quotidien:

— Contradiction entre la productivité atteinte et l'usage destructeur qui en en est fait.

— Contradiction entre le niveau de bien être atteint par les uns et la misére dans laquelle s'enlisent les autres et cela, non seulement au niveau planétaire, mais national. Comme le dit Sartre: »Le tiers monde commence dans la banlieue«.

— Contradiction entre les possibilités de libération atteinte par la technique à l'égard du travail, de la misére et de la souffrance et la création continuelle de nouvelles sources d'oppression.

Si cette thése est exacte, alors il convient aussi de se demander s'il est possible de faire de tous les secteurs de la vie quotidienne de nouveaux secteurs de luttes et si nous n'entrons pas dans une nouvelle phase du capitalisme où les luttes ne s'effectueront plus toujours au nom des mêmes mots d'ordre traditionnels. Le socialisme deviendrait, comme l'a montré dans sa conférence Rudi Supek, une véritable exigence biologique et la lutte pour le socialisme une lutte de civilisation.

En partant de Marx comme de Freud, il semble qu'il soit possible de décrire une sorte de limite de l'alienation. Dans les sociétés capitalistes, et même en général les sociétés industrielles avancées, on peut se demander si cette limite n'est pas aujourd'hui atteinte et si on n'assiste pas aujourd'hui à une prise de conscience sans précédent. Il semble que l'étonnant mélange d'oppression, de barbarie et de bien-être qui définit le style de vie capitaliste ne puisse s'éterniser. Ci cette consience nouvelle de l'aliénation, consience qui entraîne une révolte aussi bien esthétique, instinctuelle, morale, que politique es généralisait dans le prolétariat, il pourrait s'agir de la plus violente des révoltes et l'allurance üue la société capitaliste la plus puissance ne peut pas éternellement accroître son bien-être, avec ce niveau de vie et d'oppression, en exportant allègrement du napalm et des télévisions en couleur.

recent protest movements, theoretical works like those of Lotta Continua: “Today we take the houses, tomorrow we take the city“.

It is again this new type of demand that breaks out in the "wildcat strikes" of Western Europe: "wildcat" because they are often triggered without notice, by the base and not by the unions and that the qualitative demands for which they break out do not always find expression in the programs of the trade unions.

Finally, he cites all the savage oppositions: those of the students, the marginalized, a large fraction of the youth of the capitalist countries which, outside the parties, unleashed a generalized offensive against the system from the different levels of oppression. everyday life, transforming all these sectors of oppression into so many sectors of struggle.

All these facts lead us to wonder if it might not be possible to describe new contradictions of capitalism at the level of everyday life:

— Contradiction between the productivity achieved and the destructive use made of it.

— Contradiction between the level of well-being achieved by some and the misery in which others are bogged down and this, not only at the planetary level, but nationally. As Sartre says:

»The Third World begins in the suburbs«.

— Contradiction between the possibilities of liberation attained by technology with regard to work, misery and suffering and the continual creation of new sources of oppression.

If this thesis is correct, then we should also ask ourselves if it is possible to make all the sectors of daily life new sectors of struggle and if we are not entering a new phase of capitalism where the struggles do not will no longer be carried out in the name of the same traditional watchwords. Socialism would become, as shown in his lecture Rudi Supek, a real biological requirement and the struggle for socialism a struggle for civilization.

Starting from Marx as from Freud, it seems that it is possible to describe a kind of limit of alienation. In capitalist societies, and even in general advanced industrial societies, one can wonder if this limit has not been reached today and if we are not witnessing today an unprecedented awareness. It seems that the astonishing mixture of oppression, barbarism and well-being that defines the capitalist

lifestyle cannot go on forever. If this new consciousness of alienation, a consciousness which leads to a revolt as aesthetic, instinctual, moral, as political, was generalized in the proletariat, it could be the most violent of revolts and the allure The most powerful capitalist society cannot eternally increase its well-being, with this standard of living and oppression, by merrily exporting napalm and color televisions.

III

LA DIALECTIQUE DES BESOINS

Ces quelques remarques, que je n'ai pas lè temps de développer ici, me semblent aboutir à deux questions fondamentales:

— Qu'est-ce qui caractérise la dialectique des besoins dans la société capitaliste?

— Peut-on déjà définir les différences qualitatives qui opposeraient une société capitaliste et une société socialiste?

Je crois que la première question ne fait de probléme pour personne: la théorie marxiste nous fournit avec des concepts comme ceux d'aliénation et de réification les instruments conceptuels pour décrire cette dialectique des besoins. Il faut d'abord s'entendre sur la definition même du besoin et rejeter deux acceptations courantes et réactionnaires:

La première est religieuse et mystique: elle considère l'homme comme victime d'une éternelle nostalgie. Quelle que soit son existence, il demeure une »conscience malheureuse« et rien ne saurait le satisfaire. La seconde conception, est tout aussi réactionnaire, malgré son faux matérialisme« elle laisse croire que les besoins sont satisfaits à mesure que se développe la technique. Marx et Engels, au contraire, n'ont cessé d'insister sur le caractère historique et dialectique du besoin qui évolue en fonction de l'homme et du niveau technologique atteint.

Il est bien évident que dans la société capitaliste, la plupart des besoins peuvent être qualifiés de faux besoins. Si l'idéal du communisme est »à chacun selon ses besoins« celui du capitalisme pourrait être »à chacun selon ses faux besoins«: encore ne peut-il satisfaire — et loin de là — tous les faux besoins qu'il crée par la publicité pour entretenir une surconsommation. L'industrie, loin de satisfaire les besoins fondamentaux crée perpétuellement des besoins artificiels et l'idéologie dominante, les mass media contraignent l'individu à s'identifier avec ses faux besoin, à se reconnaître dans des besoins réifiés qui masquent ses vrais désirs, comme si chacun s'exprimait complètement et réalisait son désir le plus profond dans le choix d'une voiture, d'une marque de savon ou de lames de rasoirs.

Parallèlement à ce développement des faux besoins, les vrais besoins ne cessent d'être étouffés et les désirs refoulés, relégués dans l'univers des rêves et des fantasmes, à leur tour repris en charge par les industries du rêve de la consommation. Dans *l'Homme Unidimensionnel* Marcuse a remarquablement décrit cette dialectique de la répression sournoise et intégrée et de la fausse libération. La puissance des mécanismes de réduction idéologique est telle que Marx, Rimbaud ou Lénine peuvent être vendus au drugstore sans que la critique violente du systéme qu'ils impliquent soit perçue. On lit Rimbaud dans le métro, mais comme un

III

THE DIALECTIC OF NEEDS

These few remarks, which I do not have time to develop here, seem to me to lead to two fundamental questions:

— What characterizes the dialectic of needs in capitalist society?

— Can we already define the qualitative differences between a capitalist society and a socialist society?

I believe that the first question poses no problem for anyone: Marxist theory provides us with concepts such as those of alienation and reification with the conceptual instruments to describe this dialectic of needs. We must first agree on the very definition of need and reject two common and reactionary acceptances:

The first is religious and mystical: it considers man as the victim of an eternal nostalgia. Whatever his existence, he remains an »unhappy conscience« and nothing can satisfy him. The second conception is just as reactionary, despite its false materialism, “it suggests that needs are satisfied as technology develops. Marx and Engels, on the contrary, never ceased to insist on the historical and dialectical character of the need which evolves according to the man and the technological level reached.

It is quite obvious that in capitalist society most needs can be qualified as false needs. If the ideal of communism is "to each according to his needs", that of capitalism could be "to each according to his false needs": still cannot satisfy - and far from it - all the false needs that it creates by advertising to maintain overconsumption. Industry, far from satisfying fundamental needs, perpetually creates artificial needs and the dominant ideology, the mass media, con-rains the individual to identify with his false needs, to recognize himself in reified needs that mask his true desires, as if everyone expressed themselves completely and realized their deepest desire in the choice of a car, a brand of soap or razor blades.

Parallel to this development of false needs, real needs continue to be stifled and desires repressed, relegated to the universe of dreams and fantasies, in turn taken over by the dream industries of consumption. In One-Dimensional Man Marcuse has remarkably described this dialectic of underhanded and integrated repression and false

liberation. The power of the mechanisms of ideological reduction is such that Marx, Rimbaud or Lenin can be sold at the drugstore without the violent critique of the system they imply being perceived. We read Rimbaud in the metro, but like a 184

roman policier: le désir forcené de tout briser, de changer sa vie n'est plus perçu comme tel à travers ses poémes réduits à de simples marchandises culturelles.

Le style répressif du capitalisme s'étend désormais à la majeure partie des pays et des individus. Les pays socialistes n'y échappent pas nécessairement et la classe ouvrière encore moins. Si elle n'est pas intégrée économiquement au systéme capitaliste, aussi profondément en Europe qu'elle l'est aux etats-Unis (et encore l'exemple de l'Allemagne Fédérale mériterait une discussion approfondie), il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'elle est *idéologiquement* intégrée aux valeurs du capitalisme. Aussi en vient-on à considérer qu'on ne peut aujourd'hui définir les besoins d'une société socialiste que par la négation radicale des besoins existants. Les différentes tentatives — encore impossible à réunir — qui s'efforcent de créer, parfois même par la violence, des brèches dans l'idéologie et le systéme social méritent une étude particulière, même si elles combattent le réel au nom de l'utopie, et veulent concrétiser par la violence ce qui n'apparaît encore que comme un rêve.

Faut-il alors considérer que les besoins qualitativement différents qui correspondraient à ceux d'une société qualitativement différente sont à inventer? Je ne le crois pas. Peut-être sont-ils déjà présents, à l'état d'ébauches, au niveau des luttes du quotidien, même les plus marginales. Je pense tout d'abord à toux ceux qui vivent en marge de l'idéologie ou presque en marge, la révolte de la jeunesse américaine, révolte qui est à la fois politique, esthétique, morale et que l'on a vu évoluer ces dernières années dans des formes de plus en plus radicales. Je pense aux étudiants, aux beatniks, à tous ces marginaux qui refusent massivement un systéme qu'ils jugent inacceptable, qui le contestent globalement en refusant de s'y intégrer. Il y a là quelque chose de radicalement nouveau qui témoigne du développement d'une nouvelle conscience politique et instinctuelle. La jeunesse apparaît de plus en plus comme la conscience malheureuse du système. En inventant son propre style de vie, sa culture, sa contre-culture, elle manifeste non seulement la négation des besoins existants — le confort, l'argent, la sécurité sociale, la surconsommation-mais l'ébauche de nouveaux besoins et d'une nouvelle vie.

Est extérieur au systéme capitaliste, à ses valeurs, le Tiers Monde des opprimés, ceux qui vivent dans les ghettos, aux portes des capitales. Leur révolte contre l'oppression est l'affirmation de nouvelles valeurs. Il suffit de relire les écrits de Guevara — tel le *Socialisme et l'homme à Cuba* — pour s'en convaincre. Les nouveaux besoins apparaissent là-bas comme la réaction spontanée à ce qui s'y passe.

Le probléme essentiel, c'est celui posé par Marcuse dans ses derniers ouvrages, en particulier dans *L'Homme Unidimensionnel* et *Vers la Libération:* comment généraliser cette prise de conscience radicale et marginale, comment généraliser cette aspiration vers

detective novel: the frenzied desire to break everything, to change one's life is no longer perceived as such through his poems reduced to simple cultural goods.

The repressive style of capitalism now extends to most countries and individuals. The socialist countries do not necessarily escape it and the working class even less so. If it is not integrated economically into the capitalist system, as deeply in Europe as it is in the United States (and again the example of Federal Germany deserves an in-depth discussion), it is not. less true that it is ideologically integrated into the values of capitalism. So we come to consider that today we can only define the needs of a socialist society by the radical negation of existing needs. The various attempts—still impossible to bring together—which strive to create, sometimes even by violence, breaches in the ideology and the social system deserve a particular study, even if they fight reality in the name of utopia. , and want to concretize by violence what still only appears as a dream.

Should we then consider that the qualitatively different needs which would correspond to those of a qualitatively different society are to be invented? I do not believe that. Perhaps they are already present, in draft form, at the level of daily struggles, even the most marginal. I am thinking first of all of those who live on the margins of ideology or almost on the margins, the revolt of American youth, a revolt which is at once political, aesthetic, moral and which we have seen evolve in recent years in increasingly radical forms. I am thinking of the students, of the beatniks, of all those marginalized people who massively refuse a system that they consider unacceptable, who contest it globally by refusing to integrate into it. There is something radically new here that testifies to the development of a new political and instinctual consciousness. Young people appear more and more as the unhappy conscience of the system. By inventing its own lifestyle, its culture, its counter-culture, it manifests not only the denial of existing needs—comfort, money, social security, overconsumption—but the outline of new needs and a new life.

Outside the capitalist system, outside its values, is the Third World of the oppressed, those who live in the ghettos, at the gates of the capitals. Their revolt against oppression is the affirmation of new values. It suffices to reread the writings of Guevara—such as Socialism and the Man in Cuba—to be convinced of this. The new needs appear there as the spontaneous reaction to what is happening there.

The essential problem is that posed by Marcuse in his last works, in particular in Unidimensional Man and Vers la Liberation: how to

generalize this radical and marginal awareness, how to generalize this aspiration towards 185

de nouveaux besoins alors que les besoins régnants empêchent même de les formuler? C'est ce cercle, si souvent dénoncé par Marcuse, sur lequel on ne cesse de se heurter. La révolution n'est possible que si se généralise cette prise de conscience et cette prise de conscience exige déjà la révolution. Ce qui demeure ouvert, c'est l'étude de toutes les bréches et de toutes les failles du système au niveau du quotidien et l'effort constant pour les élargir. Assurément, comme l'a souligné Marcuse encore, la solidarité avec les combats du Tiers Monde constitue les prémisses d'une nouvelle Anthropologie.

new needs when the prevailing needs even prevent them from being

formulated? It is this circle, so often denounced by Marcuse, on which we keep coming up against. Revolution is only possible if this awareness becomes generalized and this awareness already demands revolution. What remains open is the study of all the breaches and flaws in the system on a day-to-day basis and the constant effort to widen them. Undoubtedly, as Marcuse has again underlined, solidarity with the struggles of the Third World constitutes the premises of a new Anthropology.

»POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY« AND FREEDOM

Ivan Kuvačić

Zagreb

First of all the concept »post-industrial society« should be questioned. Did we give a satisfactory definition of a society by saying that it follows in time after another type of society? What does »post-agrarian« or »post-industrial« society comprise? We only state that a certain society follows another type of society we are more or less familiar with and nothing else. Accordingly, that is a negative or hollow definition which can be of no analytical value. The term »technotronic society« in relation to »industrial society« is better and has more meaning. At least it states that in the society in question electronics plays an important part.

The mentioned term is meaningless and bad and as such it cannot have any scientific value.

However, the author of the term, Daniel Bell, links it with some other denominations, which do not clarify the term itself, but elucidate certain concepts related to it. Post-industrial society is a period or stage in the general periodical division of society. The stages are: pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial society. The basic criterion of this periodical division is the rate of growth of economy, i. e., the income per capita. »Post-industrial« society has per capita income ranging from $ 4,000 to $ 20,000. Another essential feature of this society is that »intellectual institutions assume a central position in the social structure«.

If we take a critical look at the term itself and the periodical division it is based upon, we will soon find that it represents neither a scientific approach nor a scientific contribution, but a very superficial generalization which has an apparent ideological aim. The foremost aim of this periodical division is to push aside and replace the Marxian concept of socio-economical formations. While the Marxian periodical division is firmly based on the theory of work-value and surplus value and directed towards the research of social relations, the futurologist periodical division is a good

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example of a superficial, positivist, typically American construction.

It is not hard to prove that the futurologist concept has an anti-humanist character. This becomes apparent when we examine its relation to the concept of freedom.

Futurologists never do that because the realm of freedom is of no vital importance to them. They are interested in the analysis of concepts such as: technological progress, organization, social control. For their theoretical basis they take structuralism, which neglects human values and builds everything on the system. The system is a closed entity; is measurable and accordingly subject to and out programming. Each society has a certain totality of relations and the regulating principle of the system holds all the parts in equilibrium. Spontaneity and individual choice of alternatives are harmful to the flawless functioning of the system. Such functions are reserved only for the powerful centers, the authority of which is supported by the organs of repression. Whatever could be described as an »event« disturbs the routine of the system's functioning, so that the projections of the futurologists can be applied only to an eventless world. Accordingly, futurology is nothing else but a projection of existing automatic processes and procedures into the future. This, of course, is possible only if no unforseen events take place, i. e., if we eliminate freedom of action. Events are thus reduced to statistical projections within the limits of probability. This represents a very common form of dogmatism which has rather unpleasant moral and human consequences. Its recourse is the ancient legend, according to which man pays for more power by selling his soul to the devil. This legend provides a good illustration for the opposition that exists between the technocrat ideology and the concept of freedom. Futurology forsees and programms everything in advance, but freedom belongs only to those who conquer it daily.

It is evident from the above that so-called »post-industrial« society is characterized by the absence of radical change, or, as this is usually discribed: all changes in this society have an institutional character. Radical change as the futurologist authors see it (see: The Year 2000, by Kahn and Wiener, New York, 1967; The Meaning of the Twentieth Century, by K. Boulding, London. 1965, and others), is the change of social relations in a Marxian sense. Such change is unnecessary and meaningless from the standpoint of futurology, because the conditions which could bring it about have, allegedly, disapppeared in the existing highly developed society. The Marxian theory of surplus value, which has discovered the roots of radical social change in the relations of production, has lost its meaning. Changes in the composition of capital due to the development of modern techonology have brought about a situation in which »work is no longer a constituting part of the process of production« because, »man has taken over the rôle of supervisor and regulator vis á vis the process of production« (Grundrisse).

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The process which is essential for Marxist analysis because it« announces the self-destruction of capitalism« (ibidem) is interpreted by the technocrat doctrine as the main argument for the vitality of capitalism, which rejuvenates itself by losing the basic characteristics of an exploiting system. It does not do that because of a desire to make all men equal but because of more profit, for, as Boulding puts it, »capital derives more profit from the exploitation of nature than from the exploitation of people« — (Sic) The critique of the political economy of capitalism is thus replaced by the economy of growth and development, which enables all social strata to participate to a higher degree in the distribution of the realized surplus. Inequality continues to exist not only among individuals but also among different strata, classes and nations, although it is not quite clear how it originates, if we discard the explanation that it results from the appropriation of the fruits of someone else's labour.

Problems that attract most interest are those concerned with man's relation to his environment. Ecology thus becomes an important science in »post-industrial« society. These are the problems of birth-control, the development of huge urban centers, the air and water pollution. Ecology and other sciences of »post industrial society« have a very practical approach to these problems. They try, in most cases, to provide models and techniques by means of which the problems can be reduced to their quantitative dimensions and after that they get solved in an »exact manner«. They do not even try to comprehend the essence of the problems and the question, how does a superrational organization produce irrational and meaningless results, is beyond their scope. To be able to pose such a question, one first has to establish a firm connection between scientific research and humanist criticism. The model for such an approach we can find in the theory of surplus value. The analysis of the concept shows how the exchange of work and capital splits into two processes: the selling of labour power is in accordance with the law of value. The exploiting of labour power by the capitalist produces value. The separation of these two processes explains the difference between the value contained in the wage and the value produced by the labour. If we comprehend this difference correctly, we will see that it is not just a dry analysis of the rent, profit, but of *position and fate of modern man,* whose essential capacities and potentialities have been degraded into commodities for sale. This represents the essence of the critique of capitalist political economy, which is both scientific and humanistic and shows that the main difference between antiquity and industrial society lies in the fact that in the former man's needs were the goal of production, whereas in the latter production is the goal and man only a means. This sheds a different light on the problems of ecology and futurology, the two most important sciences of »post-industrial« society. It becomes evident that the technocrats' proscription of humanism has a clearly defined apologetic function. The data about the desappearance

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of manual workers and the increase in the number of intellectual institutions which are acquiring a central position in the social structure, do not deny, but on the contrary, confirm the above analyses. They clearly show the trend to turn a vast majority of the population into employees. Cynical remarks that economy based on production is a thing of the past replaced by economy based on selling and growth on a mass scale, including the selling of oneself, are quite frequent (see: A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New York, 1970).

At the end of this short discussion, which is only an attempt to provide a basis for a broader discussion about the mentioned topic, I would like to list the following conclusions:

1) The concept »post-industrial society« is very vague and undefined; therefor, for logical reasons, not suitable as an instrument for the analysis of contemporary social processes. All the explanations and examples concerning this concept touch only upon some outward, accompanying aspects of the technological development related to it. The concept itself remains empty and consequently does not succeed to say something essentially new about contemporary capitalism.

2) The concept of »post-industrial« society has a markedly ideological function. It creates illusions about present day and future capitalism, representing it as a harmonious and conflictless society, in which the intellectual who is dedicated to his ideas gets replaced by the expert who is concerned with the improvement of the standard of living and does exactly that what he is expected to do and paid for to do. It is the ideology of the technocrats, for whom technological progress is the true meaning of human existence, and for whom the stressing of other human needs belongs to the realm of the »traditional-humanist mithology.« This ideology is widespread both in the West and in the East and its strongholds are the powerful military and industrial structures.

3) The founders of the »post-industrial« concept advocate a strong, centralized government that looks after the interests of the people. That is, as they put it, in accordance with the general trend: humanity is growing out of the phase of spontaneity and entering the phase of total programming. It is evident that in this approach to such vital questions for mankind technocrat positivism theoretically does not differ from Stalinism, because it suffocates every sprout of human freedom.

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VORÜBERLEGUNGEN ZU EINER THEORIE DER FRATERNITÄT

Horst v. Gizycki

Frankfurt

Eine Gesellschaft, in der die Herrschaft von Menschen über Menschen und selbstentfremdende Formen der Arbeitsteilung abgeschafft wären, stünde an der Schwelle einer emanzipatorischen, das menschliche Wesen verwirklichenden Gattungsgeschichte, wie Marx sie vorausgedacht hat. Freiheit und Gleichheit für alle wären also, als Bedingungen der Aufhebung von Selbstentfremdung, zugleich Bedingungen der wahren Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen.

Über ihre Konkretisierung zu reden heißt gegenwärtig, utopisch zu reden, und das bekannte Dilemma jeder emanzipatorischen Utopie besteht darin, daß eine Verbindlichkeit beanspruchende Vorausbestimmung der Konkretion nichtentfremdeter Selbstverwirklichung Freiheit und Gleichheit in einer künftigen Gesellschaft einschränken müßte. Marx hatte daher gute Gründe für seinen Verzicht auf detailliertere Nachrichten aus dem Reich der Freiheit: er wußte, daß eine wirklich freie Gesellschaft sich auch nicht durch ihre eigenen Geburtshelfer bevormunden lassen darf.

Über das »Selbst« nichtentfremdeter Menschen mit seinen bewußten und unbewußten Momenten, seinen Bedürfnissen und Eigenschaften läßt sich also theoretisch nur wenig Bestimmtes ausmachen. Eine kritische, emanzipatorische Psychologie hat vielmehr zunächst die Aufgabe, die empirisch vorgefundenen Bedürfnisse, Eigenschaften und Bewußtseinsstrukturen als entfremdete, also als hergestellte und daher prinzipiell veränderbare zu erweisen.

Die empirisch vorfindbaren Erscheinungsformen des Selbst, wie durch eine vorkritische Psychologie festgestellt werden, konfrontiert kritische Psychologie mit erst noch herzustellenden, möglichen Verwirklichungsformen des Selbst.

Beim theoretischen Entwurf solcher Formen bleibt sie allerdings, selbst historisch bedingt, im Koordinatensystem bisheriger

THE FRATERNITXT

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A society in which the dominance of humans over humans and in which self-alienating forms of the division of labor were abolished would stand on the threshold of an emancipatory history of the species that realizes the human essence, as Marx envisioned it. Freedom and equality for all were thus, as conditions for the abolition of self-alienation, at the same time conditions for true human self-realization.

At the moment, to talk about their concreteness means to talk utopian, and the well-known dilemma of every emancipatory utopia consists in the fact that a binding predetermination of the concreteness of non-alienated self-realization would have to restrict freedom and equality in a future society. Marx therefore had good reasons for not reporting more detailed news from the realm of freedom: he knew that a truly free society should not allow itself to be patronized by its own obstetricians.

Theoretically, therefore, little definite can be said about the "self" of non-alienated people with its conscious and unconscious moments, its needs and characteristics. Rather, a critical, emancipatory psychology has the task of proving that the empirically found needs, characteristics, and structures of consciousness are alienated, i.e., created and therefore fundamentally changeable.

The empirically found manifestations of the self, as determined by a pre-critical psychology, confronts critical psychology with possible forms of realization of the self that have yet to be established.

In the theoretical design of such forms, however, it remains in the coordinate system of previous 191, even for historical reasons

Geschichte befangen, und daher kreisen ihre Vorstellungen meist um den Sachverhalt, den St.-Exupéry einmal mit dem bekannten Diktum umchrieben hat, daß in jedem Kinde ein kleiner Mozart erschlagen werde. Dem naheliegenden Einwand, daß der Möglichkeit nach in jedem Kinde auch ein kleiner Hitler stecke, läßt sich damit begegnen, daß es selbstverständlich auf die Inhalte der jeweiligen Sozialisationsprozesse ankommt, daß also für emanzipatorische Zielsetzungen herrschaftsabbauende, kreativitätsbegünstigende Bedingungen der Sozialisation hergestellt werden müssen.

Dieses Herstellen ist, da es das entscheidende Beweisverfahren für die Gültigkeit von Aussagen einer emanzipatorischen Psychologie der menschlichen Möglichkeiten darstellt, konstitutiv für das Gelingen einer solchen bisher erst in Ansätzen entwickelten Psychologie selbst.

Dem Verhältnis von Empirie und Theorie der traditionellen erfahrungswissenschaftlichen Psychologie korrespondiert daher auch das Verhältnis von Praxis und Theorie in der emanzipatorischen Psychologie. Der vorgefundenen Wirklichkeit, über die jene nachdenkt, korrespondiert die hergestellte Wirklichkeit, die diese, im Bündnis mit den übrigen Sozialwissenschaften, entwirft.

Wie seinerzeit die Einführung des Experiments Verfahren der Gültigkeitskontrolle von Aussagen über die Natur als Voraussetzung ihrer bewußten Kontrolle ermöglichte, müssen heute analog Verfahren der Gültigkeitsfundierung für Aussagen im Bereich der Sozialwissenschaften entwickelt werden, die als exemplarische Praxis oder Modelle Voraussetzung für die bewußte Herstellung herrschaftsfreier gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit sein können. Modelle sind nicht nur ein wichtiges Hilfsmittel erkennender Analyse, also der Theorie, sondern vor allem ein entscheidendes Hilfsmittel der Praxis. Sie konkretisieren die Vermittlung beider.

Zur Begründung des hier entwickelten Ansatzes muß in Erinnerung gerufen werden, daß es in der bisherigen Gattungsgeschichte neben der von vielen Marxisten für primär fundierend und auch historisch für grundlegend gehaltenen Arbeitsteilung mindestens zwei weitere »assoziations« — begründende Prinzipien gibt, die sich nicht auf jene oder aufeinander reduzieren lassen und deren jedes die Ausübung von Herrschaft zu praktizieren erlaubt. Das eine dieser Prinzipien, Verwandtschaft, begründet soziale Differenzierung, wie wir heute wissen, früher als die Arbeitsteilung. Verwandtschaftliche Strukturmuster der Assoziation von Gesellschaftsmitgliedern waren also ökonomischen vorgeordnet und Herrschaft wurde in solchen »kinship« — Strukturen durch Rangordnungen begründet, die keineswegs allein mit Kategorien der Arbeitsteilung zu fassen sind. Dies geht schon aus der durch ethnologische Forschung unserer Tage belegte Tatsache hervor, daß die Regelung der Frage, wer wem im Zweifelsfall zu parieren hatte, auch in frühgeschichtlichen Gesellschaften aufgrund der kinship-Strukturen viel differenzierter erfolgt sein dürfte, als das unter Gesichtspunkten der Arbeitsteilung bei ökonomisch so rudimentärem Entwicklungsstand möglich gewesen wäre.

History biased, and therefore their ideas usually revolve around the facts, which St. Exupery once paraphrased with the well-known dictum that in every child a little Mozart will be killed. The obvious objection that there is a possibility that there is a little Hitler in every

child can be countered by the fact that the content of the respective socialization processes is of course important, i.e. that for emancipatory goals, conditions of socialization that reduce domination and promote creativity are created have to.

Since it represents the decisive proof procedure for the validity of statements of an emancipatory psychology of human possibilities, this production is constitutive for the success of such a psychology itself, which has only been developed in rudiments up to now.

The relationship between empiricism and theory in traditional empirical psychology therefore also corresponds to the relationship between practice and theory in emancipatory psychology. The found reality that the former thinks about corresponds to the manufactured reality that the latter, in alliance with the other social sciences, designs.

As at that time the introduction of the experiment made possible methods of checking the validity of statements about nature as a prerequisite for their conscious control, today analogous methods of establishing the validity of statements in the field of the social sciences must be developed which, as exemplary practice or models, are a prerequisite for the conscious creation of social reality can be. Models are not only an important tool in cognitive analysis, i.e. theory, but above all a crucial tool in practice. They concretize the mediation of both.

In order to justify the approach developed here, it must be recalled that, in addition to that of many Marxists, it is primarily founded in the history of the genre to date!

and also, historically, there are at least two other "association" principles that are fundamental to the division of labor that cannot be reduced to one or the other, and each of which allows the exercise of power to be practiced.

believes One of these principles, kinship, established social differentiation, as we now know, before labor did. Family structure patterns for the association of members of society were therefore prioritized over economic ones, and domination was justified in such "kinship" structures by hierarchies, which by no means can be grasped solely with categories of the division of labor. This is evident from the fact, documented by contemporary ethnological research, that the regulation of the question of who had to defend whom in case of doubt was much more differentiated in early historical societies due to

the kinship structures than it was from the point of view of the division of labour would have been possible at such a rudimentary level of economic development.

Hat ein ökonomistisch reduzierter Marxismus nicht eine erst in späteren Geschichtsepochen auftretende Manifestationsform von Herrschaftsstrukturen, nämlich die Arbeitsteilung, auf jene älteren Strukturen zurückprojiziert und dabei übersehen, daß beide zwar schon sehr früh korrelieren, daß diese Korrelation aber nicht kausal in seinem Sinne interpretiert werden darf?

Das dritte der assoziationsbegründenden Prinzipien ist, neben Verwandtschaft und Arbeitsteilung, jene Art von gegenseitiger Bindung, für die es schwierig ist, einen überzeugenden Terminus zu finden, der alle bisher historisch aufgetretenen oder erst noch zu realisierenden Erscheinungsformen dieses Typs von Assoziation repräsentieren könnte. Wenn in Freuds Überlegungen jener Grundtrieb, dessen Ziel es ist, »immer größere Einheiten herzustellen und so zu erhalten«, den Namen »Eros« führt, dann weist dieser bedeutungsüberfüllte Ausdruck auf eine Facette des Sachverhalts hin, der hier gemeint ist, zu dem aber dann nicht nur Assoziationsmuster wie das — etablierte Verwandtschaften und Arbeitsteilungen störende — Dual von Romeo und Julia, sondern auch umfassendere Kommunen befreundeter Genossen gehören, die exemplarisch demonstrieren, welche emanzipative Dynamik sich aus konkreter »Fraternität entwickeln läßt.

Daß auch unter Verliebten, unter Freunden, Genossen und nichtverwandten »Brüdern und Schwestern« Herrschaftsverhältnisse entstehen können, ist evident. Wir alle tragen die Sozialisationsspuren der verwandtschafts- und arbeitsteiligen Gesellschaft unserer bisherigen Geschichte. Meine zentrale These ist, daß diese Spuren nur zu löschen sind durch neue und intensive Lernprozesse, die zunächst im dritten hier angeführten Assoziationstyp, dem fraternitären, ihr reales soziales Substrat finden müssen.

Wer prägnante, geometrische Ordnungen schätzt, könnte versucht sein, die hier angeführte Auswahl von Assozationsmustern zur Trikolore jener Ideen in Korrespondenz su bringen, die der französischen Revolution vor Augen standen. Die liberté bezöge sich dann auf die Emanzipation von ursprünglich kinship-vermittelten Herrschaftsstrukturen, die durch den Sozialisationsprozeß in der Familie bis in die unbewußte Regulation jedes Menschen hineinwirken; die égalité bezöge sich auf die Emanzipation von Ungleichheit, wie sie in der Arbeitsteilung und später durch unterschiedliches Recht der Verfügung über Produktionsmittel und Mehrwert begründet ist; die fraternité schließlich wäre, indem sie die beiden anderen Assozationsformen in ihrer Lieblosigkeit — zunächst in exemplarischer Modell-Praxis — aufhebt, die eigentliche energiegebende Basis oder Standfläche für den Kampf gegen Unterdrückung und Ausbeutung.

Ins Reich der Freiheit gelangen wir bekanntlich in unserer realen Geschichte nicht durch einen plötzlichen Sprung. Emanzipation ist ein Prozeß — je nacht Hinsicht ein ökonomischer, gesellschaftlicher, geschichtlicher oder auch ein individueller Lernprozeß. In diesem komplexen Gescheen gibt es selbstverständlich einzelne Gruppen oder Menschen, ebenso wie einzelne historisch-gesellschaftliche oder psychologisch beschreibbare Situationen, in

Has an economistically reduced Marxism not projected a form of manifestation of power structures that only appeared in later historical epochs, namely the division of labour, back onto those older structures and overlooked the fact that the two correlate very early

on, but that this correlation should not be interpreted causally in its sense ?

The third of the association-founding principles, next to kinship and division of labor, is that kind of mutual bond for which it is difficult to find a convincing term that could represent all historically occurring or yet to be realized manifestations of this type of association. If, in Freud's reflections, that basic drive whose goal is "to produce and thus maintain ever larger units" bears the name "eros," then this meaning-laden expression points to a facet of the situation that is meant here, but to that then not only patterns of association like the dual of Romeo and Juliet - which disturbs established kinships and divisions of labor - but also more comprehensive communes of comrades who are friends, which demonstrate in an exemplary manner which emancipative dynamics can develop from a concrete "fraternity".

It is evident that relationships of dominance can also arise among lovers, friends, comrades and unrelated "brothers and sisters". We all bear the socialization traces of the family and work-sharing society of our previous history. My central thesis is that these traces can only be erased through new and intensive learning processes, which first have to find their real social substrate in the third type of association mentioned here, the fraternitarian.

Anyone who appreciates concise, geometric orders could be tempted to bring the selection of association patterns for the tricolor given here into correspondence with the ideas that the French Revolution had in mind. The liberte would then refer to the emancipation from originally kinship-mediated structures of domination, which through the socialization process

work in the family right down to the unconscious regulation of every human being; the ćgalite would refer to the emancipation of inequality as it is based on the division of labor and later on through different rights of disposal over the means of production and added value; which would finally be fraternite, in that the other two forms of association in their lovelessness -

initially in exemplary model practice — abolishes the actual energy-giving base or platform for the struggle against oppression and exploitation.

As is well known, in our real history we do not reach the realm of freedom by a sudden leap. Emancipation is a process — depending on the point of view, an economic, social, historical or even an individual

learning process. In this complex process there are of course individual groups or people, as well as individual historical

-social or psychologically describable situations, in 193

denen vergleichsweise ein Plus oder Minus an Selbstbestimmung, in denen »mehr« oder »weniger« Emanzipation realisiert ist. Es wäre der Irrtum eines in anschaulichen Prägnanzstufen oder Dichotomien befangenen Denkens zu meinen, daß man nur »frei« oder »unfrei« sein kann, allseitig emanzipiert oder unterdrückt. In Wirklichkeit sind emanzipatorische Prozesse adäquater durch Gradienten zu bestimmen, deren konkrete inhaltliche Definition noch im einzelnen zu leisten ist, und an deren Klärung und praktischer Erkundung in konkreten Modellen zu arbeiten sein wird. Gegenüber dem traditionellen Geometrismus wird damit gewissermaßen die Infinitesimalrechnung in die Theorie und Praxis der Emanzipation eingeführt.

Sozialpsychologisch gewendet heißt das, daß konkrete Teilrealisationen von Freiheit und Gleichheit mit der Entstehung der Industriegesellschaft auch gegen die Interessen der herrschenden Oligarchien geschehen und möglich sind. Zwar dient die Rede von Demokratie nach wie vor in oligarchisch strukturierten Gesellschaften des Privat- oder Staatskapitalismus als interessenverschleiernde Ideologie; gleichzeitig hat die mit der fortschreitenden Industrialisierung fortgeschrittene Klassensegmentierung dazu geführt, daß die Versprechen von Freiheit und Gleichheit und die Erfahrung ihrer zumindest partiellen Einlösbarkeit umfassende Verunsicherungen und Ängste zur Folge haben. Werden nicht auf Fraternität zielende Verhaltensweisen bewußt und methodisch eingeübt, dann werden Freiheits- und Gleichheitsversprechen zum Nährboden verschärfter Rivalitäten in allen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen. Einer der Gründe dafür ist, daß »natürliche« Unterschiede in teilemanzipierten Situationen neue Hierarchien begünstigen: größere Vitalität, Gesundheit, cleverness, rhetorische Geschicklichkeit, Schönheit verführen leicht zu offenen oder geheimen Dominanzansprüchen und egozentrischen Formen von Selbstverwirklichung oder — auf der anderen Seite — zu Selbstherabsetzungs-Anvandlungen, wenn sie nicht durch fraternitäre Gegenpotentiale daran gehindert werden.

Ein Potential steht damit zur Diskussion, das mit der Produktion von Negentropie zu tun hat, mit dem Herstellen von »immer größeren Einheiten«, mit Liebesfähigkeit. In Konkreten Modell--Kommunen mit radikal zu erneuernder und das heißt auch: sozial neu zu verankernder Praxis solidarischer Selbsthervorbringung muß diesem Potential die Möglichkeit der Aktualisierung verschafft werden. (Über Theorie und Praxis einer solchen Kommunebildung s. H. v. Gizycki: »Aufbruch aus dem Neandertal, Entwurf einer neuen Kommune«; erscheint in Kürze als Buch. Vorabdruck in Auszügen in »Frankfurter Hefte«, 12, 1971).

comparatively a plus or minus of self-determination, in which »more« or »less« emancipation is realized. It would be the error of thinking caught in graphic levels of pragmatism or dichotomies to think that one can only be "free"

or "unfree," emancipated or oppressed on all sides. In reality, emancipatory processes are to be determined more adequately by gradients, the concrete content of which still needs to be defined in detail, and whose clarification and practical exploration in concrete models will have to be worked on. In contrast to traditional geometry, the infinitesimal calculus is thus introduced into the theory and practice of emancipation.

In terms of social psychology, this means that concrete partial realizations of freedom and equality with the emergence of industrial society also happen and are possible against the interests of the ruling oligarchies. In oligarchically structured societies of private or state capitalism, the talk of democracy still serves as an ideology that conceals interests; At the same time, the class segmentation that has progressed with advancing industrialization has led to the fact that the promises of freedom and equality and the experience that they can at least partially be redeemed result in comprehensive insecurities and fears. If behaviors that are not aimed at fraternity are consciously and methodically practiced, then promises of freedom and equality become the breeding ground for intensified rivalries in all areas of society. One of the reasons for this is that "natural" differences in part-mancipated situations favor new hierarchies: greater vitality, health, cleverness, rhetorical dexterity, beauty easily lead to overt or secret claims of dominance and egocentric forms of self-actualization or - on the other hand Side - to attacks of self-deprecation unless prevented by fraternitarian counter-potentials.

A potential is thus up for discussion that has to do with the production of negentropy, with the production of "ever larger units" with the ability to love. In Concrete Model

-Municipalities with a practice of solidary self-creation that needs to be radically renewed and that also means socially newly anchored practice must be given this potential the possibility of actualization. (On the theory and practice of such a commune formation see H. v. Gizycki: »Aufbruch aus dem Neandertal, Draft of a new commune«; will be published shortly as a book. 1971).

PROPRIÉTÉ ET NONLIBERTÉ

Džemal Sokolović

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Rendue possible uniquement par la possession, la société est devenue pour l' homme une société impossible; elle n'est donc pas née d'elle-même, mais elle a été rendue possible par sa négation par l' appropriation de la nature, la production de la possession qu' exigeait *nécessairement* l' association des hommes même en dehors de leur lien générique. La possession privée a par conséquent donné naissance à l'illusion d'une société dans laquelle elle est une catégorie de l' intégration sociale des hommes (les hommes devant s' associer pour réaliser la possession privée), et elle a en même temps donné naissance à l' illusion réelle d' une société authentique en tant qu' abstraction impossible (car une telle société sous-entend que sa réalisation n'est possible que par la négation de la possession privée, qui est sa détermination négative).

L' abolition de la possession, en tant que condition essentielle de la réalisation du rapport social, n' est donc possible que par la réalisation du rapport *humain* en géneral, c'est-à-dire d'un rapport envers la nature qui ne signifie pas l' appropriation de la nature, la production de la possession. L' homme a donc, comme condition de sa liberté, produit également la condition de la liberté de la nature. Pour pouvoir se réaliser en tant qu' être social, il doit être un être humain; pour pouvoir se comporter envers un autre homme comme envers lui-même, il doit se comporter envers la nature comme envers un autre homme. Bref, il doit nier le travail.

La liberté est possible, mais seulement si elle est universale; une liberté partielle, on n'existant que pour elle-même, même s'il s'agit de la société entière, est fondamentalement une non-liberté. Pour se libérer, l'homme doit libérer la nature de luimême, de son appropriation.[1]

[1] Peut-être est-ce là aussi la pensée de Pierre Naville lorsqu'il dit: »Ce qu'il ne faut pas oublier ici c'est que l'aliénation n'a pas sa base seulement dans la société mais aussi dans la nature; mais les rapports naturels peuvent créer de nouveu ce qui détruit les rapports humains: une nouvelle appropriation de l'homme dépendant de son maintien«. *De l'aliénation à la jouissance*, Anthoropos, Paris 1970, p. 152

PROPERTY AND NONLIBERTfi

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Made possible only by possession, society has become an impossible society for man; it was therefore not born of itself, but was made possible by its negation by the appropriation of nature, the production of the possession that the association of men necessarily demanded even outside of their generic bond. . Private possession has therefore given rise to the illusion of a society in which it is a category of the social integration of men (men having to associate to achieve private possession), and it has at the same time given rise to the real illusion of an authentic society as an impossible abstraction (because such a society implies that its realization is possible only through the negation of private possession, which is its negative determination).

The abolition of possession, as an essential condition for the realization of the social relationship, is therefore possible only by the realization of the human relationship in general, that is to say a relationship with nature. which does not mean the appropriation of nature, the production of possession. Man has therefore, as a condition of his freedom, also produced the condition of the freedom of nature. To be able to realize himself as a social being, he must be a human being; in order to be able to behave towards another man as towards himself, he must behave towards nature as towards another man. In short, he must deny the work.

Freedom is possible, but only if it is universal; a partial freedom, one existing only for itself, even if it is about the whole society, is fundamentally an unfreedom.

To liberate himself, man must liberate nature from himself, from his appropriation.1

1 Perhaps this is also the thought of Pierre N a v ille when he says: “What we must not forget here is that alienation has no base only in society but also in nature; but natural relationships can create anew what destroys human relationships: a new appropriation of man depending on his maintenance. From alićn ation to enjoyment

yes, A nthoropos, Paris 1970, p. 152

Economiquement parlant, la possession est le résultat du processus d'appropriation de la nature. Toute forme de cette appropriation d'un objet natural est en réalité une dénaturalisation de la nature. La propriété est donc, par son contenu, une catégorie artificielle. Elle est le résultat du rapport de l'homme avec la nature, fondamentalement non nature. Ce caractère non naturel du rapport de l'homme avec la nature ne peut résider que dans le rapport selon lequel l'homme, confondant la matière avec la nature, s'approprie en réalité cette dernière. Et la condition, et peut-être en même temps la conséquence d'un tel rapport, est l'homme en tant qu'être non naturel, arraché à la nature. La possession privée en tant qu'appropriation de la nature est donc, en fait, l'homme rendu par l'appropriation étranger à la nature, l'homme approprié. L'homme est ainsi, au sens le plus large du terme, possession privée. Il est le postulat de toute autre forme d'appropriation de la nature et, en tant que possession, la condition de toute autre forme de possession. L' homme en tant qu'appropriation de son propre rapport d'appropriation de la nature, détermine toute manifestation de l'objet naturel, matériel, en tant que possession. La notion du travail selon Marx, qui y voit »le rapport d'échange de la matière avec la nature«, est donc le contenu de la notion de possession. Andrija Gams écrit: »Même lorsqu'il est question de possession, il n'est pas aisé de dire ce qui est forme et ce qui est contenu. Pourtant, Marx lui-même a donné la formule fondamentale de cette différenciation: »le contenu de la possession est l'appropriation d'un objet de la nature, et les règles sociales, les normes sociales réalisant cette appropriation seraient les formes de la possession«.[2] Par sa détermination le travail ne peut créer que la possession, et comme tel il est la condition dont la libération de l'homme du rapport de possession avec la nature — suppose l'abolition. Mais les formes de possession ne se manifestent pas exclusivement dans les règles sociales et les normes sociales. Il ne saurait même être question que des règles ou normes déterminées réglementent les formes de la possession. Tout au contraire, les règles et normes sociales sont déterminées à la base par la forme, le degré de développement du rapport d'appropriation — le travail, et par conséquent par les formes de possession déjà données. Et non seulement cela. Le travail, c'est-à-dire une forme déterminée, tout-à-fait certaine, de la possession, non seulement règlemente le comportement d'une société au moyen de règles et de normes, mais il est aussi la base sur laquelle la société se structure, sur laquelle se construit une structure sociale plus ou moins ossifiée et, sur cette base ,tout un système de raports sociaux. Par conséquent, la manifestation sociale des formes de la possession est une structure sociale déterminée. Le travail en tant que *rapport générale de propriéte* de l'homme avec la nature devient un rapport social.

[2] Dr Andrija Gams, *Oblici svojine,* (Formes de la possession). SANU, Belgrade 1965.

T r a v a il e t p o ssessio n

Economically speaking, possession is the result of the process of appropriating nature. Any form of this appropriation of a natural

object is in reality a denaturalization of nature. Property is therefore, by its content, an artificial category. It is the result of man's relationship with nature, fundamentally non-nature. This unnatural character of the relationship of man with nature can only reside in the relationship according to which man, confusing matter with nature, in reality appropriates the latter. And the condition, and maybe

-to be at the same time the consequence of such a relation, is man as an unnatural being, torn from nature. Private possession as appropriation of nature is therefore, in fact, man rendered by appropriation alien to nature, the appropriated man. Man is thus, in the broadest sense of the term, a private possession. It is the postulate of any other form of appropriation of nature and, as possession, the condition of any other form of possession. Man as the appropriation of his own relationship of appropriation of nature determines every manifestation of the natural, material object as possession.

The notion of labor according to Marx, who sees in it "the relationship of exchange of matter with nature", is therefore the content of the notion of possession. A ndrija Gams writes: “Even when it is a question of possession, it is not easy to say what is form and what is contained. However, Marx himself gave the fundamental formula of this differentiation: "the content of possession is the appropriation of an object of nature, and the social rules, the social norms realizing this appropriation would be the forms of possession. “.2 By its determination, labor can only create possession, and as such it is the condition whose liberation of man from the relationship of possession with nature presupposes the abolition. But the forms of possession do not manifest themselves exclusively in social rules and social norms. There can even be no question of rules or determined norms regulating the forms of possession. Quite the contrary, the social rules and norms are determined at the base by the form, the degree of development of the relation of appropriation - work, and consequently by the forms of possession already given. And not only that. Work, that is to say a determinate, absolutely certain form of possession, not only regulates the behavior of a society by means of rules and norms, but it is also the basis on which society is structured, on which is built a more or less ossified social structure and, on this basis, a whole system of social relations. Consequently, the social manifestation of the forms of possession is a determinate social structure. Work as a general relationship of property between man and nature becomes a social relationship.

2 Dr Andrija Gams, O blici svo jin e, (Forms of Possession). GOLD, Belgrade 1965.

Et le rapport social, né du rapport envers la possession, perd son caractère essentiellement humain, et par suite son caractère social.

La possession a donc sa forme la plus générale. De cette forme procèdent toutes les autres. De plus, elle les détermine fondamentalement, et chacune des formes historiques concretes de possession contient les éléments de cette notion générale. Par notion générale de possession nous entendons en réalité le résultat du rapport social envers la nature. Le travail, abstraitement conçu comme travail de la société tout entière, a pour résultat un seul produit possible — la possession en tant que possession de la société. Originellement, la propriété n'existe pas autrement qu'en tant que possession de la communauté entière.

Ici le problème de la détermination de la possession en général s'identifie au problème de l'origine de la possession, et c'est dans ce sens que nous nous intéresserons à leurs liens mutuels.

Origine de la possession

»La possession, dit Marx, ne signifie donc rien d'autre, originellement, que le rapport de l'homme envers ses conditions naturelles de production, en tant que siennes, *inhérentes à sa propre existence;* son rapport envers elles en tant que en tant que *conditions préelables naturelles* de l'homme lui-même, qui ne constituent en quelque sorte que le prolongement de son propre corps.[3]

La notion générale de possession commence comme possession en général? Donc, ce qui se manifeste originellement comme possession subsiste également, abstraitement parlant, dans toutes les formes ultérieures de possession. La possession, au sens générique, découle de rapport primitif de l'homme envers la nature comme envers lui-même, comme envers son »corps« prolongé«. La première forme de possession, par conséquent, suppose le travail, donc l'appropriation de cette nature, mais le travail lui-même, l'appropriation même dans l'acte d'appropriation, s'approprie ce qui *pour lui est à lui, donc partie* de lui-même. Ceci, bien entendu, seulement à l'origine.

Plus tard, l'homme commence à s'approprier aussi ce qui est à autrui. D'une part, en s'appropriant ce qui est déjà approprié, donc la possession d'autres hommes ou bien de ces derniers eux-mêmes — de l'autre son appropriation est toujours, donc, d'une manière générale, l'appropriation de ce qui appartient à autrui, car l'homme est lui-même devenu étranger à la nature, de sorte que son travail en tant que rapport envers la nature est maintenant un rapport non pas envers *ce qui lui appartient,* mais envers ce qui *appartient à autrui.*

Par conséquent, le rapport originel envers la nature est également le rapport général envers la possession. La nature est une

[3] Karl Marx, *Epoques économiques de la formation de la société,* Belgrade 1960, page 32.

And the social relation, born of the relation to possession, loses its essentially human character, and consequently its social character.

Possession therefore has its most general form. From this form proceed all the others. Moreover, it fundamentally determines them, and each of the concrete historical forms of possession contains the elements of this general notion. By general notion of possession, we really mean the result of the social relationship with nature. Labour, abstractly conceived as the labor of society as a whole, results in a single possible product—possession as the possession of society. Originally, property does not exist except as the possession of the entire community.

Here the problem of the determination of possession in general is identified with the problem of the origin of possession, and it is in this sense that we will be interested in their mutual links.

Origin of ownership

Possession, says Marx, therefore signifies nothing other, originally, than the relation of man to his natural conditions of production, as his own, inherent in his own existence; his relation to them as natural preconditions of man himself, which somehow constitute only the extension of his own body.3

The general notion of possession begins as possession in general? Hence, what originally manifests as possession also subsists, abstractly speaking, in all subsequent forms of possession. Possession, in the generic sense, stems from man's primitive relationship with nature as well as with himself, as with his extended "body". The first form of possession, therefore, presupposes labor, hence the appropriation of this nature, but labor itself, appropriation even in the act of appropriation, appropriates what for it is its own. , therefore part of itself. This, of course, only at the origin.

Later, man begins to appropriate also what belongs to others. On the one hand, by appropriating what is already appropriated, therefore the possession of other men or of the latter themselves - on the other hand, its appropriation is always, therefore, in a general way, the appropriation of what belongs to others, for man himself has become a stranger to nature, so that his work as a relation to nature is now a relation not to what belongs to him, but to what belongs to others.

Consequently, the original relation to nature is also the general relation to possession. Nature is a

* Karl Marx, Economic epochs of the formation of society, Belgrade 1960, page 32.

possession par le fait même que l'homme se comporte envers elle, même dans le travail originel — acte d'appropriation *directe,* comme envers sa possession. En tant que telle, que nature, c'est-à-dire non pas encore un produit du travail, la possession est la *condition préalable naturelle* de l'appropriation, de l'existence naturelle de l'homme, et aussi d'elle-même en tant qu'appropriation, produit du travail — possession qui conditionne l'existence artificielle de l'homme. Mais dans cette même forme primitive de possession est également contenue la notion générale de possession. Le rapport envers la nature en tant que lui appartenant est le rapport de tout homme, et les hommes ne diffèrent pas selon leur rapport envers la nature. Au contraire, ce rapport les unit, car il les rend égaux par rapport à la nature, mais aussi, ce qui est plus important, entre eux. Du rapport général envers la nature, en laquelle ils voient une possession, une partie d'eux-mêmes, découle aussi le rapport général entre les membres de la communauté en tant que s'appartenant, mais pour cette seule raison que la communauté, comme la nature, est la *condition naturelle* de ce rapport envers la propriété. La communauté est bien la *condition* d'appropriation, mais pour cette seule raison qu'elle est elle-même, tout comme la nature, une condition préalable. La notion générale de possession découle ainsi de la forme originelle de possession. C'est là un rapport général car c'est, d'une part, le rapport général des hommes en tant que membres d'une communauté,[4] envers, d'autre part, l'objet, général de l'appropriation — la nature. Originellement, donc, la possession était une possession commune, car le rapport envers la possession était un rapport général. Ou bien, et c'est précisément cela qui nous intéresse, la propriété générale était originelle; c' est d'elle que sont issues toutes les formes ultérieures de la possession et, qui plus est, la notion générale de possession est toujours présente dans chacune des formes historiques concrètes de la possession, en dépit du fait que dans certains cas il semble qu'elles s'excluent l une l'autre.

La possession, cependant, non seulement continue d'exister mais elle ne prend ses véritables formes que lorsque l'homme cesse, au cours du processus d'appropriation, de se comporter envers la nature comme envers sa propre condition naturelle. L' acte même d'appropriation a rendu l'homme étranger à la nature et, de ce fait, la nature est en réalité devenue étrangère à l'homme. Mais, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, la notion générale de possession existe toujours. D'un côté, en effet, l'homme continue à concevoir son rapport envers la nature comme un rapport envers sa possession, et ne conçoit pas l'appropriation comme telle, mais y voit au contraire un acte d'autoréalisation. La forme primordiale, originelle, de possession générale continue donc d'exister, mais seulement dans l'imagination de l'homme. En réalité, la forme générale de la propriété se réalise dans son contraire — l'appropriation, et l'hom-

[4] Marx a écrit que »la *communauté tribale,* communauté naturelle, n'est pas le *résultat* mais la *condition préalable de l'appropriation commune* (provisoire) *et de l'utilisation de la terre*«. Ibd. page 7.

possession by the very fact that man behaves towards it, even in the original work — an act of direct appropriation, as towards his

possession. As such, as nature, that is to say not yet a product of labor, possession is the natural precondition of appropriation, of the natural existence of man, and also of herself. even as appropriation, the product of labor—a possession which conditions the artificial existence of man. But in this same primitive form of possession is also contained the general notion of possession. The relation to nature as belonging to it is the relation of every man, and men do not differ according to their relation to nature. On the contrary, this relationship unites them, because it makes them equal in relation to nature, but also, what is more important, among themselves. From the general relationship to nature, in which they see a possession, a part of themselves, also flows the general relationship between the members of the community as belonging to one another, but for this sole reason that the community, like nature, is the natural condition of this relationship to property.

The community is indeed the condition of appropriation, but for the sole reason that it is itself, like nature, a prior condition. The general notion of possession thus derives from the original form of possession. This is a general relationship because it is, on the one hand, the general relationship of men as members of a community,4 towards, on the other hand, the general object of appropriation - the nature. Originally, therefore, possession was a common possession, for the relation to possession was a general relation. Or else, and this is precisely what interests us, general property was original; it is from this that all subsequent forms of possession have sprung and, moreover, the general notion of possession is always present in each of the concrete historical forms of possession, in spite of the fact that in certain cases it seems that they are mutually exclusive.

Possession, however, not only continues to exist but takes on its true forms only when man ceases, in the process of appropriation, to behave towards nature as towards his own natural condition. The very act of appropriation has alienated man from nature, and therefore nature has in fact become alien to man. But, as we have already said, the general notion of possession still exists. On the one hand, in fact, man continues to conceive his relationship to nature as a relationship to his possession, and does not understand appropriation as such, but on the contrary sees it as an act of self-realization. The primordial, original form of general possession therefore continues to exist, but only in the imagination of man. In reality, the general form of property is realized in its opposite — appropriation, and man.

4 Marx wrote that “the tribal community, a natural community, is not the result but the precondition of (pro-visional) com m unity

appropriation and use of land. Ibd. page 7.

me voit dans la nature une possession commune, sa propre possession, appropriée par lui. D'un autre côté, la notion générale de possession est possible car elle est déterminée également par le rapport général des hommes envers la possession en tant qu'appropriée. Naturellement, dans un rapport de possession ainsi réduit, les hommes occupent des positions différentes vis-à-vis de la possession, mais ils sont tous, même an tant qu'esclaves, même en tant que possession directe d'autres hommes, liés aux autres hommes par un rapport de possession. Ce qui, originellement, s'appartient à soi-même — la nature — à quoi l'homme appartenait naturellement, est maintenant anthropomorphiquement déterminé, et, selon l'homme, ne lui appartient que s'il est rationnellement utilisable — valeur d'utilisation. Hors de l'utilisation des valeurs, la nature, pour l'homme, est abstraite. (Précisément parce qu'il est homme abstraitement — uniquement grâce à sa conception autospéculative). Et alors qu'en réalité l'homme est devenu étranger â son milieu originel — la nature et la société —, il s'imagine que la nature et la société lui sont devenus étrangers, opposés, et sont donc, nécessairement, l'objet de son appropriation. C'est précisément ce qui a lieu. Au lieu de se comporter envers la nature comme envers une possession, lui appartenant donc naturellement, l'homme, au moyen de la possession, qu'il se serait lui-même appropriée, se comporte envers les autres hommes comme envers la nature. Cela signifie que, de même qu'il se comporte â présent envers la nature comme envers une non-possession, étrangère à lui, abstraite, il se comporte également envers les autres hommes comme envers des étrangers, *non-siens*. Marx a justemnt remarqué que »l'esclavage et le servage ne sont que le développement ultérieur de la possession qui repose sur la communauté tribale«[5], mais le fait lui a échappé, en cet endroit au moins, que précisément à ce moment un événement capital s'est passé dans l'historie. Jusque là, la possession ne signifait que »l'appartenance à une tribu«[6], à une communauté. En fait, non seulement c'est à ce moment que s'est établi le rapport d'appropriation des autres hommes également en tant qu'étrangers, (d'ailleurs, même au niveau de la communauté tribale les hommes se sont mutuellement appropriés, selon leur appartenance à des communautés diverses), mais aussi le rapport envers la nature est devenu un rapport étranger à l'homme; celui-ci s'est senti étranger à la nature. Ce fut là l'événement essentiel. Et sur cette base, la base d'un rapport avec la nature étranger à l'homme, s'établit aussi le rapport entre les communautés en tant qu' objets d'appropriation mutuelle.

En résumé: lorsque cesse le rapport de l'homme envers la nature en tant que possession, et qu'apparaît la possession hors de la nature en tant qu'appropriation de l'homme, la nature devient étrangère à l'homme. Alors qu'originellement l'homme était en rapport avec la nature du fait qu'il était membre de la communauté, il est maintenant membre de la communauté du fait qu'il

[5] Ibid., p. 35.
[6] Ibid., p. 34.

sees me in nature a common possession, his own possession, appropriated by him. On the other hand, the general notion of possession is possible because it is also determined by the general relation of men towards possession as appropriate. Naturally, in a relation of possession thus reduced, the men occupy different positions vis-a-vis the possession, but they are all, even as slaves, even as the direct possession of other men, linked to the other men through a relation of possession. What originally belonged to itself — nature — to which man naturally belonged, is now anthropomorphically determined, and, according to man, belongs to him only if it is rationally usable — value. of use. Apart from the use of values, nature, for man, is abstract. (Precisely because he is man abstractly - only thanks to his self-speculative conception). And while in reality man has become estranged from his original environment—nature and society—he imagines that nature and society have become estranged from him, opposed to him, and are therefore necessarily the object of its ownership. This is precisely what takes place. Instead of behaving towards nature as towards a possession, therefore belonging to it naturally, man, by means of the possession which he would have appropriated to himself, behaves towards other men as towards nature.

This means that, just as he now behaves towards nature as towards a non-possession, foreign to him, abstract, he also behaves towards other men as towards strangers, not his own. M arx rightly remarked that "slavery and serfdom are only the further development of possession which rests on the tribal community"5, but the fact escaped him, in this place at least, that precisely moment a momentous event happened in history. Until then, possession only meant "belonging to a tribe"6, to a community. In fact, not only was it at this moment that the relationship of appropriation of other men was established, also as foreigners (moreover, even at the level of the tribal community, men mutually appropriate, according to their belonging to various communities), but also the relationship with nature has become a relationship alien to man; this one felt alien to nature. This was the essential event. And on this basis, the basis of a relationship with nature foreign to man, is also established the relationship between communities as objects of mutual appropriation.

In summary: when man's relation to nature as possession ceases, and possession outside of nature appears as appropriation by man, nature becomes foreign to man. Whereas originally man was in contact with nature because he was a member of the community, he is now a member of the community because he is 5 Ib id , p. 35.

8 Id., p. 34.

s'approprie la nature. A l'origine, cette autre communauté était elle aussi objet d'appropriation, car elle était hors de la comunauté propre, et par conséquent une partie seulement de la nature. Cependant, constituant la possession hors de la nature en tant que possession, l'homme pouvait également être en rapport envers les membres d'une autre communauté en tant que possession hors de la nature, en tant qu'outils de travail *produits* (appropriés). Par conséquent, l'esclavage et le servage ne sont pas apparus seulement sur la base de la possession tribale. Leur apparition a nécessité quelque chose de plus que l'appropriation directe d'autres hommes, l'appropriation de membres *d'autres* communautés. Les hommes, en fait, n'ont jamais cessé de s'approprier mutuellement, mais l'homme n'a pu devenir appropriation que lorsque celui qui approprie a cessé d'être un être naturel. Et cela sous-entendait déjà une forme développé de possession appropriée par la nature. L'appropriation des hommes du type esclavage et servage exigeait un degré déjà développé d'appropriation des hommes mêmes de la part de la possession. Depuis lors, en effet, la possession ne signifie plus l'appartenance à une tribu, à une communauté, Qui plus est, le rapport envers les membres d'une même communauté propre existe lui aussi en tant que rapport envers la possession, la possession n'existe que par leur appropriation, comme c'est le cas des membres d'autres communautés, de la nature en général. *La propre communauté est à présent l'objet de l'appropriation.*

La nouvelle forme de possession apparaît donc lorsque *le travail* déjà *objectivisé* produit *le travail*, cette objectivisation contenue dans l'homme ne constituant pas un changement essentiel.

Ou encore cette transformation essentielle peut s'exprimer de la manière suivante: Le rapport envers les autres hommes, envers les membres d'autres communautés, est originellement un rapport envers les valeurs utilisées, comme envers tous les autres objets *trouvés* dans la nature. Dès l'instant où l'homme *découvre* [7] un nouveau procédé d'utilisation des autres hommes autre que leur extermination physique et leur utilisation pour sa nourriture,, il commence à *produire* des autres hommes pour son propre usage. Un nouveau rapport apparaît alors parmi les hommes — le rapport envers les hommes en tan que valeurs.

L'homme a toujours été pour l'homme une valeur utilisable, mais le mal a commencé lorsque l'homme est devenu une valeur

[7] »*L'esclavage* a été découvert...«, écrit Marx dans »l'Antidühring«, et Morgan à dit de l'esclavage qu'il n'avait pas disparu parce qu'on avait découvert la *dignité de l'homme*, mais parce qu'on avait découvert que l'homme libre était une meilleure »machine à faire fortune« que l'esclave. (I. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York 1872. D'après L. Vajt, *Nauka o kulturi*, Belgrade 1973, p. 125).

Nous pourrions ajouter que toutes les formes de classe de la société sont des *découvertes*. Ces nouvelles formes de rapports entre les hommes ne s'arrêtent pas à un seul type d'utilisation des autres hommes, mais ils découvrent et produisent de nouveaux procédés de cette utilisation. Les rapports de classes sont transformés en choses car les hommes eux-mêmes sont devenus des choses.

appropriate nature. Originally, this other community was also an object of appropriation, because it was outside the community proper, and therefore only a part of nature.

However, constituting possession outside of nature as possession, man could also relate to members of another community as possession outside of nature, as tools of labor produced (appropriate). Therefore, slavery and serfdom did not arise solely on the basis of tribal possession. Their appearance necessitated something more than the direct appropriation of other men, the appropriation of members of other communities. Men, in fact, have never ceased to mutually appropriate, but man could only become an appropriation when the one who appropriates ceased to be a natural being. And that already implied a developed form of possession appropriated by nature. I'

appropriation of men of the type slavery and serfdom demanded an already developed degree of appropriation of men themselves on the part of possession. Since then, in fact, possession no longer signifies belonging to a tribe, to a community. exists only through their appropriation, as is the case with members of other communities, of nature in general.

The own community is now the object of appropriation.

The new form of possession therefore appears when the work already objectivized produces work, this objectification contained in man not constituting an essential change.

Or again, this essential transformation can be expressed in the following way: The relationship towards other men, towards the members of other communities, is originally a relationship towards the values used, as towards all the other objects found in nature. . As soon as man discovers a new method of using other men other than their physical extermination and their use for his food, he begins to produce other men for his own use.

A new relation then arises among men — the relation to men as values.

Man has always been a usable value for man, but evil began when man became a value. 7 Slavery was discovered. . .«, wrote M arx in the »Antiduhring«, and Morgan said of slavery that it had not disappeared because the dignity of man had been discovered, but because we had discovered that the free man was a better »machine for making a fortune« than the slave. (I.H.

Morgan, Ancient Society, New York 1872. D 'apržs L. Vajt, The Culture of Nature, 1872;

Belgrade 1973, p. 125).

We might add that all forms of class in society are discoveries. These new forms of relationships between men do not stop at a single type of use of other men, but they discover and produce new methods of this use. Class relations are transformed into things because men themselves have become things.

pour l'homme. Et c'est précisément ce qui s'est passé lorsque sont apparue les premières formes de differenciation de classes dans la communauté.

Ce rapport entre les hommes est déterminé, bien entendu, par le rapport général de l'homme avec la nature. Alors qu'à l'origine ce rapport était un rapport envers la possession, c'est-à-dire envers une valeur utilisable qu'il s'agissait seulement de consommer, à un niveau de développement essentiellement nouveau le rapport de l'homme envers la valeur, donc envers la nature *appropriée*, est devenu rapport envers la nature. L'homme se comporte à présent envers l'appropriation de la nature, de la valeur, de la production du travail, comme envers une nature qui lui appartient. En dehors de cela la nature n'existe pas pour l'homme sauf, sporadiquement, en tant que valeur utilisable.

Ce qui est lourd de conséquences. Produisant une nature nouvelle, en tant que valeur, l'homme renonce en fait à la nature en tant que son bien propre, que possession. La possession, i. e. la nature, en tant que valeur, devient pour l'homme propriété, car elle est absolument subordonnée à sa volonté, et sa seule fonction est de servir cette volonté. Mais la possession n'est pas seulement devenue propriété, la nature ne devient pas seulement soumise à l'home: la propriété elle aussi devient possession. En effet, non seulement l'homme a modifié son rapport envers la nature comme étant sienne, sa possession; il s'est aussi lui-même séparé de la nature et a ainsi cessé lui-même de s'appartenir.

Si nous avons déjà dit que l'homme se comporte maintenant envers la valeur, le produit du travail, donc la propriéte, comme envers sa nature — son rapport envers la propriété est de nouveau un rapport de possession. Etant donné que, d'une part, la propriété est en dehors de la nature en tant que possession de l'homme, et que, de l'autre, l'homme lui-même est en dehors de sa possession en tant que nature, que s'appartenant à lui-même, la propriété — devenue sa nouvelle nature — est en réalité maintenant la possession de l'homme, le *propre bien* de l'homme, auquel lui,même appartient. De même que pour l'homme, autrefois, la nature était une possession, car il ne se différenciait pas d'elle, de même la propriété est à présent pour lui devenue possession car elle est, comme l'homme, le produit d'un seul et même processus — le rapport d'appropriation de la nature — le travail.

Cette différenciation historique — différence aussi de conceptions — entre la possession et la proprieté, est indispensable lorsqu'il s'agit d'exprimer les changements historiques du rapport de l'homme avec la nature. La propriété est donc un produit historique, donc, simplement, une notion plus restreinte de la possession. Elle n'est que l'entremise indispensable [8] menant à la réalisation de la possession en tant que lien authentique de l'homme avec la nature. Elle est donc bien la possession de l'homme, puisqu'

[8] »Ce n'est qu'avec l'abolition de cette entremise — postulat d'ailleurs indispensable — qu'apparaît l'humanisme *positif* qui commence positivement à partir de lui-même«. K. Marx, *Ekonomsko-filozofski rukopisi*, Rani radovi, Naprijed, Zagreb 1967, p. 330.

for the man. And this is precisely what happened when the first forms of class differentiation appeared in the community.

This relationship between men is determined, of course, by the

general relationship of man with nature. Whereas originally this relation was a relation towards possession, that is to say towards a usable value which it was only a question of consuming, at an essentially new level of development the relation of man towards value, therefore towards appropriate nature, has become a relation towards nature. Man now behaves towards the appropriation of nature, of value, of the production of labor, as towards a nature that belongs to him.

Apart from that nature does not exist for man except, sporadically, as usable value.

Which has serious consequences. Producing a new nature, as value, man in fact renounces nature as his own good, as possession. Possession, i. e. nature, as a value, becomes property for man, because it is absolutely subordinate to his will, and its only function is to serve this will. But possession has not only become property, nature has not only become subject to man: property also becomes possession. Indeed, not only has man changed his relationship to nature as his, his possession; he also separated himself from nature and thus ceased to belong to himself.

If we have already said that man now behaves towards value, the product of labor, therefore property, as towards his nature — his relation to property is again a relation of possession. Since, on the one hand, property is outside of nature as the possession of man, and on the other hand, man himself is outside of his possession as that nature, that belonging to itself, property—which has become its new nature—is in reality now man's possession, man's own good, to which he himself belongs. Just as for man, formerly, nature was a possession, for he is not different from it, so property has now become for him a possession, for it is, like man, the product of nature. one and the same process

— the relationship of appropriation of nature — work.

This historical differentiation—a difference also of conceptions—between possession and property, is indispensable when it is a question of expressing the historical changes in the relationship of man with nature. Property is therefore a historical product, therefore, simply, a more restricted notion of possession. It is only the indispensable intermediary 8 leading to the realization of possession as an authentic link between man and nature. It is therefore indeed the possession of man, since

8 "It is only with the abolition of this en trem ise — an indispensable postulate, moreover — that there appears the positive humanism which begins positively from itself" . K. M arx, E k o n om sk o -filo zo fsk i ru k opisi, Rani radovi, Naprijed, Zagreb 1967, p. 330.

elle a approprié l'homme, mais la possession n'est pas toujours la propriété, car elle transcende l'homme en tant que possession de la propriété. Originellement la possession exprime le lien naturel de l'homme avec la *non-nature*, donc un lien non naturel. La propriété exprime la *possession aliénée* de l'homme, précisément parce que l'illusoire (l'impossible) produit la puissance de l'homme sur la possession. (Il est impossible d'*exercer un pouvoir* sur ce qui est déjà *à soi*. Cela voudrait dire un pouvoir sur soi-même, ce qui est un non-sens. Cependant, pour y parvenir malgré tout, l'homme s'approprie même sa possession — en réalité il se l'aliène — pour régner sur elle; ce faisant, il ne se rend pas compte qu'il est lui-même approprié, aliéné. C'est pourquoi l'illusion du pouvoir est possible).

Cette question de l'extériorisation de l'homme à l'intérieur de la possession est le problème fondamental de son aliénation. Comment est-il possible, en effet, d'extérioriser l'être naturel de l'homme à l'intérieur du monde qui est sa possession, sinon par l'extériorisation de lui-même.[9] *L'extériorisation de la nature à l'intérieur même de cette extériorisation, la découverte de la possession, n'est rien d'autre pour l'homme que l'extériorisation de l'homme lui-même.* C'est pourquoi toute extériorisation de la nature *en dehors de l'homme* entraine directement l'extériorisation de l'homme. Cependant, Marx a écrit: »Même là où il s'agit seulement de *trouver et de découvrir*, cela exige bientôt un effort, un travail — par exemple chasser, pêcher, garder les troupeaux — et la production (i. e. le développement) de certaines aptitudes de la part du sujet«.[10] Oui, mais de quelles aptitudes s'agit-il? Si la *production* est le développement d'aptitudes de la part du sujet, et si cette production s'effectue dans le *processus du travail*, c'est là alors la *production (i. e. le développement) du sujet pour le travail!* Le travail est donc ici, même en tant que production — une appropriation, l'appropriation de l'homme (pris à la nature), son extériorisation! Ou, comme Marx l'a dit ailleurs: »La production ne produit pas l'homme seulement comme *marchandise, marchandise humaine*, l'homme déterminé en tant que *machandise*, elle le produit également, en accord avec cette détermination, comme être *spirituellement* et physiquement déshumanisé. Immoralité, monstruosité, stupidité de l'ouvrier et du capitaliste. — Son produit est une *marchandise consciente d'elle-même et agissant d'elle-même*, . . . l'homme — marchandise«.[11]

Possession privée

La possession privée commence en tant que propriété. Et la propriété commence en tant que possession donnée. Mais la pos-

[9] Conf. Herbert Marcuse, *Čovjek jedne dimenzije* (L'homme d'une dimension) Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo 1968, p. 161. »Le mode tend à devenir objet de gestion totale, qui absorbe même les gestionnaires«.

[10] K. Marx, *Epoques* . . . page 34

[11] K. Marx, *E-f. rukopisi*, page 260.

it has appropriated man, but possession is not always property, for it transcends man as the possession of property. Originally possession expresses the natural link of man with non-nature, therefore an unnatural link. Property expresses possession alienated from man,

precisely because the illusory (the impossible) produces man's power over possession. (It is impossible to exercise power over what is already one's own. That would mean power over oneself, which is nonsense. his possession—in reality he alienates it—in order to reign over it; in doing so, he does not realize that he is himself

-even appropriate, alien. This is why the illusion of power is possible).

This question of man's exteriorization within possession is the fundamental problem of his alienation. How is it possible, indeed, to exteriorize the natural being of man within the world which is his possession, if not by the exteriorization of himself?9 The exteriorization of the nature of man The very interior of this exteriorization, the discovery of possession, is nothing other for man than the exteriorization of man himself. This is why any exteriorization of nature outside of man directly entails the exteriorization of man. However, Marx wrote: “Even where it is only a matter of finding and discovering, it soon requires effort, work

— e.g. hunting, fishing, herding — and the production (i.e. development) of certain skills on the part of the subject“.10 Yes, but what skills are these? If production is the development of skills on the part of the subject, and if this production takes place in the process of work, then this is the production (i.e. the development) of the subject for work! Labor is therefore here, even as production — an appropriation, the appropriation of man (taken from nature), his exteriorization! Or, as Marx said elsewhere: "Production does not produce man only as commodity, human commodity, man determined as commodity, it also produces him, in accordance with this determination, as spiritually and spiritually physically dehumanized. Immorality, monstrosity, stupidity of the worker and the capitalist. — His product is a self-conscious and self-acting commodity.

-even, . . . man — commodity«.11

Possession privee

Private possession begins as property. And ownership begins as possession given. But pos-9 Conf. H erbert Marcuse, Č o vjek jed n e dim en zije (The man of one dim ension) V eselin M asleša, Sarajevo 1968, p. 161. ->The mode tends to become an object of total management, which even absorbs the managers«.

10 K. Marx, And few. . . page 34

11 K. Marx, E -f. ru k o p isi, page 260.

session commence en tant que donnée lorsque l'homme cesse d'être conscient de s'appartenir, et commence à ressentir comme sa possession seulement ce qui est déterminé par lui; la possession privée est une notion anthropomorphique. La propriéte exprime donc le pouvoir de l'homme sur le monde extérieur. L'homme est propriétaire car il est le sujet de l'appropriation de ce monde, de la nature. Et de même que »l'appropriation de la *volonté* d'autrui est la condition préalable du rapport de domination«[12] en général, de même en ce qui concerne la nature l'appropriation est en fait la négation de toute forme de spontanéité du rapport avec la nature. L'homme ne devient maître de cette dernière que s'il la nie, appropriant sa »volonté«, sa spontanéité, et la conséquence inéluctable de l'appropriation est la domination de l'homme, le pouvoir.

Si *l'essence subjective*[13] de la propriété privée est le travail, son essence objective n'est que la propriété privée donnée selon le travail, i. e. selon son essence subjective. »Le rapport de propriété privée contient de manière latente le rapport de propriété privée en tant que *travail*, ainsi que le rapport de ce dernier en tant que *capital* et le rapport mutuel de ces deux expressions«.[14] Le travail et la possession privée ne sont donc pas des contraires, bien que leur existence mutuelle ne puisse être qu'antagoniste; ils ne s'excluent pas, au contraire ils se rendent *possibles*. Le travail et la propriété privée sont possibles uniquement dans une négation mutuelle; la négation est donc ici le moyen de leur réalisation mutuelle. Le travail et la possession de l'homme provenant du travail est *une* notion — le rapport de la propriété privée et du travail — en dernière instance l'homme en tant qu'*ouvrier*.

Le travail en tant qu'essence subjective de la propriété privée, dont *l'essence objective* est donc la propriété privée, sous-entend que l'homme en tant que sujet du travail joue le rôle de condition de la possession privée. La possession privée découle par conséquent de l'homme en tant que possession privée. Celleci sous-entend l'homme en tant que possession privée, mais aussi la possessio privée en dehors de l'homme, et dès maintenant possession de l'homme. Par conséquent, pour sentir comme sien ce qui est privé, l'homme lui-même doit être privé.

La notion de *privé* provient ainsi de deux sources.[15] D'un côté elle se rapporte à *dépouillé* (latin *privare* — priver), de l'autre à *ce qui appartient* (latin *privatus* — à soi, personnel). Dans ce sens la notion de *possession privée* paraît à première vue *contradiction*

[12] K. Marx, *Epoques* . . ., p. 47.

[13] K. Marx, *E.-f. rukopisi*, p. 267.

[14] Ibidem, p. 261. Marx exprime également cette idée dans les termes suivants: »L'ouvrier produit le capital, le capital produit l'ouvrier, celui-ci se produit donc lui-même, et le produit de l'ensemble de ce mouvement est l'homme en tant qu'*ouvrier*, que *marchandise*« . . . Ibid., p. 259.

[15] »Dans ce double sens, elle (la notion de »privé«) exprime en même temps le processus historique dans la transformation des communautés primitives en formations de classes, qui permet à une minorité de s'approprier personnellement les biens sociaux, *privant* la majorité d'être maîtres des conditions naturelles de production«. Ljubomir Tadić, *Smisao društvene svojine u svetlu njenih istorijskih pretpostavki*, SANU, Belgrade, 1965, p. 8.

session begins as a given when man ceases to be conscious of belonging to himself, and begins to feel as his possession only that

which is determined by him; private possession is an anthropomorphic notion. Property therefore expresses the power of man over the external world. Man is the owner because he is the subject of the appropriation of this world, of nature. And just as "the appropriation of the will of others is the precondition of the relationship of domination"12 in general, so with regard to nature, appropriation is in fact the negation of any form of spontaneity of the relationship. with nature. Man only becomes master of this latter if he denies it, appropriating his »will«, his spontaneity, and the inevitable consequence of appropriation is the domination of man, power.

If the subjective essence13 of private property is labour, its objective essence is only private property given according to labour, i. e. according to its subjective essence. "The relation of private property latently contains the relation of private property as labor, as well as the relation of the latter as capital and the mutual relation of these two expressions".14

Labor and private possession are therefore not opposites, although their mutual existence can only be antagonistic; they do not exclude each other, on the contrary they make each other possible. Labor and private property are possible only in mutual negation; negation is therefore here the means of their mutual realization. Labor and the possession of man arising from labor is a notion — the relation of private property and labor — ultimately man as worker.

Labor as the subjective essence of private property, whose objective essence is therefore private property, implies that man as the subject of labor plays the role of condition of private possession. Private possession therefore follows from man as private possession. Celled implies man as private possession, but also private possessio outside of man, and now possession of man. Therefore, to feel as his own what is deprived, man himself must be deprived.

The notion of private thus comes from two sources.15 On the one hand it relates to bareness (Latin private — to deprive), on the other to what belongs (Latin privatus — to know, personal). In this sense, the notion of private possession appears at first sight to be a contradiction 12 K. M arx, Epoques . . . , p. 47.

13 K. Marx, E.-f. ru k op isi, p. 267.

14 Ibidem, p. 261. M arx also expresses this idea in the following terms: “The worker produces capital, capital produces the worker, the latter therefore produces himself, and the product part of this m ovem

en t is man as a worker, as a commodity. . . Ibid., p. 259.

15” In this

double meaning, it (the notion of »private«)

exp rime in meme

tem ps the historical p rocess in the transformation of prim itive communities into class formations, which allows a minority to appropriate p ersonally social property, deprives the m ajority of' being m asters of the n alu relle conditions of production«. Ljubom ir Tadić, Sm isa o dru Stvene s vo jin eus v e t l u n j e n h i s t o r i j s k i p r e t p o s t a v k i , SA NU, Belgrade, 1965, p. 8.

in adjecto, ce qui est privé étant déjà une négation, la négation de la possession. Cela sous-entend que quelque chose qui n'est pas à moi m'appartient. En fait l'appropriation ou la privation est impossible en tant que fait da s'approprier se qui appartient déjà — la possession — (ou de s'en dépouiller).

Mais du fait, précisément, que le travail en tant que privation du sujet même du travail signifie déjà le fait de priver l'homme de la possession, cet homme extériorisé, dépouillé, qui ne s'appartient plus, ne peut s'approprier la possession. Par conséquent la possession n'est pas privée par elle-même, mais par rapport à l'homme en tant qu'individu privé, dépouillé de sa possession primordiale — la communauté. C'est pourquoi la condition te toute suppression de possession privée est la suppression de la cause de cette possession. Pour que celle-ci cesse d'être privée, l'homme doit abolir on propre dépouillement, il doit s'appartenir. Il doit, pour changer son rapport envers la possession privée, changer son rapport envers la possession en général.

Comme la possession privée est déterminée par son essence subjective, donc par l'homme en tant qu'ouvrier, la première forme de possession privée est possible en tant que forme générale de possession. L'égalitarisme primitif, l'état primitif *d'égalité* parmi les hommes *est possible* en tant qu'état *d'inégalité* générale par rapport à la nature. En d'autres termes, avant que les hommes n'aient commencé à devenir différents entre eux, ils sont universellement devenus inégaux par rapport à la nature. L'homme s'est donc d'abord dépouillé lui-même, et seulement ensuite il était prêt à dépouiller autrui, et à être lui-même dépouillé par autrui. Le rapport de propriété privée parmi les hommes est donc antérieur à ce rapport de propriété privée entre l'homme et la nature. Il est donc logique de conclure que la possession privée est possible même en dehors de la société de classes. Et cela non seulement à un niveau archaïque de société, mais aussi comme modèle de société postérieure à la société de classes, en tant que communisme grossier. »Du fait qu'il comprend le rapport de propriété privée dans sa *généralité*, le communisme n'est, dans sa première forme, que la *généralisation et l'achèvement* de cette propriété . . . la détermination de l'ouvrier ne cesse pas, elle s'étend à tous les hommes; le rapport de propriété privée reste un rapport de la communauté vis-à-vis du monde des choses . . . La première abolition positive de la propriété privée, le *communisme grossier*, n'est donc que la *forme de manifestation* de la perfidie de la propriété privée, qui veut se présenter comme communauté positive«.[16] Cette généralisation de l'homme en tant que possession privée en une communauté — possession privée du monde des choses, est brutalement manifeste justement aujourd'hui. »Cette tendance d'opposition de la propriété privée générale à la propriété privée se manifeste sous une forme bestiale, lorsqu'on oppose au *mariage* (qui est certainement une forme de *la propriété privée exclusive)* la *communauté des femmes* où, par conséquent, la femme devient

[16] K. Marx, *E.-f. rukopisi*, pp. 273-5.

in adjecto, what is private already being a negation, the negation of possession. It implies that something that is not mine belongs to me. In fact, appropriation or deprivation is impossible as the act of appropriating what already belongs.

— possession — (or to get rid of it).

But precisely because work as deprivation of the very subject of work already signifies the fact of depriving man of possession, this exteriorized, stripped man, who no longer belongs to himself, cannot appropriate possession. Possession, therefore, is not private in itself, but in relation to man as a private individual, stripped of his primordial possession—the community. This is why the condition of any suppression of private possession is the suppression of the cause of this possession. For this to cease to be deprived, man must abolish his own stripping, he must belong to himself. He must, in order to change his relation to private possession, change his relation to possession in general.

As private possession is determined by its subjective essence, therefore by man as worker, the first form of private possession is possible as a general form of possession. Primitive egalitarianism, the primitive state of equality among men is possible as a state of general inequality with respect to nature. In other words, before men began to become different from one another, they universally became unequal in relation to nature. Man therefore first despoiled himself, and only then was he ready to despoil others, and to be himself despoiled by others. The relationship of private property among men is therefore prior to this relationship of private property between man and nature. It is therefore logical to conclude that private possession is possible even outside of class society. And this not only at an archaic level of society, but also as a model of society subsequent to class society, as crude communism. “Because it understands the relation of private property in its generality, communism is, in its first form, only the generalization and the completion of this property. . . the determination of the worker does not cease, it extends to all men; the relationship of private property remains a relationship of the community vis-à-vis the world of things. . . The first positive abolition of private property, crude communism, is therefore only the form of manifestation of the perlidy of private property, which wants to present itself as a positive community. privateness in a community - private possession of the world of things, is brutally manifest right now. This tendency of opposition of general private property to private property manifests itself in a bestial form, when one opposes to marriage (which is certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women or, therefore, the woman becomes 10 K. Marx, E.-f. ru kopisi, pp. 273-5.

propriété *sociale et générale*«.[17] La »révolution sexuelle«, le sexe de groupe«, n'est-il pas là précisément cette forme évidente de la tendance à la généralisation de la propriété privée? La »liberté« sexuelle, sous forme de sexe de groupe, n'est-elle pas une manifestation de possession privée en tant que possession d'un groupe?

Postulats fondamentaux du libéralisme

Tout rapport entre les hommes s'établit uniquement grâce au rapport de l'homme envers la nature. Jusqu'à présent, l'histoire des rapports entre les hommes a été en réalité l'histoire de l'appropriation de la nature. Ce rapport entraîne une conséquence inévitable, non pas accidentelle, mais essentielle: c'est l'apparition du rapport d'appropriation parmi les hommes également. La société de classes est, pour cette raison, *explicite*, le rapport social de possession à l'intérieur de la nature extériorisée.

La soif de possession de l'homme sur le plan social est la soif la plus immédiate de liberté *absolue*, de liberté hors de la nature, *le libérant de la nature. Absolue*, la liberté est celle qui est *libre de la nature* — donc la non liberté.

En appropriant, l'homme ne peut voir la possession que dans l'appropriation, et l'appropriation des autres hommes devient la condition des rapports envers ceux-ci en tant que possession. De *condition préalable* d'appropriation, la communauté devient conséquence d'appropriation, et, en tant qu'appropriation de l'homme, elle n'est qu'un moyen nécessaire. Tant mieux si l'appropriation est possible sans la communauté; et plus l'appropriation au moyen de la *communauté déjà appropriée* est efficace, plus la communauté se manifeste comme *condition*. Bientôt, l'homme — qui ressent la communauté comme étant lui-même — a le sentiment que cette communauté lui appartient — et non que, au contraire, il appartient à la communauté.

Pour un tel homme, la communauté ne devient libre que si elle assure la liberté d'appropriation. Conçue comme telle dans la Rome antique,[18] la communauté atteint son apogée en tant que communauté *libérale*, communauté de liberté d'entreprise privée.

Déterminant le libéralisme comme une »idéologie de la possession privée et du propriétaire privé«, Ljubomir Tadic écrit: »La possession privée n'est pas seulement ici le pivot de l'ordre social et politique libéral, elle est aussi la catégorie-clé, et plus encore le principe suprême régissant tous les autres rapports et notions, avant tout les notions de liberté, d'égalité et de sécurité dans la

[17] Ibidem, p. 273.

[18] »A la différence de la société grecque, la société romaine antique pourrait s'appeler conditionnellement société bourgeoise de l'Antiquité. Conditionnellement, parce qu'elle a, d'une part, développé toutes les notions fondamentales du droit civil (réel, d'obligation, d'héritage, et familial) à une époque où, d'un autre côté, l'économie de marchandise et le capital usurier et commercial représentent encore des formes sporadiques de production«. Lj. Tadić, *Smisao društvene svojine* . ., p. 9.

social and general property."17 Is not the »sexual revolution«, group sex« not precisely this obvious form of the tendency towards the generalization of private property? Freedom"

Is sexuality, in the form of group sex, not a manifestation of private possession as possession of a group?

Fundamental postulates of liberalism

Any relationship between men is established solely thanks to the relationship between man and nature. Until now, the history of relations between men has in reality been the history of the appropriation of nature. This relation entails an inevitable consequence, not accidental, but essential: it is the appearance of the relation of appropriation among men as well. Class society is, for this reason, explicit, the social relation of possession within externalized nature.

Man's craving for social possession is the most immediate craving for absolute freedom, freedom outside of nature, freeing him from nature. Absolved, freedom is that which is free from nature — hence non-freedom.

By appropriating, man can see possession only in appropriation, and the appropriation of other men becomes the condition of relations towards them as possession. From a prior condition of appropriation, the community becomes a consequence of appropriation, and, as appropriation of man, it is only a necessary means. So much the better if appropriation is possible without the community; and the more effective the appropriation by means of the community already appropriated, the more the community manifests itself as a condition. Soon, the man - who feels the community as being himself - has the feeling that this community belongs to him - and not that, on the contrary, he belongs to the community.

For such a man, the community only becomes free if it ensures freedom of appropriation. Conceived as such in ancient Rome,18 the community reached its peak as a liberal community, a community of private enterprise freedom.

Determining liberalism as an "ideology of private possession and private proprietorship", Ljubomir Tadic writes: "Private possession is not only here the pivot of the liberal social and political order, it is also the category- 17 Ibidem, p. 273.

18 “Unlike Greek society, ancient Roman society would like to call itself conditionally the bourgeois society of Antiquity. Conditionally, because it has, on the one hand, developed all the fundamental notions of civil law (real, obligation, inheritance, and family) at a time

when , on the other hand, the commodity economy and union and trade capital still represent sporadic forms of production. Lj. Tadic. S misao d ru štv e n e sv o jin e .., p. 9.

société. Par conséquent la *liberté de l'homme* en tant qu'être, ou de l'individu en tant qu'individu n'est pas — comme le libéralisme le suggère à première vue — la quintessence de l'idéologie libérale; c'est avant tout, selon moi, la liberté d'entreprise privée, la liberté d'acquérir et de posséder un objet«.[19] Parlant de certains types nouveaux d'idéologie libéraliste, et opposant son opinion à la conception du libéralisme selon Tadić, Miladin Životić déclare: »*Un libéralisme apparaît, qui ne défend pas l'initiative privée, qui accepte la propriété de l'Etat.* A la veille de la seconde guerre mondiale, un groupe de libéraux, parmi lesquels B. Russell, Moris Koen, John Dewey et d'autres, s'efforce de déterminer sa position libérale, face au fascisme et au stalinisme. Et quelle est cette position? Ils défendent le libéralisme, mais non pas la propriété privée, ni le droit à l'initiative privée. *Ils acceptent la propriété de l'Etat mais prennent leurs distances vis-à-vis du communisme.* Donc, *le libéralisme ne repose pas nécessairement sur l'acceptation de la possession privée. Ce qu'il ne peut accepter, c'est l'absence d'Etat et de société politique*«[20] En guise de réponse il suffit, nous semble-t-il, de poser une question à Životić: La propriété de l'Etat diffère-t-elle de la propriété privée? Est-il d'ailleurs contradictoire d'accepter la propriété de l'Etat et de prendre ses distances vis-à-vis du communisme!? Il ne suffit pas de ne pas défendre la propriété privée. Il faut l'attaquer!

Les devises de la jeune bourgeoisie — *liberté et égalité* — ne sont que l'expression de cette position libéraliste de la propriété privée. La liberté et l'égalité, si nécessaires aux hommes de toutes les »époques révolues« de la formation économique de la société«, ont apporté *au travail la liberté*, et *l'égalité du travail et de l'homme*.[21] Le libéralisme a permis à liberté de travail d'atteindre des dimensions insoupçonnées et l'a finalement identifiée à l'homme lui-même. En réalité le libéralisme est né bien avant le capitalisme, avec les toutes premières formes de la possession privée et la négation de la forme naturelle, primordiale de la possession; et dans sons sens le plus général il signifie une liberté qui repose sur le travail. C'est ainsi seulement qu'on peut comprendre également sa forme finale, dans laquelle la liberté se réduit en fait au travail, faisant ainsi de celui-ci la liberté de l'homme, éliminant *la communauté*, en tant que sphère de la liberté véritable de l'homme, en tant que produit du travail. Dès l'apparition de la nouvelle forme de possession — propriété, »propriété de l'outillage«, forme qui repose sur *l'ouvrier en tant que propriétaire*«, ou le »*propriétaire-travailleur*«, commence la liberté du travail, forme primor-

[19] Ljubomir Tadić, *Privatno-svojinske granice čovekove slobode* Filosofija n⁰. 1/71, p. 18.

[20] Miladin Životić, Discussion au colloque »Libéralisme et socialisme«, Filosofija n⁰ 1/71, p. 41.

[21] Conf. H. Marcuse, *Um i revolucija* (Raison et révolution), Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo 1966, p. 275 et suiv.: Cependant, pour que la devienne marchandise, il faut qu'il y ait du travail »libre«: le particulier doit être libre de vendre sa main d'oeuvre à celui qui est libre et capable de l'acheter. Le contrat de travail implique, pour la société bourgeoise, cette liberté, légalité et la justice.«

.Company. Consequently the freedom of man qua being, or of the individual qua individual, is not — as liberalism at first sight suggests — the quintessence of liberal ideology; it is above all, in my opinion, the freedom of private enterprise, the freedom to acquire and possess

an object. , Miladin Zivotić declares: “A liberalism appears, which does not defend the private initiative, which accepts the property of the State. On the eve of the Second World War, a group of liberals, including B. Russell, Moris Koen, John Dewey and others, endeavored to determine their liberal position in the face of fascism and Stalinism. And what is this position? They defend liberalism, but not private property, nor the right to private initiative. They accept state ownership but distance themselves from communism.

Thus, liberalism is not necessarily based on the acceptance of private possession. What he cannot accept is the absence of a state and of a political society. different from private property? Besides, is it contradictory to accept state ownership and to distance oneself from it?

screw communism!? It is not enough not to defend private property. We must attack it!

The mottos of the young bourgeoisie—liberty and equality—are only the expression of this liberalist position of private property. Liberty and equality, so necessary to men in all "bygone epochs" of the economic formation of society, have brought liberty to labor, and equality of labor and of man. freedom of work to reach unsuspected dimensions and finally identified it with man himself. In reality, liberalism was born long before capitalism, with the very first forms of private possession and the negation of the natural, primordial form of possession; and in its most general sense it means a freedom which rests on work. It is only thus that one can also understand its final form, in which freedom is in fact reduced to work, thus depriving of it of the freedom of man, eliminating the community, as the sphere of freedom. true of man, as a product of labor. From the appearance of the new form of possession — property, »ownership of tools«, a form which rests on the worker as owner«, or the »owner-worker«, begins the freedom of work, forms prim or-19 Ljubom ir Tadić, P r iv a tn o -s v o jin s k e granice čo v ek o v e slobode Filoso-tija n°. 1/71, p. 18.

20 Miladin Zivotić, Discussion au colloque "Liberalism and socialism", Filosofija n° 1/71, p. 41.

21 Conf.

H.

Marcuse,

One

i

rev o lu tion

(Raison

et

revolution),

Veselin M asleša, S arajevo 1966, p. 275 et seq.: However, so that the dev ien -

ne goods, there must be “free” labour: the individual must be free to sell his labor to those who are free and capable of buying it.

The labor contract implies, for bourgeois society, this freedom, equality and justice.

diale du libéralisme. »Comme l'outil lui-même est déjà un produit du travail, donc un élément constituant une propriété, existant déjà par le travail, la communauté ne peut plus ici avoir une forme spontanée comme dans le premier cas (communauté sur laquelle cette forme de propriété est fondée), mais elle est déjà elle-même produite, seconde — produite par l'ouvrier lui-même.«[22] Le libéralisme étant au début la liberté de travail, et celle-ci, comme Marx l'explique ici, la liberté de la communauté non libre, le libéralisme atteint son degré final dans la *non liberté absolue de la communauté* en tant que *liberté absolue du travail.* Et de même que la communauté primitive était la condition du travail, de la possession, de même l'abolition de la propriété privée, du travail, est la *condition préalable* de la réalisation de la communauté, de la société, dans sa forme primordiale, spontanée. Pour que l'homme soit homme, devienne un être social, il doit donc devenir un être naturel.

La transformation de la communauté en possession en tant que produit du travail seulement, donc propriété privée, et la transformation de la communauté elle-même en tant que produit du travail, donc privée, en propriété, sous sa nouvelle forme — a nécessité l'acte même du travail. Mais ce processus, pour atteindre son degré extrême de libéralisme, a nécessité l'histoire *entière* de l'homme. Et cela sous-entend précisément l'abolition ou la disparition des conditions préalables originelles du libéralisme, conditions d'élaboration des premières formes de la possession privée. Pour se réaliser jusqu'au conséquences extrêmes, le libéralisme devait supprimer toutes ses limitations, et même les conditions préalables de sa formation primitive. Le libéralisme est donc le processus qui *abolit constamment la puissance de l'homme sur le travail,* et constamment, étant sa propre condition, libère le travail de toute espèce de limitation. Dans sa forme définitive *le libre travail devient condition du travail salarié.*[23] »Ce qui nous importe ici avant tout: le rapport du travail et du capital ou des conditions objectives de travail en tant que capital, suppose un processus historique qui abolit les formes différentes dans lesquelles l'ouvrier est propriétaire ou dans lesquelles le propriétaire travaille.«[24] Cette abolition s'effectue, selon Marx, dans l'ordre suivant:[25]

1. Le rapport envers le sol en tant que »condition naturelle de production« doit être aboli, car il suppose une communauté dans le cadre de laquelle tous les membres sont propriétaires. La possession qui découle de ce rapport est *»la propriété directement commune«.*

[22] K. Marx, *Epoques . . .*, p. 45.

[23] Marx a écrit: »Sui le libre travail et l'échange de ce libre travail contre de l'argent, pour qu'il reproduise et fructifie, pour être dépensé par l'argent comme valeur d'usage non pas pour la jouissance mais comme valeur d'usage pour l'argent — sont une condition préalable du travail salarié et l'une des conditions historiques du capital, l'autre condition est la séparation du libre travail des conditions objectives de sa réalisation — des moyens de travail et des matériaux du travail.« (Ibidem, p. 5)

[24] Ibidem, p. 41

[25] Ibidem, p. 41-3.

dialect of liberalism. “Since the tool itself is already a product of labor, therefore an element constituting a property, already existing through labor, the community here can no longer have a spontaneous form as in the first case (community on which this form of property is

founded), but it is itself already produced, second—produced by the worker himself. freedom of the unfree community, liberalism reaches its final degree in the absolute unfreedom of the community as absolute freedom to work. And just as the primitive community was the condition of work, of possession, so the abolition of private property, of work, is the precondition for the realization of the community, of society, in its primordial form. , spontaneous. For man to be man, to become a social being, he must therefore become a natural trait.

The transformation of the community into possession as a product of labor only, hence private property, and the transformation of the community itself as a product of labor, hence private, into property, in its new form—required the the very act of work. But this process, to reach its extreme degree of liberalism, required the entire history of man. And that implies precisely 1? abolition or disappearance of the original preconditions of liberalism, conditions for the elaboration of the first forms of private possession.

To realize itself to its extreme consequences, liberalism had to remove all its limitations, and even the prerequisites of its primitive formation. Liberalism is therefore the process which constantly abolishes the power of man over labor, and constantly, being its own condition, liberates labor from every kind of limitation. In its definitive form, free labor becomes the condition of wage labor.23 What matters to us here above all: the relationship between labor and capital or the objective conditions of labor as capital, presupposes a historical process which abolishes the forms different in which the worker is the owner or in which the owner works."24

This abolition is carried out, according to Marx, in the following order:25

1.

The relationship to the soil as a "natural condition of production" must be abolished, because it presupposes a community in which all members are owners. The possession that results from this relationship is "directly common property".

22 K. M arx, E few . . . , e.g. 45.

23 M arx wrote: 'Following free labor and the exchange of that free labor for money, to reproduce and adulterate, to be expended by money as use-value not for enjoyment but as use-value for money —

are a prior codification of wage labor and one of the historical conditions of capital, the other condition is the separation of free labor from objective conditions. es of its realization — of the means of work and the materials of the work.« (Ibidem, p. 5) 24 Ibidem , p. 41

25 Ibid., p. 41-3.

2. En produisant l'outillage, l'ouvrier devient aussi propriétaire de cet outillage. La désintégration de ce rapport de propriété est la condition de la libération ultérieure du travail vis-à-vis de l'homme, ou, en d'autres termes la condition de la puissance du travail sur l'homme. Avec ce type de rapport de propriété »le travail s'appartient encore à lui-même«.

3. La désintégration des rapports dans lesquels l'ouvrier est propriétaire des moyens de consommation *avant* la production Dans les cas précédents l'ouvrier agricole et l'artisan disposent d'un certain fonds de consommation avant et pendant le processus de production.

4. La désintégration sous une forme quelconque de la propriété dans laquelle l'ouvrier lui-même apparaît comme *propriété d'un autre homme,* comme *»condition objective de production«.* »Pour le capital, ce n'est pas l'ouvrier qui est la condition de la production, mais le travail lui-même. Il peut le faire accomplir au moyen de machines, ou même de l'eau, de l'air — tant mieux. Et directement, mais indirectement, au moyen de l'échange«.

Le libéralisme en tant que »liberté vis-à-vis de . . .«

Déjà les premiers postulats du libéralisme, supprimant le rapport dans lequel l'ouvrier est propriétaire, sont des formes de »la liberté vis-à-vis de . . .«, telles que la libération de l'ouvrier vis-à-vis de la terre, des outils de travail, ou d'un autre homme en tant que »condition objective de production«. Tous ces postulats de la liberté de l'homme vis-à-vis de ses conditions de production ne sont cependant que la condition de la libéralisation du travail vis-à-vis de l'homme. Et cela, naturellement, ne sous-entend nullement que l'homme est libéré du travail. Au contraire! L'homme libéré de ses conditions objectives de production s'appartenant à elles-mêmes est en position d'appartenir lui-même à ces mêmes conditions, à présent du point de vue de l'homme — conditions subjectives de production, car leur séparation de l'homme est un acte même de séparation de travail vis-à-vis de l'homme. Par conséquent, les conditions jadis *objectives* de production pour l'homme en tant que *sujet,* deviennent maintenant des conditions *subjectives* de production, pour l'homme en tant qu'*objet.* Cette libération du travail, en tant que *liberté de travail,* est la condition et la conséquence de la non liberté de l'homme.[26] Elle n'est possible

[26] Conf. K. Marx — F. Engels, *Izabrana dela,* II, Kultura, Belgrade 1950, pp. 14—15. Dans la »Critique du programme de Gotha«, Marx parle du droit qui repose sur le travail. Ce droit »reconnaît tacitement l'inégalité du talent individuel et, par conséquent, l'inégalité de capacité de travail comme des privilèges naturels. *Il est donc, par son contenu, un droit d'inégalité, comme tous les droits«.* L'égalité parmi les hommes, la liberté, qui repose sur le travail, est donc essentiellement une inégalité, une non liberté. Du fait que le travail est considéré comme une *mesure* parmi les hommes, nous ne devons considérer les hommes que *»comme des ouvriers;* et nous ne voyons rien d'autre en eux, nous faisons abstraction de tout le reste«. La liberté dont il est question est par conséquent une liberte abstraite, réduite.

2. By producing the tool, the worker also becomes the owner of this tool. The disintegration of this property relation is the condition of the subsequent liberation of labor vis-a-vis man, or, in other words, the condition of the power of labor over man. With this type of property

relationship “the work still belongs to itself”.

3. The disintegration of the relations in which the worker is the owner of the means of consumption before production In the preceding cases the agricultural worker and the artisan have a certain fund of consumption before and during the production process.

4. The disintegration in any form of property in which the worker himself appears as the property of another man, as an “objective condition of production”. “For capital, it is not the worker who is the condition of production, but labor itself. He can make it happen by means of machines, or even water, air — so much the better. And directly, but indirectly, by means of exchange.

Liberalism as “freedom from . . .«

Already the first postulates of liberalism, suppressing the relation in which the worker is property, are forms of "freedom vis-à-vis .. . ", such as the liberation of the worker vis-a-vis

-saw the earth, working tools, or another man as an "objective condition of production". All these postulates of man's freedom vis-à-vis his conditions of production are, however, only the condition for the liberalization of work vis-à-vis the conditions of production.

-a-vis the man. And this, of course, by no means implies that man is free from work. On the contrary! Man freed from his objective conditions of production belonging to themselves is in a position to belong himself to these same conditions, now from the point of view of man - subjective conditions of production, because their separation of the man is an act of separation of work vis-à-vis the man. Consequently, the once objective conditions of production for man as subject now become subjective conditions of production for man as object. This liberation from work, as freedom to work, is the condition and the consequence of the non-freedom of man.26 It is only possible 20 Conf. K. Marx — F. Engels, Izabrana dela, II, Kultura, B elgrade 1950, pp. 14— 15. In the »Critique of the Gotha Program«, M arx speaks of the law which is based on work. This law tacitly recognizes the inequality of individual talent and, consequently, the inequality of capacity for work as natural privileges. It is therefore, by its content, a right of inequality, as

ious the rights“. Equality among men, freedom, which rests on work, is therefore essentially an inequality, an unfreedom. Since work is considered as a measure among men, we should only consider men as

workers; and we see nothing else in them, we disregard everything else. The freedom in question is therefore an abstract, reduced freedom.

208

qu'au moyen de *l'esclavage* absolu de l'homme vis-à-vis du travail. La seule chose que l'homme puisse *librement* faire dans la *liberté qui se présente comme le travail,* i. e. dans le *travail en tant que liberté,* c'est de *se vendre.* C'est tout ce qui lui reste de sa *volonté.*

Le capital en tant que forme extrême du travail libéré dans son pouvoir sur l'homme n'apparaît, n'est rendu possible, que lorsque l'homme s'est libéré de toute forme de pouvoir sur le travail.[27] Le capital n'a été possible que lorsque l'homme a perdu sa dernière part de possession en tant que source de son propre pouvoir. Cette destitution de l'homme est la condition de la puissance du capital. L'homme-ouvrier est devenu par là doublement libre. Il devient libre vis-à-vis de la possession- et libre de travailler. Sa libération de la possession ne suppose pourtant pas la *libération vis-à-vis du travail,* mais, au contraire, la liberté de travailler; la liberté de l'ouvrier vis-à-vis de la possession est donc la condition de la *liberté du travail vis-à-vis de l'homme.* En tant que tel, il est la condition et la conséquence du capital. L'homme, en tant que main d'oeuvre »libre de toute possession«,[28] devient absolument libre. En tant qu'ouvrier, libre pour le travail, il appartient tout entier au travail. Et ainsi, pousqu'il ne peut exister qu'en tant qu'ouvrier, appartenant entièrement au travail, esclave, il est absolument *libre de liberté,* libre de sa vie en dehors du travail. En libérant l'homme de toute possession, le capital le rend libre de travailler, de se vendre librement, car toute sa valeur humaine s'épuise en valeur de main d'oeuvre, en valeur pour le capital, pour le travail. La liberté l'homme devient travail; le travail devient la seule liberté. Absolue, la liberté devient ainsi possible uniquement en dehors de la liberté, en tant que nécessité, qu'alienation.

Par conséquent, c'est le travail, et non pas l'ouvrier, qui est la condition du capital;[29] et le capital est la condition, le déterminant de ses propres conditions également. Le capital seul, cela s'entend, ne produit pas le travail, mais c'est lui qui permet la libération illimitée du capital. En tant que condition du travail, il est la libération de l'homme — main d'oeuvre, et le capital devient ainsi »apte, d'une part à *acheter* les conditions objectives du travail, de l'autre à échanger contre l'argent le travail *vivant* des ouvriers libérés«[30] Le capital libère le serf pour se l'attacher. Seul l'ouvrier *libre* est la condition du capital. Mais la liberté de l'homme, la liberté pour l'homme en tant qu'ouvrier n'intéresse le capital qu'en tant que liberté de travail. Toute limitation de l'homme en tant qu'ouvrier est en même temps et essentiellement la limitation du capital. Ainsi seulement s'explique l'intérêt du capital pour la libération des potentiels *de travail* de l'homme. Les hautes qualifications, le standard de vie, etc . . ., en tant qu'éléments indubi-

[27] »Il ne s'agit pas de la libération du travail car le travail est déjà libre«; le travail libre est la réussite de la société capitaliste«. H. Marcuse, *Raison et révolution,* p. 262.

[28] K. Marx, *Epoques . . .,* p. 57.

[29] Ibidem, p. 43.

[30] Conf. H. Marcuse, *Raison et révolution,* p. 250.

only by means of the absolute slavery of man vis-a-vis work.

The only thing that man can freely do in the freedom that presents itself as work, i. e. in work as freedom is to sell oneself. It's all he has

left of his will.

Capital as an extreme form of labor liberated in its power over man only appears, is made possible, when man has freed himself from all forms of power over labor.'27

Capital was only possible when man lost his last share of possession as the source of his own power.

This destitution of man is the condition of the power of capital. The man-worker has become doubly free. He becomes free from possession and free to work. Its liberation from possession does not, however, presuppose liberation from work, but, on the contrary, the freedom to work; the freedom of the worker vis-a-vis possession is therefore the condition of the freedom of labor vis-a-vis man. As such, it is the condition and the consequence of capital. Man, as labor "free from all possession",28 becomes absolutely free. As a worker, free for work, he belongs entirely to work. And so, since he can only exist as a worker, belonging entirely to work, a slave, he is absolutely free of freedom, free of his life outside of work. By freeing man from all possession, capital makes him free to work, to sell himself freely, because all his human value is exhausted in the value of labor, in value for capital, for work. Man's freedom becomes work; work becomes the only freedom. Absolute freedom thus becomes possible only outside of freedom, as a necessity, as an alienation.

Consequently, it is labour, not the worker, that is the condition of capital;29 and capital is the condition, the determinant of its own conditions as well. Capital alone, of course, does not produce labor, but it is capital that allows the unlimited liberation of capital. As a condition of labor, it is the liberation of man—labor, and capital thus becomes able, on the one hand to buy the objective conditions of labor, on the other to exchange for the 'money the living labor of the liberated workers'30 Capital liberates the serf to bind him to itself. Only the free worker is the condition of capital. But the freedom of man, the freedom for man as a worker, interests capital only as freedom to work. Any limitation of man as a worker is at the same time and essentially a limitation of capital. This is the only way to explain the interest of capital in the liberation of man's working potential. High qualifications, standard of living, etc . . ., as indubL elements

27 "It is not a question of the liberation of labor because labor is already free"; free labor is the success of capitalist society. H. Marcuse,

Raison e t rev o lu tio n , p. 262.

28 K. Marx, And few. . . , e.g. 57.

29 Ibid., p. 43.

M Conf. H. Marcuse, Raison e t rev o lu tio n , p. 250.

tables de l'émancipation humaine dans son ensemble ne signifient rien par eux-mêmes si, dans les conditions de production dictées par l'intérêt du capital, ils ne sont que le simple intérêt matériel du capitaliste. L'existence de l'ouvrier peut être, et est déjà, remplie d'une abondance insoupçonnée, tout en restant essentiellement limitée dans sa fonction de *moyen* du capital.

Avec le capital, les limitations du travailleur cessent d'être partielles. L'ouvrier est absolument libre de toute espèce de limitation de type ancien, car il est absolument lié par le capital. Mais se lien joue dans les deux sens. Le capital n'est possible que s«il libère constamment les aptitudes de travail de l'homme. Autrefois cela n'était possible que par l'accroissement physique de l'ensemble de la main d'oeuvre, recrutée dans l'armée des serfs ou dans les colonies. Cette forme de reproduction du capital existe encore aujourd'hui dans les pays d'Europe occidentale qui utilisent la main d'oeuvre étrangère. Mais le capital utilise, pour se maintenir, une nouvelle forme. De même qu'il investit dans les moyens de travail, il investit aussi dans la production d'une main d'oeuvre qualifiée, d'un »capital humain« (Human Capital).[31] En produisant ainsi l'ouvrier, le capital se produit lui-même, directement. Et l'ouvrier, produit uniquement pour le capital, dans un processus de production tendant à un niveau déterminé de technologie, se sent uniquement partie de ce capital. Bien qu'il soit finalement soumis au capital. Identifié au capital même, l'ouvrier devient soumis au capitaliste.[32]

Mais ce même processus qui identifie l'ouvrier au capital lie également le capitaliste au capital. Le capitaliste et l'ouvrier ne deviennent possibles qu'en fonction du capital, en tant que moyens de production de celui-ci.[33] Et lorsque, en tant que *capitaux,* ils se rapprochent l'un de l'autre, ils deviennent absolument opposés. Leur intérêt — le capital — devient identique et par conséquent impossible. Du fait que l'objet de cet intérêt est identique, seul l'un d'eux peut se réaliser. Et celui qui se présente comme propriétaire du capital produit nécessirement son contraire — le travailleur salarié. C'est pourquoi le capital est impossible. Il produit fatalement, dans quelques mains qu'il se trouve, le rapport salarié de l'autre. Ce rapport ne peut donc être dépassé qu'en du capital, en dehors de l'opposition du moyen de travail en tant que possession, et du travail, en dehors de l'emploi du travail vivant par le travail objectivisé. »Pour que le travail se comporte de nouveau

[31] L'homme devient objet de l'investissement capital. Sa main d'oeuvre, quelque hautes que soient ses qualifications, produite par le capital, ne peut que continuer à servir le capital. Il est intéressant de lire T. W. Schultz, *Investment in Human Capital,* dans »The American Economic Review«, No 1/1961.

[32] On peut précisément attribuer cette tendance au capital corporatif contemporain qui, d'après Galbraith du moins, s'efforce d'identifier les ouvriers à la corporation, leur offrant, bien qu«elles soient toujours essentiellement limitées, des possibilités d'adaptation de la corporation même à leurs besoins. Conf. John Galbraith, *Nova industrijska država,* Stvarnost, Zagreb, 1969.

[33] K. Marx, *Capital.*

Tables of human emancipation as a whole mean nothing by themselves if, under the conditions of production dictated by the interest of capital, they are merely the material interest of the capitalist. The existence of the worker can be, and already is, filled

with an unsuspected abundance, while remaining essentially limited in his function as a means of capital.

With capital, the worker's limitations cease to be partial. The worker is absolutely free from any kind of limitation of the old type, because he is absolutely bound by capital. But the link works both ways. Capital is only possible if it constantly liberates man's capacities for work. Formerly this was possible only by the physical increase of the whole of the workforce, recruited from the love of the serfs or from the colonies. This form of reproduction of capital still exists today in Western European countries that use foreign labor. But capital uses a new form to maintain itself. Just as it invests in the means of work, it also invests in the production of a skilled workforce, of a "human capital" (Human Capital).31 By thus producing the worker, capital product itself, directly. And the worker, produced solely for capital, in a process of production tending to a determinate level of technology, feels himself solely part of this capital. Although ultimately subject to capital. Identified with capital itself, the worker becomes obsessed with the capitalist.32

But this same process which identifies the worker with capital also links the capitalist with capital. The capitalist and the worker become possible only as a function of capital, as its means of production.33 And when, as capitals, they approach each other, they become absolutely opposite.

Their interest — capital — becomes identical and therefore impossible. Since the object of this interest is identical, only one of them can be realized. And he who presents himself as the owner of capital necessarily produces his opposite—the wage-laborer. This is why capital is impossible. It inevitably produces, in whatever hands it finds, the wage relation of the other. This relation can therefore only be surpassed in terms of capital, outside the opposition of the means of labor as possession, and labor, outside the employment of living labor by objectivized labor. »For work to behave again 31 Man becomes an object of capital investment. Its labor force, however high its qualifications, produced by capital, can only continue to serve capital. It is interesting to read T. W. Schultz,

In vestm en t in H um an C apital, dans »The Am erican Economic R eview«, No 1/1961.

32 One can precisely attribute this tendency to contemporary corporate capital which, according to G albraith at the time, strives to identify the workers with the corporation, offering them, although

they are still essentially limited possibilities of adapting the corporation itself to their needs. Conf. John G albraith, N ova in du strijsk a d rža va , Stvarnost, Zagreb, 1969.

33 K. Marx, C apital.

enversses conditions objectives comme envels sa propriété, il faut qu'un autre système vienne remplacer le système d'échange privé qui, comme nous l'avons vu, établit l'échange du travail objectivisé et de la capacité de travail, et par suite l'appropriation du travail vivant, sans échange«[34].

Tout rapport de production dans lequel l'homme vend sa main d'oeuvre à son propre travail objectivisé est un rapport social. Derrière le travail objectivisé qui *achète* le travail, il y a toujours un autre homme. Derrière le capital, il y a toujours le capitaliste. Le Salaire est nécessaire du fait même de l'échange de travail.

Avec le capital, l'homme en est réduit à ne profiter de sa liberté que lorsqu'il se *vend*, et même lorsqu'il *achète*. L' ouvrier *se dépense* même lorsqu'il dépense. Sa vie entière est une dépense qui crée le capital.

Prolétariat et propriété

En tant que possession d'une possession étrangère, l'ouvrier ne peut exister qu'en fonction de cette propriété, du capital. Lui appartenant de plus en plus, il commence de plus en plus à ne sentir qu'il s'appartient qu'avec le capital. En réalité, il devient de plus en plus objectivisé, par lui-même, mais aussi par les autres, par le capital — travail aliéné. Son existence devient la base de l'existence du capital.

Pour l' homme, cependant, seule existe l'existence du capital. Le capital, en tant que tel, apparaît possible en dehors même de l'existence salariée de l'homme. Devenant intérêt *général*, le capital s'attache à chaque homme.[35] Ne se rendant pas compte qu'il est, *en tant qu'ouvrier*, la condition du capital, l'ouvrier entre en concurrence avec le capitaliste, et non avec le capital. Le capital par conséquent produit le concurrence en tant que rapport social général qui, en preimer lieu, le reproduit; et il reproduit en même temps le rapport social même, capitaliste. En produisant éventuellement, dans le rapport de concurrence, un nouveau capitaliste, sans même pour cela devoir détruire l'ancien, il produit nécessairement aussi un nouwel ouvrier salaré. La nation de capital contient donc non seulement le capitaliste mais aussi le travailleur salarié.[36]

[34] K. Marx, *Epoques*..., p. 62.

[35] Zoran Vidaković écrit dans ce sens: »Il est observé dans les ouvrages marxistes que le *sens principal de la reproduction capitaliste* (de la production continue da rapport de production du capital et du travail salarié) se déplace, allant des rapports de propriété institutionalisés vers la *participation du système social tout entier dans la reproduction de la structure capitaliste* des forces de production«. Exrait de la préface au livre de Radovan Rihta et collaborateurs, *Civilizacija na raskršću*, Komunist, Belgrade 1972, pagre C XXXVI.

[36] »La notion de capital suppose que les conditions objective de travail — que celui-ci produit — dans le rapport avec le travail prennent un caractere personnel, on ce qui revient au même, qu'ils sont établis en tant que possession d'une *personne* etrangère à l'ouvrier. Le capitaliste est contenu dans la notion de capital«. K. Marx *Epoques*..., p. 66.

towards its objective conditions as well as towards its property, another system must come to replace the system of private exchange which, as we have seen, establishes the exchange of objectified labor and of the capacity to work, and consequently the appropriation of

living labor, without exchange“34.

Any relation of production in which man sells his labor to his own objectivized labor is a social relation. Behind the objectified work that buys work, there is always another man. Behind capital, there is always the capitalist. Wages are necessary by the very fact of the exchange of labour.

With capital, man is reduced to profiting from his freedom only when he sells himself, and even when he buys. The worker spends himself even when he spends. His whole life is an expense which creates capital.

Proletariat and property

As the possession of a foreign possession, the worker can exist only as a function of this property, of capital. Belonging to it more and more, it begins more and more to feel that it belongs only with capital. In reality, he becomes more and more objectivized, by himself, but also by others, by capital—alien labor. Its existence becomes the basis for the existence of capital.

For man, however, there is only the existence of capital.

Capital, as such, appears possible even outside of the salaried existence of man. Becoming general interest, capital attaches itself to each man.35 Not realizing that he is, as a worker, the condition of capital, the worker enters into competition with the capitalist, and not with capital. . Capital therefore produces competition as a general social relation which, in the first place, reproduces it; and it reproduces at the same time the social relation itself, capitalist. By eventually producing, in the relation of competition, a new capitalist, without even having to destroy the old one, he necessarily also produces a new wage worker. The nation of capital thus contains not only the capitalist but also the wage laborer.36

34 K. M arx, E few . . . , e.g. 62.

33 Zoran V idaković writes in this sense: “It is observed in the Marxist works that the main meaning of the capitalistic reproduction (of the continuous production of the production relation of capital and wage labor) is shifting from institutionalized ownership relationships to participatory

du s y s te m e social to u t en tier dan s la rep rod u ction d e la stru c tu re c a p ita liste

d es forces of production«. E xrait from the p reface au livre by Radovan Rihta et collaborators, Civ iliza c ija na ra skršću , Kom unist, B elegrade 1972, pagre X X X V I.

30 “The notion of capital assumes that the objective working conditions

- that what is produced - in the relationship with work take on a personal character, or what amounts to the same thing, that they are established as the possession of a person foreign to the worker. Italian capital is contained in the notion of capital. K. M arx E epochs . . . , p. 66.

Même lorsque le prolétariat en tant que classe conquiert la propriété, le moyens de production, il ne cesse pas pour autant d'être *classe*. Conquérant en effet le pouvoir politique, le prolétariat conquiert aussi nécessairement le pouvoir sur la propriété. Pratiquement possible dans certains pays socialistes, cela est, en théorie, irréalisable! Naïvement (ou peut-être pas), le prolétariat se voit donner pour but le *pouvoir*. Parce que le pouvoir est le pouvoir nécessaire sur la possession, donc la possession en tant que propriété, possession privée, il cesse d'être prolétariat. Mais cette abolition du prolétariat ne signifie pas son abolition positive en tant que classe. Au contraire, le danger existe réellement, du moins en théorie, qu'en tant que propriétaire il ne soit de nouveau produit en tant que classe,[37] mais essentiellement en dehors du prolétariat, et que, comme condition de son pouvoir sur la possession il ne produise une nouvelle classe d'ouvriers. »Du fait que dans ce processus le travail objectivisé apparaît en même temps comme la *non objectivisation de l'ouvrier*, comme l'objectivisation d'une subjectivité contraire à l'ouvrier, comme *possession* d'une volonté qui lui est étrangère, le capital est nécessairement en même temps capitaliste; et certains socialiste font erreur lorsqu'ils estiment que le capital nous est nécessaire, mais que nous n'avons pas besoin de capitalistes«[38].

C'est pouquoi lorsque Kostas Axelos dit que »le capital — vainqueur économique, social et historique — doit être intégralement vaincu par les travailleurs victorieux«[39]; c'est là un peu son propre souhait. Le capital, en effet, en produisant l'ouvrier en tant que moyen, que condition de lui-même, ne s'est-il pas — dans le travailleur salarié — produit lui-même, la capital, condition du travailleur, de sa vie, et ainsi, parce qu'il a totalement aliéné l'homme, le transformant en ouvrier, de son existence qui n'est rien d'autre qu'économique il a fait naître chez l'ouvrier l'unique intérêt pour lui-même — le capital? N'en est-il pas ainsi?

En réalité, si nous nous demandons ce qui découle de l'axiome théorique affirmant que le capital est la forme finale de la propriété privée, ne répondrons-nous pas que c'est l'ouvrier salarié — forme finale de l'homme aliéné? Et faut-il, dans cette finalité, chercher la voie de l'avenir? Cette question n'a rien de spéculatif, au contraire elle découle du rapport réel de la classe ouvrière envers le capital tel qu'il s'affirme partout où le prolétariat a réussi à exproprier la bourgeoisie traditionnelle. Car, de même que la forme *finale et totale* de la possession privée est le capital, de même le sens final et total du capital réside dans la production du besoin socialement universel de ce même capital. Non seulement le »communisme grossier« est réellement possible, mais aussi, en tant que sa *manifestation*, le capitalisme affiné ou subtil est lui

[37] Dans notre terminologie philosophique et sociologique du moins, cette classe est désignée comme »classe moyenne«.

[38] K. Marx, Ibidem, p. 66.

[39] Kostas Axelos, *Marx penseur de la technique*, Les éditions de Minuit, Paris 1969, p. 72.

Even when the proletariat as a class conquers property, the means of production, it does not cease to be class. In effect conquering political power, the proletariat also necessarily conquers power over property.

Practically possible in certain socialist countries, this is, in theory, impossible! Naively (or perhaps not), the proletariat sees itself given power as its goal. Because power is the necessary power over possession, therefore possession as property, private possession, it ceases to be proletariat. But this abolition of the proletariat does not mean its positive abolition as a class. On the contrary, there is a real danger, at least in theory, that as a proprietor he will again be produced as a class,37 but essentially outside the proletariat, and that, as a condition of his power over the possession it does not produce a new class of workers. "Because in this process objectivized labor appears at the same time as the non-objectivization of the worker, as the objectivization of a subjectivity contrary to the worker, as the possession of a will which is foreign to him, capital is necessarily at the same time capitalist; and some socialists err when they think that capital is necessary to us, but that we do not need capitalists.

This is why when Kostas Axelos says that “capital — the economic, social and historical victor — must be completely defeated by the victorious workers”39; it's a bit his own wish. Capital, in fact, by producing the worker as a means, as a condition of itself, has it not - in the wage laborer - produced itself, capital, the condition of the worker, of his life, and thus, because it has totally alienated man, transforming him into a worker, from his existence which is nothing but economic, he has given birth in the worker the only interest for itself — the capital? Isn't it so?

In reality, if we ask ourselves what follows from the theoretical axiom affirming that capital is the final form of private property, shall we not answer that it is the wage-worker?

— final form of alien man? And is it necessary, in this finality, to seek the way of the future? There is nothing speculative about this question, on the contrary it stems from the real relationship of the working class to capital as it asserts itself wherever the proletariat has succeeded in expropriating the traditional bourgeoisie. For, just as the final and total form of private possession is capital, so the final and total meaning of capital resides in the production of the socially universal need for this same capital. Not only is »coarse communism« really possible, but also, as its manifestation, refined or subtle capitalism is it. .

38 K. Marx, Ibid., p. 66.

39 K ostas A xelos, Marx p enso r de la technique, Les editions de Minuit, Paris 1969, p. 72.

aussi possible et en ce cas nécessaire. En tant qu'aspect *délicat* du »communisme grossier«, seule est possible une forme du *capitalisme* qui n'est pas autre chose que l'apparence de possibilité de tous les capitalistes, en tant que propriétaires.[40] De l'erreur, de l'apparence généralement acceptée, qui nous pouvons tous être *propriétaires*, possesseurs, capitalistes (et que s'accomplit ainsi le sens du communisme), découle la seule réalité possible; que nous soyons tous *ouvries*.[41] Dans ce cas, si l'abolition de la propriété s'arrêtait à sa *généralisation*, le communisme ne serait pas autre chose que la période suivante de formation *économique* de la sociéte.[42] Le communisme, cependant, commence au-delà de lui-même en tant que société économique, audelà, par conséquent, de la possession généralisée, du rapport social de l'homme en tant que rapport envers la possession; le communisme abolit la possession car il réalise le rapport social en réalisant l'homme en dehors du rapport envérs la possession en tant que rapport social. Le rapport de l'homme sujet-objet n'existe qu'en dehors du rapport de production matériel.[43]

C'est pourquoi la question du rapport du prolétariat envers la possession est *toujours* actuel, mais la réponse est *pour l'instant* incertaine. Avant l'abolition politique de la possession privée cette

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[40] Il est utile de se rappeler ce que Marx, dans la »Critique du programme de Gotha«, dit de la première phase du communisme: »Il est évident que règne ici le même principe qui réglemente l'échange des marchandises dans la mesure où cet échange est un échange de valeurs égales. Le contenu et la forme sont modifiés, car personne, dans des circonstances modifiées, ne peut passer en possession de personnes particulières excepté les moyens individuels de consommation. En ce qui concerne la répartition des moyens de consommation parmi les différents producteurs, le principe est le même que pour l'échange des équivalences de marchandises: une quantité égale de travail sous une forme donnée est échangée contre une quantité égale de travail sous une autre forme.

C'est pourquoi le *droit égal* est toujours compris selon le principe *droit bourgeois*, bien que le principe et la pratique ne soient plus opposés, alors que l'échange d'équivalents dans l'échange de marchandises n'existe qu'*en moyenne*, et non dans chaque cas particulier. En dépit de ce progrès, ce *droit égal* a conservé son cadre bourgeois. Le droit des producteurs est *proportionnel* au travail qu'ils donnent; l'égalité consiste dans le fait que la mesure employée est une *commune mesure* — le travail« *(Oeuvres choisies*, II, pa. 14.)

[41] L'ouvrage de Vidaković »Pouvoir social de la classe ouvrière«, consacré à l'explication de l'antagonisme de la structure de classes, et sans classes, de la société dans le socialisme, contribue à éclairer ce problème: Citons par exemple: »Toute structuration sociale contraire à la structure capitaliste conduit les groupes sociaux correspondants au seuil de la classe ouvrière«. Zoran Vidaković, *»Pouvoir social de la classe ouvrière«*, Rad, Belgrade 1970, p. 157.

[42] »La création d'une société sans classes n'est nullement le simple résultat de la destruction de la société de classes; au contraire, tout le développement conscient d'une communauté sans classes est le postulat de la disparition définitive de la structure de classes«. Ibidem, p. 13.

[43] Rappelons le passage célèbre du Capital, tome III, Kultura, Belgrade, 1964, p. 367.

as possible and in this case necessary. As a delicate aspect of

»coarse communism«, only a form of capitalism is possible which is nothing other than the appearance of possibility of all capitalists, as owners.40 From the error, from the generally accepted appearance, which can all be proprietors, possessors, capitalists (and that the meaning of communism is thus fulfilled), follows the only possible reality; let us all be working.41 In this case, if the abolition of property stopped at its generalization, communism would be nothing but the next period of economic formation of society.42 Communism, however, begins beyond him-

-even as an economic society, beyond, consequently, generalized possession, the social relationship of man as a relationship towards possession; communism abolishes possession because it realizes the social relationship by realizing man outside of the relationship towards possession as a social relationship. The subject-object relationship of man only exists outside of the material production relationship.43

This is why the question of the relation of the proletariat to possession is still topical, but the answer is for the moment uncertain. Before the political abolition of private possession this 40It is useful to remember what Marx, in the »Critique of the Gotha program«, said of the first phase of communism: »It is obvious in t that the same principle reigns here which regulates the exchange of goods insofar as this exchange is an exchange of equal values. The content and the form are m odified, because no one, in m odified circumstances, can pass into possession of particular persons ex cept the in vid ividu al means of consumption. As regards the distribution of the means of consumption among the various producers, the principle is the same as for the exchange of the eq u iv alen ces of goods: an equal quantity of labor in a form the data is exchanged for an equal quantity of labor in another form.

This is why equal right is always understood according to the principle of right

bourgeois, although the principle and the practice are no longer opposed, whereas the exchange of equivalents in the exchange of goods only exists in

average, and not in each particular case. Despite this progress, this

equal right has retained its bourgeois framework. The right of producers is pro po rtio n al to the w ork they give; equality consists in the fact that the measure employed is a common measure — the work“ (Chosen works!

11, pa. 14.)

41 V id aković's work “Social power of the working class“, devoted to the explanation of the antagon ism of the class and classless structure of society in socialism, contributes to clarifying this problem: Let us cite for example: »Any social structuring contrary to the capitalist structure leads the corresponding social groups to the threshold of the working class«.

Zoran V idaković, »Pou voir social d e la classe o u vriere«, Rad, Belgrade 1970, p. 157.

42 “The creation of a classless society is by no means the simple result of the destruction of class society; on the contrary, the whole conscious development of a classless community is the postulate of the definitive disappearance of the class structure. Ibidem, p. 13.

43 Let us recall the famous passage from Capital, tom e III, K ultura, B elgrade, 1964, p. 367.

réponse était banalement connue; mais après la révolution politique, si l'on en juge avant tout empiriquement (d'après l'attitude de *l'ancien* prolétariat), cette réponse est devenue extrêmement incertaine. Ce à quoi il existe une explication théorique. En effet, le rapport incertain du prolétariat envers la *possession privée* en général, par conséquent après l'abolition politique de cette dernière (seul, résultat, d'ailleurs, atteint jusqu'à présent en Yugoslavie, sans parler des autres Etats prolétariens) découle du destin tout-à-fait incertain du prolétariat en tant que classe. Le prolétariat, répétons-le encore, est empiriquement un fait historique, jusqu'à présent du moins, il n'est pas révolutionnaire *en soi*, et cela parce qu'il n'est pas prolétariat en soi, mais *en fonction du capital*. Son rapport, en tant que classe, envers la possession privée, envers le capital, demeurera incertain tant que le raport du capital envers le prolétariat sera lui aussi incertain. Le véritable prolétariat révolutionnaire ne peut exister que par ce qu'il *n'est pas;* et il n'est pas ce qu'il est en tant que classe, que prolétariat. Son caractère révolutionnaire décule de ce qu'il doit et peut être;[44] aucunement de ce qu'il *est*. Son autonégation est la *condition* d'un raport universel, donc révolutionnaire, envers la possession privée l'abolition de celle-ci.

Mais l'autonégation du prolétariat est-elle déjà posée par l'abolition du capitaliste, du propriétaire privé, »par l'expropriation de l' expropriateur«? De même que l'existence du capitaliste n'est pas posée par le travailleur, mais par son *travail*, son *travail salarié*, de même l'existence du travailleur, son existence salariée n'est pas fonction du capitaliste mais du *capital*. C'est pourquoi l'abolition du capitaliste est seulement la condition préalable, nullement immédiate, de l'abolition du travailleur salarié; la négation du travailleur n'est pas impliquée par la négation du capitaliste, elle est essentiellement *autonégation*, l'oeuvre, donc, de l'ouvrier lui-même. En abolissant la classe des propriétaires du capital, le prolétariat ne fait qu'arriver à un carrefour: il peut — soit abolir le capital qui se nie lui-même en tant que classe, soit s'approprier le capital pour s'affirmer en tant que classe. C'est pourquoi l'abolition du prolétariat est, essentiellement, un acte d'autoréalisation: l'autonégation prend forme d'autoréalisation au sens humain. Du fait même que l'abolition du capital *n'est pas* une nécessité après l' abolition de son propriétaire — car l'abolition du propriétaire du capital n'est pas une condition immédiate, et il est possible qu'il

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[44] Nous rappellerons seulement les mots de Milan Kangrga: »La révolution ne s'arrête et ne s'épuise donc pas dans la sphère sociale, étant donné que — agissant et s'effectuant dans les bases mêmes du monde historique de l'homme, elle rend possible, et modèle, cette même sphère sociale qui est toujours le produit et le résultat d'un acte révolutionnaire déterminé«. *Smisao povijesnoga* (Sens de l'historique), Razlog, Zagreb 1970, p. 120. Du fait même que le prolétariat lui-même n'est qu'une partie de la structure sociale existante, son caractère révolutionnaire ne peut provenir uniquement de sa position sociale. Autrement, son acte révolutionnaire s'épuiserait dans le changement de sa seule position sociale.

answer was commonplace known; but after the political revolution, if one judges it above all empirically (from the attitude of the old proletariat), this answer has become extremely uncertain. What there is a theoretical explanation for. Indeed, the uncertain relation of the

proletariat to private property in general, consequently after the political abolition of the latter (the only result, moreover, achieved so far in Yugoslavia, not to mention the other proletarian states) stems fate all-a-

-uncertain fact of the proletariat as a class. The proletariat, let us repeat it again, is empirically a historical fact, until now at least, it is not revolutionary in itself, and this because it is not proletariat in itself, but in function of capital. Its relation, as a class, to private possession, to capital, will remain uncertain as long as the relation of capital to the proletariat is also uncertain. The true revolutionary proletariat can only exist by what it is not; and it is not what it is as a class, as a proletariat. Its revolutionary character stems from what it should and can be;44 in no way from what it is. Its self-negation is the condition of a universal, and therefore revolutionary, relationship towards private possession and its abolition.

But is the self-negation of the proletariat already established by the abolition of the capitalist, of the private owner, "by the expropriation of the expropriator"? Just as the existence of the capitalist is not posited by the worker, but by his work, his waged labor, so the existence of the worker, his waged existence is not a function of the capitalist but of capital. This is why the abolition of the capitalist is only the preliminary condition, by no means immediate, of the abolition of the wage laborer; the negation of the worker is not implied by the negation of the capitalist, it is essentially self-negation, the work, therefore, of the worker himself. By abolishing the class of owners of capital, the proletariat only arrives at a crossroads: it can either abolish capital which negates itself as a class, or appropriate capital in order to affirm itself. as a class. This is why the abolition of the proletariat is, essentially, an act of self-realization: self-negation takes the form of self-realization in the human sense. From the very fact that the abolition of capital is not a necessity after the abolition of its owner - for the abolition of the owner of capital is not an immediate condition, and it is possible that ment the words of M ilan K angrga: "The revolution does not stop and therefore does not end in the social sphere, given that - acting and being carried out in the very foundations of the world history of man, it makes possible and models that same social sphere which is always the product and the result of a determined revolutionary act.

S misao p ovijesn og a (Sense of history), Razlog, Zagreb 1970, p. 120. Since the proletariat itself is only a part of the existing social structure, its revolutionary character cannot derive solely from its social position. Otherwise, his revolutionary act would be exhausted

in the change of his only social position.

214

répparaisse sous une forme modifiée le rôle révolutionnaire du prolétariat se poursuit même après la révolution politique. En réalité, la révolution ne commence vraiment, pour le prolétariat, qu' avec l'abolition véritable de celui-ci, lorsqu'il réalise son essence humaine: dans l'acte d'abolition du capital déjà approprié. C'est précisément à ce carrefour, qui mène vers l'avenir et vers le passé, que le prolétariat révèle son véritable caractère révolutionnaire. Dans la mesure où il choisit la voie de l'abolition, et non de l'appropriation du capital, le prolétariat sera possible dans sa négation. Seulement alors, après la révolution politique, le prolétariat peut devenir sujet de la révolution. Ou arrêter l'histoire.

reappears in a modified form the revolutionary role of the proletariat continues even after the political revolution. In reality, the revolution does not really begin, for the proletariat, until

with the true abolition of it, when it realizes its human essence: in the act of abolition of capital already appropriated. It is precisely at this crossroads, which leads to the future and to the past, that the proletariat reveals its true revolutionary character. To the extent that it chooses the path of abolition, and not of the appropriation of capital, the proletariat will be possible in its negation. Only then, after the political revolution, can the proletariat become the subject of the revolution. Or end the story.

SOME COMMENTS ON SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Srđan Vrcan

Split

Complex social cosequences of the social stratification or — to put it more popularly — social differences and social inequalities in Yugoslavia have been recognized as an important social problem in contemporary Yugoslav society and — at least for some — as one of the crucial questions in her further socialist development. Of course, one should be blind to believe that the problem of social differences and inequalities was not more or less constantly present in some spheres of Yugoslav society also in the past, just as it has always been present in some way or other in any other society — East or West, irrespective of the level of social life — public or private, officially recognized or officially unrecognized, open, near the ground, or underground. Today it has only obtained offical blessing and has openly and publicly been placed at the top of the list of the officially accepted key problems of our society and its future socialist development. This, of course, should only be welcomed. Yet, paradoxically, one is just as surprised as is not surprised by it. In any case, it is a source of considerable uncertainty.

First, it surprises one because it is a great, unexpected switch in the officially accepted general diagnosis of the present social situation in Yugoslavia, in the officially adopted way of the identification of the foci of key social problems of the present historic moment, and in the official vision of those fundamental social processes that in a crucial way determine our further social development. It is very well known that not long ago these problems were not officially recognized at all — in fact, they were explicitly underestimated. It is hard to pretend such a degree of amnesia and not to recall that, for instance, not very long ago a prominent Croatian politician publicly stated that there was hardly any country in a similar stage of development where social differences were so small as they were in Yugoslavia. At the same

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time a noted newspaper commentator — evidently not a lonely voice in the desert or expressing only his own private opinion — wrote in a country-wide circulation magazine: »Only now do professional inquiries timidly point to global data on extremely low differences between the worst and the best paid — 1 : 2,5 — 1 : 3.« Moreover the same commentator was decidedly persuading the Yugoslav public that »such a state of remuneration can yield no electronics, no lagre series, no raising of earnings of a million or more Yugoslav workers kept by these earnings on the verge of biological existence.«[1] That was why even tle suggestions for the raising of the minimum personal income, or the establishment of the gliding scale automatism, since long introduced in some present-day capitalist countries, between personal income and the increase of prices, used to provoke extreme negative reactions in some mass communication media in Yugoslavia, as something that would only push the country back. It is even easier to recall that not long ago all public discussions on social differences and inequalities were practically anathemised with us. Such discussions and talks were instantly looked upon with suspicion or as something heretic, or overtly counter-reformational, opposing, or even openly hostile. There was a systematic public campaign against anything stressing that problem or discussing existing social inequalities. Those, however who were writing and speaking in public about the above mentioned problem ran the risk of being exposed to systematic defamation and ridiculing and to general approval and rejoicing of those segments of our society who by their class instinct immediately sensed that under the flag of the fight for social equaliy there may again occur a penetration of »modern barbarians« — of the »primitive« »backward«, »uneducated« or »illiterate« or »semi-literate«, »lazy but envious and insatiable« proletarianized masses into the privileged spheres of social life, thus becoming a direct threat against the whole body

[1] The events having occured after these lines had been written do not absolutely support these claims. On the contrary, they support a statement pitched quite differently: an increase in social differences and inequalities may come in useful even without any special advances in electronics, without any introduction of large series, without the increase in worker's wages that keep them on the verge of biological existence, without rapid failures in total work productivity, without the increase in general economic growth. After all there are data obtained in some other countries showing, if nothing else, that the relationship between differences in remuneration and the total of social differences on the one hand and the rate of industrial growth on the other, is very complex — much more complex than it might have appeared to some people. Let us remember that the differences between the 10% of the poorest and the 10% of the richest in total population vary considerably in some industrially developed present-day countries; they are 1 : 73,6 in France; 1 : 26 in Holland; 1 : 19,7 in West Germany; 1 : 15,9 1 cont. in Danemark; 1 : 14,6 in Great Britain. There are similar variations also in the average earnings of an unskilled worker and a university trained specialist: 1 : 4,3 in Danemark; 1 : 5,9 in France; 1 : 7 in Italy; 1 : 3,2 in Sweeden; 1 : 1,9 in West Germany; 1 : 4 in USSR. The figures are taken from the book: — B. Šefer: »Socijalni razvoj u samoupravnom društvu«, Beograd, 1971. (B. Šefer: »Social Development in a Selfmanaged Society«, Belgrade, 1971.)

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Moreover the same commentator was decidedly persuading the Yugoslav public that »such a state of rem uneration can yield no electronics, no lagre series, no raising of earnings of a million or more Yugoslav workers kept by these earnings on the verge of biological existence.«1 That was why even tie suggestions for the raising of the minimum personal income, or the establishment of the gliding scale automatism, since long introduced in some present-day capitalist countries, between personal income and the increase of prices, used to provoke extrem e negative reactions in some mass communication media in Yugoslavia, as something that would only push the country back. It is even easier to recall that not long ago all public discussions on social differences and inequalities were practically anathemised w ith us. Such discussions and talks were instantly looked upon w ith suspicion or as something heretic, or overtly counter-reformational, opposing, or even openly hostile. There was a systematic public campaign against anything stressing that problem or discussing existing social inequalities. Those, however who were w riting and speaking in public about the above mentioned problem ran the risk of being exposed to systematic defamation and ridiculing and to general approval and rejoicing of those segments of our society who by their class instinct immediately sensed that under the flag of the fight for social equaliy there may again occur a penetration of

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of privileges, they had succeded in securing for them. In the best case those who pointed to the problem of social inequalities were accused of being taken in by an extreme old-fashioned and primitive mentality, belonging in fact to a pre-industrial world of rural and agrarian society long overcome by the modern world and which objectivly hinders and slows down the further development of Yugoslav society. In some worse cases they were given the epithet of incorrigible utopians and naive romatics, who did not see or did not simply want to see that the only possible choice facing our society was: the choice between social equality accompanied by an inevitable expansion and perpetuity of general poverty and general material scarcity on the one hand and general wealth and the expansion of general material abundance accompanied by intensified social inequality on the other. They were also looked upon as pure demagogues who obviously, for some dubious reasons, started discussing some problem that in essence were really actual and painful but which our society, at this stage of its development, is objectively unable to solve. In doing so they in fact drew attention and so much needed social energy away from those social acitivities that alone could pull our society out of the present unsatisfactory state of a relative industrial under-development and a still wide-spread material privation and bring it to a higher level of industrial development, modernization, and general social welfare and abundance in which all the problems of social inequalities would be more or less automatically solved.

In the worst case they were considered basically as being etatists acting as if the existing social differences and inequalities were something that suited the large majority of the workers and other working layers organized on a self-management basis and as if they were the result of their will constituted in a democratic, self-management manner — hence each public action against the existing social inequalities could be implemented in opposition to this will only by the strengthening the state and its intervention. Or they were said to advocate »uravnilovka« and concealed stalinism, although anybody knowing something from the history of the workers movement must have known quite well that it was exactly Stalin who was one of the first great fighters against »uravnilovka« and one of the first advocates of the thesis that egalitarianism had always been alien to the communist movement and its ideology and it is but the expression of an actually primitive peasant mentality and that from the historical point of view, stalinism originally started forming and manifesting itself first and foremost in a struggle against the so-called left wing groups that were stressing the problems of social inequalities.[2]

[2] M. Yanowitch wrote about it: »For nearly thirty years, starting from 1931, every important statement on the Soviet policy of remuneration has been coupled with attacks against »egalitarianism«... The situation was significantly changed in several directions after 1956. Since the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and culminating in the program accepted at the 22nd Party Congress, the main accent in the Soviet policy of remuneration was put

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n ism «. . . T he situation w as sign ifican tly changed in sev era l d irections after 1956. S in ce th e 20th Party Congress in 1956, and cu lm inating in the program accepted at th e 22nd Party Congress, th e m ain accen t in th e S o viet policy of rem uneration w a s put 219

In the worst case they were politically disqualified by what, quite paradoxically, had become one of the worst political disqualifications also in a socialist country just as it is in some capitalist countries — i. e. being the representatives of the left orientation.

In other words, a certain turn from the line has occured. It may provoke astonishment. What may also surprise one is the way in which the whole problem has become known in public. It appeared as if the existing social inequalities had suddenly fallen upon us from the blue in a more or less inexplicable way, and if they were not only quite a normal, expected result of intensely present social movements and precisely determined moves in our current politics.

But, these facts should not surprise anybody. It is well known that the socialist and communist movements have always and everywhere, from their very beginning been systematically concerned with the existence of permanent, structural forms of drastic social inequalities — whose victims, on a mass scale, have always been workers and some other proletarian working layers, — and also with efforts to eliminate such inequalities from society through radical social reforms. This has remained present in all left orientated and revolutionary movements, from the moment when Engels underlined that the modern claim for equality was based on the common characteristic that every man is a human being on the basis of this equality of human beings as human beings, the claim was made for a political and social importance of all people or at least all members of a certain society, and when in this claim made by proletarians he saw a spontanuous reaction

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on the diminution of differences in the income of highly and low-paid workers.«

(M. Yanowitch, Soviet Income Revolution, U : C. Heller, Structured Social Inequality, London 1970, p. 144.)

Similar statements are made also by J. Goldthorpe: »During Stalin's rule economic inequalities generally grew up in the Soviet Union. At the end of the war decade, these tendencies led to an exceedingly high level of inequality in Soviet society which according to many commentators surpassed the existing inequalities in the industrial societies of the West. There are even some more interesting statements by the same author who points out that pure economic factors and claims were not the only relevant factors in the process of deepening of inequalities during Stalin's rule:

»It is evident for instance, that the increased differentiations in wages and salaries during Stalin's rule could partially be explained in terms of demands and consequences of rapid industrialization. But — I would like to add — there is little doubt that these changes were at the same time the result of political decisions... and that they were frequently issued by having also in mind political and economic goals. Stalin did want a rapid industrialization, but his further political aim was that the process be materialized under his absolute control. And this meant not only the deprivation of large layers of the population from material reward in order to achieve the maximum industrial expansion but also the creation of a group of exceptionally privileged administrators and managers highly motivated to preserve their envious positions by their loyalty to Stalin and the carrying out of all that was expected from them.«

(J. H. Goldthorpe, Social Stratification in Industrial Society, U: op. p. 461.)

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(J. H. Goldthorpe, Social Stratification in Industrial Society, U: op. p.

4 61 **.)**

of the proletarians against the appaling social inequalities, against contrasts between the rich and the poor, between masters and slaves, the extravagant and the starving.[3] Or when Lenin was programmatically speaking about the transition from the formal social equality to the real one and also about other deepenings of social equality characteristic of socialism.[4] Or when Gramasci wrote that: »The ideas of equality, fraternity and freedom have matured in the people of strata who felt neither equal nor brothers with other people, nor free in relation to them, so that in each radical mass movement, in some way or other, in different forms and under the aegis of certain ideologies these claims have been put forward.[5]

This need not be surprising even when considering some of our historical experience of a more recent data. The fact is that the communist movement in Yugoslavia was loosing more than gaining when neglecting current problems of social inequalities, especially when all discussions concerning this problem within or without it were systematically prevented and held back. In that way the communist movement in Yugoslavia was losing more than gaining when after the liberation, following foreign model, and allegedly taking primary care about the efficacy of some social institutions and organizations — the army, police, state administration, party apparatus, party forums, — and doubting that the social revolution in Yugoslavia can count upon those who live for revolution and that therefore should count more upon those who only live from the revolution, it started not only introducing and developing — admittedly, always even behind the Party's back — a growing exceedingly complex system of social privileges and inequalities but also blocking, as antisocialist and subversive any public and even strictly internal party discussion on these problems as if the fate of socialism in this country had ever depended on the existence of diplomatic stores and other privileges for a tiny social layer. And vice versa, the communist movement in Yugoslavia was more gaining than losing when in its fight against Stalinism liquidated this complicated mechanism of securing social privileges for a small layer of the chosen. This holds good also regarding the moment when the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party issued its well-known letter on social privileges that — true, only at some levels — had again started restoring and spreading widely under the blessing of the Party bodies and Party officials. This holds good even more regarding Marshal Tito's well-known speech in Split. Finally this holds good most regarding the 1968 year when the communist movement in Yugoslavia lost more than gained by trying to suppress, prevent, and even ban any wider public discussion on social differences and inequalities initiated and stirred by the students' June.

[3] Engels: Anti-Duhring, Zagreb (s. a.) p. 105 and 109
[4] V. I. Lenin: State and Revolution, Belgrade, 1950. p. 130
[5] Gramsci: Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Groce, 1948, p. 94

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It should be added that all these facts need not be surprising even in view of some experiences from the recent political world history. The fact is that during deep political crises and intensified social confrontations on the left and right, the right political movements have always tended to ideologically and politically destroy, eliminate, or at least isolate and suppress left movements and forces pointing out national problems, transforming urgent social problems into national ones, and excessively glorifying the past. Left movements and forces, however, have always tended to isolate politically and ideologically right movements, by emphasizing vital social problems, transforming national problems into social ones, and uncovering their social basis and their social substrate.[6] Such a kind of dialectics was in force with us, too. Consequently no wonder that at the moment of a violent clash with the revived growing nationalistic forces and movements, the problems of social differences and inequalities emerged in the foreground, because everyone politically literate was conscious of the fact that you cannot fight and isolate nationalism politically and ideologically on the ideological basis and by action programmes formulated in purely national terms. Extreme nationalism is always capable of out — bidding on such grounds. At the end all those previously mentioned facts, are apt to provoke some justifiable uncertainties and doubts. Obviously, there exists a movement in a marked zigzag line, or a permanent oscillation between two extremes. The following fact speaks very convincingly in favour of this: In Split, a town on the Dalmatian coast in 1962, attention was drawn to »cases where the highest salary was twenty times as high as the lowest one in one and the same collective« — as to a negative social phenomenon, only to hear after a few years during which obviously no radical decrease of existing differences had occured, from other equally authoritative places that the difference between the highest and the lowest personal incomes was in fact minimal. This, of course, justified one to wonder if the official politics were not in this respect under the pressure of some opposite social forces and groups and, therefore, exposed to contradictory demands and bound to oscillate between them. Moreover, this justifies one to wonder whether in this oscillation between the emphasizing of this problem, its anathemising, and its re-placing in the rank of one of the high-priority, crucial social problems there was not a high degree of provocation, pure political manipulation, and hypocrisy. It is enough to remember that the problem of social differences and inequalities unexpectedly obtained an extremely high place and approval in the official document of an important communist party meeting in Croatia, at which it was actually aimed at clearing the floor for definite fights and unravelling within the party top which in itself had no connection whatsoever with the problem of social differences

[6] Talking about the situation in France, R. Aron says: »Some seem to be to the right, others to the left; some are shouting: »Work, family, homeland«, and others »Liberty, Equality, Fraternity«.

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All these above mentioned facts call for an extremely thorough and critical discussion on the problem of social inequalities.

I

Contrary to the impressions, certain discussions may make the problem of social differences and inequalities in Yugoslavia a very complex, serious social problem. Indeed, the most important current social differences and the most drastic social inequalities are not something that has just happened, as a bolt from the blue, gratuitously without any reason or ground. Nor are they result of a quite accidental coincidence of social circumstances which could have easily been avoided had there been a little more wisdom and foresight, or, finally, someting that is primarily and basically the result of some perfidious machinations or insinuations on the part of a relatively small number of corrupt, insatiable individuals who have consciously and intentionally arranged it all. On the contrary, the present social inequalities and the underlying processes of social differentiation are deeply rooted in the present historical situation in which objectively our whole society finds itself. They are strongly associated with some real social problems of almost every modern society and with some structural tendencies of the present-day social development. For this reason any possible measures for a reduction or elimination of at least some of the most drastic social inequalities cannot assume the form of a propaganda pursuit or political witch-hunt, or an administrative campaign of a short breath directed against consequences rather than causes and using spectacular discussions as a formal substitute for the absence of effective and longterm measures. After all, it should be admitted quite frankly that the core of the problem is not in a possible elimination of certain differences and the reduction of certain inequalities but in the price to be paid for it, that is, without endangering our self-governing democracy on the one hand and certain hypotheses for an accelerated industrial growth and development of social wealth on the other; also

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without basically creating such a social situation in which every ten years drastic measures for equalizing differences and inequalities would be undertaken, while these differences would spontaneously and automatically be revived and developed in the meantime because this would be a very reliable sign that the present--day society cannot be effectively organized and function normally on a broader egalitaristic basis. After all, the question is to show by deeds and not by declarations and speeches that a fast industrial growth, the so much needed social development, and the progress of socialist democracy are possible by an effective and systematic elimination of present social inequalities and an even more effective prevention of the crystalization and cumulation of new inequalities.

In this context it should be pointed out that in Yugoslavia there are certain social differences and social inequalities that are historically conditioned. These are all those deep social differences and inequalities created as a century-long historical process and developed in our social sphere by the very dialectics of social life, and left to us as an inheritance without asking for our opinion and approval. We must be conscious of the fact that we are just leaving a historical period of class society in which there existed and dominated extremely deep social differences and inequalities. And this not only in its marginal areas but in its very centre of its social system as its integral, constitutional, structural characteristic. We should also remember that we are living in a world in which deep, systematic, and permanent social inequalities are dominant and perpetuate themselves. Of course revolutionary changes having occured in our social spheres during the last quarter of this century have succeeded in eliminating or at least somewhat reducing some of these differences and inequalities. In this respect, the abolishment of the private ownership of basic productive means has removed one of the strongest and most stable sources of deep social differences and systematic social inequalities. However, this abolishment of the private ownership of basic productive means has not at the same time removed — indeed it actually could not- all other historically established and consolidated social difference and inequalities. Thus, there have remained operational all those differences in actual living circumstances and the culture of individual social segments that are historically constituated and which by their total practical effect in everyday life, manifest themselves as differences in social position and real life chances from which various forms of social privileges of a more permanent or repetitive nature are derived and established. Such is for instance all the body of social differences between town and country, between intelectual and physical work, between different occupations, etc. It may very justifiably be assumed that after the liberation some of these historically constituted differences and inqualities have gradually disappeared or been diminished, some others have simply perpetuated themselves, whereas some have been taken as a focal point and a framework for the

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However, this abolishment of the private ownership of basic productive means has not at the same time removed — indeed it actually could not- all other historically established and consolidated social difference and inequalities. Thus, there have remained operational all those differences in actual living circumstances and the culture of individual social segments th at are historically constituated and which by their total practical effect in everyday life, manifest themselves as differences in social position and real life chances from which various forms of social privileges of a more perm anent or

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creation and cumulation of new social privileges and for the consolidation of new social inequalities.

However, there exist just as deep social inequalities of a different origin. These are social differences and inequalities of a recent date whose deepest, objective roots lie in the social system and various forms of the social organization established after the victory of the revolution. And they exist in the social system and in the forms of the social organization as a whole, and not only in their purely formal and legal aspects. Undoubtedly, those systemic structures and institutional and organizational frames established after the war, by their everyday functioning, have systematically and permanently maintained and perpetuated very significant new social differences and inequalities of which some have been expected and systematically planned and some have emerged spontaneously and, at least in some instances, in an unexpected way. Moreover, it is obvious that abolishment of the private ownership of basic productive means could not have placed all the participants engaged in the total social process of production and reproduction in an equal social position or removed all the possibilities for the creation, within the process of production of such differences in the actual social positions that, according to Lenin's definition of social classes, could be used as a basis for the establishment of a more permanent control over other people's work and a systematic usurpation of other people's work products. Equally, all subsequent significant, far-reaching, institutional and organizational changes have failed to place all the participants in the total process of social production and reproduction in an equal social position regarding the actual control over the most important sources of social wealth and other significant social resources, or the handling of newly created values. In other words, all this has not definitively and permanently eliminated all objective conditions for the establishment and revival of a large-scale systematic power over somebody else's work and the possibility for the consolidation of various forms of an actual domination of interest in the very process of social production and reproduction. Furthermore, some structural changes and newly created institutional and organizational frames of a systematic nature have by themselves, by their total action, created and revived some of these possibilities, by which, at the beginning, in the process of the creation of new social differences and inequalities, the most important role was played by social authority and power, while later some other factors have also come into play. Functionalists, aware of the inevitability of social inequalities as an unavoidable prerequisite for every effectively functioning and stable social system, would rashly deduce from all this that what has happened is only that after a short revolutionary disturbance of natural and normal structures of the social system and a short-lasting utopian intoxication by a vision of a classless society, the same such structures, though perhaps different in appearence, have started re-establishing and perpetuating themselves in a spontaneous, unavoidable

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the same such structures, though perhaps different in appearence, have started re-establishing and perpetuating themselves in a spontaneous, unavoidable 225

way. The sole difference is that a significant shift of the most important basis for the establisment of social inequalities has occured: a shift, from private ownership to social power. Former revolutionaries would conclude that there are two forms of social inequalities: positive and negative. Yesterday's social inequalities, against which they fought and which they felt personally, were negative social inequalities. The claims that these inequalities basically depend on differences in ability, skill, devotion, self--sacrificing, the contribution of every individual etc., were pure ideology. However, the present-day social inequalities are positive and justifiable. They correspond to differences in the ability of the individuals, their different contributions to the work process, etc. Real revolutionaries would conclude that class society structures have proved to be no illusions, no more or less accidental outgrowths without any deeper social root or support in the present-day historical situation and in the real social conditions, and, therefore, without any significant vitality. On the contrary, they would have to admit that class structures are deeply rooted in the contemporary historical situation, in which there operate social forces and historical circumstances that constantly create a favourable ground for their revival, so that, the class structures still possess a significant degree of vitality and may always become backbone for the creation of a functioning social system. For them this should be a proof that social revolution in our times is a longer, more strenuous, more difficult, more open and more problematic process than it sometimes appeares at first sight. Moreover, this should be for them one more proof that a true emancipation of workers could be achieved only through the historical action of the working class itself, in which the real emancipation of workers becomes a true criterion for the emancipation of the total society from class structures and class relations.

II

Discussion on the existing social differences and inequalities is lacking an important element. With us there have been no investigations on how much the individual social segments take from the total social distribution and what a long-term general tendency in this distribution actually is. Such investigations do not exist either on the level of the whole society as such, or on the level of individual local communities or even on the level of individual organizations. That is the reason why it is not yet possible to be exactly aware of the amount of the share of income and wealth of the top 1%, or 5%, or 10%, or, vice versa, of the lowest 10%. We have still to wait for the publication of such research works as those by Kolko and Titonus.[7] Thus, each discussion on these problems must be more hypothetical than is usually the case.

[7] These works are: G. Kolko, Wealth and Power in America, New York, 1962; Titonus: Preface to: R. H. Tawney: Iquality, or P. I. Labini: Sviluppo economico e classico sociali in Italia, in: Quaterni di Sociologia, 21 (1972) 4 pp. 371—443.

way. The sole difference is that a significant shift of the most im portant basis for the establisment of social inequalities has occured: a shift, from private ownership to social power. Former revolutionaries would conclude th at there are two forms of social inequalities: positive and negative. Y esterday's social inequalities, against which they fought and which they felt personally, were negative social inequalities. The claims that these inequalities basically depend on differences in ability, skill, devotion, self-

-sacrificing, the contribution of every individual etc., were pure ideology. However, the present-day social inequalities are positive and justifiable. They correspond to differences in the ability of the individuals, their different contributions to the work process, etc. Real revolutionaries would conclude that class society structures have proved to be no illusions, no more or less accidental outgrowths without any deeper social root or support in the present-day historical situation and in the real social conditions, and, therefore, w ithout any significant vitality. On the contrary, they would have to admit that class structures are deeply rooted in the contemporary historical situation, in which there operate social forces and historical circumstances th at constantly create a favourable ground for their revival, so that, the class structures still possess a significant degree of vitality and may always become backbone for the creation of a functioning social system. For them this should be a proof th at social revolution in our times is a longer, more strenuous, more difficult, more open and more problematic process than it sometimes appeares at first sight.

Moreover, this should be for them one more proof that a true emancipation of workers could be achieved only through the historical action of the working class itself, in which the real emancipation of workers becomes a true criterion for the emancipation of the total society from class structures and class relations.

II

Discussion on the existing social differences and inequalities is lacking an im portant element. With us there have been no investigations on how much the individual social segments take from the total social distribution and what a long-term general tendency in this distribution actually is. Such investigations do not exist either on the level of the whole society as such, or on the level of individual local communities or even on the level of individual organizations. That is the reason why it is not yet possible to be exactly aware of the amount of the share of income and wealth of the top 1%>, or 5°/o, or 10%, or, vice

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Searching for the most important, actual foci of the most significant social differences and the most drastic inequalities in Yugoslavia, including the deepest and most permanent sources of these social differentiations acting in fact as the articulators of the real structure of differences and inequalities in its actual dimensions, we could assume the existence of three most significant foci and sources.

The first focus is represented by the village and those social processes occuring along the country — town relation. In fact, it can be stated with a high degree of certainty that a significant number of present social differences and inequalities of a more permanent nature in Yugoslavia have been caused by or directly derived from the process of social differentiations and social stratification having affected the village or taken place along country — town relation. True, it is customary to positively estimate the information that the share of the peasant population earning their living by working on their own land and from agriculture had decreased from about 75% to 36% since 1945 till the last census. Favourably estimated are also statistical data on the number of radios, television-sets, various domestic labour saving devices, cars and similar products recorded in villages and village households as a sign of the changes having affected the rural life and how strongly these objects of modern civilization and the urban way of life have penetrated also into the Yugoslav village. However, some other facts should not be neglected either. First, the Yugoslav village has been and remains a significant field of our social life according to the number of the people living there and their close connection with it. A still significant number of the total population belongs to the rural population. In this respect, the village in Yugoslavia is by no means only a marginal social phenomenon, or a more or less significant oasis within our society as a whole. Nor is the rural and peasant population a social category that should be neglected. Consequently, all that positively or negatively affects this segment of our present-day society and has a great significance for our total social life. Some suggestions that towns, or at least some towns, should be protected from the negative results of what is going on in the country, by stopping the rising tide of village newcomers into the towns, cannot prevent but may only give these consequences another form — possibly, from a long-term point of view, more explosive and more disrupting. Second, this segment lives in the relatively most difficult living, social and cultural conditions and predominantly belongs to those strata of our present-day society that are at the lowest level or at the very bottom of the social pyramid. Statistics say that approximately 80% of the rural population has a total below the Yugoslav average, while 20% of this population, according to their total income, may be listed in the category of those who live on the verge of subsistence and in the condition of direct social threat. Third, this segment of the Yugoslav society gets a poor share in the distribution of almost all benefits and products of our modern civilisation. »About 10,000 small rural hamlets — with about 200

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inhabitants each — have, as a rule, no social institutions developed as the outgrowth of industrialization and urbanization, no developed social work distribution, no intellectuals, no simplest items of the modern living standard. And this holds good also for a number of larger rural settlements.« — says S. Šuvar in this article on this problem.[8] A vivid example of the functioning of the distribution mechanism in Yugoslavia has offered itself recently during the distribution of loans and financial help in some definitely rural areas affected by the earthquake.[9] Fourth, the majority of the paupers in our society are located in villages or directly originate from them. Our rural and peasant population appears to be part of our present-day society within which there are the worst and the most wide-spread forms of misery, poverty and privation. The poor in Yugoslavia are, in their major part the rural poor. Fifth, rural areas recruit and reproduce those segments of the urban population which are objectively at the bottom of the social scale. Servants, maids, workers doing most difficult and least paid works, seasonal workers, workers without any permanent employment or normal social and health insurance, without any self-managing rights, etc. — they all by their origin are directly linked with the country-side. In fact, the majority of the rural and peasant population, definitely transferred to town, enter urban life, as a rule, from below. Modern trends of urbanization in Yugoslavia show that the highest burden and the greatest difficulties and sacrifices that the transfer from country to town, from agriculture to industry and tertiary activities entail, are thrown entirely on the shoulders of those who make this transfer without being supported by any significant organized social efforts towards a somewhat more even distribution of these difficulties and sacrifices. A classic example in this connection is the current housing policy in many urban areas und industrial organizations.

Large-scale processes of social differentiation and stratification are taking place along the country — town relation. Certain villages and rural areas situated nearer to urban centres and areas, or close to the main traffic arteries, are undergoing a more rapid social progress and are participating more evenly in the distribution of the advantages of civilization.

In such cases some of those social differences that used to exist between people in these rural areas and those living in towns are diminishing or are compensated. However, villages and large rural areas far from towns and main communications are at the same time, rapidly stagnating and even sometimes showing a pronounced social decline. The previously existing social differences and inequalities are rapidly increasing in such cases. It may be assumed that at the present moment total social differences between the population living in some rural areas in our Zagora and the categories of the urban population living in the best conditions and

[8] S. Šuvar: Town-Village Conflict, U: Vjesnik, 13. VII 1972, № 9124 p. 9

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Finally, the village itself is subject to process of rapid social differentiations. These processes primarily occur in those groups of the rural population who are objectively ahead regarding their initial social status and those who are in some way seriously handicapped by their starting living conditions. The sources of objective privileges may be: initial material conditions, vital characteristics, cultural level, etc. — all the factors offering some advantages in the possible inclusion in the processes of industrialization and modernization of society. In other words, a significant process of differentiations is in progress in the village at the present moment. This process leads to a social stagnation and general social decline in a relative and, sometimes, absolute sense — of these groups of the rural population that somehow, from the very beginning, are socially handicapped by, for instance, old age, health and family conditions, lack of property, poverty, etc.

The second focus of the present processes of social differentiation and stratification is the private earner. However, it is clear that the private sector taken as a whole is no important source of new social differences und inequalities. Even less could be said about that private sector comprising traditional crafts and those who remain within the framework of their own work and owning their own production means. However, this cannot be said for that portion of the private sector which is connected with new prosperous trades, or even less so for those who virtually have all the characteristics of huge private enterprises. In fact, the latter part of the private sector is responsible for creating, reviving and deepening significant social inequalities. And this is due to weakness of the whole economic system and the links easily created between huge private enterprises and the enterprises functioning on the basis of collective ownership rather than to some specially active, high-quality, or innovating engagement or a pronounced readiness to indulge in higher business risks on the part of this portion of the private sector.

Such business is prospering mainly on the account of »holes« and shortcomings in the economic system and the structures of earnings based on social resources. It paricularly takes advantage of the fact that the total economic system functions in such a way that a high percentage of newly created values in the existing mechanisms of earning is in fact »rolling along the street« — as somebody put it — and is therefore accessible to all possible operations, being, so to speak, at hand to every handy passer-by. Moreover, it takes also advantage of the easy estabilshment of co-operation of various kinds between private businessmen and the social sector which, in various points, develops various forms of actual group property. The final effect of such links is that a part of newly created values in enterprises, directly or indirectly,

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-operation of various kinds between private businessmen and the social sector which, in various points, develops various forms of actual group property. The final effect of such links is that a part of newly created values in enterprises, directly or indirectly, 229

through different channels is used for private purposes and is cleverly dispatched to private pockets.

The third important focus in the current processes of social differentiation and stratification is the social sector and, more widely, the socio-political system. Moreover, this is a field where one can trace the starting point of some of the most significant systematic large-scale social differences and inequalities that are appearing and perpetuating themselves at the present time.

III

The existing social differences and inequalities in Yugoslav society are complex, wide-spread and manifest themselves in various fields of social life, True, it appears as if such a statement speaks openly against a popular habit of discussing the problem of existing differences and possible inequalities by connecting it, as a rule, mostly with differences in incomes or personal earnings. It does seem quite natural in a certain way to pay immediate attention, when speaking about differences and inequalities, to differences in terms of income. And obviously, this is not without any reason. First of all, differences in the total income of various categories of people in a society have proved to be one of the most significant indicators of social differences and inequalities. Moreover, differences in income are directly or indirectly reflected also in various fields of public life, being a basis for further significant new differences and inequalities. All this, of course, relates to our present circumstances. Moreover, in our conditions this kind of views is influenced also by some pure ideological mechanisms. It is natural to expect that in a society where it is officially proclaimed that work and the results of work are the only basis for the social status of every individual, as there is a distinct tendency to show all present social differences and inequalities, regardless of the field of social life as a mere natural and unavoidable consequence of actual differences in the results of work and in contribution of work of individual persons, by wholly neglecting opposite possibilities, that is, the possibilities that the actual differences in work contribution and in possible results of work are to a great extent pre-determined by the previously existing differences and inequalities up to a degree at which such differences and inequalities determine chances for individual persons to take over various positions in the social distribution of work and in the working process. In this sense it may be claimed also for our condition, that differences in incomes — especially when referring to differences in personal incomes within a work organization as it is often the case — cover up rather than uncover the actual differences and the depth of existing differences and inequalities. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that a great many optimistic statements on minimum differences in Yugoslavia have referred, as a rule, to data on the differences in average personal incomes within work organizations, leaving, in fact, aside all other things as more or

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less irrelevant. However, the totality of social differences and inequalities in Yugoslavia cannot today be reduced only to differences in personal incomes or to differences in the total incomes of individual persons. Significant differences and inequalities exist in the general position of families, in housing conditions, in the possibilities of training and education, and, consequently, in the possibility of the choice of profession, in the real possibilities of the use of health and social protection, and, last but not least, in the social power and influence.

If starting from the distribution of personal incomes and their differences in individual work organizations, it must be concluded that such a distribution does not and cannot appear as a particularly significant source of larger social differences and inequalities. True, for some time, it was generally stated that differences in personal incomes within individual organizations ranged 1:2.5 — — 1:3. However, these differences in Split are above the average. If comparing the highest personal incomes of managers with the average personal income of unskilled workers — i. e. not the lowest — the ratio obtained is 1:3.2 for the first quarter of 1972. In industry this ratio is 1:3.6, in construction 1:4.5. In some work organizations this ratio is even higher. In a trade enterprise the ratio was 1:6.2; in a construction establishment 1:5.9, and in a large industrial organization 1:5.[10] There are indications that all the existing differentials tend to decrease. This appears to be valid for Split if comparing data for 1971 and 1972. In this respect the assumption that Yugoslavia is a country with the lowest differences in personal incomes within work organizations might be accepted. However, this means at the same time that in the totality of existing social differences the most important social differences with us are not established on this basis of differences in the income of individual categories of the employed within a work organization or within personal incomes, not even on the basis of renumeration obtained for the regular working time. And this is mostly due to the fact that the distribution of personal incomes within a work organization is in fact the only possible form of distribution which could be influenced by large segments of the working class, more or less effectively, appearing at least as a specific veto-group and preventing the establishment and perpetuation of certain privileges. It appears that the tendency towards a diminuation of differences in the personal income can be explained as a result of a permanent pressure on the part of the working class — or at least of a significant part of it — who in this way protect their own position in distribution. And this goes on also under the circumstances when such resistence is qualified as politically negative, as pure primitivism, a tribute to pre- industrial mentality or a tendency towards »uravnilovka«.

[10] According to data published by the Institute of Statistics, Split (Personal Incomes according to the Qualification of the Employed in the First Quarter of 1972, and the Distributions of Personal Incomes according to Differences in March, 1972, Split, 1972)

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However, there are fields of distribution also within the work organization and in the macrosystem that are without any control or influence on the part of working class. The influence and control of trade unions and similar organizations, which could appear here as a form of workers' control, either do not exist at all, or are negligible. No substitute or working class representative are capable of securing the degree of control that can be secured by the everyday control of the wide segments of the working class itself.

The picture therefore, changes if taking into account some more significant distribution factors, first of all, not only personal incomes relating to the regular working time but all the earnings of the individual categories of the employed, that is, all that in some form or other is actually obtained either on the basis of overtime work, part-time work, travel expenses for official trips, allowances for the use of cars, special rewards, provisions, representation allowances, advertising, etc. Of course, these kinds of income would not exert any significant influence on the present differences and inequalities if the respective means were distributed more or less evenly to all main categories of the employed. In reality, this is obviously not the case. The actual distribution of these means is not only without the control of the working class but, in its major part, is the privilege of a very tiny stratum of the employed. All these special incomes are for the most part divided among the top people in work organizations, although a significant share is also distributed among some other categories of workers. Data from Slovenia show that 23% of the total personal consumption in Slovenia derived from other incomes, and that these 23% related to only 5% of the employed Slovenians.[11] Besides, these incomes proved tending towards a more rapid growth than that relating to personal incomes. In any case, actual differences are rapidly growing if taking into account also the previously mentioned incomes, and are and we are in no case within that popular range of 1:2.5 to 1:3. This is where the foci of significant social differences and inequalities are created, and these differences mainly depend upon the place occupied in the hyerarchic structures. Of course, this whole dialectic system, which in reality manifests itself in the relationship between the distribution of personal incomes and other earnings, could be functionalistically explained as a perfect practical proof of a low functionality or even nonfunctionality of the real situation in the distribution of personal incomes characterized by unacceptably low differences and inherent tendencies towards egalitarism which is incompatible with the principles of a well-functioning modern work organization. It may be concluded that the increase and expansion of other incomes in work organizations are nothing but an unavoidable consequence of the action of yet latent structural tendencies inherent in every well-functioning work organization and bound to be expressed and acknowledged in an »indirect«, »abnormal« way when their normal manifestation

[11] Kropušek: One Quarter of the Income earned outside the Working Relation, In Social Differences in Socialism, Belgrade, 1971, p. 72

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form of workers' control, either do not exist at all, or are negligible. No substitute or working class representative are capable of securing the degree of control that can be secured by the everyday control of the wide segments of the working class itself.

The picture therefore, changes if taking into account some more significant distribution factors, first of all, not only personal incomes relating to the regular working time but all the earnings of the individual categories of the employed, that is, all th at in some form or other is actually obtained either on the basis of overtime work, part-tim e work, travel expenses for official trips, allowances for the use of cars, special rewards, provisions, representation allowances, advertising, etc. Of course, these kinds of income would not exert any significant influence on the present differences and inequalities if the respective means were distributed more or less evenly to all main categories of the employed. In reality, this is obviously not the case. The actual distribution of these means is not only without the control of the working class but, in its major part, is the privilege of a very tiny stratum of the employed. All these special incomes are for the most p art divided among the top people in work organizations, although a significant share is also distributed among some other categories of workers. Data from Slovenia show that 23% of the total personal consumption in Slovenia derived from other incomes, and that these 23% related to only 5% of the employed Slovenians.11 Besides, these incomes proved tending towards a more rapid growth than that relating to personal incomes. In any case, actual differences are rapidly growing if taking into account also the previously mentioned incomes, and are and we are in no case w ithin th at popular range of 1:2.5

to 1:3. This is where the foci of significant social differences and inequalities are created, and these differences mainly depend upon the place occupied in the hyerarchic structures. Of course, this whole dialectic system, which in reality manifests itself in the relationship between the distribution of personal incomes and other earnings, could be functionalistically explained as a perfect practical proof of a low functionality or even nonfunctionality of the real situation in the distribution of personal incomes characterized by unacceptably low differences and inherent tendencies towards egalitarism which is incompatible w ith the principles of a well-

-functioning modern work organization. It may be concluded that the increase and expansion of other incomes in work organizations are nothing but an unavoidable consequence of the action of yet latent structural tendencies inherent in every well-functioning work

organization and bound to be expressed and acknowledged in an »indirect«, »abnormal« way when their normal manifestation 11 Kropušek: One Quarter o f the Incom e earned outside th e Working Relation, In Social D ifferences in Socialism , B elgrade, 1971, p. 72

is blocked by the existing personal income distribution mechanisms, to allow the organization to function at all. In this case, what happens is only that what is being denied and thrown out mechanisms is returning through the back door as the distribution of other forms of earning. However, this is by no means, the only possible explanation. It is possible to interpret this dialectics just as well within the framework of the orientations that do not look upon the contemporary work organization as an almost incorporel operative human machinery, but as a social system within which there act various social groups with their different strategies. Any more durable condition within the social space of an organization is structured according to actual relations of power and under the influence of the strategies of various social groups. In this context the dialectics of relations between the distribution of personal income earned in regular working time and the distribution of other incomes is revealed also as a dialectics in which the powerful and influential groups and categories which fail to accomplish some of their important aspirations through the mechanism of the personal income distribution owing to the resistence of the working class, try to find out, by using their power and influence, some indirect ways to materialize their aspirations through other forms of distribution. In this case, of course, distribution appears to be itself a highly conflicting field within the microsystem of the organization.

The picture is even more changed when the so-called interbranch differences are taken into consideration. In that case actual differences rapidly grow. Differentials between different qualifications and schooling are wiped out. In such a way differences between the highest personal incomes for the regular working hours in those organizations that are at the top of the list by the average personal income on the one hand, and on the other the lowest personal incomes in those organizations that are at the bottom of the same list, may indeed range from 1:12 to 1:15. Such a picture may, for instance, be obtained by comparing the highest and the lowest personal earnings for the regular working time in oil industry, foreign trade enterprises, banks and similar bodies, and state administration versus the earnings in tobacco and textile industries, In Split the ratio in the first quarter of 1971 was 1:13.1, and in the first quarter of 1972 it was reduced to 1:10. It is hard to believe that such differences are primarily due to differences in the concrete results of work accomplished under more or less identical general circumstances or to the actual scarcity of the available resources, and skill that, as some economists claim, should be activated and optimally used. Moreover, it is not possible to believe that only natural consequences of various rate of productivity and accumulation levels are involved. How to explain reasonably in that context the fact that a branch of production permanently at the bottom of the list of the average personal incomes, could at the same time be highly accumulative for the community? Or, how could it come to it that on the average nonproductive activities

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are, as a rule, better paid than productive ones so that the tertiary sector earns more than the secondary one, the average differences being as high as one fifth to one fourth? Or, finally, how could it be that those employed in the tertiary sector, in health services, educational and cultural institutions, by their personal income are below the average income in that sector, whereas officials in socio--political organizations earn at least one fourth and those in banks, business corporations and chambers more than one third above that average?

If also other incomes were added, the actual differences would be even larger; in some cases they certainly exceed the 1:30 ratio.

It is obvious that the present social differences and inequalities are not shown in full if considered only within the framework of differences in the personal incomes of individual persons. These differences are caused far more by the general living conditions and the total income of a family. In fact, differences in income go up as soon as the income per family member is taken into consideration. Even with identical actual earnings of the employed significant differentials in average income per family member come out as soon as the earnings of working class family are compared with the earnings of a non-manual worker's family or the family of intelectuals or managers. It is the characteristics of the working class families and the families of other less well-off strata that along with a somewhat higher average number of family members there is a somehwat lower average number of the employed per family. Some investigations in Split have shown that the employment of the spouse or mother could be taken as a very reliable indicator of the general socio-economic status of the family. The lower the average socio-economic status of the family, the higher the likelihood that the second marital companion is not employed and vice versus. The study of the secondary school youth in Split some years ago revealed that mothers of childern attending the Classical Secondy School (with emphasis on classical studies) were only housewives in 57% of cases, while the mothers of children attending the Construction School Center were housewives in 88.1% of cases. It should also be added that in this case there is also a not irrelevant difference in the kind of the employment of the second marital companion regarding various social categories. This is suggested by the fact that the employed mothers of young industrial workers in Split were themselves in 76% of cases manual workers, they were peasants in 10% of cases, and non-manual workers in 12% of cases. Another research in one of the largest industrial enterprises in Split has shown that two years ago the total income per family member in this enterprise was under 400 Dinars per month for 86% of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, for 70% of skilled workers, and for 60% of highly skilled workers, while at the same time 67% of university and college trained employees and 68% of those with secondary training be-

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longed to the families with an average income per month above 400 Dinars per family member.[12]

The same phenomenon appears if we take into consideration not only the existing differences in the income at a certain moment, but also in probable total incomes earned through the whole life. There are, of course, some categories of the employed that start with a relatively low income and in this respect are equal to or come near the incomes of some categories of manual workers. However, these categories can reckon with a high degree of certainty upon a significant increase of their income during their total life work. Manual workers, for the most part, cannot reckon upon such important improvements. Their possible top income is, as a rule, limited in advance.

All this shows that during a four-year period the members of certain social layers have the chance of earning normally as much as an average manual worker earns in the course of his normal 40-year working life.

Even greater differences exist in another important area of social life in Yugoslavia, that is, in housing. First of all there are enormous differences in the average investments in housing. Industrial organizations annually invest 10 to 500 Dinars per empolyee in building houses for their employees. At the same time the annual investments of government bodies, banks, business corporations, foreign trade firms, and socio-political organizations for the same purpose range from 5,000 to 20,000 Dinars per employee. Furthermore, there are great differences in the actual chances of obtaining a collectively owned flat according to the social stratum one belongs to. Thus, an analysis carried out in one of the largest industrial organizations in Split has revealed that the manual workers comprising 75% of all the employed in that industry, had participated in the total distribution of flats since the liberation only with 15%. It has also been shown in another large organization in Split that in a long-term perspective a worker has to wait to get a flat through his enterprise for about 15 to 18 years, whereas the members of some other strata change even two flats in the same period. Third, there are considerable differences in the quality of flats according to different social strata.: According to recent investigations of the Yugoslav Institute of City Planning, flats of 60 to 70 square metres in modern districts house 84% of non-manual workers and only 8.6% manual workers, larger flats house 88% of non-manual workers and 8.3% of manual workers, and in the flats of more than 80 square metres there are no manual workers at all.[13] Finally the way of collecting means for housing and the way of their distribution and utilization clearly show that there is a complex social machanism by which those who are less

[12] M. Žuvela, Basic cause of work stoppage lies in the objectively bad material position of the working class in Yugoslav society, In: Pogledi, 2 (1970) 3, p. 23

[13] V. Mlakar, Stanovanja danes in jutri, (Housing Today and Tomorrow), Teorija in praksa (Theory and Pracice), 9 (1972) 6—7

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13 V. Mlakar, Housing Today and Tomorrow, Theory and Practice, 9 (1972) 6-7

well-off virtually subsidise financially those who are better off. For this reason there is no wonder to hear that they would have already had a flat had they each month put aside and save what has been substracted from their earning for the building of houses. How paradoxical this situation is can be seen by remembering various suggestions and proposals for the establishment of special funds to facilitate the workers to obtain flat. This means that apart from normal mechanisms by which financial means are accumulated for the building of flats from the values newly created by the working class, some special mechanisms of solidarity are to be introduced and some special campaigns are to be organized in order to build flats also for workers. In other words, double social mechanisms are to be established: one kind for nonworkers' flats and the other for workers' flats! It would be worth calculating differences — quite certainly not below the range of one versus several hundreds.

The third field of social life where processes of social differentiation and stratification occur and perpetuate themselves is the field of training and education. This is particularly important. The school system in Yugoslavia is one of the significant mechanisms of social promotion and ascending social mobility like in many industrialized societies. In fact, the greatest possibilities of intragenerational social promotion are offered by the school system has also a purely ideological function. By its normal functioning it presents the actual deep social differences and inequalities in the starting social positions of the members of different social classes and strata as if they were differences in the natural abilities of individuals. The school system presents the influence of present social differences and inequalities upon the starting social position of individuals as if they were the result of pure differences in their natural talent.

The school system in Yugoslavia reflects and confirms the existing social differences and inequalities to an important degree. There are in fact schools for urban children and predominantly schools for rural children, schools mostly attended by chldren of manual workers and peasants and schools mostly attended by the children of well-off social strata.

An investigation in Split has shown that in schools training manual workers 59.9% of pupils are of the working class origin, 10.9% of peasant origin, 8.2% were independent craftsmen's children and 9.5% non-manual children. A previous study has shown that in the final classes of the Split secondary schools the percentage of manual workers' children was only 36.8%. Here, too, the differences are more than indicative: 21.4% of pupils at the Construction School Center and 2.9% at the Classical Secondary School were of peasant origin; 47,6% at the Construction School Center and 14.7% at the Clasical Secondary School were of the working class origin; 19.0% at the Construction School Centre and 38.2% at the Classical Secondary School were the children of non--manual workers. No wonder, therefore, that the majority of

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workers are recruited from the working class and peasantry. A study of the youth in Split has shown that the fathers of young workers up to 25 years of age are workers themselves in 56.2% of cases, in 24.0% of cases they are peasants, in 5.6% of cases independent craftsmen, in 8.7% of cases non-manual workers and in 2.6% others. A similar distribution was obtained in a study of young workers at the shipbuilding enterprise »Jadranbrod«: the fathers of young shipbuilding workers were manual workers themselves in 43.8% of cases, in 27.9% of cases they were peasants, in 5.7% independent craftsmen, in 8.7% non-manual workers and in 2.2% others. In other words, the school system plays an important role in determinating the differences in life chances of the members of various social classes and strata. In this respect one of the crucial decisions affecting the whole life is the choice of what school boys or girls are to enroll after they finish their primary 8-year school training. Joining a school which prepares for manual workers has also something of a true life verdict as J. Goldthrope and D. Lockwood put it when writing about England.[14] Indeed, the school system with its spontaneous effect, is in no small measure responsible for the fact that a manual worker's child today has on the average at least nine to ten times less chance to become a professional than a child of a university trained person or a manager. And vice versa, the child of a university trained person or a manager has on the average at least twenty times less chance to become a manual worker than a manual worker's child.

The fourth field of social life in which significant social differences and inequalities appear and perpetuate themselves is employment and job security. This, of course, is of special importance because, on the one hand, unemployment in Yugoslavia has for several years exceeded, by its scope, the limits of a marginal social phenomenon. Unemployment as exists in Yugoslavia has some characteristics of the so-called recession unemployment. On the other hand, employment is an actual prerequisite to utilize significant self-management rights. In this respect unemployment actually excludes a person from many fields of normal social life. The investigations carried out by M. Žuvela in Split, have shown that the unemployment has developed a distinct selective character, not equally affecting on the average all social strata and classes.[15] On the contrary, unemployment strikes most frequently and most bitterly the members of those social strata and classes which are already in the most unfavourable social position. The majority of unemployed in Split turned out to be of agricultural and working class origin. It is also they who remain unemployed for the relatively longest time period, and if employed, their jobs are the relatively worst paid and least promising. This occurs also when the

[14] J. H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, Affluence and the British Class structure, U: Sociological Review, 11 (1963) 2.

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unemployed persons of working class and peasant origin have the highest school degrees.

The fifth field of social life affected by social differences and inequalities is the field of public health and social welfare. However, in this field it is difficult to provide arguments for scope and depth of the existing differences, because there have been no significant, large-scale investigations in the Split area that would offer relevant and systematic data. Of course, it may be reasonably assumed that many of the differences of social character and origin that have proved to exist, such as differences in the mortality rate of children, average life expectancy, the frequency of certain diseases, exposure to occupational injuries and diseases, chance of permanent disability, general life security, especially in old age etc, also exist in the Split region. Thus, on the basis of some unsystematic impressions it may be argued that for some, when needed, there is available quick and effective health protection of the second half of the 20th century standard, whereas some, as a rule, are treated according to the standards of the beginning of the century. There are some who cannot be socially imperilled by almost any disease or accident along with those whose total life is at risk by any more serious disease or accident.[16] Or those for whom retirement often means the increased possibility of earning along with those for whom retirement means poverty and sometimes direct beggery.

The sixth field of social life where significant social differences — indeed the most significant ones — exist and tend to be constantly revived is the area of social power and influence. In fact, social power and influence are very unevenly distributed. There are some people that by their social position dispose with an enormous amount of social power and in some way or other handle with large public funds and control significant sources of social wealth. To put it more popularly, there are some that are in charge of enormous means and whose decisions affect the life of a great many people and channel the use of large public resources. At the same time, there are some that have practically no power at all and their actual public influence on making key public decisions is nil or almost nil. Of course, differences in social power and influence are expressed to a great degree in the field of political life, but not only in this field. It is true that political life in Yugo-

[16] In view of this an example from our region is symptomatic. It demonstrates the action of the spontaneous mechanisms of social differentiation in case of employment occupationally disabled persons. Deviations from the top income, that is, from the maximum possible number of points — for invalids working in a large industrial organization in Split are: for highly skilled workers 60 points, for skilled workers 45 points, for semi-skilled workers 14 points, for unskilled workers 50 points, and for the staff with advanced and university training 31 points, for the staff with secondary school training 8 points, and for the staff with lower school training 12 points. What happens in retirement scheme is even more symptomatic. Actual differences in pensions sometimes are such as to be several times higher than the differences in personal incomes. An investigation to these differences and their numerical presentation would be worth-while.

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h ighly skilled w orkers 60 points, for sk illed w orkers 45 points, for sem i-

-sk illed workers 14 points, for u nsk illed w orkers 50 points, and for the staff w ith advanced and u niversity training 31 points, for the sta ff w ith secondary school training 8 points, and for th e sta ff w ith low er school training 12 points. W hat happens in retirem ent schem e is even more sym ptom atic.

Actual differences in pensions som etim es are such as to be several tim es higher than the differences in personal incomes. An investigation to these differences and their num erical presentation w ould be w orth -w h ile.

slavia is an area where the principles of equality are present in a formal legal way. However, even in this field operate the mechanisms of social differentiation and stratification which are neither wholly autonomous, nor a mere reflection of what is going on in other fields of public life. It appears that there exist at least four large segments of the society,[17] that may be visualized as four concetric circles in accordance with the real role in political life and the social power these segments have at their disposal.

The first circle and the largest segment is composed of those parts of Yugoslav society who practically in their everyday life live outside the world of politics or, in the best case, only at its margins. This large segment of society is connected with current political life only by very feeble, incidental links. The world of politics seems to be far away from the life of this segment of people — a kind of life which is often pretty hard. The members of this social segment are those who are occupied with troublesome questions of their everyday living, do not, as a rule, read newspapers or read them only from time to time, and when they read them they are interested only in local newspapers and in local events. They are not interested in political news and political commentaries. They know little about current politics and they do not discuss it. They do not belong or do not know to belong to any sociopolitical organizations. They pay no membership fees, except perhaps those automatically taken from their personal income. They do not appear at any meetings of voters and other political meetings of voters and other political meetings, and if they do, they never say a word there. These are people who have never had or will ever have an opportunity in their life to take part in a formal dinner, or a party or any similar festivities prepared out on state or party money. Their participation in the country's political life is in fact reduced to voting during periodical elections looked upon by them as something entirely formal, so much so that they even do not know for whom they may vote. It is true that they are present in the political life in another way: the whole political world is allegedly turning around them taking care about them, and acting for their well-being. To put it more realistically, they are present in the world of politics in that they suffer the results of political moves. In the majority of cases this segment consists of those who by their total social position are at the bottom of the existing social pyramid, and by their average total incomes are markedly below the general averages. Their actual social power and influence are insignificant.

The second narrower but sufficiently large segment is composed of those who are in close contact with the world of the country's politics and participate in it at least at periodical intervals. They more or less regularly read newspapers, following political news

[17] See something more detailed about it, coupled with arguments relating to Macedonia, in the paper: D. Mirčev, Granice emancipacije samoupravne svijesti, (Limits of Emantipation of Selfmanagement Awareness), Sociology, 14 (1972) 1, p 91—101

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The third, even narrower segment is composed of those who to a considerable extent live within the world of politics and actively participate in it. They regularly read newspapers, mostly the central ones. Political news and commentaries are within the sphere of their interest. In their close circles they discuss politics and form their own political attitudes. As a rule, they know, at least partially, also the reverse, non-public side of otherwise public affairs. Periodically, they are able to get, by formal or informal channels, important political information, not accesible to the wider public. They are, as a rule, members of several political organizations and sometimes even their prominent activists and functionaries. In its largest part, this social segment is composed of those who are, or were, members of certain self-management, representative, and other political bodies. They are, as a rule, present in the making of some significant social and political decisions. However, they are neither the initiators nor actual creators of these decisions, they only acknowledge, discuss, popularize and apply them. In fact, this segment represents the »replaceable« part of leading political and social structures, or the part that moves in close orbits round these structures but always in a minor function. This segment possesses a certain degree of social power and influence, yet, downwards rather than upwards. In its largest part it belongs to well-to do social layers with a total income significantly higher than the average and, in normal conditions, with a high degree of social security.

The fourth and the narrowest circle comprises those for whom it may be said that they are »chief« structure of the social political organizations and organs and who rule the state and most important social institutions on all levels of public life. This segment is composed of the »irreplaceable« part of the leading structures which, even if subjected to certain changes continues moving at the same or similar hierarchical level, carrying along the greatest part of the acquired privileges. One is dropped out of this circle

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only in the case of extreme political deviations or severe moral scandals that cannot be covered up. Even when retiring, the members of this segment remain staying in the center or very near the center of political life, either in a formal or informal way, so that their »come back« is possible. They represent the very soul of political life — the centre around which all the political world of Yugoslavia more or less rotates. This segment is the nucleus of actual creators of most important decisions and true initiators of the most important political moves. This is the nucleus where the greatest social power and influence is concentarted.

It would be difficult to numerically express the actual social differences which in this respect exist.

IV

The picture of the total social differences and inequalities that may at first be obtained by this review of the present differences in various fields of public life in Yugoslavia may be slightly wrong. The review may suggest that the present social differences and inequalities are subtle and diffused and that, as a rule, they do not cumulate. In other words, it may be assumed that in the present situation one social segment is privileged in one way, the second in the other way, and the third in the third way. And vice versa, that one segment is handicapped in one field of public life but privileged in the other one. In such a case various social differences and inequalities tend to cumulate. Those segments of society wiped out. Consequently, such a pricture would show a social situation where social equality prevails in spite of the existing significant social differences and inequalities. Unfortunately, the actual state of affairs is quite different. The existing social differences and inequalities tend to cumulate. Those segments of society who are handicapped in one field of social life are at the same time handicapped in almost all other fields. And even worse, the existing differences and inequalities not only accumulate but are transferred from one generation to the other. In other words, they have the characteristics of permanent and systematic differences. And what is more important, these differences and inequalities, by their total social longterm effect, are not irrelevant to the concrete social relations between all social segments and all participants in the process of social production and reproduction on the one hand and productive means on the other.

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VOM BEGRIFF DES MANGELS BEI HEGEL

Milan Kangrga

Zagreb

In diesen kurzen Ausführungen möchte ich über den Begriff des Mangels bei Hegel reden. In diesem Begriff ist meiner Meinung nach die Möglichkeit für das Verständnis des wesentlichen Verhältnisses von Metaphysik und Geschichtlichkeit zu finden, und damit auch ein Weg zur Aufhebung der Metaphysik. Diese Frage ist schon bei Hegel ganz klar gestellt. Wir werden, um dieser Frage näher zu kommen, kurz bei Hegels Bestimmung des Begriffs des Willens verweilen, womit gleichzeitig das Verhältnis des Theoretischen und Praktischen bestimmt wird.

Im § 4 (Zusatz) der *Rechtsphilosophie* sagt Hegel folgendes: »Das Theoretische ist wesentlich im Praktischen enthalten: es geht gegen die Vorstellung, daß beide getrennt sind, denn man kann keinen Willen haben ohne Inteligenz. Im Gegenteil, der Wille hält das Theoretische in sich.« Das Theoretische ist hier schon seinem Wesen nach so gefaßt, daß es an die *Aneignung des Gegenstandes* als seines eigenen geht, das Denken ist gleichzeitig als Wollen erfaßt vielmehr, es geht erst aus einem Wollen hervor, so daß »das, *was ich will*, was ich mir vorstelle, für mich Gegenstand ist.« Da das Denken auf die Totalität des menschlichen Wesens und sein Verhältnis zur Welt des Seienden gerichtet ist, der Wille jedoch ohne die Einheit mit der Intelligenz undenkbar ist, so wäre »daß der Mensch einerseits denkend, andererseits wollend sei und daß er in der einen Tasche das Denken, in der anderen das Wollen habe . . . *eine leere Vorstellung*«.

Der Gegenstand des Denkens *wird* im Denken nicht nur so *möglich*, daß er (logisch oder gnoseologisch konstituiert) als das Objekt für das Erkenntnissubjekt gesetzt wird, sondern in einem gedanklich-willentlichen Verhältnis, das eine vollkommene Aneignung des Gegenstandes ist, was bedeutet, daß hier eine Umwandlung des Gegenständlichen am Werke ist, daß sein Erzeugen das ist, was es erst zu dem macht, was es ist. Insofern ist die *Gegenständlichkeit* des Gegenstandes als seine Erzeugtheit, die das Öf-

PORTRAITSETSITUATIONS

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF DEFICIENCY

Milan Kangrga

Zagreb

In these brief remarks I would like to talk about the concept of deficiency in Hegel. In my opinion, the possibility of understanding the essential relationship between metaphysics and historicity is to be found in this concept, and thus also a way to abolish metaphysics. This question was already posed quite clearly in Hegel. In order to get closer to this question, we will dwell briefly on Hegel's definition of the concept of will, which at the same time defines the relationship between the theoretical and the practical.

In § 4 (addition) of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel says the following:

"The theoretical is essentially contained in the practical: it goes against the idea that the two are separate, for one cannot have a will without intelligence. On the contrary, the will contains the theoretical within itself." The theoretical is here already in its essence so conceived that it concerns the appropriation of the object as its own; thinking is grasped at the same time as willing rather, it only comes from a willing emerges, so that "what I want, what I imagine, is an object for me." of intelligence is unthinkable, then "that

the human being on the one hand thinking, on the other hand willing and that

he has thinking in one pocket and willing in the other. . . an empty imagination".

The object of thought becomes possible in thought not only in that it is posited (logically or gnoseologically constituted) as the object for the knowing subject, but in a mental-volitional relationship that is a complete appropriation of the object, which means that here a transformation of the object is at work, that its creation is what makes it what it is. In this respect, the objectivity of the object as its createdness, which is of-243

fnen des Horizonts seiner Möglichkeit ist, erfaßt. Das transzendentale Ego verwandelt sich hier am Ende seines eigenen Dankprozesses (von Kant bis Hegel) in ein geschichtliches Subjekt als Einheit der theoretisch-praktischen Beherrschung der Welt, die seine eigene *ist,* weil sie das *geworden* ist und immer wieder wird. Es hätte das nie auf dem Standpunkt jener traditionell-metaphysischen *theoria* (platonisch-aristotelisch begriffen) werden können, und wäre es auch nicht deworden, wenn diese Wendung im Denken nicht wäre, die in Fichtes Bestimmung des Denkens (der Intelligenz) als der einzig wirklichen *Tätigkeit* schon ganz klar formuliert ist, wo das Theoretische nicht nur als schon im Praktischen enthalten verstanden ist (der konstitutive Charakter der Vernunft im Willen), sondern auch umgekehrt, jetzt mit Hegel *explizit* ausgesagt: daß nämlich das praktische Moment im Theoretischen enthalten ist. Aber noch viel mehr: das Praktische ermöglicht sowohl das Theoretische wie auch seinen Gegenstand. Erst so kann der Gegenstand überhaupt etwas sein, da er ja schon als ein geschichtliches Erzeugnis verstanden ist, als Gesetztes-Aufgestelltes, ein tätig-denkend Vermitteltes. Darum kann Hegel auch sagen: »Ebensowenig kann man sich aber ohne Willen theoretisch verhalten oder denken, denn indem wir denken, sind wir eben tätig. Der Inhalt des Gedachten erhält wohl die Form des Seienden, aber dies Seiende ist ein Vermitteltes, durch unsere Tätigkeit Gesetztes.« (Ibid., § 4)

Gerade in solchen und ähnlichen Sätzen wird Kants großes Verdienst sichtbar, mit seinem Begriff »des Primats der praktischen Vernunft« einen geschichtlich ganz neuen Gedankengang eröffnet zu haben, der das bisherige (metaphysische) Weltbild umwandelt, damit, daß er zum ersten Mal die Frage nach dem *wirklichen Subjekt* dieses Bildes stellt und es in der Dimension des Praktischen findet »jenseits ihrer selbst«. Diese Wendung wird durch Fichte und Schelling vertieft, durch Hegel mit der These über den wesentlich praktischen Charakter des Theoretischen vollendet. Er sagt: »Der Unterschied zwischen Denken und Willen ist nur der zwischen dem theoretischen und praktischen Verhalten, aber es sind nicht etwa zwei Vermögen, sondern der *Wille ist eine besondere Weise des Denkens:* das Denken als sich übersetzend ins Dasein, *als Trieb,* sich Dasein zu geben.« (Ibid., § 4)

Die abstrakte Jenseitigkeit des Gegenständlichen, wie es sich für *jede* erkenntnis-theoretische Position stellt und deshalb eine von ihrem Standpunkt aus wesentlich unlösbare Frage (des Subjekt-Objekt Verhältnisses) bedeutet, wird hier durch die »Einbeziehung« in das Denken als Willenstätigkeit, der nichts widerstehen kann, da es doch erst aus ihr hervorgeht, aufgehoben. Aber nicht so, daß jenes »an sich« absolut verschwinden würde, als wäre es nie da gewesen, sondern es erscheint erst als solches in jenem, das aus dieser Tätigkeit erst ist. Obwohl als »nichtig« verstanden, ist es damit nicht »vernichtet«, sondern ist dadurch, daß es jetzt »an sich *und* für sich« ist, was, mit Hegel gesprochen, heißt, daß es »dialektisch aufgehoben« ist. Darum nimmt der Wille als Denken und als diese Tätigkeit das Seiende nicht und läßt es auch

open the horizon of his possibility. Here, at the end of its own process of thanksgiving (from Kant to Kegel), the transcendental ego is transformed into a historical subject as a unit of theoretical-practical domination of the world, which is its own because it has become and

always will be. It could never have been from the standpoint of that traditional-metaphysical theoria (Platonic-Aristotelian conception), and it would not have been either if this turn in thinking were not that in Fichte's determination of thinking (of intelligence) as of the only real activity is already quite clearly formulated, where the theoretical is understood not only as already contained in the practical (the constitutive character of reason in the will), but also vice versa, now explicitly stated with Hegel: namely that the practical moment in the Theoretical is included. But much more: the practical makes both the theoretical and its subject possible. Only in this way can the object be something at all, since it is already understood as a historical product, as something that is established and established, something that is mediated through active thinking. That is why Hegel can also say: 'But one cannot behave or think theoretically without will, for just as little as we think, we are active. The content of what is thought receives the form of what is, but this what is mediated, something dictated by our activity.« (Ibid., § 4)

Precisely in such and similar sentences, Kant's great merit becomes visible, that with his concept "of the primacy of practical reason" he opened up a historically completely new train of thought, which transforms the previous (metaphysical) world view, so that he first May asks the question about the real subject of this picture and finds it in the dimension of the practical »beyond itself«. This turn is deepened by Fichte and Schelling, completed by Hegel with the thesis on the essentially practical character of the theoretical. He says: "The difference between thinking and will is only that between theoretical and practical behavior, but there are not two faculties, but the will is a special way of thinking: thinking as translating itself into existence, as drive to give oneself existence.« (Ibid., § 4) The abstract otherworldliness of the object, as it poses itself for every epistemological position and therefore means a question (of the subject-object relationship) that is essentially insoluble from its point of view, is abolished here by the "inclusion" in thinking as an act of will, which nothing can resist, since it only emerges from it. But not in such a way that that "in itself" would absolutely disappear, as if it had never been there, rather it first appears as such in that which first arises from this activity. Although understood as "void," it is not "annihilated" with it, but is because it is now

"in itself and for itself" is what, to use Hegel's language, means that

it is »dialectically sublated«. That is why the will as thinking and as this activity does not take beings and also leaves them 244

nicht, wie es ist, sondern ist schon wesentlich darauf gerichtet »die Welt erst *zu dem zu machen, was sie sein soll.* Das Unmittelbare, das Vorgefundene gilt dem Willen nicht als ein festes Sein, sondern nur als Schein, als ein an sich *Nichtiges.*« (Sämtliche Werke, Jub. Ausgabe in 20 Bänden, H. Glockner, Stuttgart (1927), 1940, VIII, S. 444 ff.)

Ist also vom Willen die Rede, geht aus seiner eigenen Bestimmung hervor, daß man über den *freien* Willen spricht oder über die Freiheit selbst, weil er sich hier auch gar nicht anders denken ließe. Die *Allgemeinheit* des Denkens verwandelt nämlich den Trieb in Willen, sie ermöglicht, daß sich das einzelne, unmittelbare und somit endliche Begehren, das nach seiner Befriedigung mitte äußerlicher Dinge strebt, aus seiner abstrakten (und in diesem Sinne noch immer un-menschlichen!) Unmittelbarkeit »herauszieht« und auf die Ebene des objektiven Zweckes sich hebt, auf welcher jetzt jedes einzelne Wollen »partizipieren« kann und soll. Man könnte sagen: damit daß der Mensch Selbstbewußtsein »hat«, oder besser, daß der Mensch Selbstbewußtsein *ist,* was bedeutet daß er sein eigener Gegenstand sein kann und somit auch ein Gegenstand für den Anderen, ist er frei. Oder: *denkend* ist der Mensch frei. Aber auch umgekehrt, eben daraus daß der Wille schon als freier Wille verstanden wird, daß der Mensch durch seinen Willen (also als »praktisches Wesen«) frei ist, geht die Möglichkeit des Denkens selbst als freien Denkens hervor. Das »freie Denken« erscheint so seiner wesentlichen Bestimmung nach als bloße Tautologie, da es keine Freiheit ohne Denken und kein Denken ohne Freiheit gibt, denn, wie Hegel sagt: »Der wirkliche freie Wille ist die Einheit des theoretischen und praktischen Geistes ... Diese *allgemeine* Bestimmung hat der Wille nur als seinen Gegenstand und Zweck, indem er sich *denkt,* diesen seinen Begriff weiß, *Wille* als freie *Intelligenz* ist.« (Enzyklopädie, § 481) Der Mensch unterscheidet sich in seinem praktischen Verhalten vom Tiere eben damit, daß er denkt, also mit Hilfe des Denkens, denn: »das Tier handelt nach Instinkt, wird druch ein Inneres getrieben, und ist so auch praktisch, aber es hat keinen Willen, weil es sich das nicht vorstellt, was es begehrt.« (Rphil, § 4)

In der Begierde (im Begehren, Streben, in der Gier) ist also jener erster allgemeiner Ursprung des Praktischen zu finden, und zwar dem Wesen als solchen eigen, das heißt gerade dem Lebewesen. Diese Erkenntnis ist voller weitreichender Konsequenzen, reich an tiefsten Implikationen; und damit kommen wir zur Frage, die wir uns gestellt haben. Von hier aus knüpfen sich, in einer ganzen Folge und einem ganzen Geflecht, die tiefsten, innerlich sinnvoll begründeten Bestimmungen an, die den Horizont des »Durchbrechens« und wesentlicher Überwindung, das heißt der Aufhebung der alten Metaphysik in ihrem Grund, öffnen. Die *Begierde* ist nämlich als das *Lebendige* selbst erfaßt, als Trieb, Spannung, Anstrengung, »Impetus« oder »Impuls« des Seienden, sich in jenem was *ist,* mit Hilfe des *Anderen* zu erhalten; das Seiende hat Bedürfnis oder *braucht* jenes Andere außer sich selbst als sein eigenes Wesen, und auch sein Sein ist im Anderen seiner

not as it is, but is already essentially aimed at it

»to make the world what it is meant to be. What is immediate, what is found does not count for the will as a fixed being, but only as an

appearance, as something null and void.« (Sammliche Werke, Jub. Edition in 20 volumes, H. Glockner, Stuttgart (1927), 1940

VIII, S. 444 ff.)

So if we are talking about the will, it follows from its own definition that we are talking about free will or about freedom itself, because it cannot be thought of any differently here. The universal unity of thought transforms drive into will, it makes it possible for the individual, immediate and thus finite desire, which strives for its satisfaction in the midst of external things, to emerge from its abstract (and in this sense still inhuman!) “pulls out” immediacy and elevates itself to the level of objective purpose, on which every individual will can and should now “participate”.

One could say: so that man "has" self-consciousness, or better, that man is self-conscious, which means that he can be his own object and thus also an object for the other, he is free. Or: thinking man is free. But vice versa, precisely because the will is already understood as free will, because man is free through his will (that is, as a "practical being"), the possibility of thinking itself as free thinking emerges. According to its essential definition, "free thinking" appears as a mere tautology, since there is no freedom without thinking and no thinking without freedom, because, as Hegel says: "Real free will is the unity of the theoretical and practical spirit. . .

The will only has this general determination as its object and purpose, in that it thinks, knows this its concept, is will as free intelligence.« (Encyclopedia, § 481) Man differs in his practical behavior from animals precisely in that he thinks, i.e. with the help of thinking, because: "The animal acts on instinct, is driven by an inner being, and is therefore also practical, but it has no will because it does not imagine what it desires." (Rphil, § 4)

In desire (in desire, striving, in greed) that first general origin of the practical is to be found, and indeed inherent in the being as such, that is to say precisely in the living being. This realization is full of far-reaching consequences, rich in the deepest implications; and that brings us to the question we asked ourselves. From here, in a whole sequence and a whole network, the deepest, inwardly meaningfully founded determinations are attached, which set the horizon of the

"Breaking through" and essential overcoming, that is, the abolition of the old metaphysics at its very basis. Desire is grasped as the living itself, as a drive, tension, exertion, "impetus" or "impulse" of beings to

maintain themselves in that which is, with the help of the other; the being has need or needs that other outside of itself as its own essence, and its being is also in the other of its 245

selbst als endliches, damit es überhaupt ist. Jedoch die Begierde, das vorrangig Lebendige in seiner Äußerung, ist hier nicht mehr im Sinne jener (aristotelisch-metaphysischer) »organischer Entwicklung« als *Evolution und Involution* gefaßt, wo das Seiende teleologisch (mit Hilfe oder aus seinem inneren Zweck) nur in das, was es in seiner abstrakt vorausgesetzten »Vollheit« schon im Vorhinein oder »am Anfang« (seinem Wesen und Sein nach) ist, sich »entwickeln« kann, und es ist nicht und kann auch nie *anders* sein, sondern dieses Geschehen ist wesentlich *Re-evolution*. Das Seiende »beginnt« nicht mit seiner organisch-teleologischen Vollheit, sondern — mit dem *Mangel*. Die Begierde oder das Lebendige des Seienden ist in seinem Kern wesentlich Mangel, weil sein Inneres oder Subjektives *als Zweck der Mangel selbst ist*. Gerade als solches ist das Seiende in seiner Offenheit (als »Hunger« nach dem Anderen) *wesentlich praktisch*. Das Lebendige erscheint notwendigerweise als das Praktische, weil es das schon seinem Sein und Wesen nach ist, das heißt, daß es sich in seiner Wurzel selbst in der Dimension der praktischen Aneignung der Welt als eigener manifestiert und bestätigt. Aber diese praktische Aneignung der Welt ist nicht nur das *Werden* des Seienden selbst, sondern gleichzeitig auch seiner Welt. Damit ist auch die Welt eine »praktische Bühne« des Werdens und Erscheinens von allem, was ist.

Wenn wir nun alle diese Bestimmungen des Seienden als Seienden verbinden, ergibt sich daraus das, was schon im Begriff der Begierde selbst enthalten ist: die *Begierde*, die wesentlich der *Mangel* selbst ist oder der innere *Zweck* als das *Subjektive*, ist das *Lebendige*, das aus sich heraus in das *Andere* strebt, um mit seiner Hilfe (als ihrem Anderssein) überhaupt als etwas *Objektives* zu sein, womit das Lebendige seinem Wesen nach *praktisch* ist. Wenn wir jedoch im Auge behalten, daß für Hegel das Praktische *geschichtlich* ist, dann kommen wir, dieser Setzung der Sache folgend (die Hegel in diesem Sinne die Sache selbst nennen wird) zu Hegels wichtigstem Satz, der den Horizont seines ganzen Philosophierens eröffnet und der lauten würde: *das Lebendige = das Praktische = das Geschichtliche* (in der Logik kommt dies zum Ausdruck mit der Setzung: Sein — Nichts — Werden). Die Lebendigkeit des Lebendigen ist hier unmittelbar mit der Geschichtlichkeit des Geschichtlichen gleichgesetzt. Diese Unmittelbarkeit ist jedoch der Erkenntnis wegen auch selbst schon das *Ergebnis* der geschichtlichen Bestimmung und des Erblickens des Seins des Seienden, womit das Sein (das — wie aus dem eben Ausgeführten hervorgeht — auch selbst im Mangel des Seienden selbst seinen Ursprung hat) als ein *geschichtliches Erzeugnis* bestimmt ist, was auch bedeutet, daß es vorher in die Sphäre der Subjektivität einbezogen wird. Hier genügt jedoch jenes übliche (und oft äußerst schematische) interpretative Beharren bei Hegels Forderung, die Substanz gleichzeitig als Subjekt darzustellen, nicht, weil es schon das *Ergebnis* des ganzen Denkprozesses ist, das sich erst nachträglich (scheinbar in seiner Fertigkeit und Unmittelbarkeit) als »Anfang« oder Grund erhält und erscheint. Es ist nämlich zu fragen, wodurch diese Forderung *möglich* ist. Aber sie ist nur als

even as finite, so that it is at all. However, desire, the primarily living thing in its expression, is no longer understood here in the sense of that (Aristotelian-metaphysical) "organic development" as evolution and involution, where beings teleologically (with the help of or from their inner purpose) only what it is in its abstractly presupposed "completeness" in advance or "at the beginning" (according to its essence and being) can "develop" itself, and it is not and can never be otherwise, rather this happening is essentially Re~ evolution. Beings do not "begin" with their organic-teleological fullness, but - with the lack. The desire or the living of beings is essentially lack at its core, because its interior or subjective as end is lack itself. Precisely as such, beings are essentially practical in their openness (as "hunger" for the other). The living necessarily appears as the practical because that is what it is by its being and essence, that is, it manifests and confirms itself at its root in the dimension of the practical appropriation of the world as its own. But this practical appropriation of the world is not only the becoming of beings themselves, but also of their world at the same time. Thus the world is also a "practical stage" for the becoming and appearance of everything that is.

If we now combine all these determinations of beings as beings, what follows is what is already contained in the concept of desire itself: desire, which is essentially lack itself or the inner purpose as the subjective, is the living, that strives out of itself into the other, in order to be with its help (as its otherness) as something objective at all, with which the living is practical according to its essence.

However, if we keep in mind that for Hegel the practical is historical, then, following this positing of the thing (which Hegel will call the thing itself in this sense), we come to Hegel's most important proposition, which opens up the horizon of his entire philosophizing and which would read: the living = the practical = the historical (in logic this is expressed with the positing: being - nothing - becoming). The liveliness of the living is here directly equated with the historicity of the historical. For the sake of knowledge, however, this immediacy is itself the result of the historical determination and the perception of the being of beings, with which being (which—as emerges from what has just been explained—also has its origin in the lack of beings themselves) as a historical product is determined, which also means that it is previously included in the sphere of subjectivity. Here, however, that usual (and often extremely schematic) interpretative insistence on Hegel's requirement that the substance be represented as a subject at the same time is not sufficient, because it is already the result of the whole thought process, which only subsequently (apparently in its skill and immediacy) as

»Beginning« or reason and appears. The question that needs to be asked is how this requirement is possible. But she is only as 246

das wesentlich geschichtlich gesetzte Sache selbst möglich, deren erste und wirkliche Wurzel im Begriff der Begierde, des Lebendigen, das praktisch ist, liegt. Damit, daß das Seiende in seiner Endlichkeit wesentlich Mangel ist, *wird* es, was es ist und »hat« nur als solches Geschichte, bzw. *ist* Geschichte (denn es ist ein Geschehen).

Deswegen müssen wir hier bei Hegels Begriff des Mangels verweilen, weil in ihm ein ganzer Reichtum der tiefsten und wesentlichsten Bestimmungen enthalten ist, durch die eine *gedankliche Wendung* sich ereignet, sowohl im Grund der Metaphysik als auch ihrer (fertigen, beendeten, »vollen«, bestehenden) Welt. Diese bedeutende und entscheidende Stelle bei Hegel lautet im ganzen:

»Die Bestimmtheit der Form nach ist der Zweck und die Ausführung des Zweckes: der Zweck ist zunächst nur ein mir Innerliches, *Subjektives*, aber er soll auch *objektiv* werden, den Mangel der bloßen Subjektivität abwerfen. Man kann hier fragen: warum ist er dieser Mangel? *Wenn das, was Mangel hat, nicht zugleich über seinem Mangel steht, so ist der Mangel für dasselbe kein Mangel.* Für uns ist das Tier ein Mangelhaftes, für sich nicht. Der Zweck, insofern er nur erst unser ist, ist für uns ein Mangel, denn Freiheit und Wille sind uns Einheit des Subjektiven und Objektiven. Der Zweck ist also objektiv zu setzen und kommt dadurch nicht in eine neue einseitige Bestimmung, sondern nur zu seiner Realisation.« (Rechtsphilosophie, § 8, Zusatz)

Veruschen wir hier nur einige Momente zu bezeichnen, die einerseits in dieser Stelle enthalten sind und sich andererseits als ihre möglichen weiteren gedanklichen Konsequenzen aufdrängen. Aus diesen Thesen folgt also:

1. vor allem das Verweisen auf die *Möglichkeit des Mangels* als dessen, was im Grund, der Welt selbst liegt als der *schon menschlichen Welt* (die »menschliche Welt« ist eigentlich eine tautologische Bestimmung). Das *Sein* der Welt ist dieser Mangel selbst, der das, was er ist, erst dann ist und *wird*, wenn es sich als diesen Mangel *aufgehoben und überwunden* hat, und wird auch nur dann sichtbar, wenn, das, was einen Mangel, hat, gleichzeitig über oder außerhalb (»jenseits«) seines Mangels steht. Einen Mangel »haben« bedeutet etwas an sich »haben«, das noch »nichts« ist, bedeutet etwas entbehren (von etwas entblößt sein), was jedoch *wesentlich* zum Mangelhaften *gehört*, damit es überhaupt wäre, und dann auch »etwas« wäre, wenn es schon darüber hinaus ist. Das Sein als Mangel ist also durch seine eigene überschrittene »Schranke«, die Nichts ist oder etwas nur Subjektives, möglich, in Anbetracht des innerlichen Zweckes (oder Triebes), der eben als solcher notwendig seine Realisation anstrebt, die das Objektive ist, um überhaupt etwas Reales zu sein. Das Sein als Mangel ist also durch seine Aufgehobenheit möglich, was bedeutet, daß der Mangel nur jenseits von sich selbst in seiner schon (durch das Nichts) aufgehobenen Gestalt möglich ist. Die Welt »fängt« also »an« mit ihrem Mangel, der dieses Nichts in ihm selbst ist. (Das »Herausgehen« aus dem Mangel zeigt sich also als eine Dimension

the essentially historically posited thing itself possible, whose first and

real root lies in the concept of desire, of the living that is practical. With the fact that beings in their finiteness are essentially lacks, they become what they are and "have"

history only as such, or is history (since it is an occurrence).

That is why we have to dwell here on Hegel's concept of lack, because it contains a whole wealth of the deepest and most essential determinations through which a conceptual turn occurs, both in the foundation of metaphysics and in its (finished, ended, " full (existing) world. This significant and decisive passage in Hegel reads as a whole:

The specificity of the form is the purpose and the execution of the purpose: the purpose is initially only something internal to me, subjective, but it should also become objective, throw off the lack of mere subjectivity. One can ask here: why is it this lack? If what has a defect is not at the same time above its defect, then the defect is not a defect for the same. For us the animal is defective, for itself not. The purpose, insofar as it is only ours in the first place, is a defect for us, for freedom and will are for us the unity of the subjective and the objective. The purpose is therefore to be set objectively and does not come into a new one-sided determination, but only to its realization.« (Rechtsphilosophie, § 8, addendum)

Let us try to name only a few moments here, which on the one hand are contained in this passage and on the other hand impose themselves as their possible further intellectual consequences. From these theses follows:

1.

above all, the reference to the possibility of lack as that which lies in the ground, in the world itself as the already human world (the "human world" is actually a tautological definition). The being of the world is this defect itself, which is and becomes what it is only when it has removed and overcome this defect, and only becomes visible when that which has a defect at the same time stands above or outside ("beyond") its lack. "Having" a deficiency means "having" something about itself that has "nothing" yet.

is, means to lack something (to be deprived of something), which, however, essentially belongs to the deficient, so that it would be at all, and then would also be "something" if it is already beyond that.

Being as lack is thus transcended by its own

"Limit" that is nothing or something only subjective, possible in view of the inner purpose (or drive), which as such necessarily strives for its realization, which is the objective in order to be something real at all. Being as lack is thus possible through its sublation, which means that lack is only possible beyond itself in its already (by nothing) sublated form. So the world »catches«

"on" with its lack, which is this nothingness in itself. (The

So "coming out" of lack shows up as a dimension 247

der Revolution.) Da liegt der Ursprung des Seins selbst, das gleichzeitig das Nichts ist (es steht in der Logik: Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist *dasselbe!);*

2. das verstehen des *Zweckes* als dieses innerlichen Mangels, wodurch auch dieses Nichts etwas nur Subjektives ist. Er kann das nicht bleiben, weil er, um zu sein, »befriedigt« werden muß und dadurch unaufahltsam seine Verwirklichung anstrebt. Er *soll* auch etwas *Objektives* werden, womit das *Sollen* aus dem Charakter desSeienden selbst hervorgeht, das wesentlich mangelhaft ist, und nicht erst als ein moralisches Postulat erscheint;

3. die *Realisation des Zweckes,* der novwendig aus diesem Mangel, der das Seiende selbst ist, hervorgeht, aber so, daß die Setzung des Zweckes als etwas *Objektives* nicht mehr eine neue einseitige Bestimmung ist, sondern nur die Realisation selbst von jenem noch bloß Subjektiven und Innerlichen, das erst auch möglich wird als dieses Objektive (als Trieb zum Anderen, das heißt zu seiner eigenen Objektivierung). Der realisierte oder »befriedigte« Zweck zeigt, ob es *überhaupt* einen inneren (subjektiven) Zweck gab und *was* er ist;

4. Die Möglichkeit selbst der *Dimension des Sollens,* das der innerlich angemessenste »Ausdruck« des Seienden aus seinem wesentlichen Mangel ist. Weil das Seiende, um überhaupt zu sein, sein *soll,* weil es nicht nur einfach ist, da es nicht als dieser Mangel in der Gestalt der reinen Innerlichkeit oder Subjektivität bleiben kann, die nur jenes Nichts ist. Oder: Handeln (wie auch Sollen) ist nur unter der Voraussetzung von etwas Negativem (d. h. Mangelhaftem) möglich, das durch das Handeln aufgehoben werden soll. Das Sollen eröffnet den Horizont der eminent menschlichen Welt, in welcher es die Dimension der Möglichkeit des wesentlich Anderen ist, schon als bloßer Mangel (oder: Sein) da ist, oder einfach das Negative. Hegel bestimmt dieses »es soll« sogar als den *Begriff des Menschen* (Religionsphilosophie);

5. die *Bestimmung des Praktischen* im Verhältnis zum Theoretischen. Die Begierde ist der ursprüngliche und urtümliche Ausdruck des Mangels des Seienden, in ihr »übersetzt« sich dieser Mangel als innerer oder subjektiver Zweck, als Bedürfnis oder Trieb, *durch das Sollen* in das, wonach er strebt, das heißt in das Objektive und kommt dadurch zu seiner Realisation. Damit ist die Begierde jene ureigene und wahrhaftige praktische Haltung, in der und durch die sich die sogenannten sinnlichen Dinge, oder die bloße Gegebenheit schon im Grund in ihrer *Nichtigkeit* zeigen: »Das Selbstbewußtsein (ist) hiermit seiner selbst nur gewiß durch das Aufheben dieses Anderen, das sich ihm als selbständiges Leben darstellt; es ist *Begierde.* Der Nichtigkeit dieses Anderen gewiß, setzt es *für sich* dieselbe als seine Wahrheit, vernichtet den selbständigen Gegenstand und gibt sich dadurch die Gewißheit seiner selbst als *wahre* Gewißheit, als solche, welche ihm selbst aus *gegenständliche Weise* geworden ist.

In dieser Befriedigung aber macht es die Erfahrung von der Selbständigkeit seines Gegenstandes. Die Begierde und die in ihrer

the revolution.) There lies the origin of being itself, which is at the same time nothing (it says in logic: pure being and pure nothingness are the same!);

2. the understanding of the purpose as this inner lack, whereby this nothing is also something only subjective. It cannot stay that way because, in order to be, it must be "satisfied" and thereby inexorably strive for its realization. It should also become something objective, with which the ought emerges from the character of the being itself, which is essentially defective and does not first appear as a moral postulate; 3. The realization of the purpose, which necessarily arises from this deficiency, which is the being itself, but in such a way that the positing of the purpose as something objective is no longer a new, one-sided determination, but only the realization itself of what is still merely subjective and inner, which only becomes possible as this objective (as a drive towards the other, i.e. towards its own objectification). The realized or "satisfied" purpose shows whether there was any inner (subjective) purpose at all and what it is;

4. The possibility of even the dimension of the ought, which is the most appropriate "expression" of beings from their essential lack. Because what is, in order to be at all, should be, because it is not only simple, since it cannot remain as this lack in the form of pure inwardness or subjectivity, which is only that nothing. Or: action (as well as ought) is only possible under the presupposition of something negative (i.e.

defective) possible, which should be canceled by action. The ought opens the horizon of the eminently human world, in which it is the dimension of the possibility of the essentially other, already there as a mere lack (or: being), or simply the negative. Hegel even defines this "it should" as the concept of man (philosophy of religion); 5. the determination of the practical in relation to the theoretical. Desire is the original and primordial expression of the lack of beings, in it this lack "translates" itself as an inner or subjective purpose, as a need or drive, through the ought into what it strives for, i.e. into the objective and comes through it to its realization. Desire is therefore that very own and genuine practical attitude in which and through which the so-called sensual things, or the mere fact, show themselves in their insignificance:

“Self-consciousness (is) only certain of itself through the sublation of this other, which presents itself to it as independent life; it is desire. Certain of the nullity of this other, it posits the same as its own truth, annihilates the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as true certainty, as such that it has become objective in its own way.

In this satisfaction, however, it experiences the independence of its

object. Desire and in its 248th

Befriedigung erreichte Gewißheit seiner selbst ist bedingt durch ihn, denn sie ist durch Aufheben dieses Anderen; daß dies Aufheben sei, muß dies Andere sein.« (Phänomenologie, Suhrkamp, S. 143).

Die Begierde als die *unmittelbare* praktische Haltung ist so die *absolute Vermittlung,* und besteht daher nur als die Aufhebung des selbständigen Gegenstandes und ist die Aneignung dessen, was es dem Selbstbewußtsein als das Eigene ist. Im Verhältnis zum Theoretischen als solchem betont Hegel das Praktische, das sich in der Begierde als die absolute Form der Lebendigkeit des Lebens bestätigt, und betont es so sehr, daß er darin auch die Tiere für weiser als die Theoretiker (und Theorie), die ihren Ausgangspunkt in »der Gewißheit der Realität der sinnlichen Gegenstände« finden, hält.

Also: das was *ist,* enthält den *Mangel* in sich nur dadurch, daß er sich *aufhebt,* und dieses Aufheben ist die *Begierde* selbst als primäre *praktische Haltung,* die in der Aneignung (des äußeren, selbständigen, sinnlichen, gegebenen) Gegenstandes durch ihre Tat selbst nicht nur der tehoretischen Frage: *ob, was und wie* ein Gegenstand ist, vorausgeht, sondern ist gleichzeitig durch sich selbst als *Vermittlung* auch die tätige (praktische) Antwort auf diese Frage. Damit ist ausgesagt und gezeigt, daß im Grund der Welt selbst, damit sie *sein* könnte und damit man *wissen* könnte, was sie ist, eine *Re-evolution* als geschichtlich-revolutionärer Vorgang geschieht;

6. die Notwendigkeit des *Aufhebens der Subjektivität* der Moralität, die schon im Begriff des Zwecks selbst liegt, des Zwecks »der zuerst nur etwas mir Innerliches, *Subjektives* ist«. Er ist an sich schon als Mangel der bloßen Subjektivität bestimmt, der zu verwerfen ist, aber so, daß er *objektiv* werden *soll,* was heißt — wie gesagt —, daß auch der Mangel selbst (als Innerlichkeit oder Subjektivität des Zwecks) erst als das, was er schon ist, erscheint, wenn oder nachdem wir schon über ihn selbst hinaus sind, also in der Dimension seines Aufgehobenseins. Da es jedoch das Wesen der Moralität selbst ist, gerade auf dieser Innerlichkeit und Subjektivität zu beharren, sind daher auch *ihre Zwecke* wieder etwas nur Innerliches und Subjektives, als reiner Gegensatz zum äußerlichen Objektiven, womit man auch beim Mangel als eigenem Wesen stehen bleibt (ins Unendliche). Das mangelhafte Seiende hebt sich hier *unmittelbar* auf den Rang des Seins — aber nur des gedachten — in der Form des Postulats. Das Postulat selbst an sich (jenes abstrakte »es soll«), in dieser seiner absoluten Getrenntheit, erscheint als bestimmte Wirklichkeit, ohne jedoch noch zu Wirklichkeit gekommen zu sein, da es aus ihr nur mit einem ihrer Momente abstrahiert ist, und als solches gerade aufgehoben sein soll, um etwas Objektives (objektiver Zweck) zu werden. Die Begierde als die praktische Haltung ist hier noch nicht am Werk, weil sie es noch nicht sein darf, da sie vom Standpunkt der Moralität aus schon als ihm wesentlich *unzugehörig* (»wertlos« oder »unwürdig«) erfaßt wird. Damit ist der Kreis des abstrakten Sichbewegens in-

Satisfaction of certainty of oneself attained is conditioned by him, for it is by sublating this other; that this is lifting, this other must be.«

(Phenomenologie, Suhrkamp p. 143).

Desire as the immediate practical attitude is thus the absolute mediation and therefore exists only as the sublation of the independent object and is the appropriation of what it is to self-consciousness as its own. In relation to the theoretical as such, Hegel emphasizes the practical, which is confirmed in desire as the absolute form of the liveliness of life, and emphasizes it so much that in it he also considers the animals wiser than the theoreticians (and theories) who are theirs Finding a starting point in "the certainty of the reality of sensible objects," halt.

So: what is contains the lack in itself only because

it abolishes itself, and this abolition is desire itself as a primary practical attitude, which in the appropriation (of the external, independent, sensuous, given) object through its act itself not only the theoretical question: whether, what and how an object is, precedes, but is at the same time by itself as mediation also the active (practical) answer to this question. This states and shows that at the bottom of the world itself, so that it could exist and so that one could know what it is, a re-evolution as a historical-revolutionary process takes place;

6.

the need to abolish the subjectivity of morality, which already lies in the very concept of purpose, of purpose

"which is at first only something internal to me, something subjective." It is already defined in itself as a defect of mere subjectivity, which is to be rejected, but in such a way that it should become objective, which means -

As I said — that the lack itself (as the inwardness or subjectivity of the purpose) only appears as what it already is when or after we are already beyond it itself, i.e. in the dimension of its being sublated. However, since it is the essence of morality itself to insist on this inwardness and subjectivity, its purposes are also something only internal and subjective, as a pure contrast to the external objective, with which one also stands with deficiency as one's own essence remains (to infinity). The deficient being rises here directly to the rank of being—but only of what is thought—in the form of the postulate. The postulate itself (that abstract "es soli"), in this its absolute separateness, appears as a specific reality, but has not yet achieved reality, since it is abstracted from it with only one of its moments, and

as such precisely to be suspended in order to become something objective (objective purpose). Desire as the practical attitude is not yet at work here, because it must not yet be, since from the point of view of morality it is already grasped as essentially inappropriate ("worthless" or "unworthy"). Thus the circle of abstract moving is in-

nerhalb der reinen Subjektivität oder Innerlichkeit (und ihres Zwecks) geschlossen, als »Weinen« über den eigenen Mangel, der so das, was er ist, bleibt — das abstrakte Nichts oder der Zweck, der nur sein soll (ohne jeglichen oder mit einem beliebigen Inhalt). Oder, wie Hegel sagen würde: »'In magnis voluisse sat est' hat den richtigen Sinn, daß man etwas Großes wollen solle; aber man muß auch das Große ausführen können: sonst ist es ein nichtiges Wollen. Die Lorbeeren des bloßen Wollens sind trockene Blätter, die niemals gegrünt haben.« (Rechtsphilosophie, § 124, Zusatz)

Aus dem bisher Gesagten geht für Hegel nicht nur hervor, daß das Praktische als der Grund der »menschlichen Welt« selbst geschieht; was wir gezeigt haben, sondern damit ist gleichzeitig die Übermacht der praktischen Idee über dieOhnmacht der theoretischen festgehalten (siehe darüber: *Wissenschaft der Logik* F. Meiner 1963, S. 478).

Mit dieser und einer solchen Setzung der Dinge ist schon jenes für die alte traditionelle (vor allem griechische) Metaphysik »Ungehörige« am Werk, das heißt jenes *Novum*, das als gedankliche Wendung aus dem Geiste der modernen Zeit hervorgeht, die schon sich selbst *geschichtlich geworden* ist. Im Sein selbst der bestehenden Welt (der Metaphysik) ist diese Wendung oder Umwälzung auf die Weise geschehen, daß die Theorie selbst praktisch geworden ist, daß das Praktische als ihre eigene *Möglichkeit* erblickt und gesetzt und daß endlich das Praktische als das Geschichtliche erfaßt wurde. Die praktische Wurzel des Theoretischen liegt hier gerade darin, daß Sein der Theorie in der *Zeit als geschichtlichem Geschehen* verstanden wurde, womit dieses Sein aufgehoben wird, so daß an seine *Stelle* (Topos) ein *U-topos* kommt, in dessen Dimension sowohl dieses geschichtliche Geschehen in der Zeit, wie auch das Erscheinen des Seins selbst erst möglich wird und zwar dadurch, daß das Sein in die Zeit als geschichtlichen Prozeß »ver-stellt« oder »verschoben« (Schub!) wird und sein Erzeugnis hervorging. Das Sein selbst ist dieser geschichtliche Prozeß der Setzung der Welt als ihrer praktisch-theoretischen Aneignung durch den Menschen, für den Menschen und für sich selbst. Damit wird die Welt *konkrete* historische Wirklichkeit. Erst in dieser Welt verwandelt sich Philosophie in Geschichte, Denken in Wille und Theorie in Praxis, oder umgekehrt, gerade damit *wird* die Welt das, was sie ist. Jedoch *werden* kann nur etwas, was noch *nicht geworden* ist. Das, was schon ein Gewordenes (als ein fertiges und vollendetes Etwas) ist, soll und kann nicht erst werden, weil es *ist*, so daß es aus dem Sein (aus diesem »ist«) unmittelbar *kein Werden* gibt. Darum wird die Welt aus ihrem wesentlichen Mangel aus jenem tätigen Nichts, das die Möglichkeit (die Möglichkeit des Seins und der Welt) ist. Sie entsteht also aus ihrem *utopischen Grund*, der das, was noch nicht ist, ist, womit ihre wesentliche Offenheit festgestellt ist.

Das Praktischwerden der Theorie, bzw. das praktische Wesen des Theoretischen enthält, da »sich das Prinzip der Freiheit nicht nur *im* Denken befindet, sondern es auch die *Wurzel* des Dankens

closed within pure subjectivity or inwardness (and its purpose), as "weeping" over one's lack, which thus remains what it is - the abstract nothingness or purpose that is only supposed to be (without any or with any Contents).

Or, as Hegel would say: »'In magnis voluisse sat est' has the correct meaning that one should want something big; but you have to

also be able to carry out the great: otherwise it is a vain willing. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that have never greened.« (Rechtsphilosophie, § 124, addendum)

the practical as the ground of the "human world" itself happens; what we have shown, but at the same time the superiority of the practical idea over the impotence of the theoretical is recorded (see: Science of Logic F. Meiner 1963, p. 478).

With this and such a positing of things, that which is “inappropriate” for the old traditional (above all Greek) metaphysics is already at work, i.e. that novelty which emerges as a conceptual turn from the spirit of the modern age, which already has itself has become historical. In the being itself of the existing world (metaphysics) this turn or revolution happened in such a way that the theory itself became practical, that the practical was seen and posited as its own possibility, and that finally the practical was grasped as the historical. The practical root of the theoretical lies precisely in the fact that being of the theory in time was understood as a historical event, with which this being is abolished so that

in its place (topos) comes a u-topos, in the dimension of which both this historical event in time and the appearance of being itself become possible in the first place, namely because being is "dis-placed" in time as a historical process «

or "postponed" (boost!) and its product emerged.

Being itself is this historical process of positing the world as its practical-theoretical appropriation by man, for man and for himself. The world thus becomes concrete historical reality. It is only in this world that philosophy is transformed into history, thinking into will, and theory into practice, or vice versa, and it is precisely with this that the world becomes what it is. However, only something that has not yet become can become.

What has already become (as a finished and perfected something) should not and cannot become because it is, so that out of being (out of this "is") there is no direct becoming.

Therefore the world, out of its essential lack, becomes that active nothing which is the possibility (the possibility of being and of the world). It therefore arises from its utopian ground, which is that

which is not yet, with which its essential openness is established.

The practical becoming of the theory, or the practical essence of the theoretical, contains that “the principle of freedom is not only found in thinking, but it is also the root of thankfulness 250

ist« womit »von nun an ein ganz neuer Standpunkt entsteht« (Geschichte der Philosophie, III), in sich schon den Satz über die »Realisierung des Dankens« so daß damit die spätere Marxsche Forderung nach der »Veränderung der Welt« (11. These über Feuerbach) philosophisch begründet, ausgeführt und schon ganz vorbereitet ist, die Forderung, die erst möglich ist, wenn es sich zeigt, daß die *Veränderung* im Grund der Welt selbst möglich ist (daß sie schon geschieht). Sonst würde auch diese Forderung nur ein bloßes (moralisches) Postulat im kantischen Sinne bleiben. Dieser »ganz neue Standpunkt«, über den Hegel spricht, ist der Standpunkt der modernen Epoche, der Epoche der (bürgerlichen) Revolution, wo es zu jenem grundlegenden Unterschied zu dem »reinen«, sich — selbst-genügenden Denken der Metaphysik (»theoria«) kommt und ihres noch ganz kontemplativ gedachten »Seins«, so daß sich das Denken der Neuzeit in die *geschichtliche Wirklichkeit,* in der auch das Sein selbst erst möglich wird, verwandelt (als »Produkte, Produzieren« — Hegel!). Die Umwälzung (Revolution) im Sein der (bestehenden) Welt selbst bringt auch die Umwälzung im Denken mit sich, das damit *geschichtliches Denken oder Denken des Geschichtlichen* wird, weil auch der Gegenstand selbst ein geschichtliches Seiendes geworden ist. So stellt sich in dieser Denkanstrengung Hegels zum Verständnis der modernen Welt *das Verhältnis zwischen Begriff und Geschichte* als die Frage der Verhältnisses von *Philosophie und Revolution,* ein Problem, das Hegel nicht nur bis zum Ende seines Lebens beschäftigte, sondern sich auch auf den *Ausgangspunkt* seines Philosophierens selbst, der ihn als solcher auf den Weg der geschichtlichen Aufhebung der Metaphysik führte, auswirkte. Und das bleibt auch die wesentliche Frage unserer Gegenwart.

is" with which "from now on a completely new point of view arises" (History of Philosophy, III), in itself already the sentence about the

"Realization of thanks" so that the later Marxian demand for the

"change of the world" (11th thesis on Feuerbach) is philosophically justified, carried out and already completely prepared, the demand that is only possible when it turns out that the change at the bottom of the world itself is possible (that it is already happening). Otherwise this demand would remain only a mere (moral) postulate in the Kantian sense.

This "entirely new point of view" that Hegel is talking about is the point of view of the modern epoch, the epoch of the (bourgeois) revolution, where there was a fundamental difference to that

"pure," self-sufficient thinking of metaphysics ("theoria") and its "being," which is still conceived entirely contemplatively, so that the thinking of the modern age finds its way into historical reality, in which also being itself first becomes possible , transformed (as "products, producing" — Hegel!). The upheaval (revolution) in the being of the (existing) world itself also brings with it the upheaval in thinking, which thereby becomes historical thinking or thinking of the historical, because the object itself has also become a historical being. Thus, in Hegel's intellectual effort to understand the modern world, the relationship between concept and history is posed as the question of the relationship between philosophy and revolution, a problem that Hegel occupied not only until the end of his life, but also at the starting point of his philosophizing itself, which as such led him along the path of the historical abolition of metaphysics. And that remains the essential question of our present.

DIALEKTIK DER AUFKLÄRUNG ODER AUFGEKLÄRTE DIALEKTIK

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Kants *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung* sagt Aufklärung wäre »der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmüdigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen.«[1]

Das Denken als *Verstand* bleibt jedoch »bei der festen Bestimmtheit und der Unterschiedenheit derselben gegen andere stehen; ein solches beschränktes Abstraktes gilt als für sich bestehend und seiend.« Hegels »Enzyklopädie« bestimmt das dialektische Moment als »das eigene Sichaufheben solcher endlicher Bestimmungen und ihr Übergehen in ihre entgegengesetzten.«[2]

Die *Dialektik der Aufklärung* untersucht so den Weg in dem sich das Befreien vom Naturzwang in immer grössere Abhängigkeit verwandelt, den Weg des Verschwindens des autonomen Subjekts, des Subjekts das sich doch kaum aus der Natur herausgestaltet hatte. Horkheimer und Adorno stellten sich die Aufgabe zu erkennen« warum die Menschheit, anstatt in einen wahrhaft menschlichen Zustand einzutreten in eine neue Art von Barbarei versinkt.«[3] Diese Aufgabe ist anfänglich noch in Fortsetzung der gesammten Kritischen Theorie zu deuten, obwohl schon die »Vorrede« über die Notwendigkeit eines völlig neuen Zugangs spricht. Die Kritische Theorie konstituierte sich, ursprünglich, gegenüber der traditionellen mit dem Vorwurf daß die traditionelle Theorie ihre eigene gesellschaftlichen Voraussetzungen nicht reflektiere und dadurch der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft diene. Den bürgerli-

[1] I. Kant, »Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?«, Kants Werke, Akademie-Ausgabe, Band VIII, S. 35

[2] G. W. F. Hegel, »Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften«, 80, 81, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Band 8, S. 169-70, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt, 1970

[3] M. Horkheimer und Th. W. Adorno, »Dialektik der Aufklärung«, Philosophische Fragmente, Querido Verlag 1947, S. 5 (weiter: D. der A.)

DIALECTICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT OR ENLIGHTENED

DIALECTIC

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Kant's answer to the question: What is enlightenment says enlightenment would be 'man's emergence from his self-inflicted immaturity. Idleness is the inability to use one's understanding without the guidance of another.'

Thinking as understanding, however, “remains stuck with its firm determination and its differentiation from others; such a limited abstract is considered to exist and exist for itself.' Hegel's 'Encyclopedia' defines the dialectical moment as 'the self-abolishing of such finite determinations and their transition into their opposites'

The dialectic of enlightenment thus examines the way in which liberation from the compulsion of nature turns into increasing dependence, the way of the disappearance of the autonomous subject, the subject that had hardly formed itself out of nature. Horkheimer and Adorno set themselves the task of recognizing "why mankind, instead of entering a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism."3 This task can initially still be interpreted as a continuation of the entire critical theory, although it is the "Preface" talks about the need for a completely new approach.

Critical theory was originally constituted in opposition to traditional theory with the reproach that traditional theory did not reflect its own social presuppositions and thereby served bourgeois society. Den buirgerli-1 1. K ant, "Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?", K ants Works, Academy Edition, B and V III, p. 35

2 G. W. F. H egel, "E nzyklopadie der P hilosophischen W issenschaften", 80, 81, works in twenty volumes, volumes 8, pp. 169-70, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt, 1970

3 M. Horkheimer and Th. W. Adorno, »D ialektik der Aufklarung«, P h ilo -

Sophische Fragmente, Querido Verlag 1947, p. 5 (further: D. der A.)

chen Gesellschaftswissenschaften wird vorgeworfen daß sie die menschliche Geschichte sozusagen als ein Naturprozeß betrachten während die kritische Theorie darauf besteht daß zur Entwicklung der Gesellschaft auch bewußtes kritisches Handeln gehört. Die Lage der Welt wird im Sinne der Alternative: Barbarei oder Reich der Freiheit gesehen; die Erkenntnise der politischen Ökonomie werden in einer Weise vorausgesetzt wie sie auch in der folgenden Formulierung ersichtlich ist: »Die Konstruktion des Geschichtsverlaufs enthält zugleich den selbst aus ihm hervorgehenden Protest gegen diese Ordnung und die Idee der Selbstbestimmung des menschlichen Geschlechts, das heißt eines Zustands, in dem seine Taten nicht mehr aus einem Mechanismus, sondern aus seinen Entscheidungen fließen.«[4] Die Kritische Theorie bezieht sich nicht wie die traditionelle- grieschische, auf das unveränderliche Wesen der Dinge jenseits des wandelnden Bereichs menschlicher Taten. Aber, die Kritische Theorie als eine Philosophie der Geschichte hat die Intention das Ganze zu ergreifen[5] trotz des Bewußtseins der eigenen Geschichtlichkeit und trotz des wiederholten Betonens, daß sich die Theorie mit dem Wandeln der Zeit ändert. Die Kritische Theorie ist so ursprünglich als ein Moment der Geschichte gesetzt, die sie jedoch kraft ihrer Erkenntnise auch vorantreibt. Die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen in der Gegenwart ist jedoch nicht die mathematische Naturwissenschaft, die als ewiger Logos erscheint, sondern die vom Interesse an vernünftigen Zuständen durchherrschte kritische Theorie der bestehenden Gesellschaft.«[6] Die Beziehung zur traditionellen Theorie ist im programmatischen Text so ausgedrückt: »Die Selbstanschauung der Vernunft, die für die alte Philosophie die höchste Stufe des Glücks bildete, ist im neueren Denken in den materialistischen Begriff der freien, sich selbst bestimmenden Gesellschaft umgeschlagen;«[7]. Die Kritische Theorie möchte durch das Bekennen zu ihrer Funktion die Unabhängigkeit der Selbstbestimmung erreichen — sie wirft den besonderen Wissenschaften vor, daß ihre Autonomie falsch ist, weil die Wissenschaften, die kausal deuten, schon ihrer logischen Struktur nach technisch verwertbar sind. Die Kritische Theorie dient keinem fremden Interesse[8] weil »die Praxis, auf die sie verweist, nur die Ergänzung der Praxis ist, die mit ihr selbst geschieht.«[9]

Es gilt nun die erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen dieser Thesen aus Horkheimers früheren Schriften zu prüfen, Schriften, in welchen die aufklärerische Position noch nicht in Frage gestellt ist. Es scheint als ob es sich wirklich um eine gewisse Wieder-

[4] M. Horkheimer, »Kritische Theorie«, Band 2, S. 177, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt 1968 (weiter KT 1 und KT 2)
[5] KT 1, S. 9, 29.
[6] KT 2, S. 147
[7] KT 2, S. 196
[8] »Keinem fremden Interesse dienen« und auch die Idee des guten Lebens ist Aristotelsches Erbgut (»Metaphysik« 982b, 1075a, b; das zehnte Buch der Nikomachschen Ethik). Das betont besonders M. Theunissen, »Gesellschaft und Geschichte, zur Kritik der kritischen Theorie«, de Gruyter, Berlin 1969 — dieses Buch ist auch in Zusammenhang mit anderen in diesem Text erörterten Fragen bedeutend.
[9] Theunissen, a. a. 0

Some social sciences are accused of viewing human history as a natural process, so to speak, while critical theory insists that conscious critical action is part of the development of society. The state of the world is seen in terms of the alternative: barbarism or the kingdom of

freedom; the findings of political economy are presupposed in a way that can also be seen in the following formulation: “The construction of the course of history contains at the same time the protest against this order, which itself arises from it, and the idea of the self-determination of the human race, i.e a state in which his actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his decisions.«4 Critical theory, unlike traditional Greek, does not refer to the unchanging nature of things beyond the changing realm of human action. But, critical theory as a philosophy of history intends to grasp the whole,5 despite an awareness of its own historicity and despite repeated emphasis that

the theory changes with the passage of time. Critical theory is originally set as a moment in history, which it also pushes forward with the power of its findings. The self-knowledge of man in the present, however, is not the mathematical science that appears as an eternal logos, but the critical theory of the existing society, which is dominated by interest in reasonable conditions.'6 The relationship to traditional theory is like this in the programmatic text In other words: "Reason's introspection of itself, which formed the highest level of happiness for the old philosophy, has turned into the materialistic concept of a free, self-determining society in modern thinking." Critical theory would like to achieve the independence of self-determination by acknowledging its function - it reproaches the special sciences with the fact that their autonomy is wrong, because the sciences that interpret causally are already technically usable according to their logical structure. Critical theory does not serve anyone else's interest8 because "the practice to which it refers is only the supplement to the practice that happens to itself."9

It is now a question of examining the epistemological presuppositions of these theses from Horkheimer's earlier writings, writings in which the Enlightenment position has not yet been called into question. It seems as if there is really a certain re-4 M. Horkheimer, »Critical Theory«, Volume 2, p. 177, Fischer Verlag, F rankfurt 1968 (further KT 1 and KT 2)

5 KT 1, S. 9, 29.

0 KT 2, S. 147

7 KT 2, S. 196

8 "Do not serve a foreign interest" and also the idea of the good life is Aristotelian heritage (»Metaphysics« 982b, 1075a, b; the tenth book of

Nikomach's ethics). This is particularly emphasized by M. Theunissen,

»Society and History, on the Criticism of Critical Theory«, de Gruyter, B erlin 1969 - this book is also important in connection with other questions discussed in this text.

9 Theunissen, a. a. 0

holung kantischer Elemente handeln würde.[10] Die Bestimmungen des Bewußtseins als solchen werden auf das menschliche Geschlecht übertragen. »Die Tatsachen, welche die Sinne uns zuführen, sind in doppelter Weise gesellschaftlich präformiert: durch den geschichtlichen Charakter des wahrgenommenen Gegenstands und den geschichtlichen Charakter des wahrnehmenden Organs. Beide sind nicht nur natürlich, sondern durch menschliche Aktivität geformt; das Individuum jedoch erfährt sich selbst bei der Wahrnehmung als aufnehmend und passiv. Der Gegensatz von Passivität und Aktivität, der in der Erkenntnistheorie als Dualismus von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand auftritt, gilt für die Gesellschaft nicht im gleichem Maß wie für das Individuum. Wo sich dieses als passiv und abhängig erfährt, ist jene, die sich doch aus Individuen zusammensetzt, ein wenn auch bewußtloses und insofern uneigentliches, jedoch tätiges Subjekt.«[11] Was nehmen wir eigentlich wahr? Horkheimer meint daß auf höheren Stufen der Zivilistation die bewußte menschliche Praxis nicht nur die subjektive Seite der Wahrnehmung unbewußt bestimmt, sondern vielmehr auch den Gegenstand selbst; dort wo es natürliche Gegenstände gibt, werden auch sie im Kontrast zur gesellschaftlichen Welt wahrgenommen, und sind so abhängig von ihr. Weil die Tatsachen. die die Theorie begreifen möchte, gesellschaftlich produziert sind, können wir in ihnen, obwohl im begrenzten Sinne, Vernunft finden. Die Eingliederung in die Systeme des Verstandes geht ohne Schwierigkeiten vor, weil die Welt der Erscheinungen, über die befunden werden muß, fast ausnahmslos aus einer Tätigkeit hervorgeht, die von den gleichen Gedanken bestimmt wird mit Hilfe welcher das Individuum sie erkennt. »In Kants Philosophie ist dieser Sachwerhalt in idealistischer Form ausgedrückt.«[12] Die Menschengattung, die so die Bestimmungen des transzendentalen Subjekts übernimmt, besteht zwar noch nicht als reale Einheit, aber für die Zukunft wird sogar einer Art von Beseitigung des Zufalls vorgesehen: »Aus der rätselhaften Übereinstimmung zwischen Denken und Sein, Verstand und Sinnlichkeit, menschlichen Bedürfnissen und ihrer Befriedigung in der heute chaotischen Wirtschaft, einer Übereinstimmung, die in der bürgerlichen Epoche als Zufall erscheint, soll in der zukünftigen das Verhältnis vernünftiger Absicht und Verwirklichung werden.«[13] Alles Natürliche, das sich solcher Beherrschung widersetzt, soll möglichst eingegrenzt werden. Über das Problem der Voraussage in Sozialwissenschaften sagt Horkheimer z. B., daß die Voraussage von ihrem Gegenstand ‚von den strukturellen Veränderungen der Gesellschaft abhängt und widersetzt sich der Ansicht daß die Voraussage auf dem Gebiete der außermenschlichen Natur notwendig leichter sei, weil ja auch die natürlichen Gegenstände immer mehr der menschlichen Freiheit unterworfen werden, der Freiheit die mit der Beherrschung der Natur in und um uns in vernünftiger Entscheidung identisch ist.

[10] KT 2, 148—153
[11] KT 2, S. 149
[12] KT 2, S. 151
[13] KT 2, S. 166

retrieval of Kantian elements.10 The determinations of consciousness as such are transferred to the human race. “The facts which the senses convey to us are socially preformed in two ways: by the historical character of the object perceived and by the historical character of the

perceiving organ. Both are not only natural but formed by human activity; the individual, however, experiences himself as receptive and passive in perception. The contrast between passivity and activity, which appears in epistemology as the dualism of sensuality and understanding, does not apply to society to the same extent as it does to the individual. Where this experiences itself as passive and dependent is that which is made up of individuals, an albeit unconscious and therefore inauthentic, but active subject."11 What do we actually perceive?

Horkheimer thinks that at higher levels of civilization, conscious human practice not only unconsciously determines the subjective side of perception, but rather also the object itself; where there are natural objects, they too are perceived in contrast to the social world, and are thus dependent on it. Because the facts. that the theory seeks to comprehend are socially produced, we can find reason in them, albeit in a limited sense. The incorporation into the systems of the mind proceeds without difficulty because the world of phenomena to be judged almost invariably emerges from an activity governed by the same thoughts by which the individual cognizes it. "In Kant's philosophy, this material value is expressed in an idealistic form."12 The human species, which thus adopts the definitions of the transcendental subject, does not yet exist as a real unit, but a kind of elimination of chance is even planned for the future: " From the enigmatic correspondence between thinking and being, understanding and sensuality. human needs and their satisfaction in today's chaotic economy, a coincidence that in the bourgeois epoch appears as accidental, in the future the relationship of reasonable intention and realization should become become. On the problem of prediction in the social sciences Horkheimer says e.g. B. that the prediction depends on its object, on the structural changes in society, and opposes the view that the prediction in the field of extra-human nature is necessarily easier, because the natural objects are becoming more and more common to be subjected to human liberty, the liberty which is identical with the dominion of nature in and around us in rational choice.

10 KT 2, 148— 153

11 KT 2, S. 149

12 KT 2, S. 151

13 K T 2, S. 166

Einige Jahre später problematisiert Horkheimer — zusammen mit Adorno — diese Naturbeherrschung die bis daher einen der Gründe des aufklärerischen Vertrauens in die Selbstbestimmung bildete. Jetzt wird die Dialektik der Naturbeherrschung untersucht, in der die Herrschaft des Menschen über die Natur zur Herrschaft der Natur über die Menschen führt. Die Kritische Theorie gibt ihren früheren Maßstab auf, den der Rationalität, so das rationales Handeln nicht mehr ein Vorbild ist — die Kritik geht in eine Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft über. Man versucht die Gesellschaft der hochentwickelten Vernunft mit einem unvermittelten Rückgang auf die Geschichte der Gattung zu begreifen. »Die Geschichte der Anstrengungen des Mencshen, die Natur zu unterjochen, ist auch die Geschichte der Unterjochung des Menschen durch den Menschen.«[14] Damit ist also die Verbindung mit der Aufklärung unterbrochen. In einer etwas späterer Formulierung wird die ganze neuentstandene Problematik so erfaßt: »Daß Vernunft ein anderes als Natur und doch ein Moment von dieser sei, ist ihre zu ihrer immanenten Bestimmung gewordene Vorgeschichte. Naturhaft ist sie als die zu Zwecken der Selbsterhaltung abgezweigte psychische Kraft; einmal aber abgespalten und der Natur kontrastiert, wird sie auch zu deren Anderem. Dieser ephemer entragend, ist Vernunft mit Natur identisch und nichtidentisch, dialektisch ihrem eigenen Begriff nach. Je hemmungsloser jedoch die Vernunft in jener Dialektik sich zum absoluten Gegensatz der Natur macht und an diese in sich selbst vergißt, desto mehr regrediert sie, verwilderte Selbsterhaltung, auf Natur; einzig als deren Reflexion wäre sie Übernatur.«[15]

Das Problematisch-werden der Natur in der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« geschieht jedoch nicht auf die Art jener anderen marxistischen Disskusion über die Dialektik der Natur und die Dialektik in der Natur. Lukács beharrte damals auf der These, daß es Dialektik nur auf Grund der dialektischen Beziehung des Subjekts und des Objekts im geschichtlichen Prozeß geben könne, so daß die dialektische Methode sich auf die historisch-soziale Wirklichkeit beschränken sollte (Lukács meinte daß »doch die entscheidenden Bestimmungen der Dialektik: Wechselwirkung von Subjekt und Objekt, Einheit von Theorie und Praxis, geschichtliche Veränderung des Substrats der Kategorien als Grundlage ihrer Veränderung im Denken etc. in der Naturerkenntnis nicht vorhanden sind.«[16] Horkheimers und Adornos Umwandlung des Begriffs der Natur setzt die Dialektik der Natur freilich nicht als die Grundlage eines geschlossenen Systems, ihre »Dialektisierung« der Natur geht weiter zurück. In der Verdrängung der Natur erblicken sie die Wurzel der aufklärerischen Ambivalenz. Die Freiheit in der Gesellschaft ist für sie freilich auch auf dieser Stufe ohne aufklärerisches Tun und Denken nicht undenkbar. Aber. Horkheimer und Adorno erkannten »daß der Begriff eben dieses Denken, nicht

[14] M. Horkheimer, »Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft«, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt 1967, S. 104.
[15] Th. W. Adorno, »Negative Dialektik«, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 1966.
[16] G. Lukacs, »Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein«, de Munter, Amsterdam (Raubdruck nach der Erstausgabe), S. 17.

A few years later, Horkheimer — together with Adorno — problematized this domination of nature, which until then had been

one of the reasons for the Enlightenment's trust in self-determination. Now the dialectic of the domination of nature is examined, in which the domination of man over nature leads to the domination of nature over man. Critical theory gives up its earlier standard, that of rationality, when rational action is no longer a model - the critique turns into a critique of instrumental reason. One tries to understand the society of highly developed reason with a direct return to the history of the species.

"The story of man's efforts to subjugate nature is also the story of man's subjugation by man."14 So the connection with the Enlightenment is broken. In a somewhat later formulation, the entire problem that has arisen is grasped in this way: »That

Reason is something other than nature and yet a moment of nature, is its prehistory, which has become its im manent determination. It is natural as the psychic power diverted for the purpose of self-preservation; but once split off and contrasted with nature, it also becomes its other. Bearing this ephemeral, reason is identical and non-identical with nature, dialectically according to its own concept. However, the more unrestrained reason in that dialectic makes itself the absolute opposite of nature and forgets about nature in itself, the more it regresses, overgrown self-preservation, to nature; it would only be supernatural as its reflection.«15

However, the problem of nature becoming atic in The Dialectics of Enlightenment does not happen in the manner of that other Marxist discussion on the dialectics of nature and the dialectics in nature. At that time Lukacs insisted on the thesis that

there could only be dialectics on the basis of the dialectic relationship of subject and object in the historical process, so that the dialectic method should be limited to historical-social reality (Lukacs meant that “the decisive determinations of dialectics: interaction of subject and object, unity of theory and practice, historical change in the substratum of the categories as the basis for their change in thought etc. are not present in the knowledge of nature.«10 Horkheimer's and Adorno's transformation of the concept of nature does not, of course, posit the dialectic of nature as the basis of a closed system, their "dialectization" of nature goes further back. In the repression of nature they see the root of the enlightened ambivalence. For them, freedom in society is of course also at this level without enlightened action and Thinking is not unthinkable. But Horkheimer and Adorno recognized "that the concept is precisely this thinking, not

15 Th. W. Adorno, »Negative Dialektik«, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 1966.

18 G. Lukacs, »History and Class Consciousness«, de Munter, A m sterdam (pirated after the first edition), p. 17.

weniger als die konkreten historischen Formen, die Institutionen der Gesellschaft, in die es verflochten ist, schon den Keim zu jenem Rückschritt enthalten, der heute überall sich ereignet.«[17]

Das, was »heute« geschieht, ist, daß sich die aufgeklärten Massen dem Despotismus ohne Widerstand unterwarfen und die neu entwickelten Mythologien annahmen. All dieses sollte man Horkheimer und Adorno zufolge nur, d. h. neu, anhand der Beziehung zwischen Aufklärung und Mythologie erfassen können, wobei der Grundgedanke ist daß schon der Mythos Aufklärung sei und Aufklärung in den Mythos zurückfällt; die Aufklärung wollte die Welt entzaubern, sie für die Barbeitung und Berechnung zurichten, den Mythos vertreiben und die Natur in etwas völlig Objektives verwandeln, etwas grenzlos beherrschbares. Aber diese Unterwerfung der unberechenbaren Natur führt zur Liquidation des Subjekts.[18] Der Mensch muß sich der Natur anpassen um sie beherrschen zu können. Für die Aufklärung ist der Ursprung des Mythos immer Anthropomorphismus, Projektion von Subjektiven auf die Natur. Im Fortgang der Ausführung stellen Horkheimer and Adorno fest, daß die Mythen die der Aufklärung zu Opfer fallen schon immer ihr eigenster Produkt sind. Die Mythen wollten ursprünglich mitteilen, benennen, darstellen, den Ursprung bezeichnen, sie wurden aber dann aus einem Bericht zur Lehre; die Riten enthalten schon ein theoretisches Element, die Vorstellung von einem Prozeß, den man beeinflussen möchte. In dem Entwickeln des Begriffs der Aufklärung wird weiter der Prozeß untersucht, durch welchen die Macht als das Prinzip aller Beziehungen anerkannt wurde — das war der Preis für das Erwachen des Subjekts. Die Aufklärung kennt die Dinge, sowiet sie sie manipulieren kann. Der Wissenschaftler kennt sie, wenn sie nicht mehr an sich, sondern für ihn da sind. Das Wesen der Dinge enthüllt sich in dieser Analyse als etwas immer gleiches, als das Substrat der Herrschaft, und in dieser Identität soll sich die Einheit der Natur entwickeln. In der Magie gibt es keinen solchen identischen Geist, die Schamanen rufen den Wind und die Schlange an, nicht Stoffe oder Exemplare. Der Mensch erreicht die Identität mit sich selbst erst wenn er sich nicht mehr in der Identifikation mit anderen verliert. Eine ganze Reihe von Qualitäten wird der Identität des Geistes und ihrem Korelat, der Einheit der Natur, geopfert. Im Denken werden die Qualitäten aufgelöst, der Mensch zur realen Konformität gezwungen, das Inkommensurabile wird einfach weggeschnitten. »Jeder Versuch den Naturzwang zu brechen, indem Natur gebrochen wird, gerät nur um so tiefer in den Naturzwang hinein. So ist die Bahn der europäischen Zivilisatin verlaufen. Die Abstraktion, das Werkzeug der Aufklärung, verhält sich zu ihren Objekten wie das Schicksal, dessen Begriff sie ausmerzt: als Liquidation.«[19]

Die Distanz zu den Dingen, die der Herr durch den Beherrschten gewinnt, begründet die Distanz des Subjekts und des Objekts, die die Voraussetzung jeder Abstraktion ist, und die

[17] D. der A., S. 7
[18] M. Horkheimer, »Zur Kritik . . .«, S. 94.
[19] D. der A., S. 24.

less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions of society in which it is embedded already contain the germ of that regression that is happening everywhere today

What is happening "today" is that the enlightened masses submitted unopposed to despotism and embraced the newly developed mythologies. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, all this should only be done, i. H. new, based on the relationship between enlightenment and mythology, the basic idea being that myth is enlightenment and enlightenment falls back into myth; the Enlightenment wanted to disenchant the world, prepare it for elaboration and calculation, banish myth and transform nature into something totally objective, something infinitely controllable. But this submission to unpredictable nature leads to the liquidation of the subject.10

Man must adapt to nature in order to be able to dominate it. For the Enlightenment, the origin of myth is always anthropomorphism, projection of the subjective onto nature.

As the discussion progresses, Horkheimer and Adorno state that the myths that fall victim to the Enlightenment have always been their own product. The myths originally wanted to communicate, name, represent, indicate the origin, but then they turned from a report into a teaching; the rites already contain a theoretical element, the idea of a process that one might want to influence. In developing the notion of Enlightenment, the process by which power was recognized as the principle of all relationships is further examined—that was the price of the subject's awakening. Enlightenment knows things as well as it can manipulate them. The scientist knows them when they are no longer there in themselves but for him. The essence of things reveals itself in this analysis as something always the same, as the substratum of domination, and the unity of nature should develop in this identity. In magic there is no such identical spirit, the shamans invoke the wind and the serpent, not matter or specimens. Man only achieves identity with himself when he no longer loses himself in identification with others. A whole series of qualities are sacrificed to the identity of spirit and its corelate, the unity of nature. Qualities are dissolved in thinking, man is forced into real conformity, the incommon ensurable is simply cut away. »Every attempt to break the compulsion of nature by breaking nature only gets deeper into the compulsion of nature. Such was the course of the European civilisatin. Abstraction, the tool of enlightenment, relates to its objects like fate, whose concept it eradicates: as liquidation.«10

The distance from things which the lord gains through the ruled establishes the distance between subject and object, which is the presupposition of all abstraction, and the 17 D. der A., p. 7

19 M. Horkheimer, »On Criticism . . .«, p. 94.

19 D. der A., p. 24.

diskursive Logik ist — als Herrschaft in der Sphäre des Begriffs — auf der Herrschaft in der Wirklichkeit begründet, die Wahrheit ist mit dem disponierendem Denken gleichgesetzt. Der Mensch denkt, er würde sich von der Angst befreien, wenn es nichts unbekanntes mehr geben wird; diese Überzeugung bestimmt den Weg der Aufklärung, die das Lebendige mit Totem gleichsetzt, wie früher der Mythos Totes mit Lebendigem. Nach Horkheimers und Adornos Meinung ist der Positivismus das neueste Produkt des Mythos, weil er sozusagen einen universellen Tabu aufstellt.

Auch der Begriff wird in diesen Zusammenhang gesetzt. Er wird gedeutet als das Produkt des dialektischen Denkens, »worin jedes stets nur ist, was es ist, indem es zu dem wird, was es nicht ist.«[20] Wenn der Baum nicht nur ein Baum ist, sondern der Sitz von Dämonen und Gottheiten, wird in der Sprache der Widerspruch ausgedrückt, daß etwas zugleich es selbst und ein Anderes ist. Die Sprache verwandelt sich aus der Tautologie in Sprache. Die Sprache als Zeichen muß sich mit der Kalkulation begnügen, um die Natur zu erkennen, den Anspruch aufgeben, ihr ähnlich zu sein. Als Abbild kann sie keinen Anspruch auf Erkenntnis erheben. Die Trennung von Zeichen und Bild führt, obwohl sie unabwendbar ist, zu der Zerstörung der Wahrheit, wenn man die beiden isolierten Prinzipien selbstzufrieden hypostasiert. »Den Abgrund, der bei der Trennung sich auftat, hat Philosophie im Verhältnis von Anschauung und Begriff erblickt und stets wieder vergebens zu schließen versucht: ja durch diesen Versuch wird sie definiert.«[21]

Es wird auch wieder auf Kant hingewiesen, aber in einer anderen Einstellung. Es wird gesagt, daß der Kreis auf welchen die »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« das Denken beschränkte, der Kreis der Naturbeherrschung sei, daß Kant aber die Überzeugung von dem unermüdlichen Fortschritt ins Unendliche mit dem Bewußtsein seiner Beschränktheit vereinigt. »Auf das Neue zielt nach Kant das philosophische Urteil ab, und doch erkennt es nichts Neues, da es stets bloß wiederholt, was Vernunft schon immer in den Gegenstand gelegt ... die Weltherrschaft über die Natur wendet sich gegen das denkende Subjekt selbst, nichts wird von ihm übriggelassen, als eben jenes ewig gleiche Ich denke, das alle meine Vorstellungen muß begleiten können ... Subjekt und Objekt werden beide nichtig ... die Gleichung von Geist und Welt geht am Ende auf, aber nur so, daß ihre beide Seiten gegen einander gekürzt werden.«[22] Je mehr dieses Denken sich das Seiende unterwirft, desto mehr beschränkt es sich, Horkheimer und Adorno zufolge, auf bloße Reproduktion dieses Seienden. Dort wo nur Tatsachen gelten, wo sich Erkenntnis auf das Wiederholen von Tatsächlichen beschränkt, fällt die Aufklärung zurück in Mythologie. »Das Wesen der Aufklärung ist die Alternative, deren Unausweichlichkeit die der Herrschaft ist. Die Menschen hatten immer zu wählen zwischen ihrer Unterwerfung unter Natur oder

[20] D. der A., S. 27.
[21] D. der A., S. 30.
[22] D. der A., S. 39.

discursive logic is—as dominance in the sphere of the concept

— based on dominance in reality, truth is equated with disposing thought. Man thinks he will free himself from fear when there will be

no more unknown; This conviction determines the path of enlightenment, which equates the living with the dead, like the myth of the dead with the living. In Horkheimer's and Adorno's view, positivism is the latest product of myth because it establishes, so to speak, a universal taboo.

The term is also used in this context. It is interpreted as the product of dialectical thinking, "in which everything is always just what it is by becoming what it is not."20 When the tree is not just a tree, but the seat of demons and deities, the language expresses the contradiction that something is itself and another at the same time. Language changes from tautology into language. Language as a sign must content itself with calculation in order to recognize nature and give up the claim to be similar to it. As an image, it cannot lay claim to knowledge.

The separation of sign and image, though inevitable, leads to the destruction of truth when the two isolated principles are nypostasised in a self-satisfied manner. "Philosophy has seen the abyss that opened up with the separation in the relationship between intuition and concept and has repeatedly tried in vain to close it: yes, it is defined by this attempt."21

Kant is also referred to again, but in a different shot. It is said that the circle to which the "Critique of Pure Reason" restricted thinking is the circle of the domination of nature, but that Kant united the conviction of tireless progress into infinity with the consciousness of his limitations. “According to Kant, philosophical judgment aims at the new, and yet it recognizes nothing new, since it always merely repeats what reason has always placed in the object. . . world domination over nature turns against the thinking subject himself, nothing is left of him but that eternally same I think, which must be able to accompany all my ideas. . . Subject and object both become void. . . the equation of spirit and world finally works out, but only in such a way that both sides are reduced in relation to each other.«22 The more this thinking submits to beings, the more, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, it limits itself to mere reproduction this being. Where only facts count, where knowledge is limited to repeating facts, enlightenment reverts to mythology. »The essence of enlightenment is the alternative whose inevitability is that of domination. People have always had to choose between their submission to nature or their 20 D. der A., p.

21 D. der A., p. 30.

22 D. der A., p. 39.

der Natur unter das Selbst.«[23] Mit der Unterordnung des ganzen Lebens den Erfordernissen seiner Erhaltung garantiert die herschende Minderheit, zusammen mit ihrer eigenen Sicherheit, auch das Bestehen des Ganzen, aber die Ausgeschlossenheit dieser Minderheit von der Arbeit bedeutet zugleich ihre Verstümmelung, »der Knecht bleibt unterjocht an Leib und Seele, der Herr regrediert.«[24]

Das Beherrschen der Natur verlangte das Gestalten des Individuums mit fester Ich-Identität, die verhindern soll der Versuchung zu erliegen, sich wieder zu verlieren, die Grenzen den Anderen gegenüber zu verwischen und sich der Destruktion und dem Tode zu überlassen; das Gattungsgesetz widersetzt sich also dem, was heute wieder mit den Menschen geschieht: daß sie wieder bloße Gattungswesen werden, eingegliedert in der Isoliertheit der zwanghaft gesteuerten Kollektivität. Aber die Herrschaft mußte sich in ihrer Verwandlung in Gesetz und Organisation auch beschränken, weil die Instrumente der Herrschaft, mit welchen allen regiert werden soll, solche sein müssen, die allen verständlich sind. Das Moment der Rationalität kann insofern auch verschieden sein vom Moment der Herrschaft. Aber das Denken vermag trotzdem nicht den Schein der Vernünftigkeit der Gesellschaft zu brechen — es ist ein Organ der Herrschaft und muß als solches zwischen Befehlen und Unterwerfen wählen. Es kann sich seiner Vorgeschichte nicht befreien; aber es kann in der Logik seiner Emanzipation von der Natur das in sich erkennen, was natürlich, unversöhnt und sich selbst entfremdet ist. In dem Zwangsmechanismus des Denkens wird die Natur fortgesetzt und reflektiert, das Denken muß wegen der eigenen unaufhaltbaren Konsequenz auch sich selbst als Natur reflektieren, als Natur die sich selbst vergessen hat.[25] Der Begriff bekommt eine weitere Definition, als »ideales Werkzeug«. Ein ideales Werkzeug, das immer von Neuem das Chaotische vom Bekannten trennt. Das Denken kann diese distanzierende Funktion nicht verleugnen und Horkheimer und Adorno lehnen in diesem Buch jede mystische Vereinigung ab. Sie meinen, daß die Trennung des Subjekts und des Objekts, auf der die Aufklärung beharrt, auch der Wegweiser für die Selbstbesinnung der Aufklärung sein könnte. Würde man die Herrschaft bis ins Denken hinein als unversöhnte Natur erkennen, wäre man, nach Horkheimer und Adorno, auch der Vorstellung von jener Notwendigkeit befreit, »welcher als Zugeständnis an den reaktionären common sense der Sozialismus selbst vorschnell die Ewigkeit bestätigte ... so bliebe das Verhältnis der Notwendigkeit zum Reich der Freiheit bloß quantitativ, mechanisch, und Natur, als ganz fremd gesetzt, wie in der ersten Mythologie, wurde totalitär und absorbierte die Freiheit samt dem Sozialismus.«[26]

Damit haben wir also die Grundthesen dargestellt, in denen das veränderte Verhältnis der Kritischen Theorie zum Begriff der

[23] D. der A., S. 45.
[24] D. der A., S. 49.
[25] D. der A., S. 54.
[26] D. der A., S. 56.

of nature under the self.«23 With the subordination of the whole of life to the requirements of its preservation, the ruling minority,

together with its own security, also guarantees the existence of the whole, but the exclusion of this minority from work means at the same time its own mutilation,

"The servant remains subjugated in body and soul, the master regresses."24

Dominating nature required shaping the individual with a firm ego identity that would prevent succumbing to the temptation to lose oneself again, to blur the boundaries with others, and to abandon oneself to destruction and death; The law of the species thus opposes what is happening to people again today: that they again become mere species beings, integrated into the isolation of the compulsively controlled collectivity. But government also had to limit itself in its transformation into law and organization, because the instruments of government, with which everyone is to be governed, must be those that are understandable to everyone.

In this respect, the moment of rationality can also be different from the moment of domination. But thinking is still unable to break the appearance of the reasonableness of society -

it is an organ of domination and as such must choose between commanding and subordinating. It cannot rid itself of its history; but it can recognize in the logic of its emancipation from nature what is natural, unreconciled, and alienated from itself. Nature is continued and reflected in the coercive mechanism of thinking; because of its own unstoppable consequence, thinking must also reflect on itself as nature, as nature that has forgotten itself.25 The term is given a further definition, as an “ideal tool «. An ideal tool that separates the chaotic from the familiar over and over again. Thinking cannot deny this distancing function, and Horkheimer and Adorno reject any mystical union in this book. They think that the separation of subject and object, which the Enlightenment insists on, could also be the signpost for the self-reflection of the Enlightenment. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, if one were to recognize domination as an unreconciled nature right down to the level of thought, one would also be freed from the idea of the necessity

»which, as a concession to the reactionary common sense, socialism itself prematurely confirmed eternity. . . then the relation of necessity to the realm of freedom would remain mere

quantitative, mechanical, and nature, posited as quite alien, as in the first mythology, became totalitarian and absorbed freedom along with

socialism.«20

We have thus presented the basic theses in which the changed relationship between critical theory and the concept of 23 D. der A , p. 45.

24 D. der A., p. 49.

23 D. der A., p. 54.

29 D. der A., p. 56.

Natur sich ausdrückt. Die Natur wurde sozusagen zur Schlüsselfrage, da es scheint daß die Kritische Theorie als eine Theorie der Geschichte diese Verschiebung im Naturbegriff eigentlich nicht verkraften kann. Eigentümlicherweise handelt es sich um ein Wiederbeleben des Objektivismus der Natur, obwohl hier die Natur eher Züge des Subjekts annimmt. Horkheimer und Adorno fühlen zwar keine Verpflichtung gegenüber der philosophischen Uberlieferung, da sie ja einen neuen Durchbruch in einer neuen Situation versuchen — es ist uns aber trotzdem wichtig zu sehen ob es sich vielleicht doch um ein Wiederholen oder Widerauf-nehmen älterer Motive handelt, das aus dem Problem selbst notwendigerweise entsteht.

II.

»Die Natur liebt es, sich zu verbergen.«[27] Und auch der Begriff spricht darüber das die Natur das sei, woraus alle Dinge entstehen, bestehen und auch zurückfinden. Für Aristoteles gibt es eine zwiefache Natur: die Natur als das, aus dem das Gewachsene geworden ist und das Werden des Wachsenden, die Verwirklichung der Materie durch reine Form.[28] In der jüdisch-christlichen Überlieferung ist die Natur von Gott geschaffen und von ihm abhängig, für die scholastische Metaphysik ist das Problem in der Tatsache enthalten, daß man die Natur nicht mit anderem Seiendem gleichsetzen kann, aber auch nicht über es stellen, weil das doch Gottes Stellung ist. Scotus Eriugena setzt die Natur vierfach: 1. die nicht-geschaffene schaffende Natur (Gott als Urgrund); die schaffende geschaffene Natur (die geistigen Wesenheiten), 3. die nicht schaffende geschaffene Natur (die endlichen Wesen), 4. die nicht schaffende nicht-geschaffene Natur (Gott als Endziel).[29] Bei Averroes wird die Unterscheidung zwischen »natura naturans« und »natura naturata« eingeführt; Thomas von Aquin versteht unter Natur das innere Prinzip einer Erzeugung oder einer Tätigkeit, dann die »essentia« eines Dinges, das Ding selbst und die Totalität der Dinge, besonders der vernunftlosen. Natura absoluta ist die reine Wesenheit des Dinges. Er gebraucht ferner noch andere Bestimmungen, wie natura corporalis, natura creata bzw. increata, natura spiritualis usw.

Wir haben es jedoch unmittelbar mit der neuzeitlichen wissenschaftlich-technischen Bestimmung des Wesens der Natur zu tun. Das Wort sprach ursprünglich von Selbsterzeugen, nun wird dieses Selbsterzeugen jedoch als Herausarbeiten im breitesten Sinne gefaßt. Das, was Natur heißt, stellt sich so dar, daß schon die theoretische Erkenntnis über die Natur in sich selbst technisch ist und so unmittelbar in die Praxis übergehen kann. Kausal definiert wird die Natur ein Gegenstand des Herstellens nach Gesetzen. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur brauchen keine Betrachtungen über die Natur als ein Seiendes und auch die Philosophie

[27] Heraklit (»Die Vorsokratiker«, Kröner, Stuttgart 1968, S. 152)
[28] Aristoteles, »Metaphysik«, 1014b, 1015a.
[29] »Wörterbuch der phil. Begriffe«, Eisler, Berlin 1929.

N ature expresses itself. Nature became the key question, so to speak, since it seems that critical theory as a theory of history cannot actually cope with this shift in the concept of nature. Oddly enough, it is a revival of the objectivism of nature, although here nature takes on

more traits of the subject. Although Horkheimer and Adorno feel no obligation to the philosophical tradition, since they are trying to make a new breakthrough in a new situation, it is nevertheless important for us to see whether it is a question of repeating or taking up older motifs necessarily arises from the problem itself.

II.

»Nature loves to hide itself.«27 And the term also speaks about the fact that nature is that from which all things arise, consist and also find their way back. For Aristotle there is a two-fold nature: nature as that from which what has grown has become and the becoming of what grows, the realization of matter through pure form.28 In the Jewish-Christian tradition, nature is created by God and dependent on him, for scholastic metaphysics the problem is contained in the fact that one cannot equate nature with other beings, but neither can one place them above them, because that is God's position. Scotus Eriugena posits nature fourfold: 1. the non-

-created creative nature (God as primeval ground); the creative created nature (the spiritual beings), 3. the non-creative created nature (the finite beings), 4. the non-creative non-created nature (God as ultimate goal).20 In Averroes the distinction between »natura naturans" and "natura naturata" were introduced; Thomas Aquinas understands by nature the inner principle of a production or an activity, then the

"essentia" of a thing, the thing itself and the totality of things, especially the unreasonable ones. Natura absoluta is the pure essence of the thing. He also uses other definitions, such as natura corporalis, natura creata or increata, natura spiritualis, etc.

However, we are dealing directly with the modern scientific-technical determination of the essence of nature. The word originally spoke of self-generating, but now this self-generating is understood as working out in the broadest sense. What is called nature presents itself in such a way that even the theoretical knowledge of nature is technical in itself and can thus be directly applied in practice. Defined causally, nature becomes an object of production according to laws. The sciences of nature do not need any considerations about nature as a being and neither does philosophy 27 Heraclitus (»Die Vorsokratiker«, Kroner, Stuttgart 1968, p. 152) 28 Aristoteles, »Metaphysik«, 1014b, 1015a.

2n »Dictionary of the phil. Terms«, Eisler, Berlin 1929.

vermöchte solches Denken nicht zu erhalten.[29a] Mit den Naturwissenschaften hat der Mensch das Wirken der Natur selbst in die Hand bekommen; ist dieses Wirken einmal der technischen Beherrschung zu Verfügung, werden ungeahnte Wirkungen erzielt. Man kann aber neben dieser eindeutigen Richtung auch einiges abwegiges finden, sowohl in strengen wie auch in mystischen Varianten. Auch Spinoza läßt sich nicht rationalistisch verkürzen, durch das Übernehmen der Unterscheidung von natura naturans und natura naturata entsteht doch ein System in dem deus sive natura gleichermaßen cogitatio und extensio zugeschrieben werden. J. Böhme, für den die Natur die Emanation eines in Gott seienden Gegensatzes ist, versucht die Vereinigung des Nur-Ausgedehnten und des Nur-Gedanklichen auf eigenen Wegen, aber auch etwa für Leibniz muß das Problem weiterhin aus dem Versuch bestehen, Mechanismus und Teleologie zu vereinigen. Das mechanische Deuten der Natur sollte in Kraft bleiben, aber die Natur sollte gleichzeitig auch göttlichen Zwecken dienen. Diese Metaphysik kehrt immer wieder zur Frage nach der Substanz zurück, eben jener Frage mit der Kant Schluß macht. Für Kant ist die Natur der einheitliche, gesetzmäßige Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen, als der kategorial verarbeiteten Sinnesdata; sie besteht nicht »an sich«, ist aber durch ein »An sich« begründet.[30] Fichte betrachtet die Natur, das »Nicht -Ich«, als ein durch das Ich gesetztes Bewußtseinsobjekt, zwar Mittel und Bedingung des Lebendigen, aber tot, sie wird als Mittel, als Material der sittlichen Pflicht immer wieder aufgehoben.

Auch Schellings Ausgangsproblem ist das Erfassen der Wirklichkeit als der Selbstbestimmung des Geistes, die Natur ist jedoch anders gesetzt, gleichzeitig als Erscheinungsweise und Stufe des absoluten Seins. Im Ich soll Natur, in der Natur ein Ich hervorgebracht werden. Natur und Geist sind die beiden Pole des Absoluten — das Absolute als solches ist »natura naturans absoluta«; sie spaltet sich in die ideale und in die reale Natur. Aber schon bei Schelling hängt die Erhebung der Natur vom Menschen ab, sie ist »ein Abgrund von Vergangenheit«, in ihr aller »nur durch Entwicklung«, sie ist Sehnsucht und Wille und noch vieles mehr, in einem Zusammenhang den man erst langsam wieder erblicken lernt, weil, in der bei uns vorherrschenden Deutung, Schelling als durch Hegel »aufgehoben« galt. Für die »Dialektik der Aufklärung« waren jedoch beide wenigstens gleichbedeutend. Es bleibt uns nur übrig unseren kurzen Andeutungen noch eine über Hegels Bestimmung der Natur hinzuzufügen. Die Philosophie der Natur ist als die Wissenschaft von der Idee in ihrem Anderssein gesetzt: »Die Natur zeigt daher in ihrem Dasein keine Freiheit,

[29a] Die Philosophie hat im Gegenteil bei Descartes, Hobbes, Locke usw. eine mechanistische Deutung der Natur gegeben die im Einklang mit der technischen Beherrschung ist.

[30] Die Frage von der Natur und dem natürlich Schönen wird in der »Kritik der Urteilskraft« auch noch anders gestellt, auf eine Weise, die wir hier nicht betrachten können. (Darauf hat besonders H. Marcuse, »Counterrevolution and Revolt«, Beacon, Press, Boston 1972, hingewiesen, besonders pp. 67—78).

was not able to maintain such thinking.293 With the natural sciences man has taken control of the workings of nature himself; once this

activity is at the disposal of technical mastery, undreamt-of effects are achieved. In addition to this unequivocal direction, however, one can also find some devious things, both in strict and in mystical variants. Even Spinoza cannot be reduced rationalistically, by adopting the distinction between natura naturans and natura n aturata, a system emerges in which deus sive natura are equally ascribed to cogitatio and extensio. J. Bohme, for whom nature is the emanation of an opposite existing in God, tries to unify the

- Extensive and purely intellectual in its own way, but also for Leibniz, for example, the problem must continue to consist of the attempt to unite mechanism and teleology. The mechanical interpretation of nature should remain in force, but nature should also serve divine purposes at the same time. This metaphysics returns again and again to the question of substance, precisely that question with which Kant puts an end. For Kant, nature is the unified, lawful connection of appearances as the categorically processed sensory data; it does not exist 'in itself', but is based on an 'in itself'.30

Fichte regards nature, the "not-I," as a conscious object posited by the ego, a means and condition of the living, but dead; it is repeatedly sublated as a means, as the material of moral duty.

Schelling's initial problem is also grasping reality as the self-determination of the spirit, but nature is posited differently, at the same time as the mode of appearance and level of absolute being. In the ego nature, in nature an ego should be brought forth. Nature and spirit are the two poles of the absolute—the absolute as such is natura naturans absoluta; it splits into ideal and real nature. But even with Schelling, the elevation of nature depends on man, it is "an abyss of the past", in it all "only through development", it is longing and will and much more, in a context that one only slowly learn to see again, because, in the interpretation that prevails among us, Schelling was said to have been "repealed" by Hegel. For the "dialectics of enlightenment," however, both were at least of equal importance. It only remains for us to add one more remark about Hegel's determination of nature to our brief remarks. The philosophy of nature is posited as the science of the idea in its otherness: "Nature therefore shows no freedom in its existence, 2°a P h ilosophy has, on the contrary, in Descartes, Hobbes, L ock etc.

a mech anistic interpretation of nature is given which is in line with technical mastery.

30 The question of nature and the naturally beautiful is discussed in

the

"Critique of Judgment" also posed differently, in a way that we cannot consider here. (This has been particularly pointed out by H. Marcuse, »Counterrevolution and R evolt«. Beacon, Press, Boston 1972, h in , especially pp. 67-78).

sondern *Notwendigkeit* und *Zufälligkeit*. Die Natur ist darum nach ihrer bestimmten Existenz, wodurch sie eben Natur ist, nicht zu vergöttern, noch sind Sonne, Mond, Tiere, Pflanzen usf. vorzugsweise vor menschlichen Taten und Begebenheiten als Werke Gottes zu betrachten und anzuführen. — Die Natur ist *an sich*, in der Idee göttlich, aber wie sie ist, entspricht ihr Sein ihrem Begriffe nicht; sie ist vielmehr der *unaufgelöste Widerspruch*.«[31] Oder, wie es ihm Übergangs — Paragraph lautet: »Die absolute *Freiheit* der Idee aber ist, daß sie nicht bloß ins *Leben* übergeht, noch als endliches Erkennen dasselbe in sich *scheinen* läßt, sondern in der absoluten Wahrheit ihrer selbst sich *entschließt*, das Moment ihrer Besonderheit oder des ersten Bestimmens und Andersseins, die *unmittelbare Idee* als ihren Widerschein, sich als *Natur* frei *aus sich zu entlassen*.«[32]

III.

Die weiteren Ausführungen lassen sich sinngemäß mit einem Gedanken aus Adornos »Negativer Dialektik« einleiten, wo eine Bestimmung seines Verhältnisses gegenüber Kants und Hegels Deutung der Naturgesetze gegeben wird und es zu einer Verschiebung zur Marxscher Fragestellung gibt: »Daß die Annahme von Naturgesetzen nicht à la lettre zu nehmen, am wenigsten im Sinne eines wie immer gearteten Entwurfs vom sogenannten Menschen zu ontologisieren sei, dafür spricht das stärkste Motiv der Marxschen Theorie überhaupt, das der Abschaffbarkeit jener Gesetze. Wo das Reich der Freiheit begönne, gälten sie nicht mehr. Die Kantische Unterscheidung eines Reichs der Freiheit von einem der Notwendigkeit, wird, durch Mobilisierung der Hegelschen vermittelnden Geschichtsphilosophie, auf die Folge der Phasen übertragen.«[33]

Die Frage der Abschaffbarkeit der Naturgesetze bei Marx ist jedoch nicht so eindeutig zu lösen. In einem Brief an L. Kugelmann[34] sagt Marx z. B. ganz eindeutig daß man Naturgesetze überhaupt nicht abschaffen kann, daß nur die Form, in der sich diese Gesetze äußern, in geschichtlich verschiedenen Situationen veränderbar ist. Aber auch Adornos Annahme von der Abschaffbarkeit der Naturgesetze ist zweideutig. In den schon angeführten Stellungnahmen aus Horkheimers früheren Schriften zeichnet sich als stärkstes Motiv eben dieser Wunsch ab, den Schein einer natürlich-zwanghafter Entwicklung der Gesellschaft zu zerstören. Auch in der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« gibt es ähnliche Thesen aber sie scheinen unvereinbar mit der neuen Grundeinstellung. Nun nimmt jedoch Adorno in der »Negativen Dialektik« unter Berufung auf Marx das Problem wieder auf. Es gilt also die Marxsche Fragestellung zu untersuchen.

[31] Hegel, »Enzyklopädie . . .«, 248.
[32] Hegel, a. a. O., 244.
[33] Adorno, »Negative Dialektik«, S. 346.
[34] Marx an L. Kugelmann, am 11. VII. 1868.

but necessity and contingency. Nature is therefore not to be deified according to its specific existence, which makes it nature, nor are the sun, moon, animals, plants, etc. to be regarded and cited as God's works, preferably before human deeds and events. - Nature is divine

in itself, in the idea, but as it is, its being does not correspond to its concept; it is rather the unresolved contradiction.«31

Or, as he put it in the transitional paragraph: "The absolute freedom of the idea, however, is that it does not merely pass into life, nor does it allow the same to shine in itself as finite cognition, but resolves itself in the absolute truth of itself, the moment of its particularity or of the first determination and otherness, the immediate idea as its reflection, to release itself freely as nature.«32

III.

The further explanations can be introduced with a thought from Adorno's "Negative Dialectics", where a determination of his relationship to Kant's and Hegel's interpretation of the laws of nature is given and there is a shift to the Marxian question: "That the assumption of natural laws is not To take it a la lettre, least of all to ontologize it in the sense of any kind of draft of the so-called human being, speaks in favor of the strongest motive of Marx's theory of all, that of the abolitionability of those laws.

Where the realm of freedom began, they were no longer valid. The Kantian distinction between a realm of freedom and a realm of necessity is transferred to the sequence of phases by mobilizing Hegel's mediating philosophy of history.«33

However, the question of whether the laws of nature can be abolished in Marx's case cannot be resolved so clearly. In a letter to L. Kugelmann 34 Marx says e.g. For example, it is quite clear that the laws of nature cannot be abolished at all, that only the form in which these laws are expressed can be changed in historically different situations. But Adorno's assumption that the laws of nature can be abolished is also ambiguous. In the statements from Horkheimer's earlier writings already mentioned, this desire to destroy the appearance of a natural, compulsive development of society emerges as the strongest motive.

There are similar theses in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" too, but they seem incompatible with the new basic attitude.

Now, however, Adorno takes up the problem again in "Negative Dialectics" with reference to Marx. It is therefore necessary to examine Marx's question.

31 H egel, »Encyclopaedia . . . . . .«,

32 Hegel, a. the. O., 244.

33 Adorno, »Negative Dialectics«, S. 346.

34 Marx an L. K ugelm ann, am 11. VII. 1868.

Bekannterweise hat Feuerbach als erster kritisch auf denn aufgeführten 244. Paragraph aus Hegels »Enzyklopädie« hingewiesen indem er seinen Naturalismus abstrakt Hegels Idealismus widersetzte; bei Hegel hebt die aus der Idee entlassene Natur ihre natürliche Bestimmungen eine nach der anderen auf und geht in den Geist über — Feuerbach möchte die Natur wieder als causa sui sehen. Was wird nun also aus dieser Feuerbachschen Natur bei Marx? Bei Feuerbach ist das erkenntnistheoretische Problem, also die Grundfrage der neuzeitlichen Philosophie, auf die sinnliche Anschauung und den empirischen Einzelnen verkürzt, so daß für ihn Hegels Lehre nur einen rationalen Ausdruck der theologischen Lehre von der Welt als Gottes Schöpfung darstellt. Bei Marx sieht die Übertragung der Schöpfung ins Geschaffene so aus: »Indem aber für den sozialistischen Menschen die *ganze sogenannte Weltgeschichte* nichts anders ist als die Erzeugung des Menschen durch menschliche Arbeit, als das Werden der Natur für den Menschen, so hat er also den anschaulichen, unwiederstehlichen Beweis von seiner *Geburt* durch sich selbst, von seinem Entstehungsprozess. Indem die *Wesenhaftigkeit* des Menschen und der Natur, indem der Mensch für den Menschen als Dasein der Natur und die Natur für den Menschen als Dasein des Menschen praktisch, sinnlich anschaubar geworden ist, ist die Frage nach einem *fremden* Wesen, nach einem Wesen über der Natur und dem Menschen — eine Frage, welche das Geständnis von der Unwesentlichkeit der Natur und des Menschen einschließt — praktisch unmöglich geworden... der Sozialismus als Sozialismus... beginnt von dem *theoretisch und praktisch sinnlichen Bewußtsein* des Menschen und der Natur als des Wesens.«[35]

Unmittelbare Stellungnahmen in Bezug auf Hegel finden wir im dritten Manuskript aus dem Jahre 1844, wo man lesen kann, daß »auch die *Natur*, abstrakt genommen, für sich, in der Trenung vom Menschen fixiert«[36] für den Menschen nichts ist. Horkheimers und Adornos Geschichtskonstruktion läßt sich gut an den parallel verlaufenden Ausführungen der »Deutschen Ideologie« über Bewußtsein und Sprache erhellen. Die unauflösbare Verbundenheit von »Geist« und »Materie« soll sich nämlich vorzugsweise durch die Sprache äußern, die Sprache die so alt ist wie das Bewußtsein, die das praktische, auch für andere existierende Bewußtsein ist; Sprache und Bewußtsein entstehen erst aus dem Bedürfnis, »der Notdurft des Verkehrs mit anderen Menschen.« Und weiter: »Hier wie überall tritt die Identität von Natur und Mensch auch so hervor, daß das bornierte Verhalten der Menschen zur Natur ihr borniertes Verhalten zueinander, und ihr borniertes Verhalten zueinander ihr borniertes Verhältnis zur Natur bedingt, eben weil die Natur noch kaum geschichtlich modifiziert ist...«[37] Ein Gegensatz zwischen Natur und Geschichte wird in der »Deutschen Ideo-

[35] K. Marx, »Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte«, Reclam, Leipzig 1970, S. 197/198.
[36] a. a. O., S. 252.
[37] Marx-Engels, »Die deutsche Ideologie«, Frankfurt 1971 (Raubdruck nach MEW, Bd. 3, 1958), S. 28.

As is well known, Feuerbach was the first to critically refer to paragraph 244 of Hegel's "Encyclopedia" by opposing his naturalism abstractly to Hegel's idealism; in Hegel nature released from the idea abolishes its natural determinations one after the other and passes

over into the spirit — Feuerbach would like to see nature again as a causa sui. So what becomes of this Feuerbachian nature in Marx? With Feuerbach, the epistemological problem, i.e. the basic question of modern philosophy, is reduced to the sensory perception and the empirical individual, so that for him Hegel's teaching represents only a rational expression of the theological teaching of the world as God's creation. With Marx, the transfer of creation into the created looks like this: “But since for the socialist man the whole of so-called world history is nothing other than the creation of man through human work, as the becoming of nature for man, he has i.e. the vivid, irresistible proof of its birth through itself, of its process of formation.

Since the essential nature of man and nature, in that man has become practically, sensually visible to man as the existence of nature and nature to man as the existence of man, the question of an alien being, of a Being above nature and man - a question which includes the admission of the inessentiality of nature and man - has become practically impossible...

socialism as socialism. . . begins with the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence.«35

We find direct statements in relation to Hegel in the third manuscript from 1844, where one can read that "even nature, taken abstractly, for itself, fixed in the separation from man"36 is nothing for man. Florkheimer's and Adorno's historical construction can be well elucidated by the parallel explanations of the »Deutsche Ideologic« on consciousness and language. The inseparable connection between "spirit" and "matter" should preferably be expressed through language, the language that is as old as consciousness, that is the practical consciousness that also exists for others; Language and consciousness only arise from the need, "the necessities of intercourse with other people." their narrow-minded attitude towards one another, and their narrow-minded attitude towards one another, necessitates their narrow-minded relationship to nature, precisely because nature has hardly been historically modified .. ."37 A contrast between nature and history is presented in the "Deutsche Ideo-15 K. M arx, “O konom isch-philosophische M anuSkripte”, Reclam, Leipzig 1970, pp. 197/198.

a. a. O., S. 252.

37 M arx-E ngels, »The German Ideology«, Frankfurt 1971 (pirated after MEW, Vol. 3, 1958), p. 28.

logie« abgelehnt« solch ein Gegensatz sei die Folge dessen daß man die Geschichte nach einem außer ihr liegendem Maßstab schreibt, so daß die wirkliche Lebensproduktion außerhalb bleibt und damit das Verhältnis der Menschen zur Natur; »als ob das zwei voneinander getrennte »Dinge« seien, der Mensch nicht immer eine geschichtliche Natur und eine natürliche Geschichte vor sich habe«[38] Aber die Priorität der äußeren Natur wird erhalten, wird da gesagt, »und allerdings hat dies Alles keine Anwendung auf die ursprünglichen, durch generatio aequivoca erzeugten Menschen« aber »diese der menschlichen Geschichte vorhergehende Natur (ist) ja nicht die Natur in der Feuerbach lebt . . .«[39]

Das Ausklammern dieser Natur wird bei Marx also als unumgänglich angesehen. Dieser Begriff der Natur deckt sich mit dem sogenannten wissenschaftlichen Objektivismus, den auch Horkheimer und Adorno ablehnen, obwohl eben zu untersuchen bleibt wieso ihre Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses zur Natur auch solche Züge trägt und nicht nur eine Weiterführung der Gedanken von dem Akzeptieren der Naturbestimmung. Ebenfalls in der »Deutschen Ideologie«, im »Sankt Max«, wird der christliche Wunsch nach der Befreiung von der Naturbestimmung gedeutet. »Bin ich nämlich nicht selbst Natur, gehören meine natürlichen Begierden, meine ganze Natürlichkeit — und dies ist die Lehre des Christentums — nicht zu mir selbst, so erscheint mir jede Bestimmung durch die Natur, sowohl durch meine eigene Natürlichkeit wie durch die sogenannte äußere Natur, als Bestimmung durch etwas Fremdes, als Fessel, als Zwang, der mir angetan wird, als *Heteronomie im Gegensatz zur Autonomie des Geistes*«.[40]

Wichtig werden uns jedoch vorallem die Naturbestimmungen aus dem »Kapital«, die Bestimmungen der sogenannten objektiven Natur, der Natur wie sie im gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsprozeß erscheint, weil die Arbeit als »Bildnerin von Gebrauchswerten«, als »nützliche Arbeit«, »eine von allen Gesellschaftsformen unabhängige Existenzbedingung des Menschen, ewige Naturnotwendigkeit »ist«, um den Stoffwechsel zwischen Mensch und Natur, also das menschliche Leben zu vermitteln.«[41] Auch in der berühmten Stelle aus dem fünften Kapitel wird dieser Zusammenhang zwischen dem Menschen, der Natur und der Arbeit dargestellt, zunächst unabhängig von jeder bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Form: »Die Arbeit ist zunächst ein Prozess zwischen Mensch und Natur, ein Prozess worin der Mensch seinen Stoffwechsel mit der Natur durch seine eigne Tat vermittelt, regelt und kontrolliert. Er tritt dem Naturstoff selbst als eine Naturmacht gegenüber . . . Indem er . . . auf die Natur außer ihm wirkt und sie verändert, verändert er zugleich seine eigene Natur. Er entwickelt die in ihr schlummernden Potenzen und unterwirft das Spiel ihrer Kräfte seiner eigenen Botmäßigkeit.«[42]

[38] Marx-Engels, a. a. O., S. 42.
[39] Marx-Engels, a. a. O., S. 43.
[40] Marx-Engels, a. a. O., S. 258.
[41] K. Marx, »Das Kapital« I, MEW Bd. 23, S. 57.
[42] K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 192.

"Logic" rejected "such a contradiction is the consequence of the fact that history is written according to an external standard, so that the

actual production of life remains outside and with it the relationship of man to nature; "as if these were two separate 'things', man does not always have a historical nature and a natural history before him"38

But the priority of the external nature is preserved, it says, "and yet all this has no application to the original human beings produced by generatio aequivoca"

but »this nature, which precedes human history (is) not the nature in which Feuerbach lives ...«39

The exclusion of this nature is therefore regarded by Marx as unavoidable. This concept of nature coincides with the so-called scientific objectivism, which Horkheimer and Adorno also reject, although it remains to be investigated why their redefinition of the relationship to nature also has such features and not just a continuation of the idea of accepting nature nature determination. Also in the

»German ideology«, in »Sankt Max«, the Christian desire for liberation from the destiny of nature is interpreted.

"If I am not my own nature, if my natural desires, my whole naturalness - and this is the teaching of Christianity - do not belong to me, then every determination by nature appears to me, both by my own naturalness and by the so-called outer nature, as determined by something alien, as a bondage, as a compulsion on me, as heteronomy as opposed to the autonomy of the spirit«.40

What is important to us, however, are the determinations of nature from Capital, the determinations of so-called objective nature, of nature as it appears in the social labor process, because labor as "former of use values" as

"Useful work", "a condition of human existence independent of all forms of society, eternal natural necessity "is" in order to mediate the metabolism between man and nature, i.e. human life."4' Also in the famous passage from the fifth chapter this connection between man, nature and work is presented, initially independent of any specific social form:

“Work is first and foremost a process between man and nature, a process in which man mediates, regulates and controls his metabolism with nature through his own actions. He confronts the natural substance itself as a nature eight. .. By

. .. affects the nature outside him and changes it, he changes his own nature at the same time. He develops the dormant potencies in her and subjects the play of her powers to his own dominion.«42

38 M arx-Engels, a. am. O., S.

3n M arx-E ngels, a. a. O., S. 43.

40 M arx-Engels, a. am. O., S.

41 K. Marx, »Das Kapital« I, MEW Bd. 23, S. 57.

42 K. Marx, a. a. O., S. 192.

Zusammengefasst könnte man also sagen daß für Marx die Natur auch das an sich Seiende ist, das Universum des Seienden und damit die Grundlage der menschlichen Geschichte; aber das entscheidende ist in dem Zusammenhang zu sehen, als »das Werden der Natur für den Menschen«, das in der Arbeit geschieht, in der Arbeit, die den Menschen erzeugt und erhält. Jede menschliche Arbeit gehört zur Natur, sie schließt die Natur nicht bloß als Gegenstand ein. Der Mensch ist also ontologisch dadurch ausgezeichnet, daß seine »Essenz«, seine »Natur«, die »Bedingung« seiner »Existenz« ist.[43] Natürlich zu sein heißt also arbeiten. Bekanntlich ist das bei Engels auch ganz explizit gesetzt, im »Anteil der Arbeit an der Menschwerdung des Affen«. Auch in diesem keineswegs frühem Text wird über die unauflösliche Verbundenheit mit der Natur geschrieben; aber die Naturbeherrschung wird nicht nur als eine Aufgabe der Erkenntnis, der Wissenschaft und der Kräfte der Bewältigung angesehen. Eben aus dieser Naturverbundenheit ensteht auch die Notwendigkeit die weiteren gesellschaftlichen Folgen unseren produktiven Tätigkeit zu untersuchen; nur der Umsturz der bisherigen Produktionsweise *und* der bisherigen gesellschaftlichen Ordnung, konnte dieser Naturverbundenheit gerecht werden. Diese Naturverbundenheit ist jedoch immer als und durch Arbeit zu betrachten; die »Resurrektion der gefallenen Natur« lässt sich Marx und Engels zu Folge nur als ein verändertes Verhältnis zu der Natur in einer veränderten Welt der Arbeit deuten.

IV.

Die Grundfrage bleibt also die Zerstörung des Scheins von der Naturnotwendigkeit der heutigen Produktionsweise und der bestehenden gesellschaftlichen Ordnung. Man muß die theoretischen Voraussetzungen der Forderung nach einer alternativer Beziehung zu der Natur untersuchen, nach einer Beziehung in der wir es nicht mit einer ausgebeuteten sondern mit einer brüderlichen Natur zu tun hatten, mit der wir kommunizieren würden, die wir nicht beherrschen würden. Bei Marcuse ist diese Frage ganz eindeutig gelöst. Er meint, daß die gefesselte Subjektivität der Natur nur durch die Aufhebung der Besitzverhältnisse zwischen den Menschen befreit werden könnte. Für Adorno und Horkheimer stellt sich die Frage anders, in einem Kontext, den die Weltsituation aufgedrängt hatte. Der dogmatische Marxismus vermag mit den Kategorien der politischen Ökonomie »die neue Art von Barbarei« nicht entsprechend zu deuten. So wurde die These aufgestellt, daß Kultur an sich in die Barberei führt, weil die gewaltsame Lösung aus der Natur, diese Vergewaltigung, die allgemeine Manipulierbarkeit und Berechenbarkeit eben das Subjekt vernichten, das gerade im Prozeß der Loslösung von der Natur in ihrer Beherrschung entsteht.

[43] V. Sutlić, »Rad i bog«, (»Arbeit und Gott«), Treći program RTB, leto 1970, besonders S. 59 ff.

In summary, one could say that for Marx, nature is also what is in itself, the universe of what is, and thus the basis of human history; but what is decisive is to be seen in the context of "the becoming of nature for man," which takes place in work, in work that creates and sustains

man. All human work belongs to nature, it does not include nature merely as an object. Man is thus characterized ontologically by the fact that his "essence", his "nature", the "condition"

of its "existence."43 So being natural means working. As is well known, this is explicitly stated by Engels in the "part of the work involved in the incarnation of the ape." This text, which is by no means early, also writes about the indissoluble connection with nature; but the domination of nature is not only regarded as a task of cognition, science and the powers of mastery. It is precisely from this closeness to nature that the need to examine the further social consequences of our productive activity arises; Only the overthrow of the previous mode of production and the previous social order could do justice to this closeness to nature. However, this closeness to nature is always to be seen as and through work; According to Marx and Engels, the “resurrection of fallen nature” can only be interpreted as a changed relationship to nature in a changed world of work.

IV.

The basic question therefore remains the destruction of the appearance of the natural necessity of today's mode of production and the existing social order. One must examine the theoretical premises of the demand for an alternative relationship to nature, a relationship in which we would not deal with an exploited but with a fraternal nature with which we would communicate, who would w we would not master. With Marcuse this question is quite clearly resolved. He believes that the shackled subjectivity of nature could only be freed by the abolition of property relations between people. For Adorno and Horkheimer the question is posed differently, in a context imposed by the world situation. Dogmatic Marxism is unable to interpret »the new kind of barbarism« with the categories of political economy. Thus the thesis was put forward that culture in itself leads to barbarism, because the violent detachment from nature, this rape, the general manipulability and predictability destroy precisely the subject who, precisely in the process of detachment from nature in its mastery arises.

43 V. S utlić, »Rad i bog«, (»Work and God«), T reći program RTB, leto 1970, especially p. 59 ff.

Es scheint, daß diese Art Fragestellung auch aus dem zu engem Gesellschaftsbegriff im ursprünglichen Entwurf der Kritischen Theorie entspringt. Diesen »gesellschaftlichen« Standpunkt der Betrachtung karakterisiert Marx in dem bekanntem Satz aus den »Grundrissen«: »Das sogenannte Betrachten vom Standpunkt der Gesellschaft aus, heißt nichts als die Unterschiede übersehen, die grade die gesellschaftliche Beziehung (Beziehung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft) ausdrücken.«[44] Ein erneutes Auftauchen des Gegensatzes Kultur — Natur ist gerade durch das Ausklammern eines diffenrenzierteren Gesellschaftsbegriffs ermöglicht.

Schon Holbach verwendete die schöne Metapher vom Felde, das dem Walde entrissen wurde und doch ein Teil des Ganzen bleibt und sagt, daß der Mensch ein Teil der Natur wäre, ihren Gesetzen unterworfen, so daß er sich nicht befreien könne, nicht einmal in Gedanken die Natur verlassen könne. Bei Adorno und Horkheimer erscheint die Tatsache, daß der Mensch ein Teil der Natur selbst in seinen Gedanken bleibt, als eine Verpflichtung, die man erfüllen soll; es ist sozusagen nötig zu büßen weil man darauf vergaß und um eine Versöhnung zu ermöglichen. Die Versöhnung kann jedoch nicht durch eine erzwungene Angleichung im Begriff erreicht werden; die Identitätsphilosophie wird gleichfalls angeklagt, als die vollendete Gestalt des Vergessens. Das Denken müßte sich also älteren Motiven zuwenden. Die durch die schmerzliche Erfahrung der Aufklärung aufgeklärte Dialektik stellt den Satz auf: »Dialektik ist das konsequente Bewußtsein von Nichtidentität.«[45] Diese Dialektik dient der Versöhnung; die Versöhnung ihrerseits ermöglicht das, was der subjektive Verstand nicht tun kann — sie bewahrt die Mannigfaltigkeit des Verschiedenen. Heißt das nun wirklich, daß die Kritische Theorie jenseits der neuzeitlichen Setzung des Subjekts, die ihre Autoren in der Identitätsphilosophie als mit dem gesellschaftlichem Zwang verbunden enthüllen wollten, in irrationale Versuche außerhalb der Geschichte des Denken fallen?

Die Grundbegriffe der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« sind *Ich* und *Natur*. Gerade dieses Ich, daß sich dem Grundgedanken nach mit den empirischen Subjekten decken sollte, ist der schwache Punkt. Das Ich, das Subjekt der Naturbeherrschung, hat sich als ein Ort der Gewalt und der Entsagung erwiesen; das Wissen, die Wissenschaft, die Logik, die Intelligenz, die Vernunft selbst können nicht mehr als Mittel der Emanzipation angesehen werden, sondern als Organe der Selbsterhaltung und Anpassung, also als Organe der Natur. Aber ein anderes Subjekt gibt es nicht: eben diese Subjekte sollten einen Umsturz herbeiführen, die Versöhnung erreichen zwischen Natur und Kultur, aber nicht durch einen unmittelbaren Rückkehr ins Amorphe und Ungestaltete, sondern irgendwie anders, in einer Weise die wir gar nicht in die Welt unserer Vorstellungen einbeziehen dürfen. Das impliziert gewissermaßen eine »Transzendenz schlechthin«, etwas das dem Hork-

[44] K. Marx, »Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie«, Dietz, Berlin, 1953, S. 176.
[45] Th. Adorno, »Negative Dialektik«, S. 15.

It seems that this kind of questioning also arises from the too narrow concept of society in the original draft of critical theory. Marx characterizes this "social" point of view in the well-known sentence from

»Fundamentals«: »The so-called viewing from the standpoint of society means ignoring nothing but the differences that express precisely the social relationship (relationship of bourgeois society).«44 A renewed emergence of the contrast between culture and nature is just through the bracketing of a more differentiated concept of society.

Already Holbach used the beautiful metaphor of the field, which was snatched from the forest and yet remains a part of the whole, and says that man is a part of nature, subject to its laws, so that he cannot free himself, not even in it thoughts could leave nature. With Adorno and Horkheimer, the fact that man remains a part of nature even in his thoughts appears as an obligation to be fulfilled; it is necessary to stay, so to speak, because one forgot it

and to facilitate reconciliation. However, reconciliation cannot be achieved by forced alignment in concept; the philosophy of identity is also accused as the perfect form of forgetting. So thinking had to turn to older motives. The dialectic enlightened by the painful experience of enlightenment sets up the sentence:

"Dialectic is the consequent consciousness of non-identity."45

This dialectic serves reconciliation; the reconciliation, in turn, makes possible what the subjective mind cannot do—it preserves the diversity of the different. Does that really mean that critical theory falls beyond the modern positing of the subject, which its authors in the philosophy of identity wanted to reveal as being linked to social coercion, into irrational attempts outside the history of thought?

The basic concepts of the "dialectics of enlightenment" are I and nature. Precisely this I, which according to the basic idea should coincide with the empirical subjects, is the weak point. The ego, the subject of nature's domination, has shown itself to be a place of violence and renunciation; knowledge, science, logic, intelligence, reason itself can no longer be viewed as a means of emancipation, but as organs of self-preservation and adaptation, i.e. as organs of nature. But there is no other subject: precisely these subjects should bring about an overthrow, achieve reconciliation between nature and culture, but not through an immediate return to the amorphous and unformed, but somehow different, in a way that we even should not be included in the world of our imaginations. To a certain extent, this implies a "transcendence par excellence," something that Hork-44 K. Marx, "Outline of the Criticism of Political Economy," Dietz, Berlin, 1953, p. 176.

45 Th. Adorno, »N egative Dialektik«, p. 15.

heimer und Adorno zeitgenössischen, obwohl befeindeten Denken Heideggers nicht so fremd ist (es gibt gewissermaßen auch eine Paralelle in dem Deuten der Beherrschung und Berechnung des Subjekts).

Die Kritische Theorie begann mit dem absolutem Anspruch die Wahrheit in ihrer Ganzheit von dem positivistischem fraglos-bürgerlichen Betrieb zu bewahren. Die Wahrheit als das Ganze war für sie die gesellschaftliche Wahrheit der Geschichte und als solche absolut gültig. Das Subjekt der Geschichte, das früher oder später die Verwirklichung der Vernunft ermöglichen sollte, war zwar die Arbeiterklasse, aber mit Kennzeichen versehen die eher dem aufgeklärtem Forscher selbst entsprechen würden. Auf dieser Stufe stellte sich die Frage der Naturbeherrschung nicht, die Entwicklung der Produktionsmittel sollte die Grundlage für die Möglichkeit einer vernünftigen Gesellschaft geben. Wird die Stellung der Natur verändert, verändert sich die gesammte Theorie. Was ist also geschehen? Die Kritische Theorie hat in einem aufklärerischen Schwung jede falsche Begründung durchschauen wollen, sie hat eine ganze Reihe von Verbindungen und Bedingungen aufgezeigt. So mußte sie auch bis zu jenem ewig »zweitem«, »anderem« in der Philosophie kommen — zur Natur. Der Begriff der »Gesellschaft« sollte ursprünglich den zentralen Platz der Theorie einnehmen und jedes Befassen mit der »Ersten Philosophie« ersparen. Doch der Begriff der Gesellschaft ist zu kurz um eine Theorie zu begründen, die das Ganze erfassen sollte. So wurde erst dieser Anspruch und dann sozusagen auch der Begriff selbst aufgegeben. Das Ganze der Gesellschaft erweist sich als ihre Unwahrheit, als die Unterwerfung unter ein Allgemeines und wird in der Theorie als der Ausdruck der Unfähigkeit die Versöhnung zu erreichen gewertet, dem Nichtidentischem zum Ausdruck zu verhelfen. Das Denken soll sich also gegen sich selbst wenden, in einer negativen Dialektik und seine eigene Beschränktheit und Verantwortung durchdenken. Jedes Planen oder auch nur Benennen des Zukünftigen überschreitet schon die Grenzen dieser notwendigen Selbsteinschränkung. Alles dreht sich um den Begriff der Versöhnung, der so gleichzeitig zum Gegensatz und Weiterentwicklung des Begriffs der Emanzipation wird, des Begriffs der das Ziel jeder aufklärerischen Position beschrieb.[46] Dieser Begriff der Versöhnung führt uns sehr weit, bis zu den theologischen Überlegungen in Horkheimers letzten Äußerungen.

Innerhalb der sogenannten Frankfurter Schule wurde auf verschiedene Weisen eine Lösung gesucht. Jürgen Habermas lehnt

[46] Lateinisch bedeutet emancipare »einen erwachsenen Sohn bzw. einen Sklaven aus der väterlichen Gewalt entlassen in die Selbstständigkeit. »Das Wort wurde später im Sinne von *Selbst*- Befreiung gebraucht und die Emanzipation des Menschen von der Natur bedeutet in der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« eigentlich ein gewaltsames Zerreißen der Verbindung, der Nabelschnurr; und das Bedürfnis nacht Versöhnung ist das Bedürfnis nach dem Heil, der Erlösung. Das Wort »Versöhnung« entstand als Präfixbildung zu dem Verb sühnen; »sühnen« heißt büßen und wiedergutmachen, ist aber auch dem Verb svaana, »einschläfern, stillen«, verwandt.

heimer and Adorno is not so alien to Heidegger's contemporary, although hostile, thinking (there is also a certain parallel in the interpretation of the domination and calculation of the subject).

Critical theory began with the absolute claim to preserve the truth in its entirety from the positivist, unquestioningly bourgeois establishment. For them, the truth as a whole was the social truth of history and, as such, absolutely valid. The subject of history, which sooner or later should make possible the realization of reason, was indeed the working class, but provided with characteristics that would rather correspond to the enlightened researcher himself. At this stage the question of dominating nature did not arise; the development of the means of production should provide the basis for the possibility of a rational society. If the position of nature is changed, the whole theory changes. So what happened? Critical theory, in an enlightened sweep, wanted to see through every false justification; it pointed out a whole series of connections and conditions. So she had to reach that eternally "second", "other"

come in philosophy—to nature. The concept of "society" was originally supposed to occupy the central place of the theory and save any dealing with "first philosophy".

But the concept of society is too short to justify a theory that should cover the whole. So first this claim and then, so to speak, the concept itself was abandoned.

The whole of society proves to be its untruth, as submission to something universal and is valued in theory as the expression of the inability to achieve reconciliation, to help the non-identical to express itself. Thinking should therefore turn against itself, think through its own limitations and responsibility in a negative dialectic. Any planning or even just naming the future already exceeds the limits of this necessary self-restraint. Everything revolves around the concept of reconciliation, which thus simultaneously becomes the opposite and development of the concept of emancipation, the concept that described the goal of every enlightened position.46 This concept of reconciliation takes us very far, right up to the theological considerations in Horkheimer's last statements.

Within the so-called Frankfurt School, a solution was sought in various ways. Jurgen Habermas rejects 46 In Latin, em ancipare means »to release an adult son or a slave from paternal power to become self-employed. »The word was later used in the sense of self-liberation and the e m ancipation of man from nature actually meant in the

»dialectics of enlightenment« it's the tearing of the connection, the umbilical cord; and the need for reconciliation is the need for salvation, redemption. The word "reconciliation" came into being as a prefix formation for the verb to reconcile; "Reconcile" means to abide and make amends, but is also related to the verb svaana, "to sleep, to quiet".

jede Wiedereinführung der Natur ab. An die »Dialektik der Aufklärung« anknüpfend übernimmt er den Gedanken von der Verknüpfung von Denken und Herrschaft aber verweist auf die Möglichkeit eines Raumes in dem das Nichtidentische seine Rechte bewahrt: »Daß wir konkrete Gegenstände in explizierter Rede niemals vollständig beschreiben können, ist eine triviale Einsicht. Indem wir über ein Besonderes ... eine Aussage machen, wird es jeweils im Hinblick auf eine allgemeine Bestimmung erfaßt; dabei läßt sich die Bedeutung des Besonderen durch fortgesetzen Subsummieren unter solche Allgemeinheiten nicht 'erschöpfen'. Sobald aber Subjekte *miteinander* (und nicht *über* objektivierte Sachverhalte) sprechen, treten sie sich mit dem Anspruch gegenüber, als unvertretbare Individuen in ihrer absoluten Bestimmtheit anerkannt werden. Diese Anerkennung verlangt die paradoxe Leistung, mit Hilfe prinzipiell allgemeiner Bestimmungen und gleichsam durch diese hindurch, die volle Konkretion desjenigen, der mit Allgemeinheiten diesen gerade nicht identisch ist, zu fassen.«[47] Habermas sieht so einen der Versöhnung ähnlichen Zustand in der Struktur des Lebens in zwangsloser Kommunikation, die wir seiner Meinung nach immer implizieren wenn wir etwas Wahres aussagen möchten. Die Theorie der sprachlichen Kommunikation nimmt so eine zentrale Stelle ein in dem, was Habermas die Organisierung der Aufklärung nennt. Das Ziel der Theorie ist die Möglichkeiten einer unverzerrten Kommunikation zu orten. Dieses Ziel entsteht daraus, daß Habermas schon früher den Begriff der Arbeit in die Begriffe der Arbeit und der Interaktion verteilte. Die produktive Arbeit selbst ist dann wiederum unproblematisch geworden, es geht vor allem darum zu einer Übereinstimmung zu kommen, wie und wo sie auszuführen sei. Habermas warnt zwar wiederholt, daß damit das Bedürfnis nach der politischen Ökonomie nicht aufgehoben wäre, es gibt aber bei ihm keine Spur mehr von einem einheitlichem Gedanken vom wesentlichen Umsturz. Das Subjekt der noch als möglich betrachteten Umwandlung muß man jetzt auf allen möglichen Orten suchen, wenn man das durch Zwang erschaffene bürgerliche Subjekt aufheben möchte und doch einige seiner Eigenschaften erhalten bleiben sollten. Dabei bleibt die Frage des empirischen Charakters des Menschen, des Einzelnen ungelöst. Das Subjekt sollte weder der individuelle Mensch noch das ontologisierte Gattungssubjekt sein. Einen quasi-transzendentalen Status sollen jetzt Strukturen bekommen, Strukturen als konstituirende Strukturen der geschichtlichen Welt.[48]

[47] J. Habermas, »Philosophisch-politische Profile«, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1971. S. 192/193.

[48] So versucht z. B. J. P. Arnason (»Von Marcuse zu Marx« Luchterhand 1971) auf diesen Grundlagen eine dialektische Anthropologie zu entwickeln oder wenigstens vorzubereiten; diese würde sich mit geschichtlichen Entwicklungstendenzen auf anthropologischer Ebene befassen, wo sich intersubjektive Beziehungen und die Aneignung der Welt durch die gesellschaftliche Subjekte kreuzen, die Aneignung durch welche die Subjekte die Welt sowohl hervorbringen als auch ändern. Es fragt sich jedoch, ob sich eine solche »positive« Dialektik wirklich dem sogenannten antianthropologischen Denken widersetzen kann.

every reintroduction of nature. Taking up the "dialectics of enlightenment," he adopts the idea of the connection between thought and domination, but points to the possibility of a space in which the non-identical retains its rights: "That we never fully describe concrete objects in explicit speech can

is a trivial insight.

By writing about something special. . . make a statement, it is grasped in relation to a general determination; the meaning of the particular cannot be 'exhausted' by continued sub-summation under such generalities. But as soon as subjects talk to each other (and not about objectified facts), they confront each other with the claim to be recognized as irreplaceable individuals in their absolute determination. This acknowledgment demands the paradoxical achievement of grasping, with the help of fundamentally general determinations and, as it were, through them, the full concreteness of someone who is precisely not identical with generalities.«47

Habermas thus sees a reconciliation-like state in the fabric of life in informal communication, which he thinks we always imply when we want to say anything true. The theory of linguistic communication thus occupies a central place in what Habermas calls the organization of enlightenment. The aim of the theory is to locate the possibilities of undistorted communication. This goal arises from the fact that Habermas earlier divided the concept of work into the concepts of work and interaction.

The productive work itself is then again unproblematic; it is above all a matter of reaching an agreement as to how and where it is to be carried out. Although Habermas repeatedly warns that this would not eliminate the need for political economy, there is no longer any trace of a unified idea of essential overthrow in his work. The subject of the transformation that is still considered possible must now be sought in all possible places if one wants to abolish the bourgeois subject created by coercion and still want to retain some of its properties. The question of the empirical character of man, of the individual, remains unresolved. The subject should be neither the individual man nor the ontologized generic subject.

Structures are now to be given a quasi-transcendental status, structures as constitutive structures of the historical world.48

47 J. Habermas, “P h ilosop hic-political Profiles”. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1971. P. 192/193.

48 For example, B. J. P. Arnason (»From Marcuse to Marx« Luchterhand 1971) to develop or at least to prepare an edialectical anthropology on these foundations; this w ill deal with historical development tendencies at the anthropological level, where intersubjective relationships and the appropriation of the world by the social subjects, the appropriation g through which the subjects bring about the world as well as others. The question arises, however, whether such a "positive" dialectic can really oppose so-called anti-anthropological thinking.

Die strukturalistischen Tendenzen in den Gesellschaftswissenschaften (die sich natürlich nicht mit der eben angeführten Anwendung des Begriffs der Struktur decken), sind in unserem Zusammenhang vor allem wegen ihres Versuches, der Forschung einen möglichst wissenschaftlichen Charakter zu geben, interessant. Es scheint als ob es sich gewissermaßen um eine Verwirklichung jener Endphase der Aufklärung handeln würde in welcher jene Begriffe zu ihrem Opfer werden in welchen Namen der ganze Prozeß der Aufklärung, »als der Bewegung der ganzen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft« verlief. Wenn, beginnend mit der nominalistischen Kritik, daß Subjekt immer mehr zum einzigen Faktor der Weltkonstituierung wurde,[49] wird der Prozeß jetzt umgestülpt. Adorno und Horkheimer wollten das Subjekt erhalten. Ihre Forderung nach einem Bewußtsein von der prekären Abhängigkeit-Unabhängigkeit der Situation des Subjekts fällt leicht der sogenannten wissenschaftlichen Kritik zu Opfer. Aber die Frage des Verhältnisses Natur-Kultur ist nicht zu lösen, wenn man inerhalb der wissenschaftlichen Verfahrensweisen bleibt, so wie man die Reichsweite Marxscher Gedanken auch nur in einer Rückkehrung zur »ersten Philosophie« erblichen kann.[50]

Die Dialektik der Aufklärung ist also jenes Geschehen in welchem die ursprünglichen Bestimmungen der Aufklärung, die dem autonomen Subjekt ermöglichen sollten, sich vernünftig und in Selbstbestimmung seine Welt zu erbauen, in ihren Gegensatz übergehen. Es hat sich gezeigt, daß alle Mittel, die das Subjekt zu seiner Befreiung gebrauchte, notwendig seiner Versklavung

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[49] Vergleiche besonders H.J. Krüger, »Theologie und Aufklärung«, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart 1966.

[50] Die neuesten Versuche, die an die Psychoanalyse anknüpfen, wollen einen neuen Gegenstand der Wissenschaft entwerfen, der das enthalten würde, was allem Geschehen in der Kultur vorgeht. Die Grundlage dieses Versuches ist die Konstruktion der bekannten Folgereihe: »Seit Kopernikus wissen wir, daß die Erde nicht das 'Zentrum' des Universums ist. Seit Marx wissen wir, daß das menschiche Subjekt, das ökonomische, politische oder philosophische Ego nicht das 'Zentrum' der Geschichte- und wir wissen gar, entgegen den Philosophen der Aufklärung und gegen Hegel, daß die Geschichte kein 'Zentrum' hat, sondern eine Struktur, die nur in ideologischer Verblendung ein notwendiges, Zentrum besitzt. Freud nun enthüllt uns, daß das reale Subjekt, das Individuum in seinem singularen Wesen nicht die Gestalt eines Ego hat, das auf das 'Ich', das Bewußtsein oder die 'Existenz' zentriert wäre«. Es stellt sich nur die Aufgabe zu untersuchen, wie aus dem biologischen Wesen ein menschliches Kind wird, was kein biologischer Prozeß sein sollte; »dieser Übergang von der (im Grenzfall rein) biologischen Existenz zur menschlichen Existenz (dem Mencshenkind) vollzieht sich unter dem Gesetz der Ordnung, das ich das Kulturgebot nennen werde, und... dieses Gesetz der Ordnung ist in seinem formalen Wesen mit der Ordnung der Sprache verschmolzen.« (L. Althusser, »Freud und Lacan«. Merve Berlin, S. 33 und S. 23).

Die Begrenztheit solcher »Heilsformeln« ist schon durch das hervorgehende terminologische Durcheinander gegeben; man kann »das irrende Denken des Westens« nicht durch eine Angleichung der wesentlichen Struktur der Geschichte und der Struktur die durch die Zusammensetzung der Resultate einzelner Untersuchungen auf dem psychiatrischen »couch«.

The structuralist tendencies in the social sciences (which of course do not coincide with the application of the concept of structure just mentioned)

are of interest in our context above all because of their attempt to give research as scientific a character as possible. It seems as if it would be a matter of a realization of that final phase of the Enlightenment, in which those concepts become their victims, in which name the whole process of the Enlightenment, "as the movement of the entire bourgeois society," took place. If, beginning with the nominalist critique, the subject increasingly became the sole factor in the constitution of the world,49 the process is now being reversed.

Adorno and Horkheimer wanted to preserve the subject. Their demand for an awareness of the precarious dependency-independence of the subject's situation easily falls victim to so-called scientific criticism. But the question of the relationship between nature and culture cannot be solved if one stays within the scientific procedures, just as one can only inherit the scope of Marx's thoughts in a return to "first philosophy."50

The dialectic of enlightenment is therefore that event in which the original determinations of enlightenment, which should enable the autonomous subject to build his world rationally and in self-determination, transition into their opposite. It has been shown that all the means that the subject used for his liberation necessarily paralleled his enslavement, especially H.J. Kruger, »Theology and Enlightenment«. J.B.

Metzler, S tu ttgart 1966.

50 T h e latest experiments, which tie in with P sych oan alysis, want to design a new object of science, which w ould contain what precedes all happenings in culture. The basis of this attempt is the construction of the well-known sequence: »Since Copernicus we have known that the earth is not the 'centre' of the universe. Since Marx we know that the human subject, the economic, political or philosophical ego is not the 'centre' of history - and we even know it, contrary to the philosophers Enlightenment and against Hegel that history has no 'centre' but a structure. which only has a necessary center in ideological blindness. Freud now reveals to us that

the real subject, the individual in its singular essence does not have the form of an ego. that on the 'I'. consciousness or the 'exists z'

centered goods«. There is only the task of investigating how the biological being becomes a human child, what should be a biological process; »this transition from (in the limit case purely) biological existence to human existence (the human child) takes place under the law of order, which I will call the cultural commandment, and . . .

this law of order is fused in its formal essence with the order of language.« (L. Althusser, »Freud und Lacan«. M erve B erlin, p. 33 and p. 23).

The limitation of such "formulae of salvation" is already given by the preceding term in logical confusion; one cannot explain »the erring thinking of the West« by aligning the essential structure of the story and the structure of the composition of the R e-su lta individual examinations on the psychiatric »couch«.

dienen. So beschränkt sich die durch die Erfahrung dieser Dialektik der Aufklärung aufgeklärte Dialektik wesentlich auf den schon erwähnten Gedanken von dem konsequenten Bewußtsein der Nichtidentität — ein Gedanke, der sich dem ursprünglich theoretischem Verfahren widersetzt, der das Heterogene von der Vereinheitlichung bewahren möchte. Das Wahre als das Ganze wird in dieser Dialektik als Lüge bezeichnet und jeder tätige Versuch der Befreiung als »blinder Aktivismus« der die feindliche Logik akzeptiert. Der Gedankengang dem wir folgten kehrt sich jetzt gegen seinen kritischen Ausgangspunkt — am Ende kennt er nur jene Zurückhaltung an die er einst der traditionellen Theorie vorwarf.

serve. Thus the dialectic enlightened by the experience of this dialectic of enlightenment is essentially limited to the already mentioned idea of the consistent consciousness of non-identity - an idea that opposes the original theoretical procedure, which separates the heterogeneous from unification

wanted to keep. In this dialectic, the truth as a whole is described as a lie and every active attempt at liberation as "blind activism" that accepts the hostile logic. The train of thought we followed is now turning against its critical point of departure - in the end it knows only that reluctance to which it once accused traditional theory.

L' ORGANISATION SOCIALE ET LE THEATRE[1]

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Il semble presque superflu de mentionner le fait banal qu' aucune organisation sociale, même la plus parfaite, n'est en mesure de produire de création sans créateur. Cela ne signifie pourtant pas qu'un type déterminé d'organisation ne puisse empêcher le créateur d'extérioriser ses forces créatrices. Disons en termes simples — pour paraphraser Taine — qu'aucune plante ne poussera jamais sans graine, mais qu'elle poussera uniqement dans une terre féconde, tandis qu'elle périra dans le sable du désert. La négation de cette thèse à l'aide de faits soi-disant empiriqués — comme l'avait fait par exemple Hauser en démontrant que les grands artistes apparaissent souvent dans les sociétés les plus despotiques possibles — est si superficielle qu'il est inutile d'en parler. Il suffit de se demander le nombre de créateurs détruits sous les dictatures par rapport à celui, bien plus restreint, de ceux qui ont apparu malgré la tyrannie. Cela ne peut prouver qu'une certaine organisation n'empêche pas la création, mais témoigne seulement d'un grand nombre de talents dont quelques uns seulement ont pu être sauvés.

La production culturelle a sans aucun doute besoin au moins d'une ambiance sociale, d'un climat social qui n'empêchera pas son évolution. Mais si nous restons dans la controverse: culture/non-culture, la culture ne peut attendre autre chose des sphères dites extra-culturelles. Toutes les formes d'organisation sociale, même démocratiques ou libérales, qui auraient d'autres prétentions (non seulement celle de permettre la création mais de produire des créateurs à leur instar) feraient preuve forcément d'un schématisme aride, d'uniformité, d'un manque de personnalité, et aussi de l'intention d'imposer quelque chose qui ne provient pas de la création elle-même. Tout modèlle d'organisation sociale, même le

[1] Ce texte a été conçu comme exposé au »IIe Coloque International des critiques et théoriciens de théâtre« sur le sujet »Théâtre-acte collectif« à Novi Sad du 25 au 27 avril 1973.

p e n s Eeet REALITY

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE THEATER1

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It seems almost superfluous to mention the trivial fact that no social organization, even the most perfect, is able to produce creation without a creator. This does not mean, however, that a given type of organization cannot prevent the creator from externalizing his creative forces. Put simply — to paraphrase Taine — no plant will ever grow without seed, but will only grow in fertile soil, while it perishes in the sands of the desert. The negation of this thesis with the help of so-called empirical facts —1

as Hauser did, for example, in demonstrating that great artists often appear in the most despotic societies possible — is so superficial that it is useless to talk about it. It suffices to ask the number of creators destroyed under dictatorships compared to the much smaller number of those who appeared despite tyranny. It cannot prove that a certain organization does not prevent creation, but only testifies to a large number of talents of which only a few could be saved.

Cultural production undoubtedly needs at least a social atmosphere, a social climate that will not prevent its development. But if we remain in the controversy: culture/non-

-culture, culture cannot expect anything else from so-called extra-cultural spheres. All forms of social organization, even democratic or liberal, which would have other claims (not only that of allowing creation but of producing creators in their own way) would necessarily show an arid schematism, uniformity, a lack of personality, and also the intention to impose something which does not come from creation itself. Any model of social organization, even the 1 This text was designed as an exhibit at the "International Colloquium of theater critics and theoreticians" on the subject "Theater-collective act" in N ovi Sad from April 25 to 27, 1973.

plus parfait, imposé à la culture, peut selon cette thèse, avoir des conséquences négatives, sans égards aux intentions de l'organisateur. Autrement dit, si nous parlons par exemple de l'art, c'est la production artistique elle-même qui est capable de trouver les formes d'organisation qui lui conviennent et qui la rendent possible; il n'est pas nécessaire que quelqu'un d'extérieur à elle s'en occupe particulièrement. C'est la culture qui doit créer l'organisation et non pas le contraire. Pourtant, cette thèse plausible du point de vue du sens commun, n'est pas sans provoquer d'objections, malgré les apparences.

Quand nous parlons de la culture en général, nous devons tout de suite dire que l'art est en réalité la culture la plus authentique, car elle est en tant qu'activité créatrice, la plus originale et la plus libre, le vrai lieu de l'existence humaine. Il est donc impossible de parler d'un secteur culturel qui serait extérieur à la sphère sociale. L'art est, bien que cela puisse paraître paradoxal, la substance même de la vie sociale. La vie sociale n'est pas quelque chose qui pourrait se développer d'une manière indépendante et vraiement progressive en dehors de la création la plus libre, en dehors de l'oeuvre artistique qui est en même temps le prémisse et le résultat du substrat social lui-même. Comme une société sans art n'est pas une société, nous devons également souligner que l'idée d'un art soi, disant indépendant de la société est souvent plutôt le fruit d'une conception primitive de l'art »pur« et de la vision d'un artiste génial, solitaire, isolé dans sa tour d'ivoire, que la réalitê de l'activité artistique véritable.

En plus, cette conception signifie en réalité la mise entre parenthèses du sens primordial et de la mission de chaque art. Dans cette vision de l'isolement de l'art, celui-ci devient seulement un décorateur périphérique et professionnel de la vie, son altérité. En jouant complaisamment toujours sur la même clavier, l'art permettrait ainsi que la vie puisse évoluer à travers d'autres formes, non artistiques et non créatrices, en tant qu'experience quotidienne et impossible à reconnaître dans le domaine spécifique du phénomène artistique. Mais il s'agit justement de rompre d'une part avec cette attitude ignorante qui méprise la vie »banale«, et d'autre part, avec celle qui place l'art en marge de la vraie vie materielle comme un passe-temps peu sérieux et superflu. Autrement dit, il s'agit de rompre avec l'isolement et l'hypostase de la vie et avec l'idée d'un art renfermé en lui-même et de commencer, comme le dit Marx, à vivre artistiquement.

Cela ne signifie naturellement pas qu'il faille dégrader l'art au niveau de l'embellissement gratuit ou de l'apologie du réel, mais qu'il faille rehausser la réalité au niveau de ce qui est véritablement et vitalement artistique. Dans ce sens, le modèle de la création artistique peut servir de paradigme à chaque rapport createur entre les hommes.

L'intérêt professionnel de l'artiste ne peut représenter la vraie vie artistique et ne peut, pour cette raison, être imposé à la réalité sociale; de même, la simple réalité d'une société existante ne peut

more perfect, imposed on the culture, can according to this thesis, have negative consequences, regardless of the intentions of the organizer. In other words, if we speak for example of art, it is artistic production itself which is capable of finding the forms of organization which suit it and

which make it possible; there is no need for anyone outside her to take special care of it. It is the culture that must create the organization and not the contrary. However, this thesis, plausible from the point of view of common sense, is not without provoking objections, despite appearances.

When we speak of culture in general, we must immediately say that art is in fact the most authentic culture, because it is, as a creative activity, the most original and the most free, the true place of human existence. It is therefore impossible to speak of a cultural sector that would be outside the social sphere. Art is, although it may seem paradoxical, the very substance of social life. Social life is not something which could develop in an independent and truly progressive way apart from the freest creation, apart from the artistic work which is at the same time the premise and the result of the substrate. social itself. As a society without art is not a society, we must also underline that the idea of an art which is independent of society is often rather the fruit of a primitive conception of "pure" art. “and from the vision of a brilliant artist, solitary, isolated in his ivory tower, than the reality of true artistic activity.

In addition, this conception actually means putting aside the primary meaning and mission of each art.

In this vision of the isolation of art, it becomes only a peripheral and professional decorator of life, its alterity.

By playing complacently always on the same keyboard, art would thus allow life to evolve through other forms, non-artistic and non-creative, as a daily experience and impossible to recognize in the specific domain of the phenomenon. artistic. But it is precisely a question of breaking on the one hand with this ignorant attitude which despises "banal" life, and on the other hand, with that which places art on the margins of real material life like a hobby. irrelevant and superfluous time. In other words, it is a question of breaking with the isolation and the hypostasis of life and with the idea of an art contained in itself and of beginning, as Marx said, to live artistically.

Of course, this does not mean that art should be degraded to the level of gratuitous embellishment or the apology of the real, but that reality should be raised to the level of what is truly and vitally artistic. . In this sense, the model of artistic creation can serve as a paradigm for each creative relationship between men.

The professional interest of the artist cannot represent the true artistic life and cannot, for this reason, be imposed on social reality; similarly, the simple reality of an existing society cannot 272

pas être le cadre statique dont le créateur devrait épouser docilement les countours. Or, une sphère idéologique aliénée et isolée de cette vie s'impose à la sphère artistique au nom d'intérêts particuliers et partiels, et elle estime avoir le droit de lui prescrire non seulement des normes, un cadre, et les limites de sa liberté, mais également la manière et l'objet de la production artistique. Quand il s'agit de l'art théâtral, d'un art ayant de si fortes répercussions sociales et étant la quintessence de chaque art, il faut se demander si n'importe quelle manière de la diriger ne signifie pas en même temps sa dégradation et celle de la société où il se manifeste.

Permettez-moi de citer, pour illustrer cette thèse, deux penseurs religieux, deux grandes autorités ecclésiastiques, un dignitaire de l'Eglise et un théologien et philosophe. Leurs attitudes contraires illustreront plus clairement ce qu'est imposer à l'art des positions idéologiques étrangères et particulières. Le Pape Pie XII déclara le 26 août 1945 devant des acteurs de théâtre: »Le but passionné d'un art accompli est d'élever l'esprit, en représentant la beauté, au-delà du règne de la matière, jusqu'à Dieu, cette bonté et beauté suprême d'où provient tout ce qui est bon et tout ce qui est beau.« Si paradoxale qu'elle puisse paraître, cette déclaration du Pape, en limitant l'art uniquement à la tâche de s'élever à la hauteur de Dieu ne fait, au fond, que dégrader l'art, car elle le soumet à des objectifs hétérogènes, non artistiques et qui lui sont étrangers. Nous n'allons pas nous attarder maintenant sur le fait que si cette revendication était juste, nous devrions rejeter presque toutes les oevres théâtrales importantes du fait qu'elles ont toujours mis au premier plan justement la *lutte* éternelle et prométhéenne de l'homme *contre* le caractère inviolable et la terrifiante vengeance de l'autorité divine. Nous n'allons pas non plus insister sur l'indubitable contradiction qui existe entre cette approbation tactique de l'art et la conception que c'est la théologie qui a le plus grand pouvoir de connaissance parmi les sciences humaines. A travers cette position du Pape, la théologie se prive elle-même du droit qu'elle avait toujours réclamé, qui est celui d'être le sommet scientifique et la seule connaissance à travers laquelle Dieu lui-même se fait entendre. Nous sommes intéressés pour le moment par autre chose: la position théologique en question souffre avant tout d'une idéologisation aberrante de l'art. Selon cette conception, l'art est d'autant plus l'art qu'il vise des objectifs extérieurs et non artistiques. L'identification de l'art avec le pouvoir spirituel suprême n'est qu'apparente. En effet, il ne s'agit plus de l'art mais d'une activité qui doit, avec plus au moins de succès, servir à d'autres fins et propager la gloire de celui de qui vient »tout ce qui est bon et tout ce qui est beau.«

Je pense que cela a été déjà très bien remarqué à la fin du XVIII[e] siècle par un autre théologien et philosophe Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher qui est aujourd'hui un peu oublié. Son *Esthétique* fut considérée à un moment donné par certains philosophes allemands comme »le sermon tiède et stérile d'un orateur

not be the static framework whose contours the creator should obediently embrace. However, an ideological sphere alienated and isolated from this life imposes itself on the artistic sphere in the name of particular and partial interests, and it considers that it has the right to prescribe to it not

only norms, a framework, and the limits of its freedom , but also the manner and object of artistic production.

When it comes to theatrical art, an art having such strong social repercussions and being the quintessence of every art, one must ask oneself if any way of directing it does not mean at the same time its degradation and that of the society in which it manifests itself.

Allow me to quote, to illustrate this thesis, two religious thinkers, two great ecclesiastical authorities, a dignitary of the Church and a theologian and philosopher. Their contrary attitudes will illustrate more clearly what it is to impose on art foreign and particular ideological positions. Pope Pius XII declared on August 26, 1945 in front of theater actors: "The passionate aim of an accomplished art is to elevate the spirit, representing beauty, beyond the realm of matter, to God. , that supreme goodness and beauty from which comes all that is good and all that is beautiful. Raising to the height of God basically only degrades art, for it submits it to heterogeneous, non-artistic objectives which are foreign to it. We are not going to dwell now on the fact that if this claim were right, we would have to reject almost all important theatrical works because they have always rightly foregrounded the eternal and promised struggle. - theene of man against the inviolability and terrifying vengeance of divine authority. Nor are we going to insist on the indubitable contradiction which exists between this tactical approval of art and the conception that it is theology which has the greatest power of knowledge among the human sciences. Through this position of the Pope, theology deprives itself of the right it has always claimed, which is to be the scientific summit and the only knowledge through which God

-even is heard. We are interested for the moment in something else: the theological position in question suffers above all from an aberrant ideologization of art. According to this conception, art is all the more art when it aims at external and non-artistic objectives. The identification of art with the supreme spiritual power is only apparent. Indeed, it is no longer a question of art but of an activity which must, with more or less success, serve other ends and propagate the glory of him from whom comes "all that is good and all that is beautiful.«

I think this was already very well noticed at the end of the 18th century by another theologian and philosopher Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher who is somewhat forgotten today. His Aesthetics was considered at one time by some German philosophers as "the lukewarm and sterile sermon of an orator 273

impuissant« (Eduard von Hartmann). Schleiermacher s'élève d'une manière décidée contre toute déconsidération de l'art mais il se distancie énergiquement d'une divination de l'art *(Vergötterung der Kunst)*. Théologien, il dit même qu'un art érotique a sa raison d'être s'il reste artistiquement valable, mais qu'il ne peut l'être s'il reste uniquement au niveau de l'érotique au détriment du spirituel; il ne peut non plus permettre à l'élément spirituel isolé de nuire à l'érotisme artistique. A la page 74 de son *Esthétique* il exprime une pensée actuelle: »*Wenn die Kunst in ihren lascivien, erotischen Produktionen die Begierde erregt, so tut sie offenbar etwas was sie als Kunst nicht soll. Aber wir können dies auch rein von der entgegegesetzte Seite sagen. Auch wenn die religiöse Gefühl erregt, geht sie über ihre Grenze hinaus*«.[2] L'art est donc pour Schleiermacher une productivité libre, tandis que le plasir erotique, sensuel et le sentiment religieux sont, bien que différents dans d'autres circonstances, déterminés par ce que Schleiermacher appelle »l'Etre extérieur« *(ausseres Sein)*. Cette thèse selon laquelle l'art réligieux, s'il veut provoquer une sensation réligieuse et non pas artistique, cesse d'être de l'art (exprimée par un théologien jugé impuissant par ses propres confrères plus rigoureux), est assez courageuse et démontre un sentiment extraordinaire pour la valeur artistique que Schleiermacher préfère à son propre concept idéologique. C'est pour cela qu'il soutient la thèse qu'il ne faut soumettre l'art ni à la théologie ni par exemple au plaisir érotique, parce qu'il perd par là-même sa force artistique et s'asservit à des intentions ou idéologies étrangères.

Mais notre sentiment pour la valeur artistique ne devrait pas se taire non plus lorsqu'il s'agit d'autres tendences, soi disant progressives, qui sont, pour la plupart, entièrement étrangères à ce que Marx appelle la vie artistique. La question se pose alors de savoir comment quand et pourquoi nous aurions le droit d'exiger que l'art suive sans discuter notre conception. Il est extrêmement important que nous soyons à cet égard très prudents et que nous ayons à l'esprit que même l'humanisme, lorsqu'il est imposé par une sphère déterminée peut devenir sa propre contradiction. Cette prudence est surtout nécessaire quand il s'agit d'une attitude qui se croit elle-même progressive sans que nous ayons la possibilité de la vérifier. La question qui s'impose alors du point de vue marxiste est la suivante: pourquoi et comment une doctrine idéologique (et c'est l'essence même de ce qu'on appelle le »jdanovisme«) a-t-elle le droit de prétendre qu'elle est plus progressive et donc plus humaine que l'essence artistique même du phénomène artistique? Marx, non pas le jeune Marx, mais un Marx mûr de l'époque postérieure au *Manifeste*, n'a pas déclaré par hasard que la production elle-même devrait acquérir un caractère artistique et qu'il faudrait commencer à vivre d'une manière artistique. Par

[2] Si l'art provoque le désir par ses produits lascifs et érotiques, il fait quelque chose qu'il ne devrait pas faire en tant qu'art. Mais nous pouvons le dire aussi du point de vue opposé: si l'art religieux provoque le sentiment religieux, il dépasse ses propres limites.

powerless" (Eduard von Hartmann). Schleiermacher rises in a decided manner against any disregard of art but he distances himself energetically from a divination of art (Vergotterung der Kunst). As a theologian, he even says that an erotic art has its raison d'être if it remains artistically valid,

but that it cannot be so if it remains solely at the level of the erotic to the detriment of the spiritual. ; nor can it allow the isolated spiritual element to harm artistic eroticism. On page 74 of his Aesthetics he expresses a contemporary thought: "Wenn die K unst in ihren lascivien, erotischen Produktionen die Begierde erregt, so tu t sie offenbar etwas was sie als Kunst nicht soil. Aber wir konnen dies auch rein von der entgegegesetzte Seite sagen. Auch wenn die religiose Gefiihl erregt, geht sie iiber ihre Grenze hinaus«.2 Art is therefore for Schleiermacher a free productivity, while erotic, sensual pleasure and religious feeling are, although different in other circumstances , determined by what Schleiermacher calls »external Being« (ausseres Sein). This thesis that religious art, if it wants to provoke a religious sensation and not an artistic one, ceases to be art (expressed by a theologian judged impotent by his own more rigorous colleagues), is rather courageous. and demonstrates an extraordinary feeling for the artistic value that Schleiermacher prefers to his own ideological concept. This is why he upholds the thesis that art should not be subjected either to theology or, for example, to erotic pleasure, because it thereby loses its artistic force and enslaves itself to foreign intentions or ideologies.

But our feeling for artistic value should not be silenced either when it comes to other, so-called progressive tendencies, which are, for the most part, entirely foreign to what Marx calls the artistic life. The question then arises of how when and why we would have the right to demand that art follow without discussing our conception. It is extremely important that we be very careful in this respect and that we bear in mind that even humanism, when imposed by a determined sphere, can become its own contradiction. This caution is especially necessary when it is a question of an attitude which believes itself to be progressive without our having the possibility of verifying it. The question which then arises from the Marxist point of view is the following: why and how does an ideological doctrine (and this is the very essence of what is called »Jdano-vism«) have the right to claim that it is more progressive and therefore more human than the very artistic essence of the artistic phenomenon? Marx, not the young Marx, but a mature Marx of the epoch after the Manifesto, did not accidentally declare that production itself should acquire an artistic character and that one should begin to live from a artistic way. Par 2 If art provokes desire by its lascivious and erotic products, it does something that it should not do as art. But we can also say it from the opposite point of view: if religious art provokes religious feeling, it goes beyond its own limits.

là-même il a soulevé la question suivante pourquoi ce qui est exterieur et étranger à l'art serait-il plus valable et humain que l'élément essentiel de cet art? Le critère de valorisation comme critère de l'art est-il justifié alors quand on va le chercher dans une sphère extra-artistique et idéologique?

Dans ce sens, une véritable oeuvre d'art est celle qui exprime d'une manière cohérente et adéquate son contenu artistique. Quand un autre élément veut par force s'imposer à l'élément artistique, l'oeuvre cesse d'être elle-même, elle n'exprime plus sa propre nécessité intérieure et nous nous trouvons en face d'une oeuvre simulée, non-authentique et non véridique. Il faut cependant souligner qu'il ne s'agit pas de la vérité des faits mais d'une vérité vitale qui est à la fois la vérite de la vie et la vie possible d'une telle vérité.

Tout ce que nous venons de mentionner ne veut absolument pas plaider la cause de l'art pour l'art, la cause du caractère intact, isolé et sacro-saint d'un art indépendant en soi et pour soi. L'art pour l'art et c'est Plehanov qui a raison à ce sujet — cest tout aussi denué de sens que la richesse pour la richesse. Nous avons souligné dès le début que pour nous le vrai sens de l'artistique réside dans le fait qu'il est la vérité de la vie globale et non pas d'une conscience partielle, professionnelle, acitivité d'un certain nombre de décorateurs de la vie. Et pourtant, il était nécessaire d'insister sur le sens profond de l'art sujet à certaines attaques sournoises, de plus en plus fréquentes à notre époque, qui visent, avec succès d'ailleurs, l'élément artistique dans l'art au nom d'une prétendue utilité pragmatique. Mais la valeur artistique ne consiste pas dans le fait — et on ne le répétera jamais assez — que l'art doit se replier sur lui-même non sans complaisance et avec orgueil. La valeur de l'art peut se réaliser dans sa plénitude en ce qu'il provoque un changement dans la réalité extérieure dite non-artistique, qu'il humanise sans cesse et essentiellement le monde de l'homme. Il est clair qu'il ne peut s'agir ici du modèle idéal d'une organisation professionelle où règnent les artistes, mais d'une société qui s'organise en sorte de pouvoir mener une vie véritablement humaine, et qui ne peut jamais être au-delà de l'art.

En ce qui concerne le théâtre, je pense que l'organisation sociale au sein de laquelle il agit, devrait découler de la possibilité de communiquer directement avec la vie, c'est-à-dire de l'essence même de l'acte théâtral d'aujourd'hui.

Ce serait, sans aucun doute, une illusion de penser qu'on peut dans un article relativement bref, exprimer tout ce qui fait du théâtre le théâtre dans sa définition essentielle; une analyse phénoménologique partielle démontre déjà comment et combien le théâtre est en soi une notion contradictoire et combien il comporte de paradoxes fondamentaux et d' antinomies, apparemment insolubles.

Il est à la fois temporel et atemporel, artistiquement durable; il est une création individuelle de l'auteur et du metteur en scène et un acte collectif, phénomène qui embrasse l'horizon spirituel du

the same he raised the following question why should what is external and foreign to the art be more valid and human than the essential element of this art? Is the criterion of valorization as a criterion of art justified then when we look for it in an extra-artistic and ideological sphere?

In this sense, a true work of art is one which expresses its artistic content in a coherent and adequate manner. When another element wants by force to impose itself on the artistic element, the work ceases to be itself, it no longer expresses its own inner necessity and we find ourselves faced with a simulated work, not genuine and untrue. It must however be emphasized that it is not a question of the truth of facts but of a vital truth which is both the truth of life and the possible life of such a truth.

All that we have just mentioned absolutely does not want to plead the cause of art for art's sake, the cause of the intact, isolated and sacrosanct character of an art independent in itself and for itself. Art for art's sake, and Plehanov is right about that — it's just as meaningless as wealth for wealth's sake. We have underlined from the start that for us the true meaning of the artistic resides in the fact that it is the truth of global life and not of a partial consciousness, professional, activity of a certain number of decorators of the life. And yet, it was necessary to insist on the deep meaning of art subject to certain subdued attacks, more and more frequent in our time, which aim, moreover successfully, at the artistic element in art at the time. name of an alleged pragmatic utility. But artistic value does not consist in the fact - and we can never repeat it enough - that art must withdraw into itself, not without complacency and with pride. The value of art can be realized in its fullness in that it provokes a change in the external reality called non-artistic, that it humanizes constantly and essentially the world of man. It is clear that it cannot be a question here of the ideal model of a professional organization where artists reign, but of a society which organizes itself in such a way as to be able to lead a truly human life, and which cannot never be beyond art.

As far as the theater is concerned, I think that the social organization within which it acts should derive from the possibility of communicating directly with life, that is to say from the very essence of the act. theatrical today.

It would, without a doubt, be an illusion to think that one can, in a relatively brief article, express all that makes theater theater in its essential definition; a partial phenomenological analysis already demonstrates how and to what extent theater is in itself a contradictory notion and how many fundamental paradoxes and seemingly insoluble antinomies it contains.

It is both temporal and atemporal, artistically durable; it is an individual creation of the author and the director and a collective act, a phenomenon which embraces the spiritual horizon of the 275

monde existant et le crée en même temps. Il existe en tant que texte écrit et en tant que représentation il existe d'une manière ontique en soi et pour soi, et par rapport au public. Il est le reflet de la conscience historique d'une époque déterminée et la transcendence de l'histoire, expression de ce qui est le plus général, le plus typique et en même temps le plus intime, le plus individuel. C'est un phénomène qui est à la fois limité par la salle de théâtre et par le nombre de spectateurs et qui paraît, à l'epoque de la civilisation technique périmé, impuissant, patiné par le retard romantique; cependant, il reste extrêmement actuel, et il agit plus que les autres arts sur la formation de la conscience et le climat spirituel de sont temps.

Chacun de ces paradoxes mériterait une analyse, ce qui est sans doute impossible et peu utile ici, étant donné que je ne viens pas de mentionner ces paradoxes banals et connus pour eux-mêmes, mais pour démontre que ce sont là des controverses non seulement théâtrales mais aussi bien vitales, inhérentes à l'existence humaine. De plus, certaines de ces antinomies appartiennent aux dilemmes quotidiens, ressentis régulièrement par les gens de théâtre et il serait insensé d'en parler théoriquement.

Mais envisageons quand même certains de ces paradoxes.

D'abord, la contradiction entre le caractère ephémère et le caractère durable de l'acte théâtral: dans quelle mesure est-il reflet de la conscience historique tout en étant au-delà de l'histoire? Personne ne peut dire qu'Eschyle n'ait, à sa manière, exprimé son temps, comme Shakespeare ou Beckett l'ont fait pour le leur. Mais cependant, leurs oeuvres sont ce qu'elles sont grâce à ce qu'elles ont d'artistique et qui leur permet de transcender, ou si vous préferez, d'arrêter le temps. Ces oeuvres sont une gifle à l'existence banale car elles sont autre chose que de simples événements, que l'écoulement du temps. Or, aucun théâtre n'est le simple reflet de son temps, ombre passagère d'événements passés éphémères. C'est de l'intemporel qu'il nous parle à travers son temps. Eschyle et Shakespeare sont vivants grâce aux aspects de leurs oeuvres qui ne sont pas liés à une époque déterminée. Mais quand nous parlons de transcender le temps, nous ne pensons pas à quelque chose de mystique qui plane, telle une chimère dans l'éternité, ce qui serait non seulement privé de vie mais contraire à la vie. Ce que Marx appelle dans son oeuvre *Grundrisse* (p. 31) »le charme éternel de l'art« n'est nullement audelà de la vie mais c'est la vie dans sa pleine et vraie vitalité. La vie soi-disant réelle n'apporte-t-elle pas de tels moments et ne les avons-nous pas vécus au moins une fois dans notre vie — ne serait — ce que lorsque nous étions amoureux ou on face de la tragédie authentique de la mort? Nous les avons alors ressentis et crus durables, ces moments où nous avons communiqué avec quelque chose d'éternel. Le théâtre n'est-il pas au fond une sublimation, une forme plus concentrée de l'expression de la vie réellement humaine? Sa force ne réside-t-elle pas en ceci qu'il exprime tous les dilemmes infernaux, conflits, défaites, emphases et folies de la vie en tant que faits typiques, universels,

existing world and creates it at the same time. It exists as a written text and as a representation it exists ontically in itself and for itself, and in relation to the public. It is the reflection of the historical consciousness of a determined era and the transcendence of history, an expression of what is

the most general, the most typical and at the same time the most intimate, the most individual.

It is a phenomenon which is both limited by the theater hall and by the number of spectators and which seems, at the time of outdated technical civilization, impotent, patinated by romantic backwardness; however, it remains extremely current, and it acts more than the other arts on the formation of the conscience and the spiritual climate of its time.

Each of these paradoxes deserves an analysis, which is probably impossible and of little use here, given that I have not just mentioned these banal and known paradoxes for themselves, but to demonstrate that they are controversies not only theatrical but also quite vital, inherent in human existence. Moreover, some of these antinomies belong to daily dilemmas, regularly experienced by theater people, and it would be foolish to speak of them theoretically.

But let us consider some of these paradoxes anyway.

First, the contradiction between the ephemeral character and the enduring character of the theatrical act: to what extent is it a reflection of historical consciousness while being beyond history? No one can say that Aeschylus did not, in his own way, express his time, as Shakespeare or Beckett did for theirs. But nevertheless, their works are what they are thanks to what is artistic in them and which allows them to transcend, or if you prefer, to stop time. These works are a slap in the face to banal existence because they are something other than simple events, than the passing of time. However, no theater is the simple reflection of its time, a passing shadow of ephemeral past events. It is about the timeless that he speaks to us through his time. Aeschylus and Shakespeare are alive thanks to the aspects of their works which are not linked to a specific era. But when we speak of transcending time, we are not thinking of something mystical hovering, like a chimera in eternity, which would not only be lifeless but contrary to life. What Marx calls in his work Grundrisse (p. 31) "the eternal charm of art" is not beyond life, but it is life in its full and true vitality. Doesn't so-called real life bring such moments, and haven't we experienced them at least once in our lives — if only — when we were in love or faced with the genuine tragedy of the death? We then felt them and believed them to be lasting, these moments when we communicated with something eternal. Isn't theater basically a sublimation, a more concentrated form of the expression of truly human life? Does not its strength reside in the fact that it expresses all the infernal dilemmas, conflicts, defeats, emphasis and follies of life as typical, universal facts?

incarnés dans ses personnages. Ils sont présents devant nous, ici et maintenant, vivent individuellement, respirent, combattent, aiment et souffrent, se parlent directement face à face, bouche à bouche, oreille à oreille. L'acte théâtral se déroule — contrairement à tous les autres arts — devant nous et dans le moment présent; on ne peut le remettre à demain, il s'écoule comme la vie, mais il est en même temps une offense à la vie qui est inerte. La valeur du théâtre ne réside donc pas dans le fait qu'il est un art populaire et accessible — la télévision l'est encore davantage — ni dans le fait qu'il éveille l'intérêt pour les autres manifestations culturelles: arts plastiques, livres, musique et valeurs spirituelles en général. Sa signification fondamentale n'est pas non plus de représenter l'ensemble de tous ces éléments: valeurs visuelles des arts plastiques, idées, style, valeurs verbales et humaines de la parole écrite, atmosphère spirituelle de la musique. Ce qui est décisif pour la force de son influence c'est le caractère directe de sa communication, plus directe encore que celle de la télévision où l'écran représente tout de même un intermédiaire. Le fait qu'ils sont une partie de l'atmosphère que nous respirons, rend les idées et les personnages de théâtre extrêmement proches de nous et plastiques.

Il paraît au premier abord paradoxal et incompréhensible, que le théâtre, malgré les preuves pseudo-empiriques de sa crise, puisse avoir encore une telle influence sociale. A l'époque des géants techniques, des possibilités sensationnelles de la communication, à l'époque où nous avons de moins en moins de temps pour vivre le véritable temps humain, où tout le monde court, à l'époque de la vie atomique et de la mort atomique, du cosmos, quand de toutes les imprimeries du monde coulent des milliers de tonnes de journaux nous informant de tout ce qui se passe sur notre planète et en dehors d'elle à l'époque des hommes rationnels, des hommes--machines, des femmes artificielles aux yeux de poisson, au temps des massacres et au temps des véhicules forcenés, à cette époque donc, existent des salles solitaires, étranges, où de pâles fanatiques jouent de vieilles pièces, jeux périmés et gratuits: c'est le destin du théâtre. Comment se fait-il que cette plante fragile, encadrée modestement par quelques préoccupations intimes puisse encore survivre dans cette folie générale, et comment peut-elle encore agir sur quelqu'un dans ce tapage aberrant, infernal? C'était encore imaginable dans l'Antiquité où, Eliot le dit spirituellement, Aristot ne devait pas compter sur le théâtre comme source de revenus, mais comment est-ce possible aujourd'hui où tout est marchandise et où tout se monnaie?

Il semble incroyable d'abord que le théatre agisse sur nous si profondément et d'une manière violante et plus globale que tous les autres arts. Comment se fait-il qu'il agissait librement dans le drame antique et qu'il réussit encore à nous libérer aujourd'hui?

De toute façon, ce n'est pas le nombre qui importe en ce qui concerne l'humain. Prométhée était seul, mais ce solitaire suffit pour allumer la flamme qui brûle encore dans les hommes. La parole preméthéenne, impie, libératrice, se fait entendre du haut

embodied in his characters. They are present before us, here and now, living individually, breathing, fighting, loving and suffering, talking to each other directly face to face, mouth to mouth, ear to ear. The theatrical act takes place - unlike all the other arts - in front of us and in the present

moment; it cannot be put off until tomorrow, it passes like life, but it is at the same time an offense to life which is inert. The value of theater therefore does not reside in the fact that it is a popular and accessible art form — television is even more so — nor in the fact that it arouses interest in other cultural manifestations: plastic arts, books , music and spiritual values in general.

Nor is its fundamental meaning to represent the set of all these elements; visual values of the visual arts, ideas, style, verbal and human values of the written word, spiritual atmosphere of music. What is decisive for the strength of its influence is the direct character of its communication, even more direct than that of television where the screen nevertheless represents an intermediary. The fact that they are part of the atmosphere we breathe makes the ideas and characters of theater extremely close to us and plastic.

At first glance, it seems paradoxical and incomprehensible that the theatre, despite the pseudo-empirical evidence of its crisis, can still have such a social influence. In the age of technical giants, of the sensational possibilities of communication, in the age when we have less and less time to live the real human time, when everyone runs, in the age of atomic life and of atomic death, of the cosmos, when from all the printing presses in the world flow thousands of tons of newspapers informing us of everything that is happening on our planet and outside it in the age of rational men , men-

-machines, artificial women with fishy eyes, in the time of the massacres and the time of the frenzied vehicles, at this time therefore, there exist solitary, strange rooms, where pale fanatics play old plays, outdated and gratuitous games; it is the destiny of theatre. How is it that this fragile plant, modestly framed by a few intimate concerns, can still survive in this general madness, and how can it still act on someone in this aberrant, infernal uproar? It was still imaginable in Antiquity where, Eliot says it wittily, Aristot should not have counted on the theater as a source of income, but how is it possible today where everything is merchandise and where everything is money?

It seems incredible at first that the theater acts on us so deeply and in a violent and more global way than all the other arts. How come he acted freely in the ancient drama and still manages to set us free today?

In any event, it is not the number that matters as far as the human is concerned. Prom ethee was alone, but this solitary is enough to light the flame that still burns in men. The Premethean, impious, liberating word is heard from above 277

des trétaux; elle parle à certains de la force et de la protestation de l'individu, et à nous tous de ce qui est le plus humain en nous, car nous sommes tous, virtuellement au moins, des hommes. C'est le miracle du théâtre.

Il suffit que quelques-uns parmi nous ressentent la force de la parole proférée par l'homme de chair et de sang. Tout un passé lointain se déroule ici dans le présent, et la volonté, la raison, le coeur de l'homme n'ont plus besoin d'intermédiaire. En lisant une pièce, le spectateur peut créer la représentation selon sa fantaisie, mais il ne la vit qu'à travers ses particularités littéraires. La réalisation scénique elle seule peut fournir la valeur théâtrale spécifique. Le livre peut traiter les événements les plus actuels, mais au moment de la lecture, déjà, il appartient au passé. Et le passé ne peut nous émouvoir comme le présent. Le vieux Hegel écrivait déjà: »Selon moi, aucun drame de devrait être publié, mais devrait être légué au théâtre sous forme de manuscrit, comme chez les Anciens.« (Hegel, *Esthétique*, III, p. 564).

Ainsi, dans le drame antique, un homme vivant traite devant nous les rois d'ivrognes, de coureurs et de malfaiteurs; il ne craint ni les dieux ni les dénonciateurs et il défend son droit de douter, de penser et d'agir, bien qu'il connaisse le destin qui l'attend. Sans égards aux phénomènes qui l'éloignent du réel (scène, costumes, masque) que comporte l'acte théâtral, il vit, se meut, s'andresse à nous comme interlocuteur. Sa parole réveille en nous de vieilles forces oubliées qui peuvent être très dangeureuses bien qu'apparemment restreintes. Et quand les colonels grecs ont récemment interdit la représentation des drames antiques — non pas leur publication mais seulement leur représentation — cela fut jugé comme le comble de la bêtise et de l'intolérence. Nos commentateurs l'ont considéré comme inconcevable. Mais cela n'était ni stupide, ni inconcevable. Ces messieurs ont bien senti la menace d'une parole prononcée sur la scène. Ils se sont sentis véritablement menacés. Et ils ont bien fait de l'interdire. Il faut interdire le théâtre dans les pays sans liberté. Le théâtre est une étincelle qui dure, l'appel directe, la révolte.

Nous ne sommes cependant pas naifs à ce point pour penser que l'acte théâtral incite directement à fait exclue. On connaît bien l'exemple de ces maîtres qui ont pleuré d'émotion on regardant la pièce *La case de l'Oncle Tom*, mais en rentrant chez eux ont continué tranquillement à battre leurs esclaves. Or, Max Frisch a peut-être raison quand il affirme: »Des millions de spectateurs ont vu des pièces de Brecht et les verront encore; je doute cependant qu'un seul parmi eux ait modifié ses opinions politiques.«

D'ailleurs, il n'est pas question qu'un acte théâtral change l'opinion politique du public, la modifie du point de vue idéologique, l'exclut tout à fait des schémas précédents. Pourtant, un drame moderne fait déjà beaucoup s'il arrache le spectateur, confortablement installé dans son fauteuil, à sa position passive et méditative.

Il s'agit plutôt ici de faire entendre, directement et publiquement, des questions et des doutes qui éveilleront incontestablement

trestles; it speaks to some of the strength and protest of the individual, and to all of us of what is most human in us, for we are all, virtually at least, men. This is the miracle of theatre.

It is enough that some of us feel the power of the word spoken by the man of flesh and blood. A whole distant past is unfolding here in the present, and the will, the reason, the heart of man no longer need an intermediary. By reading a play, the spectator can create the representation according to his fantasy, but he only experiences it through his literary parts. Stage performance alone can provide the specific theatrical value. The book can deal with the most current events, but at the moment of reading, it already belongs to the past. And the past cannot move us like the present. The old Hegel already wrote: »In my opinion, no drama should be published, but should be bequeathed to the theater in the form of a manuscript, as among the Ancients.« (Hegel, Aesthetics, III, p. 564).

Thus, in the ancient drama, a living man treats kings before us as drunkards, runners and criminals; he fears neither the gods nor the whistleblowers and he defends his right to doubt, to think and to act, although he knows the fate that awaits him. Regardless of the phenomena that distance him from reality (stage, costumes, mask) involved in the theatrical act, he lives, moves, addresses us as an interlocutor. His word awakens in us old forgotten forces which can be very dangerous although apparently restrained. And when the Greek colonels recently forbade the performance of ancient dramas — not their publication but only their performance — this was judged as the height of stupidity and intolerance. Our commentators considered it inconceivable. But that was neither stupid nor inconceivable. These gentlemen have clearly felt the threat of a word spoken on the stage. They really felt threatened.

And they did well to ban it. The theater must be banned in countries without freedom. The theater is a spark that lasts, the direct appeal, the revolt.

We are not, however, so naive as to think that the theatrical act directly incites the exclusion. We know the example of those masters who wept with emotion while watching the play La cabin de VOncle Tom, but on returning home quietly continued to beat their slaves. Now, Max Frisch may be right when he says: "Millions of spectators have seen plays by Brecht and will see them again; I doubt, however, that any of them have changed their political views."

Moreover, there is no question of a theatrical act changing the political opinion of the public, modifying it from the ideological point of view, excluding it altogether from the preceding schemas. However, a modern drama already does a lot if it tears the spectator, comfortably installed in his armchair, from his passive and meditative position.

It is rather a question here of making heard, directly and publicly,

questions and doubts which will incontestably arouse 278

l'homme endormi, en tout premier lieu, avant le livre, la publicité politique, la propagande. Ces questions n'ont pas d'intermédiaire, elles s'adressent à chacun en tant qu'individu et à tous en tant qu'être générique; elles vont installer de nouveau en nous, si elle s'est dissipée, cette inquiétude proprement humaine qui ne nous quittera plus. Elle ne nous permettra plus de ruminer paisiblement dans la vase de l'existence en nous adaptant, tels des animaux, aux milieux naturels qui nous entourent. Si nous méritons de nous appeler encore des hommes, si tout n'est pas encore endormi jusqu'au plus profond de nous, si quelque chose encore, n'importe quand, peut encore agir sur nous, l'acte théâtral ne peut nous laisser indifferents. Quelque chose s'ouvrira devant nous, quelque chose changera, nous préssentirons et nous désirerons quelque chose. Or, ce vouloir humain a plus de valeur que tous les géants de la civilisation, que toutes les puissances financières et politiques ensemble. Cette affirmation peut paraître bien optimiste â certains; j'ose dire cependant qu'il est impossible de rester complétement sourd à la parole vivante au moment où s'ouvre devant nous, sur la scène, ce qu'il y a de plus humain en nous. Le théâtre nous montre notre propre visage sans intermédiaire. C'est pourquoi l'acte théâtral demeure fête dès les premièrs festins dionysiaques jusqu'à nos jours, non seulement pour l'acteur mais aussi pour le spectateur.

Le paradoxe entre ce qu'il y a d'intimement individuel et de collectif est signifiant également pour notre thèse sur l'existence du théâtre et sur son rôle social ettrêmement important d'ailleurs. L'auteur d'une comédie a un rapport direct avec une certaine réalité sociale. En revanche, il n'est pas indispensable que l'auteur d'une tragédie ait une expérience réelle du social; il lui suffit de donner une confession intime, une biographie exprimant des dilemmes tragiques vécus par l'individu, une expression de se qu'il y a en lui de plus maudit par le destin. Or, ce fait personnel s'exprime à l'aide d'un jeu collectif même quand il s'agit d'un unique monologue qui se déroule sur la scène. Cela non seulement en ce qui concerne les éléments techniques, sans lesquels il n'y a pas de spectacle, mais également les phénomènes sur le plan artistique depuis l'acteur jusqu'au createur réal: le metteur en scène. En réalité, l'acte théâtral est dans son essence un phénomène collectif car il n'existe pas en tant que théâtre s'il ne communique pas avec le public. Un roman sous forme de manuscrit, un tableau s'il reste dans l'atelier, un film sur bobine, toutes ces oeuvres, bien qu'elles ne puissent être évaluées, existent, en fin de compte, en tant qu' oeuvres; par contre, l'acte théâtral n'est nullement ce qu'il est sans la communication; car c'est elle qui le constitue en tant que théâtre. Nous savons tous que cet acte se déroulеant exclusivement pour chacun de nous, se déroule sans nous. C'est ce qu'il a d'individuel, de solitaire, et en même temps de vital. Si le théâtre est véritablement lui-même, il s'adresse à nous tous et chacun de nous peut dire: *de te fabula naratur.*

Tous ces paradoxes apparents pourraient être encore énumerés longuement, mai ils ont tous un seul but: montrer combien l'acte

the sleeping man, first and foremost, before the book, political advertising, propaganda. These questions have no intermediary, they are addressed to

each as an individual and to all as a generic being; they will install again in us, if it has dissipated, this properly human anxiety which will never leave us. It will no longer allow us to ruminate peacefully in the mud of existence by adapting, like animals, to the natural environments that surround us. If we still deserve to call ourselves men, if everything is not yet asleep deep within us, if something still, at any time, can still act on us, the theatrical act cannot leave us indifferent. Something will open before us, something will change, we will sense and desire something. Now, this human will has more value than all the giants of civilization, than all the financial and political powers together. This assertion may seem quite optimistic to some; I dare to say, however, that it is impossible to remain completely deaf to the living word at the moment when what is most human in us opens up before us, on the stage. The theater shows us our own face without in term ed iate. This is why the theatrical act remains a feast from the first Dionysian feasts until today, not only for the actor but also for the spectator.

The paradox between what is intimately individual and what is collective is also significant for our thesis on the existence of theater and on its very important social role.

The author of a comedy has a direct relationship with a certain social reality. On the other hand, it is not essential that the author of a tragedy have real experience of the social; it is enough for him to give an intimate confession, a biography expressing the tragic dilemmas experienced by the individual, an expression of what is most in him that destiny denies. However, this personal fact is expressed with the help of a collective game even when it is a question of a single monologue which takes place on the stage. This not only with regard to the technical elements, without which there is no spectacle, but also the phenomena on the artistic level from the actor to the real creator: the director. In reality, the theatrical act is in its essence a collective phenomenon because it does not exist as theater if it does not communicate with the public. A novel in manuscript form, a painting if it remains in the studio, a film on reel, all these works, although they cannot be evaluated, exist, in the end, as

works; on the other hand, the theatrical act is by no means what it is without communication; because it is what constitutes it as theatre.

We all know that this act taking place exclusively for each of us, takes place without us. This is what is individual, solitary, and at the same time vital. If the theater is truly itself, it is addressed to all of us and each of us can say: de te fabula naratur.

All these apparent paradoxes could be enumerated again at length, but they

théâtral a de responsabilité sociale. Et aussi, bien qu'il puisse paraître tout à fait marginal, combien il nous est essentiel; c'est pour cette raison justement qu'il peut donner plus de sens à notre vie.

Si nous parlons donc d'un besoin du rapport entre l'organisation artistique et la société, il nous faudrait conclure ainsi: dans cette organisation tout doit être soumis à l'expression libre de l'acte créateur, non seulement à cause de l'affirmation du théâtre et de certains créateurs, mais aussi à cause de la société même où vit ce théâtre. On donnant un sens au mode d'existence de cette organisation, nous ne donnons pas seulement un sens au théâtre tout seul, mais aussi nous affirmons le sens du substrat social lui-même. Ceci signifie un rapprochement de la vie et de l'art qui ne peut pas exister en dehors de la vie. En principe, on pourrait identifier les obligations du théâtre à l'égard de la société avec celles de la société à l'égard du théâtre. Il s'en suit que le théâtre ne doit aucunement laisser la société à elle-même; il ne devrait pas s'y résigner comme à quelque chose qui demeurerait toujours étranger à l'art. De même, la société n'a aucun droit d'abandonner le théâtre à lui-même, de ne pas s'en soucier, de lui refuser son aide pour un libre développement de toutes ses capacités artistiques.

Je n'ai pas l'intention d'analyser toutes les formes possibles et réalisables d'une telle organisation. Il semble tout de même, soit dit en passant et pour terminer, que la forme d'organisation, dynamique et vivante, qui conviendrait le mieux à l'acte créateur, pourrait se trouver dans une des formes de l'autogestion. Je suis persuadé aujourd'hui qu'en dehors d'elle, il ne subsiste aucune alternative humaniste. Ou bien le pouvoir, bourgeois ou étatique, sur les hommes, sur leur bien et leur destin, sur toutes les formes de l'activité culturelle y inclus le théâtre, ou bien l'autogestion des hommes dirigeant eux-mêmes et leur propre vie. *Tertium non datur.*

Certes, cela ne signifie ni un manque de sens critique, ce qui contredirait la notion même d'autogestion, ni le panégyrique d'un certain système social. Je connais trop bien les nombreuses difficultés que rencontre l'autogestion. Je n'ignore point les différentes sorte de résistance qu'elle affronte: cette manie des séances, de la persuasion, des duperies et des querelles. Je suis conscient que sous le couvert de l'autogestion règne souvent la médiocrité. Même l'autogestion, hélas, ne peut toujours éviter le danger de la conscience déformée, de l'idéologie au sens de Marx. Pourtant, il semble qu'il faille faire une nette distinction entre une autogestion apparente, truquée, et celle qui repose sur les principes valables d'une vraie autogestion, base d'une libre association des producteurs. Nous ne parlons pas d'une association de parasites bureaucratiques qui se collent à tout ce qu'il y a de créateur pour mieux l'étouffer et le souiller. Nous ne parlons pas non plus d'une association de tuteurs arbitraires qui considèrent d'une manière paternaliste tous les artistes et tous les gens cultivés comme des mineurs qui ont besoin d'être guidés sans cesse, ni d'une association de rouspéteurs désirant juger un travail qu'ils n'ont jamais fait et qu'ils ne con-

theatrical has social responsibility. And also, although it may seem quite marginal, how essential it is to us; it is precisely for this reason that it can

give more meaning to our lives.

If we therefore speak of a need for the relationship between the artistic organization and society, we would have to conclude as follows: in this organization everything must be submitted to the free expression of the creative act, not only because of the affirmation of the theater and certain creators, but also because of the very society in which this theater lives. By giving meaning to the mode of existence of this organization, we are not only giving meaning to the theater alone, but we are also affirming the meaning of the social substrate itself.

This means a coming together of life and art which cannot exist outside of life. In principle, one could identify the obligations of the theater towards society with those of society towards the theatre. It follows that the theater must in no way leave society to itself; he should not resign himself to it as something that would always remain foreign to art.

Likewise, society has no right to abandon the theater to itself.

-even, not to worry about it, to refuse him his help for a free development of all his artistic capacities.

I do not intend to analyze all the possible and feasible forms of such an organization. It seems all the same, by the way and in conclusion, that the form of organization, dynamic and living, which would best suit the creative act, could be found in one of the forms of self-management. I am convinced today that apart from it, there is no humanist alternative. Either power, bourgeois or state, over men, over their property and their destiny, over all forms of cultural activity including the theater, or else the self-management of men directing themselves and their own lives. Tertium undatur.

Of course, this means neither a lack of critical thinking, which would contradict the very notion of self-management, nor the panegyric of a certain social system. I know all too well the many difficulties of self-management. I am not unaware of the different kinds of resistance she faces: this mania for meetings, persuasion, deceit and quarrels. I am aware that under the guise of self-management often reigns mediocrity. Even self-management, alas, cannot always avoid the danger of distorted consciousness, of ideology in Marx's sense. However, it seems that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between an apparent self-management, faked, and that which rests on the valid principles of a true self-management, base of a free association of the producers.

We are not talking about an association of bureaucratic parasites who cling

to everything creative the better to smother and defile it. Nor are we talking about an association of arbitrary guardians who consider in a paternalistic way all artists and all educated people as minors who need constant guidance, nor an association of grumblers wishing to judge a job they've never done and don't know

naissent pas. L'autogestion, c'est en revanche une association de producteurs, conscients de leur droit ainsi que de l'énorme responsabilité sociale de l'activité théâtrale. Tout cela ne s'obtient pas par un décret administratif, car il ne s'agit pas d'un acte, mais d'un processus. Il faudrait tenir compte également que le processus de gestion sociale signifie parfois aussi la gestion dans le domaine culturel et théâtral. Il doit tendre sans cesse à une conversion vers l'autogestion; cela signifie que le personnel du théâtre puisse gérer librement ses créations. De même, il est clair — nous avons essayé de le montrer plus haut — que la tendence à séparer l'art, surtout le théâtre, du reste de la vie sociale, signifie une nette dégradation et une aliénation de sa quintessence. Si on sépare le phénomène théâtral pur ou encore intellectuel, de ce qui est »simplement« social, c'est-à-dire de la production matérielle, on rend impossible la conquête universelle d'une vie qui vaut la peine d'être vécue en tant qu'existence humaine véritable, artistique et réelle. En tant que perspective d'une vie libre pour libre vie de l'art.

are not born. Self-management, on the other hand, is an association of producers, aware of their rights as well as of the enormous social responsibility of theatrical activity. All this is not obtained by an administrative decree, because it is not an act, but a process. It should also

be taken into account that the process of social management sometimes also means management in the cultural and theatrical field. He must constantly strive for a conversion towards self-management; this means that theater staff can freely manage their creations. Likewise, it is clear - we have tried to show it above - that the tendency to separate art, especially the theatre, from the rest of social life, signifies a clear degradation and alienation of its quintessence. If we separate the purely theatrical or even intellectual phenomenon from what is "simply"

social, that is, of material production, the universal conquest of a life worth living as a true, artistic and real human existence is made impossible. As the perspective of a free life for the free life of art.

ECOLOGY AND MARXISM

Gunnar Skirbekk

Bergen

Ecology as a field of study is relatively new, and ecological insights have not yet really penetrated into the political sphere. We have of course had the conference on environmental problems in Stockholm, arranged by the United Nations, and some attempts have been made at starting an ecological discussion inside the Common Market as a result of Sicco Mansholt's letter of February 1972. But this awakening awareness expands slowly — perhaps because politically educated people generally have their background in the social sciences and philosophy, not in biology, and perhaps because ecological information often conflicts with invested political and economic interests. Anyway, until now the ecological movement has often been politically untrained, and political movements have generaly been ecologically unconscious.

We therefore face the task of overcoming this dualistic situation by strengthening the discussion of ecology inside the political milieu. My intention here is merely to contribute to such an initiation of the discussion. I do not pretend to give any solutions or answers.

First I shall briefly present some main points concerning ecological developments. As I have only a weak professional background to judge scientifically the various kinds of information given on this subject, I shall here merely sketch some main points and take it for granted, as an hypothesis, that this sketch is adequate. Then I shall raise the question as to what these ecological points imply for marxism today. That is, I shall proceed according to a strategical game: »If so, what then?«. If this is what ecology tells us, what then are the implications for marxist theory and praxis?

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As a preliminary suggestion, let us say this much: We have to see the ecological development in a *global* and *long-term* perspective. If we merely focus on some short-term, local problem — such as the problem of pullution in the river Thames over a period of five years from now — ecological developments will not appear as a too drastic problem, and solutions may be sought and probably found within the existing political and economic system. Ultimately, however, ecological developments *are* global and *do* imply a long-term perspective. And in this global, long-term perspective we can probably predict that existing economic systems and their ideologies will meet their challenge. To be more concrete, politically: For a limited period of time I think that capitalism probably will be able to tackle the ecological problems, but in the long run existing capitalism, and soviet socialism, will hardly survive as what they are today. — What then? An authoritarian, possibly racist, world state? Or a more democratic and decentralised society? Or, a return to the stone age?

An eco-system ih the sum of the biological community and the physical-chemical milieu, in their mutual functional interconnection — and the biological community is the mutual interconnections of animal, plant and microorganic populations.

Inside the eco-system we have three main functions, and »functionaries«, namely, the producers of the green plant-mass, mainly plants, algae and plant-plancton; the consumers of this green plant-mass, mainly animals; and the decomposers, mainly microorganisms.

By means of these agents, inside the eco-system, we have circulation, transformation and accumulation of energy and matter. A main thing here is that these fundamental ecological processes are based on the trinity of sunlight, photosynthesis and green plants. This is an ecological basis for life.

Now, the resources are in principle of two kinds: those which dispappear (qua resources) after use, such as oil, earth gas and coal, and those which can recycle, such as iron. In both cases the resources of this world are limited, but in the latter case, where a recycling is technically possible, these resources can be utilized to a higher degree than what would have been the case if they had only been used once.

Consequently we have in principle two forms of production:

An extractive form of production, which is based on a use of resources which disappear (as resources) when used, a use of recirculable resources beyond the limits of the present recirculation, and a destruction of the eco-systems themselves by bringing the eco-systems beyond the point where the eco-system is able to regenerate itself. This *extractive* form of production *cannot continue forever*, whatever the speed of extraction. It is like constantly taking food from a larder without ever putting anything into it. Whatever the speed, one day there will be no more food in the larder.

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A reproductive form of production, which is not based on disappearing resources, which uses the recirculable resources within the limits of the recirculation, and which does not destroy the reproductive eco-systems by exploiting or polluting them too strongly. This *reproductive* system can in principle continue forever.

Today we have to a large extent an extractive form of production, which does not only extract the resources of the planet, but which does so with (exponentially) *growing* speed.

The present population growth implies a doubling of the world population every 35 years. The consumption of energy grows with a speed three times that of the population growth, i. e. six times more every 35 years. Still an Indian uses only 1/20 or 1/25 of the energy used by an American, which means that the energy consumption should have grown with a speed much higher than six times more every 35 years, if the developing countries were brought up to the level of energy consumption of the most advanced industrial countries.

Similar tendencies are observed concerning other resources, and pollution.

At the same time the sad fact remains: our resources are limited.

It is therefore pretty certain that this cannot continue, in the long run. The question is: how much is there of the various resources? And how long will they last, if we suppose a certain consumption per capita and a certain size of the world population.

As to energy, there is a theoretical possibility for optimism, since it is possible that fusion energy will be made available in the future. If so, mankind will possess a huge amount of energy, for a long period of time. (Whether such a consumption of energy will lead to other problems, as for instance a drastic heightening of the temperature, is another question.)

In general, minerals can to some extent be brought back into circulation, even when this recirculation process probably will tend to make the commodities more expensive. But even so, the use of these resources have to be kept within their limits.

As to food production, the situation seems to be fairly bad, despite »green revolutions«, and despite the fact that the cultivated area probably can be expanded by 50% (according to FAO), and despite a more extensive use of the oceans. If the population growth is not brought under control, there is probably no chance to produce enough food. And there is little hope that the population explosion will be sufficiently restrained in the near future.

Some people have argued for a *synthetic* production of protein — since the main problem is connected to the production of protein, not of calories. However, this hope seems to be delusive, since such a synthetic production of protein is based on the use of resources which are found in limited amount, and this synthetic production uses more energy and water than traditional agriculture. In short, the synthetic production of protein costs too much and gives too little. As to a *microbiological* production of

A reproductive form of production which is not based on disappearing resources, which uses the recirculable resources within the limits of the recirculation, and which does not destroy the reproductive eco-systems by exploiting or polluting them too strongly. This reproductive system can in principle continue forever.

Today we have to a large extent an extractive form of production, which does not only extract the resources of the planet, but which does so w ith (exponentially) growing speed.

The present population growth implies a doubling of the world population every 35 years. The consumption of energy grows with a speed three times th at of the population growth, i. e. six times more every 35 years. Still an Indian uses only 1/20 or 1/25 of the energy used by an American, which means that the energy consumption should have grown w ith a speed much higher than six times more every 35 years, if the developing countries were brought up to the level of energy consumption of the most advanced industrial countries.

Sim ilar tendencies are observed concerning other resources, and pollution.

At the same time the sad fact remains: our resources are limited.

It is therefore p retty certain th at this cannot continue, in the long run. The question is: how much is there of the various resources? And how long will they last, if we suppose a certain consumption per capita and a certain size of the world population.

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proteins, this too is technically possible, and to some extent practicable. But this too can only be a supplement to ordinary agricultural food production, where the chemical industry is already deeply involved (to the extent that today hundreds of millions live from this surplus production, due to chemical industry). To conclude, the synthetic and semi-synthetic production of protein is no short-cut. We shall have to rely on the productivity of the soil, i. e. on green plants, certainly supported by technology — but technology only is not enough.

How many people, then, can this earth nourish? The answers vary. Some say that with the average standard of living of the developing countries there can be from 10 to 20 thousand millions, and some say that with the average standard of living of the most developed countries the world cannot even afford to nourish the present population of 3,6 thousand millions. Sicco Mansholt, for instance, asserts that this planet can only afford one thousand millions if all these have the standard of living of the advanced industrial countries.

Predictions for the ecological development are difficult to make for many reasons. One reason being that this development to some extent depends on what we think and do. However, the Forrester-group, at the Massachusetts Institute ot Technology, has tried to define some central factors (population, pollution, resources, standard of living, investments) and their interconnections, and these data have been put into an electronic data-machine. The machine tells us that the crisis will begin about 30 years from now, and culminate between 2020 and 2060. In order to limit the extension of this crisis as much as possible, we should, according to this machine, decrease the use of coal and metals by 75%, decrease the speed in the destruction of nature by 50%, decrease the investments in industry by 40%, decrease the production of food by 20%, and decrease the birth rate by 30%. All other dispositions will give a worse result, the machine says.

This certainly implies deep changes in our societies, both capitalist and socialist. A main point is that a growth economy has to be abandoned, according to these data. That is, traditional economic growth, in terms of brutto national product, is said to be impossible (which does not imply that human growth is impossible, cf. the question of human growth in the ecologically balanced ideal states of Plato and Aristotle). Sicco Mansholt, for one, has argued for this zero-growth economy, in the Common Market (for instance in an interview in *Le Nouvel Observateur* Paris, June the 12.—18., pp. 71—88 — my translation):

»I understood that it is impossible to get out of the difficulties by means of adjustments, it's the whole of our system we have to reevaluate«.

»It is not even a question of a zero-growth, but of a growth less than zero«.

»We have to simplify life, reduce consumption, in an absolute sense«.

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»Briefly, it is necessary to establish a balanced economic order, where the production is not anarchical, where the consumption is reduced, where the resources are taken care of and used in a reasonable manner, where pollution is reduced to a minimum, and where the techniques of recirculation are utilized to a maximum«.

It is not astonishing that Mansholt has met opposition inside the Common Market, both from the right and the left. Nor is it astonishing that such ecological reflections create a certain uneasiness in the developing countries, as was clairly demonstrated at the ecological conference in Stockholm in 1972: Does this mean that the rich people now ask the poor people to give up forever all hope of getting a materially better life?

However, the question is not primarily whether we like or dislike the conclusions drawn by the MIT-machine, but whether the conclusions are correct, i. e. unavoidable.

This is what the specialists, from the various fields involved, have to decide — a task which is certainly not easy, partly because of the interdisciplinary character of the subject.

Even if we do not know enough, there seems to be sufficiently strong evidence for starting to reflect on what we should do. Whatever can and will happen in the near future, we seem to know fairly well what will be the final result (if there will be a future society at all): A society based on reproductive eco-systems, an economy with recirculation of minerals and an ecologically well balanced agriculture, founded on the regenerating forces of green plants. Population, consumption and pollution will have to be kept under control. A certain centralised self-supplying and self-managing local communities are desirable, for ecological reasons.

Personally, I do not believe in an eco-catastrophe, striking the whole planet like an immediate deluge. It seems to me that we probably will face a growing eco-crisis, which strikes different classes and countries in different ways and at different times. And our problem of solving this eco-crisis is not just a technical one — it may well be that a cynic racist world-regime can tackle the eco-crisis by technological means (military suppression and genocide). Our problem is how to solve the eco-crisis without losing civilisation.

*

If by capitalism we understand a society where for one thing a profit-seeking economy governs politics, it follows that capitalism is not possible in the future, since a future society for ecological reasons demands political control of the economy (i. e., if there in the future will be enough resources left to permit, and demand, some centralised control of the use of resources). In the long-term ecological perspective the problem is thus not capitalism-or-socialism, but rather socialism-or-»fascism« — that is: a democratic, egalitarian world-wide control *or* a totalitarian, hierarchical and possibly racist, world-wide control. And this so-

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We have now reached the point where the question emerges: Granted that our sketch on ecology is correct, what does this imply for marxism?

Marx himself touched the problem of ecology (*Das Kapital*, I, shap. 13, pp. 528 and 529—530, Berlin 1971):

»Mit dem stets wachsenden Übergewicht der städtischen Bevölkerung, die sie in großen Zentren zusammenhäuft, häuft die kapitalistische Produktion einerseits die geschichtliche Bewegungskraft der Gesellschaft, stört sie anderseits den Stoffwechsel zwischen Mensch und Erde, d. h. die Rückkehr der vom Menschen in der Form von Nahrungs- und Kleidungsmitteln vernutzten Bodenbestandsteile zum Boden, also die ewige Naturbedingung dauernder Bodenfruchtbarkeit.«

»Und jeder Fortschritt der kapitalistischen Agrikultur ist nicht nur ein Fortschritt in der Kunst, den Arbeiter, sondern zugleich in der Kunst, den Boden zu berauben, jeder Fortschritt in Steigerung seiner Fruchtbarkeit für eine gegebne Zeitfrist zugleich ein Fortschritt im Ruin der dauernden Quellen dieser Fruchtbarkeit. Je mehr ein Land, wie die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika z. B., von der großen Industrie als dem Hintergrund seiner Entwicklung ausgeht, desto rascher dieser Zerstörungsprozeß. Die kapitalistische Produktion entwickelt daher nur die Technik und Kombination des gesellschaftlichen Produktions-prozesses, indem sie zugleich die Springquellen alles Reichtums untergräbt: die Erde und den Arbeiter«.

We notice, for one thing, that Marx does speak of *Naturbedingungen*, »natural conditions«. However, ecology as a field of study, and ecology as a crisis, was for historical reasons relatively unknown to Marx. (The word ecology was introduced in 1866 by the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel.) And further, according to orthodox marxist theory the capitalist exploitation of man and earth should be overcome by a rational international control, by socialism, at a relatively early stage: Capitalism led to impoverishment, relative and absolute, and crises of overproduction. — However, capitalism has more or less managed to tackle the overproduction crises by introducing a partial mass-consumption. Thereby the capitalist productivity has reached dimensions unforeseen by Marx, but which led to the present-day growing ecological crisis. This is the change from liberalist capitalism to late-capitalism: the state builds out the infrastructure for the capitalist economy, such as schools, hospitals and social institutions. Capitalists pursue a common interest with trade-unions in keeping up production *and consumption*, which implies a calculated increase in education, well-being and in salaries for the workers.

Inside the capitalist countries the growing eco-crisis can probably be analysed in marxis terms, but in marxist terms revised

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"With the ever-increasing predominance of the urban population, which gathers them together in large centers, capitalist production on the one hand accumulates the historical motive power of society, and on the other hand disturbs the metabolism between man and earth, i. H. the return of the soil components used by humans in the form of food and clothing to the soil, i.e. the eternal natural condition of permanent soil fertility.«

"And every advance in capitalist agriculture is not only an advance in the art of robbing the worker, but also in the art of robbing the soil; every advance in increasing its fertility for a given period of time is at the same time an advance in the ruin of the permanent Sources of this fertility. The more a country, like the United States of North America e.g. For example, if big industry is the background of its development, this process of destruction will be all the faster.

Capitalist production therefore only develops the technique and combination of the social production process, while at the same time undermining the springs of all wealth: the land and the worker'.

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according to the principles of ecology: Capitalism does lead to self-destroying crises, not to the predicted ones, but to an even more serious crisis, a global ecological crisis.

Some marxist rethinking seems therefore necessary.

The concept of »natural conditions« (Naturbedingungen) has to be reevaluated. Not only productive forces and relations of production, but also the natural conditions of production, belong to the base (Unterbau).

The theory of crisis will have to be rethought, together with the theory of impoverishment and revolution — roughly in this way: In an ecological perspective we have a growing absolute impoverishment, mainly of people in underdeveloped countries, as well as various forms of relative impoverishment mainly among people in the developed countries. In so far we can expect a certain polarization, or increased »class-struggle«. But the eco-crisis may hit the various groups in different ways and at different times. A common basis for global proletarian solidarity will therefore probably be very difficult to obtain. And the danger of a certain »fascistification« of the well-fed workers, mainly in the developed countries, is a real one.

This involves that the very concept of a worker will have to be reexamined, roughly thus: Even when a skilled worker in Detroit and an agricultural labourer in India both do not possess the means of production, and both give surplus value to someone else, there are some material reasons why the American worker and the Indian worker may feel as antagonists rather than as comrades. Slightly overdramatized: the one eats the bread which the other cannot afford to eat.

But how shall the poor worker in the underdeveloped country influence capitalism in the developed countries? For one thing, this worker has hardly any effective strike-weapon against the capitalist headquarters abroad.

On the other hand, on an abstract level there certainly exists a common interest of all men: to avoid an eco-catastrophe. This point, too, is important for the concept of class-struggle. However, if the eco-crisis will not be sought solved in an egalitarian, but in an ethnocentric (racist) direction, the struggle, when not »class--struggle« in an orthodox sense, will probably gain in strength.

As to socialism itself, at least two essential changes in the classical soviet model are necessary: a change from economic growth in a traditional sense to ecological stability, preferably in self-supplying and self-managing local communities (since this is ecologically cheaper), and a change from a pan-technological enthusiasm to a higher evaluation of agriculture in relation to industry.

This involves a change in values and attitudes: a cultivating attitude towards nature, not an aggressive and exploiting one, and an emphasis on qualitative values — human (cultural, social, political) values — and not on traditional economic growth.

These I think are main topics in such a rethinking of marxist theory and praxis. To be sure, it is not just a question of intro-

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In Yugoslavia, I suppose, ecology is for the time being not felt as an immediate problem. The immediate problem is still how to raise the standard of living. On the other hand, exactly because Yugoslavia is not fully developed, it is still possible to learn from the ecological mistakes of other people.

And maybe the Yugoslav self-managing system is a relatively favourable system, ecologically. At any rate, Yugoslavia is a country with an intensive and interesting discussion of marxist problems, and I am thus curious to see what Yugoslav marxists will find out concerning the relation between ecology and marxism.[1]

[1] This paper was presented as an introduction to a *working-group* on ecology, arranged at the Korčula Summer School 1972.

The literature on ecology is huge, and growing rapidly. One of the best introductory works, with comments on the question of eco-politics, is A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL, *The Ecologist* London 1972 (vol. 2, No. 1, January 1972).

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MARXISMUS UND LITERATUR

Dimitar Dimitrov

Skopje

Das Verhältnis des Marxismus, als einem philosophischen System, und der Literatur, als einem System der Kunst, überhaupt das Verhältnis der Philosophie und der Kunst kann relevant unter der Voraussetzung der systemimmanenten Autonomie der beiden Relate relevant gedacht werden, also unter einer Voraussetzung, die die Achtung der spezifischen Strukturen bedeutet, innerhalb derer sie sich als Manifestation spezifischen Charakters und als Vokation realisieren, was auch ermöglicht, daß sie nicht durch einen, sondern eben unterschiedliche Termini bezeichnet werden. Wenn das Prinzip der Autonomie überanstrengt wird, was im Falle der Literatur oft geschieht, dann wird das Verhältnis der Literatur und Philosophie entproblematisiert, denn aus der Literatur wird das reduziert, was sie zur Literatur macht, sie identifiziert sich falsch auf Grund einiger sekundärer oder Begleiteigenschaften, die andererseits der Philosophie systemimmanent sein können (Gnoseologie oder Ethik), und so reflektiert sich das Verhältnis der beiden Relate, die in ihrer Struktur unterschiedlich sind, als Verhältnis der Gleichen zum Gleichen.

So sehr dem Eingeweihten auch die Autonomie innerhalb der Literatur natürlich erscheinen mag, ist sie historisch gesehen doch erst neueren Datums: sie reicht cca zweihundert Jahre zurück, noch dazu als Standpunkt, die nie, auch heute nicht, auf mehr Verständnis stieß. Dem entgegen existieren Heteronomien unterschiedlichster Art, die die Unterführung der Literatur unter ein anderes System gemeinsam haben (Religions-, Moral- der gnoseologisches System u.A.).

Eine der vielen Formeln dieser Unterführung gab Voltaire zu seiner Zeit; er meinte, daß Tragödie oder Komödie »Lektionen in Tugend, Gerechtigkeit und Anstand« sind, »die Kunst unterrichtet Anstand durch Handlung und Dialog«.[1]

[1] Angeführt nach: D. Huisman, *L' esthétique*, PUF, Paris, 1967, S. 106.

MARXISM AND LITERATURE

Dimitar Dimitrov

Shop you

The relationship between Marxism, as a philosophical system, and literature, as an art system, and the relationship between philosophy and art in general, can be thought of as relevant under the assumption that the two relations are autonomy that is inherent in the system, i.e. under a assumption that the Respect for the specific structures means within which they are realized as a manifestation of a specific character and as a vocation, which also makes it possible for them to be designated not by one but by different terms.

If the principle of autonomy is overstretched, which often happens in the case of literature, then the relationship between literature and philosophy is unproblematized, because literature is reduced to what makes it literature, it falsely identifies itself as fundamental some secondary or concomitant properties which, on the other hand, may be intrinsic to philosophy (gnoseology or ethics), and so the relation of the two relations, differing in structure, is reflected as the relation of the same to the same.

As natural as autonomy within literature may seem to the initiated, historically it is of recent date: it dates back about two hundred years, and as a point of view that has never, not even today, met with greater understanding. On the other hand, there are heteronomies of the most varied kind, which have in common the subordination of literature to another system (religious, moral, gnoseological system, etc.).

Voltaire gave one of the many formulas for this underpass in his day; he held that tragedy or comedy are "lessons in virtue, justice, and decency," "art teaches decency through action and dialogue."1

1 References: D. Huism an, Ethics, PUF, Paris, 1967, p.

In unserer Zeit wird mit weniger Ehrlichkeit, Mystifizierung das heteronome Prinzip bestimmt-durch Formeln über die moralische, soziale oder erkenntnismäßige Fiktion der Literatur[2] -aber es handelt sich immer um ein und denselben Geist der entweder von außen motiviert wird oder aber nicht zur Unterscheidung der Manifestationen alles Menschseins herangereift ist. Deshalb hat, als es in den Zwanziger- Jahren zum Prozeß der Selbstbewußtmachung der schönen Literatur kam, Spingarn geschrieben, daß »die Vereinigten Staaten das einzige zivilisierte Land sind, in denen das moralische Urteil mehr gilt als das ästhetische, wenn as sich um ein Kunstwerk handelt«[3], dies muß als Urteil eines Menschen aufgefaßt werden ,der zu sehr Optimist war mit Rücksicht auf den Stand der Dinge außerhalb seiner Heimat. Der Zusammenstoß der heteronomen und des autonomen Zugangs ein halbes Jahrhundert später wurde in keinem Land ausgetragen und zu Ende geführt.

Im Gegenteil, dieser Zusammenstoß hat vielleicht an Schärfe und Aktualität gewonnen: er durchdrang alle marxistischen Studien über Literatur und alle Diskussionen zwischen Marxisten und Nicht-Marxisten. So wurde diese Problematik, die keinesfalls spezifisch für den Marxismus ist, gerade im Zusammenhang mit dem Marxismus ausgenützt, um dabei dem Standpunkt der sozialpolitischen Heteronomie in den Augen der Kritiker des Marxismus die Bedeutung eines Synonyms des marxistischen Zugangs zu geben, während unter den Kritikern, die sich selbst als Marxisten betrachten, Uneinigkeit auftauchte, was der wahre marxistische Zugang zur Literatur ist und zur Kunst überhaupt, die an ein Chaos grenzt.

In dieser Kakophonie gibt es Stimmen, die den marxistischen Standpunkt in der Poetik völlig verneinen, indem sie behaupten, daß der »Marxismus den literarischen Standpunkt vollständig vernichtet«, »daß es ihm nie wahrhaft um die Literatur und die Probleme der Literatur geht«[4], aber as gibt auch Anfechtungen unter den Marxisten selbst, so daß zum Beispiel die Theoretiker des sozialistischen Realismus nicht den marxistischen Charakter der Poetik und Ästhetik Lukacs[5] anerkennen, während Lukacs eines der Hauptprinzipien des sozialistischen Realismus, die sogenannte revolutionäre Romantik, die er mit dem Voluntarismus in der

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[2] In der zeitgenössischen Theorie gibt es Tendenzen, die genannten und andere Funktionen der Literatur in einen synthetischen Begriff zu erfassen. So gebraucht, z. B. G. Morpurgo-Taljabue als eiene solchen umfassenden Begriff die Formel »pädagogische Konzeption«, unter den er auch Lenins Standpunkt über die Literatur der Partei rechnet (*Savremena estetika*, Nolit, Beograd, 1968, S. 293), während A. Banfi von der »ethisch-sozialen Funktion der Kunst« spricht (*Arte e socialita*, dies in dem Buch: *Atti del III congresso internazionale di estetica*, Torino, 1957, S. 385).

[3] J. E. Spingarn, *The American Critic*, im Buch: *Literary Opinion in America* Ed. M. O. Harper-Torchbooks, New York and Evanstown, 1962, S. 126.

[4] W. K. Wimsatt — C. Brooks, *Literary Critism*, Vintage Books, New York, 1957, S. 470—71.

[5] Siehe I. Slavovs Buch, *Marksovoto esteticestko nasledstvo*, »Nauka i iskustvo«, Sofija, 1972.

In our time, with less honesty, less mystification, the heteronomous principle is determined - by formulas about the moral, social or epistemological fiction of literature2 - but it is always one and the same spirit that is either motivated from outside or not has matured to discern

the manifestations of all being human. Therefore, when the process of self-awareness of fiction came about in the 1920s, Spingarn wrote that "the United States is the only civilized country in which moral judgment prevails over aesthetic judgment, if as it is a work of art«3, this must be understood as the judgment of a person who was too optimistic with regard to the state of affairs outside his homeland. The clash of heteronomous and autonomous approaches half a century later was not fought out and brought to an end in any country.

On the contrary, this clash has perhaps gained in sharpness and topicality: it permeated all Marxist studies of literature and all discussions between Marxists and non-Marxists. This problem, which is by no means specific to Marxism, was exploited in connection with Marxism in order to give the point of view of socio-political heteronomy the meaning of a synonym of the Marxist approach in the eyes of the critics of Marxism, while disagreement has emerged among critics who consider themselves Marxists as to what is the true Marxist approach to literature, and to art in general, which verges on chaos.

In this cacophony there are voices who completely deny the Marxist standpoint in poetics, claiming that "Marxism completely annihilates the literary standpoint," "that it is never truly concerned with literature and the problems of literature «1, but there are also disputes among the Marxists themselves, so that, for example, the theorists of socialist realism do not recognize the Marxist character of Lukacs' poetics and aesthetics5, while Lukacs one of the main principles of socialist realism, the so-called revolutionary romanticism, 2 In contemporary theory there are tendencies to capture these and other functions of literature in a synthetic concept.

So used, e.g. B. G. Morpurgo-Taljabue uses the formula “pedagogical conception” as one such comprehensive term, under which he also counts Lenin’s point of view on the literature of the party (Savrem en a estetik a, Nolit, Beograd , 1968, p. 293), while A. Banfi speaks of the »ethical-social function of art« (A rte e socialita, this in the book: A tti del

III international congress of aesthetics, Turin, 1957, S. 385).

3 J. E. Spingarn, The A m erica n C ritic, im Buch: L ite r a r y Opinion in

America Ed. M. O. Harper-Torchbooks, New York and Evanstown, 1962, p.

4 W. K. W im satt — C. Brooks, L ite r a r y C ritism , Vintage Books, N ew York, 1957, S. 470—71.

4 S ieh e I. S la v ovs B uch, M arksovoto e stetice stk o n a sle d stv o ,

Ökonomie und dem Personenkult in der Politik[6] vergleicht, als nichtmarxistisch verwirft, aber er kritisiert auch Franz Mehring wegen unmarxistischer Inkonsequenz.[7]

Durch diese gegenseitigen Anfechtungen wird bald eine bald die andere Persönlichkeit in Frage gestellt. Wohlmeinende befinden sich hier scheinbar im Zweifel, wem sie glauben sollen und suchen die Lösung im Prozeß der Reduktion, durch die sie den Marxismus »säubern«- einmal von Stalin und Mao, dann von Lenin und Trotzki, manchmal kommt es so weit, daß sie sich auch Engels gegenüber reserviert verhalten, indem sie ein verlockendes Prinzip formulieren: zurück zum ursprünglichen Marx.

Wie die theoretischen Schwierigkeiten lösen, die sich hier ergeben?

Das Prinzip der Rückkehr zum ursprünglichen Marx erscheint nicht real, unhistorisch und unmarxistisch. Durch die Reduzierung der Poetik und Ästhetik des Marxismus auf Marx selbst, durch die Einklammerung des einen oder des anderen, oder aller der Marxisten nach Marx wird eine Diskontinuität eingeführt, ein Vakuum in der Geschichte des Bewußtseins. Wir würden uns so in die Lage versetzen, daß wir über diese Wüste hinweg, die sich von Marx her erstreckt in die Weite blickten und Marx selbst herannufen, fest daran glaubend, daß er -verloren oder in den falschen Köpfen fast ein Jahrhundert verknacksterst wieder mit uns seine Athentizität erlangt. Es ist nur natürlich, daß nach uns Menschen kommen, die, von derselben Logik geleitet, ebenfalls danach streben, zum ursprünglichen Marx zurückzukehren, und daß uns diese ebenfalls in Klammern setzen würden; nacht ihnen kämen wieder neue Menschen, die sie ebenfalls einklammerten und so weiterimmer würde der Raum nach Marx frei, natürlich auch der vor ihm, nur Marx bliebe der einzige kohärente, fehlerfreie Denker.

Um diese geisterhafte Vorstellung von Marx aufzugeben, muß das scholastische Räsonieren aufgegeben werden und man muß beginnen, autonom zu denken. Wenn man so denkt, ist es nicht schwer die Wurzel des Irrens um die Problematik der marxistischen Poetik und Ästhetik zu erfassen: der »Hauptschuldige« ist niemand anders, als Karl Marx selbst. Sein Zugang zum ästhetischen Phänomen ist paradoxal, und so ist es möglich, daß sich Vertreter verschiedener, sogar gegensätzlicher theoretischer Orientation auf ihn berufen.

Es ist hier nicht möglich, in der notwendigen Breite darauf einzugehen, und so werde ich nur auf das Wesen des Paradoxons im Zugang von Marx zur Literatur und Kunst zeigen. Der Grund für die Inkohärenz des ästhetischen Denkens von Marx liegt im Bestehen zweier Gesichtspunkte. Marx betrachtete die Kunst von zwei Seiten, und er sah sie auf zwei verschiedene Arten.

Die erste Art stellt das Betrachten des Marx, des Humanisten und Philosophen dar. Von diesem Gesichtpunkt aus versteht er

[6] G. Lukacs, *Die heutige Bedeutung des kritischen Realismus*, Kultura Beograd, 1959, S. 132.

[7] G. Lukacs, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ästhetik*, Kultura, Beograd, 1959, im Abschnitt über Mehring.

compares economics and the personality cult in politics6 as non-Marxist, but he also criticizes Franz Mehring for non-Marxist inconsistency.7

Through these mutual challenges, now one personality, now the other, is called into question. Well-meaning ones seem to be in doubt as to who to believe and seek the solution in the process of reduction by which they "cleanse" Marxism - first of Stalin and Mao, then of Lenin and Trotsky, sometimes going so far as to also behave reservedly towards Engels by formulating an enticing principle: back to the original Marx.

How to solve the theoretical difficulties that arise here?

The principle of returning to the original Marx seems unreal, unhistorical and un-Marxist. By reducing the poetics and aesthetics of Marxism to Marx himself, by bracketing one or the other, or all, of the Marxists after Marx, a discontinuity is introduced, a vacuum in the history of consciousness. We would put ourselves in such a position that we could look across this desert stretching out into the distance from Marx and call upon Marx himself, firmly believing that he - lost or in the wrong mind for almost a year rh h u n d ert regained its authenticity with us in the most cracked way. It is only natural that after us come people who, guided by the same logic, also strive to return to the original Marx, and that these would also put us in brackets; After them came new people who also bracketed them and so on - the space after Marx would always be free, of course also the one before him, only Marx would remain the only coherent, error-free thinker.

In order to abandon this ghostly notion of Marx, one must

the scholastic reasoning has to be abandoned and one has to

begin to think for themselves. Thinking in this way, it is not difficult to grasp the root of the error surrounding the problematic of Marxist poetics and aesthetics: the "main culprit" is none other than Karl Marx himself. His approach to the aesthetic phenomenon is paradoxical, and so it is possible that representatives of different, even contradictory, theoretical orientations refer to him.

It is not possible to go into this in the necessary breadth here, and so I will only point out the essence of the paradox in Marx's approach to literature and art. The reason for the incoherence of Marx's aesthetic thinking lies in the existence of two points of view. M arx looked at art from two sides, and he saw it in two different ways.

The first way is looking at Marx, the humanist and philosopher. From this point of view he understands

G. L ukacs, Die heutige Bedeu tung's Criticism of Realism, Belgrade Culture, 1959, p.

7 G. Lukacs, Contributions to the history of aesthetics, Kultura, Beograd, 1959, in the section on Mehring.

die Kunst als autunome Äußerung des menschlichen generischen Wesens und gibt ihr in seiner Axiologie einen hohen Platz, als Wert, der in Zukunft allen Menschen zugänglich sein wird. In der *Debatte über die Presse* stellt sich Marx dem heteronomen Zugang direkt entgegen, der im literarischen Werk das Mittel für ein äußeres Ziel sieht und sagt, daß die literarischen Werke »sich selbst Ziel sind«[8]. Als er in seiner Dissertation über die Götter Epikurs, über diese selbstzufriedenen, wertlosen und bedürfnislosen Wesen schreibt, sagt er, daß dies keine Fiktionen sind, sondern Werke der griechischen Kunst[9].

Durch Analyse[10] kann festgestellt werden, daß die anthropologische, philosophische Vision, besonders sein Begriff des menschlichen generischen Wesens, die Unterscheidung zwischen freier und entfremdeter Arbeit, daß dies auf seiner künstlerischen Erfahrung beruht. Die Kunst ist also die Grundkonstituente der Philosophie von Marx und die Leitidee jedes Lebens- und Gesellschaftprozesses: die künstlerische und ästhetische Äußerung des Menschen. stellt das Recht des Menschseins dar und als solches hat es den Wert des Thelos historischer Entwicklung.

In dieser Perspektive ist das autonome Prinzip der Kunst und Literatur impliziert. Man kann sagen, daß dieser Standpunkt in vielem in *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft* einen expliziten Ausdruck gefunden hat.

Der andere Standpukt aber impliziert eine heteronome Position in Poetik und Ästhetik. Wenn Marx daran arbeitet, seine Philosophie praktisch zu verwirklichen, wenn er seine gesellschafts-ökonomische Kritik des Kapitalismus und seine revolutionäre Tätigkeit entwickelt, stellt er die Kunst in andere Relationen, sieht sie vor allem als Mitarbeiter an der allgemeinen Sache, als eines der Mittel zum Umsturz der alten und zum Aufbau der neuen Welt. Was er einmal als strategisches Ziel ansieht, betrachtet er zum anderen Mal als taktisches Mittel. Nun haben seine »literarischen« Reflexionen (die anderen Künste wurden als für diesen Zweck nicht angemessen nicht berücksichtigt) auch den sogen. »passenden« Charakter, auf den er verweist, wie übrigens auch Karl

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[8] Marx-Engels, *Über die Kunst und Literatur*, Kultura, Beograd, 1960, S. 518.

[9] Marx schreibt: »Man hat gespottet über diese Götter des Epikur, die, Menschen ähnlich, in den Intermundien der wirklichen Welt wohnen keinen Körper, sondern einen Quasikörper, kein Blut, sondern Quasiblut haben und in seliger Ruhe verharrend, kein Fleben erhören, unbekümmert um uns und die Welt, wegen ihrer Schönheit ihrer Majestät und ihrer vorzüglichern Natur, keines Gewinnes wegen, verehrt werden.

Und doch sind diese Götter nicht Fiktion des Epikur. Sie haben existiert. *Es sind die plastischen Götter der griechischen Kunst*... Die theoretische Ruhe ist der Hauptmoment des griechischen Göttercharakters, wie auch *Aristoteles* sagt: »Was das beste ist, braucht keiner Handlung, denn es selbst ist der Zweck« (K. Marx, F. Engels, *Werke, Ergänzungsland*, Erster Teil, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1968, I. 283.

[10] Dies tat ich teilweise 1964. in meiner Magisterarbeit, die später unter dem Titel: *Zivotot i umetnosta. Prilog kon osleduvanjeto na umetnickata specificnost* erschien, Makedonska knjiga, Skopje, 1967, S. 163—165.

art as an autonomous expression of the human generic being and gives it a high place in its axiology, as a value that will be accessible to all human beings in the future. In the debate about the press, Marx directly opposes the heteronomous approach, which sees in the literary work the means to

an external end and says that literary works "are an end in themselves"8. When he writes in his dissertation about the gods of Epicurus, about these self-satisfied, worthless and needless beings, he says that these are not fictions but works of Greek art9.

Through analysis10 it can be stated that the anthropological, philosophical vision, especially his concept of the human generic being, the distinction between free and alien labor, that this is based on his artistic experience. Art is therefore the basic constituent of Marx's philosophy and the guiding principle of every life and social process: the artistic and aesthetic expression of man.

represents the right of being human and as such has the value of the thelos of historical development.

In this perspective the autonomous principle of art and literature is implied. It can be said that this point of view found explicit expression in much of Kant's Critique of Judgment.

But the other point of view implies a heteronomous position in poetics and aesthetics. When M arx works on putting his philosophy into practice, when he develops his socio-economic critique of capitalism and his revolutionary activity, he places art in other relationships, sees it primarily as a collaborator in the general cause, as a one of the means of overthrowing the old world and building the new.

What he sees as a strategic goal on the one hand, he sees on the other as a tactical means. Now his "literary"

Reflections (the other arts were not considered as not appropriate for this purpose) also the so-called. 8 M arx-E ngels, V b er die K u n st u nd L itera tu r, K ultura, Beograd, 1960, p. 518.

9 M arx writes: “People mocked these gods of Epicurus, who, like humans, dwell in the intermediaries of the real world, not a body, but a quasi-body, not blood, but Q have blood and remain in blissful peace, hear no life, careless about us and the world, because of their beauty, their majesty and their excellent nature, not for the sake of gain, are worshiped.

And yet these gods are not the fiction of Epicurus. You existed.

They are the p la stic gods of greek art. . . Theoretical calm is the main moment of the Greek god character, as Aristotle also says: "What is best needs no action, for it itself is the end" (K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, supplementary country, first part, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1968, I. 283.

10 I did this in part in 1964. in my master's thesis, which later was entitled: Z ivotot i u m etnosta. P rilog kon osled u va n je to na u m etn ick a ta

specific publication, Macedonska knjiga, Skopje, 1967, S. 163—165.

Korsch[11], der sich so illustrieren läßt: »Der wahre Unterschied zwischen Byron und Shelley liegt darin: Diejenigen, die sie verstehen und lieben, halten es für ein Glück, daß Byron in seinem sechsunddreißigsten Jahr starb, denn er wäre ein reaktionärer Bourgeois geworden hätte er länger gelebt: sie bedauern es dagegen, daß Shelley mit neunundzwanzig starb, da er war durch und durch ein Revolutionär und hatte stets zur Vorhut des Sozialismus gehört«.[12] Marx denkt hier darüber nach, was wohl Plato »als Staatsgründer« dazu gesagt hätte[13]: er wertet und ordnet alles vom Aspekt der Arbeit an der neuen Gesellschaft.

Der inkohärente, gegensätzliche Zugang von Marx zur Literatur und Kunst rief vier Denkrichtungen, vier verschiedene Standpunkte hervor.

Eine Strömung stellt den theoretischen Beitrag in der Poetik und Ästhetik dar, den Engels, Mehring, Lenin, Trotzki, Woronski, Lukacs und Sartre lieferten. Bei diesen Autoren finden wir sowohl den einen als auch den anderen Standpunkt von Marx, was den Dualismus der Kriterien bedingt, des ästhetischen und des pragmatischen, auch die dramatische textuelle Spannung, in der autonome und heteronome Prinzipien auf einander stoßen. Einerseits sind sie in der Macht des literarischen Werks, was sie dessen bewußt werden läßt, daß sie einer autonomen Sphäre zugehörig sind, andererseits sind sie bestrebt, die Literatur in ein breiteres sozialpolitisches System miteinzubeziehen. Dabei drückt sich dieses Paradox durch verschiedene Modifizierungen von Autor zu Autor aus.

Theoretisch ist diese Strömung aufregend und interessant.

Die andere Strömung ist massenhaft vertreten. Sie verbleibt nur auf dem zweiten Betrachtungspunkt, sie situiert die Literatur zur Errichtung der neuen, sozialistischen Welt. Das autonome Bewußtsein geht hier völlig verloren, die Literatur wird hier als Mittel der Kritik oder des Lobes verstanden, unmittelbar erkenntnismäßig und aktivistisch, ihr gesamtes Wesen wird verschoben, ihr Sinn, ihr Ruf stehen außer ihr, ihr Wert ist der gesellschaftlichen Anpassung und der Wirkungskraft angemessen, sie wird durch ein äußerliches, manchmal weiter, manchmal enger definiertes System bedeckt. In dieser Perspektive wird die völlige Heteronomie eingeführt, das ästhetische Prinzip der Literatur ist vollständig in Gefahr, dem Schaffen werden Normen und von anderen deduzierte Aufgaben aufgedrängt — von anderen ideologischen, politischen und ähnlichen Systemen, während die Schaffenden und ihre Werke außerästhetischen Urteilen und Verantwortungen unterzogen werden. Damit wird die Literatur als System destruiert, Tinjanov würde sagen »deformiert«[14], es entsteht ein Systemgewirr, in dem alle Werte umgekehrt, werden. Das Schaffen »nach den

[11] K. Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie,* Komunist, Beograd, 1970, S. 78, 91.

[12] K. Marx, F. Engels, W. I. Lenin *Über Kultur, Ästhetik, Literatur,* Leipzig, 1969, S. 601.

[13] Plato, *Der Staat,* Kultura, Beograd, 1966, S. 67.

[14] J. Tinjanov, *O književnoj evoluciji* im Band *Die Poetik des russischen Formalismus,* Prosveta, Beograd, 1970, S. 298.

Korsch11 who is illustrated as follows: 'The real difference between Byron and Shelley is that those who understand and love them consider it fortunate that Byron died in his thirty-sixth year, for he would have become a reactionary bourgeois he lived longer: they regret, on the other

hand, that Shelley died at twenty-nine, since he was a revolutionary through and through and had always belonged to the vanguard of socialism.' had said111: he evaluates and organizes everything from the aspect of work on the new society.

Marx's incoherent, contrasting approach to literature and art gave rise to four schools of thought, four different points of view.

A current represents the theoretical contribution in poetics and aesthetics made by Engels, Mehring, Lenin, Trotsky, Voronsky, Lukacs and Sartre. In these authors we find both the one and the other point of view of Marx, which determines the dualism of the criteria, the aesthetic and the pragmatic, as well as the dramatic textual tension in which autonomous and heteronomous principles collide. On the one hand they are in the power of the literary work, which makes them aware that they belong to an autonomous sphere, on the other hand they strive to include literature in a broader socio-political system. This paradox is expressed through various modifications from author to author.

In theory, this current is exciting and interesting.

The other current is represented en masse. It remains only on the second point of view, it situates the literature for the construction of the new, socialist world. Autonomous consciousness is completely lost here, literature is understood here as a means of criticism or praise, directly epistemological and activist, its entire essence is shifted, its meaning, its reputation are beyond it, its value is commensurate with societal adjustment and effectiveness, it is covered by an external, sometimes broader, sometimes narrower defined system. In this perspective, complete heteronomy is introduced, the aesthetic principle of literature is in complete jeopardy, norms and tasks deduced from others are imposed on creation — from other ideological, political and similar systems, while creators and their works are subject to extra-aesthetic judgments and be subjected to responsibilities. This destroys literature as a system, Ti-njanov would say »deformed«14, and a tangle of systems arises in which all values are reversed. 11 K. Korsch, Marxism u s und P h ilosoph ie, Kom unist, Beograd, 1970, p.

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12 K. Marx, F. Engels, W. I. Lenin V ber Culture, Aesthetics , Literature, .

Leipzig, 1969, p. 601.

13 Plato, The State, C ulture, Belgrade, 1966, p.67.

14 J. T injanov, Oknjiževno evolution in B and The Poetics of Russian-schen formalism, Prosveta, Beograd, 1970, p. 298.

Gesetzen der Schönheit« wird gestört, die Literatur auf die Ebene der »Vorgeschichte« im Sinne von Marx zurückgeführt.

Zusammen mit Politik und politischem Druck führt diese Theorie zu tragischen Konsequenzen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist zum Beispiel das Schiksal von Boris Piljak interessant, der wegen seines Romans *»Das nackte Jahr«* stark kritisiert wurde, dann in den folgenden Romanen *(Doppelgänger, Die Wolga mündet ins Kaspische Meer)* der Politik große Konzessionen einräumt, in das Romangewebe solche ideologische Flicken einwirkt, daß der Autor *des nackten Jahrs* kaum zu erkennen ist, der aber zuletzt dennoch zur Liquidierung verurteilt wurde.

Die dritte Strömung hat weniger Vertreter. Hier tritt der erste Gesichtspunkt von Marx hervor. Sein Text aus den *ökonomisch-philosophischen Handschriften* wird an Literatur und Kunst angewendet, und alles, was er über die generische Tätigkeit des Menschen sagt, wird als Charakteristik der Literatur, beziehungsweise Kunst angesehen. Der grudlegende Fehler dieses Zugangs ist der, daß er keine spezifische Bestimmung hat, er ist zu breit; seine Tugend aber ist es, daß die Freiheit als Prinzip des künstlerischen Schaffens gilt, was sich der pragmatischen Kunstinterpretation widersetzt[15].

Die vierte Strömung ist eigentlich die Kritik des Marxismus. Für diese Strömung ist charakteristisch, daß der Standpunkt von Marx und der marxistische Standpunkt mit dem zweiten Standpunkt bei Marx auch mit der zweiten Strömung der späteren Marxisten identifiziert werden, also mit dem heteronomen Moment. Die Argumente der Kritiker von Marx reduzieren sich auf das Urteil von Wymsett und Brooks, daß Marx und die Marxisten nicht an der Literatur als solcher interessiert sind, daß sie »ein poetisches Phänomen zerstören, daß die Erörterung der Literatur in ihrer Weise nur einer Argumentation dient, die dem Gegenstand fremd ist«[16], daß ihr wahres Interesse die Ökonomie ist, weshalb sie auch die Kunst als Darstellung eines »ökonomischen Faktors« verstehen[17].

Die weitere Entwicklung des poetischen und ästhetischen Denkens sehe ich in der Überwindung des heteronomen Moments im Marxismus, das aus alten Denkstrukturen ererbt ist, in denen das autonome systematische poetische und ästhetische Bewußtsein nicht entwickelt war, und die für die niederen historischen Existenzformen des Menschen charakteristisch sind. Der Sozialismus,

[15] Diesen Standpunkt vertreten die sowjetischen Autoren Tasalov und Pazitnov (Band *Voprosy estetiki*, Moskwa, 1958), auch Kosiks Schriften über die Kunst tragen den Charakter dieses Standpunkts (sein Beitrag zu *Marxismus und Kunst*, Komunist, Beograd, 1972). Bei uns vertritt R. Tautović dieses Prinzip (sein Beitrag in *Literaturkritik und Marxismus*. Institut für Literatur und Kunst — Prosveta, Beograd, 1971). Er ist auch in dem oben genannten Buch von mir sichtbar, in dem der Begriff des Menschseins als Prinzip der Kunst genannt wird, die sonst in manchen Aspekten nicht genügend konsequent ist.

[16] M. Verli, Obšče literaturovedenie, Moskau, 1917, S. 197.

[17] René Hugues in der Studie, *Die Kunst, ihre Geschichte und ihre Natur* Einführung in eine ausführliche Geschichte der Malerei, L' art et l' homme, Paris, 1957.

"Laws of Beauty" is disturbed, literature is reduced to the level of "prehistory" in the sense of Marx.

Together with politics and political pressure, this theory leads to tragic

consequences. In this context, for example, the fate of Boris Pilyak is interesting, who was heavily criticized for his novel »The Naked Year«, then in the following novels (Doppelganger, The Volga flows into the Caspian Sea) made major concessions to politics, into which The fabric of the novel has such an ideological patch that the author of the bare year is hardly recognizable, but he was finally sentenced to liquidation.

The third stream has fewer representatives. Here Marx's first point of view emerges. His text from the economic

-philosophical manuscripts is applied to literature and art, and everything he says about the generic activity of man is regarded as a characteristic of literature and art, respectively. The fundamental flaw of this approach is that it has no specific definition, it is too broad; its virtue, however, is that freedom is the principle of artistic creation, which opposes pragmatic art interpretation15.

The fourth current is actually the critique of Marxism.

It is characteristic of this trend that Marx's point of view and the Marxist point of view with the second point of view in Marx are also identified with the second trend of later Marxists, i.e. with the heteronomous moment. The arguments of Marx's critics boil down to the judgment of Wymsett and Brooks that Marx and the Marxists are not interested in literature as such, that they are "destroying a poetic phenomenon, that the discussion of literature in their own way serves only an argument that is alien to the subject«10, that her real interest is economy, which is why she also considers art as the representation of an »economic factor«

understand17.

I see the further development of poetic and aesthetic thinking in the overcoming of the heteronomous moment in Marxism, inherited from old structures of thought in which the autonomous systematic poetic and aesthetic consciousness was not developed, and those for the lower historical forms of existence of the people are characteristic. socialism,

,s This point of view is represented by the Soviet authors T asalov and Pazitnov (volume V op rosy estetik i, M oskwa, 1958), K osik's writings on art also bear the character of this point of view (his contribution to M arxis

m us and art, K om unist, Beograd, 1972). R. Tautović represents this principle in our country (his article in L iter a tu r C ritic an d M arxism us. Institute for L iterature and Art — Pxosveta, Beograd, 1971). It is also visible in the above-mentioned book of mine, in which the concept of being human is mentioned as a principle of art, which is otherwise not

sufficiently consistent in some aspects.

10 M. Verli, Obšče literaturovedenie, Moskau, 1917, p. 197.

17 Rene H ugues in the study, T h e art, its histories an d theirs

Nature's introduction to a detailed history of painting, L' art et 1' homme, Paris, 1957.

als höhere From des gesellschaftlichen Lebens setzt unter anderem auch eine autonome ästhetische und poetische Theorie mit klaren Distinktionen des ästhetischen und poetischen Systems dem Moralsystem, dem politischen und anderen Systemen gegenüber voraus. Er muß die Verwirrung der Prinzipien unterschiedlicher Systeme aufheben. Es können interessante Forschungen über die wechselseitigen Wirkungen dieser Systeme angestellt werden, aber immer unter der Voraussetzung, ihrer inneren Eigengesetzlichkeit und Struktur. Es ist banal zu sagen, daß eine solche theoretische Entwicklung nicht auf der Basis der Zitate von Marx über Kunst und Literatur möglich ist, es wäre unmenschlich von ihm zu verlangen, daß er alle Wissenschaften entwickelt hätte, aber es ist auch unzweifelhaft, daß sich diese Entwicklung auf der Grundlage der globalen historischen und philosophisch-anthropologischen Vision der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft aus dem Reich der Notwendigkeit zum Reich der Freikeit abspielt. In dem Ausmaß, in dem sich diese Vision verwirklichen läßt, werden der pragmatische Moment und mit ihm im Zusammenhang der heteronome theoretische Standpunkt gegenstandslos, sie verlieren nicht nur ihren theoretischen, sondern auch jeden praktischen Sinn.

as a higher form of social life presupposes, among other things, an autonomous aesthetic and poetic theory with clear distinctions between the aesthetic and poetic system and the moral, political and other systems. He must undo the confusion of the principles of different systems. Interesting

research can be done about the mutual effects of these systems, but always under the assumption of their inner autonomy and structure. It is banal to say that such a theoretical development is not possible on the basis of Marx's quotes on art and literature, it would be inhumane to expect him to have developed all the sciences, but it is also undoubted that these development based on the global historical and philosophical-anthropological vision of the development of society from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. To the extent that this vision can be realized, the pragmatic moment and, in connection with it, the heteronomous theoretical point of view become irrelevant, they lose not only their theoretical but also all practical meaning.

DIE BUDAPESTER SCHULE*

Georg Lukács

Budapest

Lieber Herr Crook!

Budapest, 15. 2. 1971

Ich danke Ihnen herzlichst für Ihren Brief vom 21. 1. 1971. Die darin gestellte Aufgabe, die »Bücher der Zukunft« anzudeuten, interessiert mich außerordentlich. Es ist ein Fragenkomplex, der in fruchtbarer Weise die tiefsten Tendenzen eines jeden bewußten Theoretikers — sowohl die subjektivisten wie die objektivisten — zu mobilisieren geeignet ist.

Ich fange daher gleich mit der Zentralfrage an. Unmittelbar nach Kriegsende schien es, als ob die zweigeteilte Welt von je einer Gedankenrichtung in unbestreitbarer Weise beherrscht werden würde. In der sozialistischen Welt gab es für die verzerrende Stalinsche Interpretation des Marxismus keine sichtbare Gegenströmung. Und der kapitalistische Westen schien von der neopositivistischen gedanklichen Manipulierung des »american way of life« zumindest ebenso konkurrenzlos beherrscht zu sein.

Die gesellschaftlichen Ereignisse des letzten Vierteljahrhunderts haben beide ideologischen Monopole stark erschüttert, in den Reihen ihrer Anhängerschaft ideologische Unsicherheiten, ja Krisen hervorgerufen. Die immer stärkere Entfaltung dieser Bewegungen hat allmählich, freilich in sehr ungleichmäßiger Weise, aber doch die deutliche Richtung gezeigt, daß die vor einem viertel

* Ein Brief an den Herausgeber des *Times Literary Supplement* (wo er in der englischen Übersetzung veröffentlicht worden ist). Wir bringen hier zum ersten Mal den ursprünglichen deutschen Text. Die Veröffentlichung dieses Briefes betrachten wir heute als besonders wichtig, weil eben in den letzten Monaten Lukács von derselben offiziellen Kreisen gefeiert wird, die seine beste Schüler rüchsichtslos angreifen und verfolgen. (Red.)

*THE BUDAPEST SCHOOL**

Georg Lukdcs

B udapest

Dear Mr. Crook!

Budapest, 15. 2. 1971

Thank you very much for your letter of January 21, 1971.

I am extremely interested in the task set in it of indicating the »books of the future«. It is a complex of questions that is fruitfully suited to mobilizing the deepest tendencies of every conscious theorist—both the subjectivists and the objectivists.

So I'll start right away with the central question. Immediately after the end of the war it seemed as if the divided world would be undeniably dominated by one school of thought. In the socialist world there was no visible countercurrent to the distorting Stalinist interpretation of Marxism. And the capitalist West seemed to be at least as unrivaled by the neo-positivist intellectual manipulation of the "American way of life".

The social events of the last quarter of a century have shaken both ideological monopolies severely, in the ranks of their followers ideological insecurities, even crises. The ever-increasing development of these movements has gradually, admittedly in a very uneven manner, but nevertheless shown the clear direction that the a quarter

** A letter to the Editor of the T im es L iterary S u p p lem e n t (where it has been published in English translation). We are bringing the original German text here for the first time. We consider the publication of this letter to be particularly important today, because in the last few months Lukacs has been celebrated by the same official circles that ruthlessly attack and pursue his best students. (Red.) 299*

Jahrhundert als längst überholt verachtete ursprüngliche Lehre und Methode von Marx immer stärker als herrschende Betrachtungsweise des theoretisch-praktischen Verständnissen der Geschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaftlichkeit angesehen und anerkannt werden mußte.

Es wäre eine heuchlerische Bescheidenheit meinerseits, daran vorbeizugehen, daß in dieser Wandlung der öffentlichen Meinung meine theoretischen Arbeiten eine bestimmte Rolle spielten und spielen. Indem ich diese Tendenzen mit innerer Genugtuung feststelle, fühle ich gleichzeitig die Verpflichtung auszusprechen, daß es sich dabei dem Wesen nach keineswegs um die Erfolge einer individuellen Leistung handelt. Im Gegenteil. Wenn meine Schriften im Zusammenhang ihrer Genesis und ihrer unmittelbaren Wirkung betrachtet werden, so wird immer klarer, daß meine theoretische Tätigkeit nie die eines »einsamen« Denkers war, daß es sich vielmehr stets — und in einer steigenden Weise — um die Konstituierung einer Richtung, einer »Schule« gehandelt hat.

Marx selbst war, so sehr Hegel, die klassische englische Ökonomie, die ersten größten Utopisten seiner Fragestellungen stark zu unterbauen geholfen haben, ein wissenschaftliches Genie, das radikal Neues in seinen theoretischen Arbeiten entdeckt und mit Erfolg zur langen wirksamen methodologischen Grundlage der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit gemacht hat. Um die Fruchtbarkeit solcher Methoden, durch ihre konkrete Anwendung auf alle wichtigen Fragen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens zu erproben und durchzusetzen, ist im Laufe meiner — theoretischen wie pädagogischen — Tätigkeit die sogenannte »Budapester Schule« entstanden. Diese versuchte in verschiedenen Einzeluntersuchungen über gesellschaftlich wichtige Entwicklungsetappen, Strukturen und Strukturwandlungen, etc. im historischontologischen Prozeß, auf dessen richtige Erfassung die Marxsche Methode ausging, konkret und aktuell klarzulegen. Daß aus dieser Literatur bis jetzt fast nur meine — zumeist in deutscher Sprache geschriebenen — Studien international bekannt geworden sind, ändert im objektiven Tatbestand, daß es sich hier um eine wissenschaftlich wichtige und in der Zukunft sicherlich einflußreiche Richtung handelt, nichts Wesentliches. Wenn ich also an Ihre höchst interessante Anfrage eine sachlich angemessene Antwort erteilen will, so ist es meine elementare Pflicht, auf die bedeutendsten Arbeiten dieser Budapester Schule des Marxismus wenigstens in den aller allgemeinsten Formen hinzuweisen.

Diese »Budapester Schule« hat eine sich in werschiedenen Richtungen verzweigende, aber zusammenhängende und kohärente Gedankenwelt. Ihre produktivste Persönlichkeit is Agnes Heller, aus deren Produktion drei Bücher die Tendenzen des Marxismus der Budapester Schule am vorbildlichsten repräsentieren. Die *Ethik von Aristoteles* und *Der Renaissance-Mensch* sind historische Monographien. Die erste charakterisiert das Ganze der platonischen und aristotelischen Philosophie in vielseitiger Weise, die zweite vollbring die Leistung eines marxistischen Cassirers: sie

In the 19th century, Marx's original teaching and method, despised as long outdated, had to be viewed and recognized more and more as the dominant view of the theoretical-practical understanding of the history of human sociality.

It would be hypocritical modesty on my part to ignore the fact that my theoretical work played and still plays a certain role in this change in public opinion. At the same time, noting these tendencies with inner satisfaction, I feel compelled to state that

it is by no means a question of the successes of an individual achievement. On the contrary. When my writings are viewed in the context of their genesis and their immediate impact, it becomes increasingly clear that my theoretical activity was never that of a "lonely" thinker, that

Rather, it has always been—and increasingly so—a matter of constituting a direction, a "school."

Marx himself was, as much as Hegel, the classical English economist who helped to underpin his questions from the first major utopians, was a scientific genius who discovered something radically new in his theoretical work and successfully made it the long-term effective methodological basis of scientific work has. In the course of my—both theoretical and pedagogical—

- Activity the so-called "Budapest School" arose. In various individual investigations, this attempted to clarify in a concrete and up-to-date manner about socially important stages of development, structures and structural changes, etc. in the historical-ontological process, which the Marxian method was intended to capture correctly. The fact that from this literature almost only my studies - mostly written in German - have become known internationally does not change anything in the objective fact that this is a scientifically important direction that will certainly be influential in the future. So if I want to give a factually appropriate answer to your extremely interesting question, it is my elementary duty to refer to the most important works of this Budapest school of Marxism, at least in the most general forms.

This "Budapest School" has a world of thought that branches out in different directions, but is connected and coherent. Her most productive personality is Agnes Heller, from whose production three books best represent the tendencies of Marxism of the Budapest School. The Ethics of Aristotle and The Renaissance Man are historical monographs. The first characterizes the whole of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy in many ways, the second accomplishes the feat of a Marxist casserole: she 300

gibt ein prägnantes und dynamisches Bild über eine Weltepoche des Denkens, die bisher vom Marxismus nur in flüchtigen Bemerkungen betrachtet war. Diese zwei Bücher bedeuten aber mehr als bloße historische Analysen: sie stellen Epochen dar — das Ende der Antike und die Renaissance Stadtgemeinschaft —, wo die Entfremdung am wenigsten entfaltet, die Distanz zwischen den Wesenskräften der Gattung Mensch und ihrem individuellen Reichtum die kleinste war. Gerade diese Problematik führte nun Agnes Heller zu ihrem bisher reiftsen Werk, zur Monographie *Das Alltagsleben,* worin die Darstellung der dynamischen Totalität des Systems der alltäglichen Tätigkeitstypen und Denkeinstellungen das Hauptthema bildet. Alle drei Bücher sind in ungarischer Sprache im Verlag der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften erschienen. Das letztgenannte Buch ist zugleich eines der wichtigsten Werke der sich im letzten Jahrzehnt erneuernden marxistischen Ontologie.

Die Forschungen von György Márkus verknüpfen sich eng mit diesem Problemkreis, doch führen sie in eine ganz andere Richtung von Márkus ist eine einzigartige philologische Tat, doch viel*sens* interpretiert zum erstenmal im Marxismus diesen Schlüsselbegriff der marxschen Ontologie und der von ihr untrennbaren Anthropologie, ungarisch im selben Verlag erschienen. Die Leistung von Markus ist eine einzigartige philologische Tat, doch vielmehr als Philologie, denn seine Ergebnisse stützen sich auf tiefstes Verständnis der Marxschen Methode. Sein kritischer Essay über Wittgenstein, seine die teleologische Struktur der Wahrnehmung im Marxismus zuerst beleuchtende Studie sind im tiefsten Sinne originell: sie bringen neue Lösungen auf Grund des Begreifens der Marxschen Konception und der tiefgehenden Kenntnis der Spezialwissenschaften hervor.

Die wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit von Mihály Vajda durchläuft einen entgegengesetzten Weg: sie führt, ausgehend von der Erkenntnistheorie, zur gesellschaftlichen Ontologie und zur politischen Gesellschaftswissenschaft, Seine Husserl-Monographien, ungarisch: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Verlag »Gondolat«, sind nicht nur die ersten wirklichen Auseinandersetzungen innerhalb des Marxismus' mit dem Problemkreis der Phänomenologie, sie beleuchten vielmehr verschiedene erkenntnistheoretische Probleme vom Standpunkt der menschlichen Praxis, das heißt von der richtigen Ontologie, auf. Wie weit thematisch sein Essay über den Faschismus von diesen Werk auch sei, bisher nur in der Zeitschrift des Philosophischen Institut der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften erschienen, er wächst doch über solche Fragestellungen weit hinaus. Seine hier aufgestellte Hypothese betrachte ich als den ersten überzeugenden marxistischen Versuch in diesem Bereich.

Die Ausarbeitung der ästhetischen Fragestellungen spielt gleichfalls eine wichtige Rolle in der »Budapester Schule«. Das bisher noch nicht gedruckte Werk von Ferenc Fehér über Dostojewski gibt, sich auf vergessene Erörterungen von Marx und auf

gives a succinct and dynamic picture of a world epoch of thought, which Marxism has hitherto considered only in passing remarks. But these two books mean more than mere historical analyses: they represent epochs — the end of antiquity and the Renaissance urban community — when

alienation was least developed, the distance between the essence of the human species and its individual wealth was the smallest. Precisely this problem led Agnes Heller to her most mature work to date, the monograph The Everyday Life, in which the depiction of the dynamic totality of the system of everyday types of activity and attitudes forms the main theme. All three books were published in Hungarian by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Publishing House. The latter book is also one of the most important works of the Marxist ontology, which has been renewed in the last decade.

The researches of Gyorgy Markus are closely related to this problem area, but they lead in a completely different direction. Markus is a unique philological act, but, for the first time in Marxism, interprets this key concept of the Marxian ontology and that of her inseparable anthropology, published in Hungarian by the same publisher. The achievement of Markus is a unique philological act, but more so than philology, for his results draw on the deepest understanding of Marx's method. His critical essay on Wittgenstein, his study, which first illuminates the teleological structure of perception in Marxism, are original in the deepest sense: they produce new solutions based on the understanding of Marx's conception and the deep knowledge of the special sciences.

The scientific activity of Mihaly Vajda follows an opposite path: it leads, starting from epistemology, to social ontology and to political social science, his Husserl monographs, Hungarian: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften and Verlag

"Gondolat" are not only the first real discussions within Marxism with the problem area of phenomenology, they rather illuminate various epistemological problems from the point of view of human practice, i.e. from the correct ontology. However far his essay on fascism is from this work, which has so far only appeared in the periodical of the Philosophical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, his essay on fascism goes far beyond such questions. I regard his hypothesis here as the first convincing Marxist attempt in this area.

The elaboration of aesthetic questions also plays an important role in the »Budapest School«. The as yet unprinted work by Ferenc Feher on Dostoyevsky refers to forgotten discussions of Marx and to 301

die tiefe Kenntnis des literarischen Materials stützend, ein neuartiges und überzeugendes Bild über die dynamische Struktur der russischen Kultur in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhundert. Fehér entwirt hier zugleich eine neue marxistische Theorie des Romans. Sein Buch ist nicht nur eine literaturhistorische Fachstudie, es beinhaltet auch eine leidenschaftliche Polemik mit dem modernen Individualismus.

Ich bin fest überzeugt: in solchen Werken bereitet sich heute schon die philosophische Literatur der Zukunft vor.

Supporting the deep knowledge of the literary material, a novel and convincing picture of the dynamic structure of Russian culture in the second half of the 19th century. At the same time, Feher develops a new Marxist theory of the novel. His book is not only a specialist

study of literary history, it also contains a passionate polemic with modern individualism.

I am firmly convinced that the philosophical literature of the future is already being prepared in such works today.

SERGE MALLET (1927—1973)

Serge Mallet, sociologue-marxiste français connu, auteur d'ouvrages importants sur le mouvement ouvrier contemporain, professeur de sociologie à l'Université de Paris à Vincennes et membre du Comité de soutien de la »Praxis«, a tragiquement perdu la vie dans un accident de la route le 16 juillet 1973.

Né en 1927 à Bordeaux, dans une famille ouvrière, Serge Mallet avait rejoint la Résistance à l'âge très jeune, en tant que »maquisard« et avait continué la vie d'un militant ouvrier au Parti communiste français et aux syndicats, à la C.G.T., où il remplissait plusieurs devoirs. Comme certains marxistes français distingués, comme son ami Henri Lefebvre, il entra en conflit avec certaines conceptions dogmatiques au P.C.F. Il quitta le P.C.F. en 1958 et adhéra à la fondation du P.S.U. (Parti socialiste uni), dans lequel il devint bientôt un des dirigeants et des théoriciens principaux. Il collabora durant des années au journal gauche »France Observateur« et plus tard au »Nouvel observateur«, en suivant attentivement les problèmes dans le mouvement ouvrier, dans les mouvements paysans et dans le mouvement des étudiants.

Comme plusieurs marxistes français, Serge Mallet exigeait et propageait un modèle différent au modèle du socialisme étatiste et il le voyait dans l'autogestion ouvrière; il contribua beaucoup à l'épanouissement des idées vers un socialisme démocratique et humaniste. Son parti lui-même, le P.S.U. avait accepté l'autogestion ouvrière en tant qu'élément essentiel de son programme politique. En 1968 Serge Mallet influença par ses idées le mouvement syndicaliste des étudiants dans l'esprit de l'augmentation des droits autogestifs des étudiants, et il eut le duel connu à la télévision avec le ministre Christian Fouchet qui proposait la réforme des universités françaises. En juillet 1971 Serge Mallet avait prêté main-forte à l'action du Secours rouge et du périodique »l'Idiot international« à propos du meurtre d'un jeune homme qui collait des affiches électorales gauches. A cette occasion Serge Mallet fut élu président du »Comité anti-mafia«, qui se donna pour tâche »de dénoncer les groupes financiers et politiques faisant main basse sur le pays«.

IN MEMORIAL

SERGE MALLET (1927—1973)

Serge Mallet, a well-known French sociologist-Marxist, author of important works on the contemporary workers' movement, professor of sociology at the University of Paris at Vincennes and member of the »Praxis« Support Committee, tragically lost his life in a road accident on July 16, 1973.

Born in 1927 in Bordeaux, into a working-class family, Serge Mallet had joined the Resistance a Vage at a very young age, as a "maquisard" and had continued the life of a worker militant in the French Communist Party and in the trade unions, at the C.G.T., where he fulfilled several duties. Like some distinguished French Marxists, like his friend Henri Lefebvre, he came into conflict with certain dogmatic views in the P.C.F. He left the P.C.F. in 1958 and adhered to the foundation of the P.S.U. (United Socialist Party), in which he soon became one of the main leaders and theoreticians.

He collaborated for years with the left-wing newspaper "France Observateur" and later with the "Nouvel observer", following attentively the problems in the workers' movement, in the peasant movements and in the student movement.

Like several French Marxists, Serge Mallet demanded and propagated a different model to the model of state socialism and he saw it in workers' self-management; he contributed a great deal to the flowering of ideas towards a democratic and humanist socialism. His party itself, the P.S.U. had accepted workers' self-management as an essential element of its political program. In 1968 Serge Mallet influenced by his ideas the student unionist movement in the spirit of increasing the autogestive rights of students, and he had the famous duel on television with the minister Christian Fouchet who proposed the reform of French universities. In July 1971, Serge Mallet lent a hand to the Red Secours Faction and the periodical "The International Idiot" regarding the murder of a young man who was putting up left-wing electoral posters. On this occasion, Serge Mallet was elected president of the "Anti-Mafia Committee", which took on the task of "denouncing the financial and political groups taking control of the country".

Sa vie d'un militant et d'un polémiste engagé est liée aux études sociologiques solides. Il publia ces livres importants: »Les paysans contre le passé« (1963), »La Nouvelle Classe ouvrière« (1964), »Le Gaullisme et la Gauche« (1966) et »Le pouvoir ouvrière« (1971). A la base de ses travaux de recherches à l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes et des ouvrages publiés, il lui était discerné en 1971 le doctorat d'Etat qui le qualifia immédiatement comme professeur et cette même année Serge Mallet fut élu à l'Université de Vincennes, département de sciences politiques.

Serge Mallet était un de ces hommes rares qui, en tant qu'enfant ouvrier, se fraya seul le chemin à travers le combat économique et politique, jusqu'à la hauteur théorique et la qualité scientifique considérable, si bien qu'il a acquis une réputation mondiale. Le Comité de rédaction de la »Praxis« et l'Ecole d'été de Korčula perdent avec lui un ami sincère, un vrai camarade et un compagnon de combat dans les mêmes idéals pour le socialisme authentique.

His life as an activist and a committed polemicist is linked to solid sociological studies. He published these important books: »The peasants against the past« (1963), »The New Working Class«

(1964), »Le Gaullisme et la Gauche« (1966) and »Labour Power« (1971). On the basis of his research work at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes and published works, in 1971 he was awarded the State doctorate which immediately qualified him as a professor and that same year Serge Mallet was elected at the University of Vincennes, department of political science.

Serge Mallet was one of those rare men who, as a

working child, fought his way alone through the economic and political struggle, to theoretical height and considerable scientific quality, so much so that he acquired a worldwide reputation.

The Editorial Board of the »Praxis« and the Summer School of Korcula lose with him a sincere friend, a true comrade and a comrade in the fight in the same ideals for authentic socialism.

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1, No. 3 — NOVEMBER 1973

José Huertas-Jourda / *The Genetic Constitution of Reality from the Innermost Layer of the Consciousness of Time.* — Dick Howard / *A Marxist Ontology? On Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical Reason'.* — Guy Debrock / *The Silence of Language in Hegel's Dialectic.* — Ronald Bruzina / *Heidegger on the Metaphor and Philosophy.*

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Number 4 Winter 1973 Volume 16

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Lao Tzu's Conception of Tao — Charles Wei-hsun Fu
Rationality and the *Tu Quoque* Argument — Joseph Agassi
Knowledge *v.* Survival — Herman Tennessen

Discussions:

Comments on 'Knowledge *v.* Survival' — Arne Naess
Rejoinder to Naess — Herman Tennessen
Cody's Categories — David Rayfield
Reply to Mr. Døør — Peter Zinkernagel

Review Discussions:

Wittgenstein Reinvestigated (James Bogen: *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language: Some Aspects of its Development;* P. M. S. Hacker: *Insight and Illusion: Wiltgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience)* — John E. Llewelyn

Understanding Hermeneutics (Richard E. Palmer: *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer)* — Guttorm Fløistad

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1, No. 3 — NOVEMBER 1973

Jose H uertas-Jourda / The G en etic C onstitution of R ea lity fro m the In nerm o st L a ye r of th e C onsciousness o f Tim e. — Dick H oward / A M a rx ist O n tology? On S a r tr e ’s ’ C ritiqu e o f D ialectical R eason\ — G uy Debrock / The S ilence of L anguage in H egel’s Dialectic. — Ronald B ruzina / H eidegger on the

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5 out of 16

On W hat it is L ike to be a Man

Virgil C. Aldrich

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A m e Naess

R ejoinder to N aess

H erman T ennessen

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David Rayfield

R eply to Mr. D e er

P eter Z in k em agel

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Language: S om e A sp ects of its D e v e lo p m e n t; P. M. S. H acker: In sigh t

and Illusion: W ittg e n stein on P h ilosoph y an d th e M etaph ysics of E x perien ce)

John E. Lew elyn

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Vol. XXI — N. 3 — Luglio-Settembre 1972

Presentazione

DOCUMENTAZIONI E RICERCHE

A. Baldissera,
G. L. Bravo,
A. Luciano,
A. Pichierri,
E. Saccomani,
Sistemi informativi e transformazioni organizzative in un grande stabilimento metallurgico

Summary

SCHEDE

A. Anfossi, *Prospettive sociologiche sull'organizzazione aziendale* (E. Saccomani). — F. K. Berrien, *General and Social Systems* (G. L. Bravo). — M. Z. Brooke e H. Lee Remmers, *The Strategy of Multinational Enterprise* (A. Pichierri). — G. Friedmann, *Problemi umani del macchinismo industriale* (A. Pichierri). — W. Lloyd Warner e J. O. Low, *Il sistema sociale della fabbrica moderna* (A. Pichierri).

PANORAMA DELLE RIVISTE

LIBRI RICEVUTI

Vol. XXI — N. 4 — Ottobre-Dicembre 1972

ARTICOLI

P. Sylos Labini — Sviluppo economico e classi sociali in Italia

G. Garandini — Proprietà classi e potere politico nella teoria di Harrington

NOTE CRITICHE

U. Scarrelli — Impegno politico e conoscenza sociologica

SCHEDE

AA.VV., *Il nuovo marxismo latino-americano* (A. Guaraldo). — L. von Bertalanffy, *Teoria generale dei sistemi* (A. Marradi). — S. Marcus e H. N. Rivlin (a cura di), *Conflicts in Urban Education* (M. Rampazi). — S. Melman, *Capitalismo militare — Il ruolo del Pentagono nell'economia americana* (S. Bova). — T. Treu, *Sindicato e rappresentanze aziendali* (M. La Rosa).

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Presentation

DOCUMENTATION AND RESEARCH

A. B aldissera,

G.L. Bravo,

. Luciano,

A. Pichierri,

E.

Saccom ani,

Information systems and organizational transformations in a large metallurgical plant

Sum m ary

CARDS

A. A nfossi, Prospective sociologist of the Asian sociological system (E. S acco-mani). — F. K. Berrien, General and Social Systems (G. L. Bravo). — M. Z.

B rooke e H. Lee Rem m ers, The S tr a te g y of M u ltin a tion al E nterprise (A. P ichierri). — G. Friedm ann, P ro b lem i u m an i d e l m acchin ism o in du striale (A.

Pichierri). — W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low, II the social system of manufacture

m odern (A. Pichierri).

OVERVIEW OF MAGAZINES

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he. X X I

No. 4 — O ttober-D icem ber 1972

ARTICLES

P. S and the Labini

Economic development and social classes in Italy

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Class ownership and political power in Harrington's theory CRITICAL NOTES

U. S carts

Political commitment and sociological knowledge

CARDS

AA.VV., II New Marxism in Latin America (A. Guaraldo). — L. von Ber-talan ffy, General theory of systems (A. Marradi). — S. Marcus and H. N. Revlin (a curator), Conflicts in Urban E ducation (M. Rampazi). — S. Melman,

M ilitary capitalism — 11 role of the Pentagon in the American economy (S.

Bova). — T. Treu, S indicated and represented by companies there (M. La Rosa).

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TESTIMONIANZE

Quaderni mensili — AnnoXVI — Giugno-Luglio 1973 — N. 155

Direttori: Ernesto Balducci e Luciano Martini

SOMMARIO

333/*Editoriale:* le ragioni dell'appoggio dei vescovi cileni alla giunta dei generali.
Testimonianze

341/Ideale evangelico e ideologia claustrale
Ernesto Balducci

355/Ipocrisie episcopali e resistenza dei giovani cattolici in Sud-Vietnam
dal rapporto di una suora francese ritornata da Saigon

362/Ideologie silenziose nella questione arabo-israeliana
Lo stereotipo occidentale dell'arabo (II)
Sergio Caruso

379/Miracoli e profitto
Carlo Prandi

Cronache

386/Cristiani per il socialismo a Bologna
l. m.

393/Testo del documento finale del convegno »Cristiani per il socialismo«

Dibattito

405/Hans Künge e la congregazione della fede

Lettere a »Testimonianze«

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Monthly notebooks - Year XVI - June-July 1973 - N. 155

Conductors: Ernesto Balducci and Luciano Martini

SUMMARY

333 /Editorial: the reasons for the support of the Chilean bishops to the junta of generals.

Testimonials

341/Evangelical ideal and cloistered ideology

Ernesto Balducci

355/Episcopal hypocrisies and resistance of young Catholics in the South

-Vietnam

from the report of one

French nun retort

hers and Saigon

362/Silent ideologies in the Arab-Israeli question The Western stereotype of the Arab (II)

Sergio Caruso

379/Miracles and profit

Carlo Prandi

Chronicles

386/Christians for socialism in Bologna

1. m.

393/Text of the final document of the conference

»Christians for Socialism«

Debate

405/Hans Kiinge and the congregation of faith

Letters to »Testimonials«

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